Quantum physics, consciousness, free will, and woo-woo

[bilby]

You are absolutely right that your emotional outpourings are wasted on me; if you want to persuade me of anything, you need more facts and less passion.

You stay focused on the wrong stuff. You're not being genuine.

I am focused on reality.

And I am wondering why you persist in making this about me. Reality is real; it's not specific to any particular person. And none of us gets to decide for anyone else what should or should not be their focus.

You won't get any less wrong if I focus my attention elsewhere, anyway.

 

[ryan]

You are absolutely right that your emotional outpourings are wasted on me; if you want to persuade me of anything, you need more facts and less passion.

You stay focused on the wrong stuff. You're not being genuine.

I am focused on reality.

And I am wondering why you persist in making this about me. Reality is real; it's not specific to any particular person. And none of us gets to decide for anyone else what should or should not be their focus.

You won't get any less wrong if I focus my attention elsewhere, anyway.

Okay, you are focused on all the right stuff. Good job!

 

[Underseer]

The problem with this of course is that if some quantum effect influences our thoughts, then some aspect of our decisions has no cause. That is, our minds are just very elaborate slot machines that make decisions at random. While this allows for "free will" under the determinism definition of free will, if our decisions are random and uncaused, then that is not what any normal person would describe as free will regardless of whether or not determinism is involved.

You just explained how there could be free will, then you said that it is not how anyone normal would describe it. Perhaps those who think they are talking about free will are not actually talking about free will. Because, an uncaused decision is definitely useful for non-compatible free will. As for randomness, it would appear to an observer as being random, but to the agent it is selected.

If it's selected, then it's caused, then it is subject to deterministic influences, such as the amount of time spent pondering a decision before making it, or the particular things read by a decision-maker prior to making a decision.

 

[Jobar]

This seems a good place to ask- what is the difference between free will, and unpredictability?

If my will is truly free, then it would seem that no other system than my own brain can predict all my choices. Even another brain, equally complex, can't precisely model my own. Which does indeed appear to be the case.

But does this mean that if one's choices are unpredictable, they are necessarily free? How could you tell? Might a more complex (intelligent) system be able to precisely model all my choices?

Free will arguments are usually intended to justify the existence of evil under the aegis of a benevolent God. But this means that there would be things that God Himself can't predict- which rather shoots the notion of omniscience in the head.

 

[Malintent]

free will relates to the ability to make choices.
predictability relates to the ability to determine the outcome of a choice, or even what choice would be made.

You may freely decide to roll the die or not, but the outcome of the roll is unpredictable... not because of randomness, but because of the complexity of all interrelated variables involved.

 

[PyramidHead]

This seems a good place to ask- what is the difference between free will, and unpredictability?

If my will is truly free, then it would seem that no other system than my own brain can predict all my choices. Even another brain, equally complex, can't precisely model my own. Which does indeed appear to be the case.

But does this mean that if one's choices are unpredictable, they are necessarily free? How could you tell? Might a more complex (intelligent) system be able to precisely model all my choices?

Free will arguments are usually intended to justify the existence of evil under the aegis of a benevolent God. But this means that there would be things that God Himself can't predict- which rather shoots the notion of omniscience in the head.

Free will in the libertarian sense implies unpredictability, but unpredictability does not imply free will. Free will is in this sense a contradiction; it must be unpredictable, but at the same time it must derive from the intentions of a conscious agent, whose motives would surely be utterly predictable to an omniscient observer. If it's just unpredictable, random, arbitrary, it won't be intentional. But if it's intentional, based on the reasoning, emotion, and desire of the actor, how can it be unpredictable?