PyramidHead
Contributor
The Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
I'd sure like to see naked pictures of my neighbor's wife. I guess the moral thing to do is to send her some of me!
The Platinum Rule: don't do unto others as you wouldn't have them do unto you.
Well... I wouldn't want my neighbor's wife to AVOID sending me naked pictures of herself, so I'd better not avoid sending her dick pics.
The Diamond Rule: don't do unto others as they wouldn't have you do unto them.
Well, shit.
Why do moral philosophers spend so much time and effort trying to define "the good", when we can just ask people directly what they want or don't want? Of course, one person's wants can be another person's not-wants, but surely there's a way to figure out which wants get priority. Hypothetically, if we could objectively measure how badly people want or don't want things, we could rank their preferences in terms of their severity. Basic needs would obviously be near the top of the list, and would necessarily be higher than preferences that violate someone else's rights or do harm. All other things being equal, my desire not to be deprived of my belongings would be much higher than your desire for my belongings. It seems to work, but I wonder what the answer would be if someone wanted my belongings really, really badly? Is it possible for their want to be more severe than my not-want in that case?
One way to find out would be to look at the consequences of prioritizing one over the other, and satisfy whatever preference results in the least number of additional unsatisfied preferences (again, taking severity into account). Robbing me of my belongings would cause a lot of other important preferences, both mine and my family's, to go unsatisfied. It's hard to imagine a scenario where not letting someone have all my belongings would rise to that level of deprivation. Let's try anyway. Imagine that if he doesn't get what he wants--which in this case is my belongings--a much larger number of people will undergo a more severe frustration of their own preferences. Taken to this extreme, I think I'd be obliged to give him my belongings if it were the only way to avert this eventuality. It's only a hypothetical anyway, but at least it doesn't damage the original premise even when it's stretched to absurd lengths.
Preference morality has the advantage of being the closest we can get to a truly objective system, because there exists definite information about what people would rather not be the case, even if it needs to be sought out. It's not like pleasure vs. pain systems, where you have to account for people who would like a certain balance of the two, people who are masochists, and so on. Those problems all disappear if you just go by what each individual actually says they would prefer. There's something inherently bad, from the perspective of a given person, about having a want or a need go unsatisfied. Even if that want is something meta, like the want to be denied satisfaction for a while so it will be extra good when I finally get it. That counts too.
The endgame of this system is interesting to consider. If a perfect world is one where everybody has what they want, then a perfect world is one where there are no unsatisfied preferences. This means that there is no advantage to wanting something and then getting it, compared to not wanting it in the first place. Either way, you don't have any more wants or needs. But the logical extension of this principle is a world without wanters, without preferrers. It reveals the truth about our unfortunate condition, as minds capable of feeling the gap between reality and a model of reality we conceive as better in some way. The source of all our problems is that gap, and our ability to discern it (actually, we create it, by making up models of reality and judging them as better than the real thing). Even if you don't accept preference morality, it can be instructive to ruminate on this point: if there is anything like natural evil in the world, it isn't an external force, it's the conscious mind itself, anything with the ability to react with felt negativity to a state of affairs it does not want.
I'd sure like to see naked pictures of my neighbor's wife. I guess the moral thing to do is to send her some of me!
The Platinum Rule: don't do unto others as you wouldn't have them do unto you.
Well... I wouldn't want my neighbor's wife to AVOID sending me naked pictures of herself, so I'd better not avoid sending her dick pics.
The Diamond Rule: don't do unto others as they wouldn't have you do unto them.
Well, shit.
Why do moral philosophers spend so much time and effort trying to define "the good", when we can just ask people directly what they want or don't want? Of course, one person's wants can be another person's not-wants, but surely there's a way to figure out which wants get priority. Hypothetically, if we could objectively measure how badly people want or don't want things, we could rank their preferences in terms of their severity. Basic needs would obviously be near the top of the list, and would necessarily be higher than preferences that violate someone else's rights or do harm. All other things being equal, my desire not to be deprived of my belongings would be much higher than your desire for my belongings. It seems to work, but I wonder what the answer would be if someone wanted my belongings really, really badly? Is it possible for their want to be more severe than my not-want in that case?
One way to find out would be to look at the consequences of prioritizing one over the other, and satisfy whatever preference results in the least number of additional unsatisfied preferences (again, taking severity into account). Robbing me of my belongings would cause a lot of other important preferences, both mine and my family's, to go unsatisfied. It's hard to imagine a scenario where not letting someone have all my belongings would rise to that level of deprivation. Let's try anyway. Imagine that if he doesn't get what he wants--which in this case is my belongings--a much larger number of people will undergo a more severe frustration of their own preferences. Taken to this extreme, I think I'd be obliged to give him my belongings if it were the only way to avert this eventuality. It's only a hypothetical anyway, but at least it doesn't damage the original premise even when it's stretched to absurd lengths.
Preference morality has the advantage of being the closest we can get to a truly objective system, because there exists definite information about what people would rather not be the case, even if it needs to be sought out. It's not like pleasure vs. pain systems, where you have to account for people who would like a certain balance of the two, people who are masochists, and so on. Those problems all disappear if you just go by what each individual actually says they would prefer. There's something inherently bad, from the perspective of a given person, about having a want or a need go unsatisfied. Even if that want is something meta, like the want to be denied satisfaction for a while so it will be extra good when I finally get it. That counts too.
The endgame of this system is interesting to consider. If a perfect world is one where everybody has what they want, then a perfect world is one where there are no unsatisfied preferences. This means that there is no advantage to wanting something and then getting it, compared to not wanting it in the first place. Either way, you don't have any more wants or needs. But the logical extension of this principle is a world without wanters, without preferrers. It reveals the truth about our unfortunate condition, as minds capable of feeling the gap between reality and a model of reality we conceive as better in some way. The source of all our problems is that gap, and our ability to discern it (actually, we create it, by making up models of reality and judging them as better than the real thing). Even if you don't accept preference morality, it can be instructive to ruminate on this point: if there is anything like natural evil in the world, it isn't an external force, it's the conscious mind itself, anything with the ability to react with felt negativity to a state of affairs it does not want.