“Reality Goes Beyond Physics,” and more

[Elixir]

whether there exists nomological, or physical, necessity, and that is what I deny

Does this necessity have to exist antecedent to the event?
I think necessity is a concept that has no physical existence. Every car crash is "necessitated" a pico-second at a time by the conditions of the preceding picosecond, but for us to observe it we have to string a lot of them together, during which photons, radiation, airborne matter all change position as they interact in ways far beyond our ability to anticipate. Therein lie "hands of Gods" that produce vastly unlikely outcomes that conform to or abuse our wishes. But yeah - if it happened, it was as necessary as necessity - a concept - gets.
I agree with Witsenwhatever, basically.

 

[pood]

whether there exists nomological, or physical, necessity, and that is what I deny

Does this necessity have to exist antecedent to the event?
I think necessity is a concept that has no physical existence. Every car crash is "necessitated" a pico-second at a time by the conditions of the preceding picosecond, but for us to observe it we have to string a lot of them together, during which photons, radiation, airborne matter all change position as they interact in ways far beyond our ability to anticipate. Therein lie "hands of Gods" that produce vastly unlikely outcomes that conform to or abuse our wishes. But yeah - if it happened, it was as necessary as necessity - a concept - gets. I agree with Witsenwhatever, basically.

Wittgenstein thinks only logical necessity exists. In the case of the car crash, there is no necessity. Every single event you describe is contingent. What we could say is that given the above conditions, the car crash is inevitable — but inevitability is still not necessity. If the future exists, as some models suggest is true, then the future is inevitable and no one change it, but that still does not mean the future is necessary and does not obviate free will, since free will doesn’t involve changing anything.

 

[steve_bank]

Something I remembered.

Back in the 70s in Hartford Ct there was a Burger King advertising blitz with a catchy jingle.

In a grocery there was a kid walking around with his mother singing the jingle. Advertising as propaganda, repetition creates an unconscious connection in the brain.

When you stand in front of a junk food machine and choose between Coke or Pepsi there is advertising conditioning and other influences beyond conscious awareness.

It is impossible to separate out all that leads into a decision.

Debate without including how our brains work is meaningless. All our thoughts are based on chemical reactions. Logic is not a abstraction, it is wired into our brains. We know emotions change brain chemistry, and the change affects logic and reasoning.

A theme in scifi. If I am predestined to make a choice if I do not make a choice is that a choice and was it predetermined?

You can drive yourself crazy.

 

[Elixir]

If the future exists, as some models suggest is true, then the future is inevitable and no one change it

The future will inevitably arrive. People will inevitably have changed it.
Thing is, I don't believe humans are the only things that have agency. That makes predicting stuff exponentially more difficult with every measurable time increment. So free will can be accommodated or not, with near equal validity (depending on what you value).

 

[Elixir]

Every single event you describe is contingent.

Every picosecond's attributes are "necessitated" by its precedent. This does not negate free will, and it doesn't enable us to predict stuff beyond probability limits. There's just too much going on at once that may effect us later (meaning more than 2 picoseconds). A single gamma particle from a long gone explosion striking a gamete and altering DNA... science fiction stuff is happening all the time, and it impinges on our "free will". Our will may be free, but that's an internal phenomenon. There are no guarantees on outcomes, other than that we will effect it somewhat*.

*we get better at it all the time, which may be our downfall. Or our savior.

 

[DBT]

Determinism doesn’t eliminate choices, it generates options, and brains are able to choose among those options. A rock cannot choose what to do after being pushed down a hill. Humans can try to break or avoid or ease the fall, and will. The hard determinists owes an explanation of the difference between rocks and animals. Granted some of our survival behaviors are instinctual and reflexive, but others are clearly a matter of planning, thinking and choosing. And, as one of the referenced articles indicates, the hard determinist owes an explanation of how future human behavior was encoded at the Big Bang, or the Last Scattering Surface, as the article would have it. I asked this a number of times and never received a satisfactory explanation as to how, for example, the jazz improv composer did not create his piece — rather, it was created by Hard Determinism. This is the hard determinist Jerry Coyne’s stance, who also calls humans “meat robots.” This view of hard determinism seems quasi-theological to me, and also a category error itself — determinism is a description of how things broadly go at the classical scale, and never a prescription.

If any other members would care to go down this rabbit hole, feel free.

If choice is defined as permitting someone to take any one of a number of possible actions in any given instance in time, that is not determinism. And if a compatibilist believes that, they are not a compatibilist, they are a Libertarian.

I’ve addressed this many times. You need not agree with what I say, but it would be nice if you would address the substance of it.

I have addressed the substance of it.

Essentially, that is inner necessity that negates the Compatibilists definition of free will and makes Compatibilism a failed argument.

The standard compatibilist position (there are variations, such as neo-Humean compatibilism) is that if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always choose X. The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise. As I have tried to explain, this must be understood in terms of modalities — the modalities of actuality, contingency, and necessity. The only necessarily true propositions are those that cannot be false under any circumstances; it can never be false that triangles have three sides, for example.

If I choose x — Coke, say, over Pepsi — I am acting on a string of precise antecedents that motivated my choice. But if y is Pepsi, it is clearly within my power, at the time of choice, to choose y — it’s right there in the refrigerator, at my fingertips. Hard determinism is not an agent that stays my hand to prevent me from choosing Pepsi. It’s just that given the relevant antecedents, I choose Coke because I want to, and not because I have to.

The options exist, but what is selected by someone in any given instance is determined, not freely willed or chosen.

The error, of course, is to overlook the fact that I, as the chooser, am part of the deterministic stream, and it is therefore I myself who determines what I choose, based on relevant antecedents.

That's the very thing I don't do.

As an incompatibilist I point out that the decision maker is inseparable from the deterministic stream.

Consequently, every decision and action must proceed as determined, without deviation or the possibility of alternate decisions (which would make it a genuine choice) or actions.

At dinner, where according your taste and proclivities, in the instance of decision making you select steak and red wine, while your wife selects salad and white wine, each according to their tastes and needs.

Right, which is perfectly compatible with compatibilism.

But still wrong to label these necessitated decisions and actions as examples of free will.

Inner necessity, where the decision maker and their actions are inseparable from the deterministic stream of events is hardly a matter of free will, hence incompatibilism.

 

[peacegirl]

A fire extinguisher lasts five to 15 year before it must be replaced or refurbished. Suppose I have a fire extinguisher in my kitchen for 15 years, but never use it, because no fire breaks out. Also, I never even test it. At the end of 15 years I get a new fire extinguisher.

Because the fire extinguisher was never used, does that mean it could not have been used? This seems to be what the hard determinist is saying, and it strikes me as surpassingly strange. Of course it could have been used, but was not, because a fire never broke out. Had different antecedents prevailed — had a fire broken out — it would have been used.

From a logical standpoint, you cannot say it necessarily was not used — necessarily, as a matter of logic, means that there is no possible world in which it could have been used, even in a world in which a fire broke out in my kitchen.

Surely the hard determinist does not mean this. So what does he mean? What form of “necessarily not used” does he have in mind, if not logical necessity? The only form that remains is this posited “nomological necessity,” but that would be the crux of a new dispute — with Wittgenstein, I see no valid category called “nomological necessity.” As with not ever using the fire extinguisher, so it goes with my not ever choosing Pepsi.

But I am glad to see we appear to have a new denizen of the rabbit hole.

There is no rabbit hole Pood. It’s your faulty definition that confuses the issue.

I could do anything other than what I did is a realistic mirage and it certainly doesn’t give us free will to do otherwise. I could jump off the Empire State Building I could be a mass murderer. I could drive into a parade and kill innocent people. Why don’t !? What’s stopping me Pood? The fact that I could is obvious when we are given the freedom to choose, but that freedom is constrained by our decision not to do these things because we cannot justify them. Your “would” only matters if your would turns into reality. No one is saying that the option to shoot is there. “I would” if I wanted to, but what stops you is that you don’t want to meaning that you could not, not you would not, given the conditions of your life up to that point.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Pood said:

... the hard determinist says I could not choose

By the compatibilist reasoning you have put forth, that is also what the compatibilist means even if the compatibilist does not convey that meaning as succinctly or as coherently as does the hard determinist.

You say that when the compatibilist says could have done otherwise what is meant is would have done otherwise had conditions been different. As noted previously, the hard determinist could/would readily agree with the statement would have done otherwise had conditions been different.

But, given the assumptions of determinism in all of its usual forms, to mean would have done otherwise had conditions been different is also to mean could not have done otherwise because conditions were not different.

This is the case because the determinist notion that antecedents determine what follows includes denying the actuality of the indeterminateness necessary for there ever to be (or for there ever to have been) actual alternatives to what has occurred, to what occurs, as well as to what will occur. All usual forms of determinism hold that the past, present, and future are at all times relevantly, equally, and utterly determinate.

When you refer to the situation in which you are "[f]aced with Coke vs. Pepsi at a vending machine," you say "the possible choice of Pepsi is very real". Is that intended as a brief description of your (subjective) experience? Or, is it also a description of the (meta)physics of the situation?

If you are merely describing your experience, what you are indicating is a lack of (experiential) awareness of being in a situation which determinism asserts is actually devoid of the indeterminateness that you seem to be experiencing. That very sort of indeterminateness is a necessary condition for there to occur an actual - rather than a merely apparent - choosing between alternatives. If such indeterminateness is not (thought to be) actual, then the experience is illusory despite being subjectively actual/real. If the experience is not illusory, if the experience well enough reflects the (meta)physics of the situation, then the present - and, hence, the future - are necessarily not as utterly determinate as the past appears to be.

If/when a hard determinist says that you could not choose, that can indicate an awareness of an indeterminateness as a necessary condition for a choice to be actual in conjunction with that hard determinist denying that there is any such indeterminateness. On the other hand, if that same hard determinist has not recognized that choice presumes such an indeterminateness, then that determinist can well be emphasizing the otherwise in you cannot choose otherwise than you do despite your seeming to experience indeterminateness as actual. What the hard determinist is not denying is that you and only you do what you do. The hard determinist agrees that your physical person (or the physics of your person) is a necessary condition for what actually occurs.

Hard determinism clearly does not cohere with - is not congruent with - the (subjective) experience of human being. And maybe compatibilism is promulgated as a reaction to that incoherence. However, it is determinism itself which does not cohere with human experience. Compatibilism might be intended as an attempt at salvaging determinism by rectifying (or maybe just smoothing out) the particular incoherence of hard determinism. However, on the face of it, hard determinism seems at least more semantically coherent than does compatibilism, and the incoherence of determinism is not - and never will be - overcome (although it might be assuaged) by resorting to the relatively greater semantic incoherence exhibited as compatibilism.

 

[Jarhyn]

that is also what the compatibilist means

You are wrong.

Many words can be placed in terms of other words and this exposes non-equivalence.

I am going to present two equivalent sentences, and an important thing about the *identity* of "could" vs the *identity* of "did" in how language functions:

He could have = "of all the things that contain him-property across the universe, some did."

He did = "exactly that thing carrying him-property did at exactly that place and time."

They are statements about entirely different sets of things, as the verb applies *modal scope* to the subject.

It is as invalid a construction of words to confuse "couldn't" with "didn't" as it is to make a sentence such as "this sentence is false", albeit for different reasons.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

that is also what the compatibilist means

You are wrong.

Many words can be placed in terms of other words and this exposes non-equivalence.

I am going to present two equivalent sentences, and an important thing about the *identity* of "could" vs the *identity* of "did" in how language functions:

He could have = "of all the things that contain him-property across the universe, some did."

He did = "exactly that thing carrying him-property did at exactly that place and time."

They are statements about entirely different sets of things, as the verb applies *modal scope* to the subject.

It is as invalid a construction of words to confuse "couldn't" with "didn't" as it is to make a sentence such as "this sentence is false", albeit for different reasons.

You have not yet demonstrated any alleged error.

Based on what I take you to seem to be trying to say, were there an error on my part related to your assertion, I suspect it would most likely be in association with this portion of my previous posting:

... given the assumptions of determinism in all of its usual forms, to mean would have done otherwise had conditions been different is also to mean could not have done otherwise because conditions were not different.

If that is not what you imagine to be the supposed problem, then maybe you will be so kind as to make explicit sufficient reference to what I wrote. And then we can take it from there. In any event, you can be certain (or is it fore-informed? forewarned?) that I am always aware of the "modal scope". A much more common matter regards the need for disambiguation, and that is often rather easily accomplished with expression alteration and/or additional explication.

 

[Jarhyn]

You have not yet demonstrated any alleged error.

He could have = "of all the things that contain him-property across the universe, some did."

He did = "exactly that thing carrying him-property did at exactly that place and time."

He could have = "of all the things that contain him-property across the universe, some did."

He did = "exactly that thing carrying him-property did at exactly that place and time."

Statements about "Could" unpacks to a statement about "did" of many things.

Many words can be placed in terms of other words and this exposes non-equivalence.

The non-equivalence, and specifically the nature of this non-equivalence, exposes the reality of the difference between what the compatibilist says (would/did/shall/(immediate to-be verb))not do otherwise), and what the hard determinist says (can/could have/may/(set modal to-be verb) not otherwise).

This is textbook modal fallacy stuff and is by far the most boring and outright idiotic conversation in discussing the foundations of modal logic and math.

It is boring!

 

[peacegirl]

Pood said:

"The only form of necessity I recognize is logical necessity ..."

Okay, then you surely realize that there is no sort of necessity (logical, entailment, or otherwise) in your earlier statement: "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always choose X." A closer to necessity form of that statement would be "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always do X." It is closer to necessity in the sense that it is more trans-perspectival. The revised statement is more trans-perspectival in that it is a statement which is coherent both from the modal determinism and the nomological determinism viewpoints. The revised statement also avoids begging the question with regards to those who regard the act of choosing as presuming an actual indeterminateness which provides for actual (and, typically, actualizable) alternatives.

But, then, there is this earlier statement: "The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise."

First of all, given that the modal approach is not logically necessary, the cited statement is more accurately expressed as "... there is no modal necessity in this choice". Secondly, the remark "contingent ... automatically means it could have been otherwise" is also not logically necessary. From the nomological determinism perspective, even granting the contingency, it is false that "it could have been otherwise" insofar as "otherwise" at least implies there having been the very sort of indeterminateness which is denied under nomological determinism.

For that matter, and certainly from the perspective of the nomological determinists, there is nothing about the modal perspective which necessarily entails that "it could have been otherwise" within the context of this universe.

To me, “nomological determinism” just means “physical determinism,” and that is what determinism is — physical. A more intriguing life of thought is whether there exists nomological, or physical, necessity, and that is what I deny, though it seems to be what the hard determinist requires for his argument to go through. I agree with Wittgenstein that only logical necessity exists.

To say, “it could have been otherwise,” or, “I could have chosen otherwise,” means, to the compatibilist using modal logic, “I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.” Even though he DID NOT choose otherwise, he COULD have done so.

Don't you see that saying "it could have been otherwise" or "he could have chosen otherwise" had the conditions been different is not the argument? The argument is that had the conditions been THE SAME, according to your logic, he COULD have chosen otherwise because he had the option to do so. This is a huge fallacy. IOW, to then say, even though he DID NOT choose otherwise, he COULD have done so, is contradicting the very compatibilist definition of determinism that you are defending. No determinist is denying that he could or would have chosen otherwise had the conditions been different, but given what the conditions were, he COULD NOT HAVE RESPONDED DIFFERENTLY THAN WHAT HE, IN FACT, DID. This argument of yours is a strawman.

 

[peacegirl]

I’d say that the term “nomological determinist” is redundant in this context, since it really just means physical or causal determinism, as distinct from other types of determinism such as epistemic, logical, or relativistic determinism.

As mentioned, if you want to invoke the concept of nomicity, I think the key question is whether nomological determinism entails nomological necessity. Such necessity, if it can be had, is what the hard determinist needs to support his claim that my choosing Coke over Pepsi is somehow necessitated. Logical necessity will not support the claim.

Are you of the opinion that — for example — your choosing the Packers to defeat the Lions in Week 14 was somehow nomologically necessary? And if so, how would you justify that claim? Simply appealing to hard determinism would be circular.

You keep bringing different definitions to determinism (epistemic, logical, or relativistic, soft, hard, etc.) that you seem to think gives your definition of determinism a free pass to allow for "free" choice within that system. It doesn't fly Pood. You also bring up nomological necessity as if to say this necessity forces our hand without our participation. People have corrected you over and over again, but you keep using this false perception as a way to sneak in free will, the kind compatibilists say we don't have, according to their very own definition. This must be libertarianism free will you are referring to. Again, determinism also does not dictate IN ADVANCE what a person must choose; it is descriptive, not prescriptive, remember? It forces nothing against our will. The problem, therefore, is with the modal fallacy that says that because we had options (which no one is denying), that "we could have chosen otherwise". We could have if we had desired to, but we didn't desire to, so we could not have. Contingency only means we base our decisions on factors (conscious and subconscious) that have led up to our present actions. This contemplation is an inextricable part in the causal chain of events that play out in our individual lives.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

You have not yet demonstrated any alleged error.

He could have = "of all the things that contain him-property across the universe, some did."

He did = "exactly that thing carrying him-property did at exactly that place and time."

He could have = "of all the things that contain him-property across the universe, some did."

He did = "exactly that thing carrying him-property did at exactly that place and time."

Statements about "Could" unpacks to a statement about "did" of many things.

Many words can be placed in terms of other words and this exposes non-equivalence.

The non-equivalence, and specifically the nature of this non-equivalence, exposes the reality of the difference between what the compatibilist says (would/did/shall/(immediate to-be verb))not do otherwise), and what the hard determinist says (can/could have/may/(set modal to-be verb) not otherwise).

This is textbook modal fallacy stuff and is by far the most boring and outright idiotic conversation in discussing the foundations of modal logic and math.

It is boring!

Sorry, but I find your manner of expression unintelligible. So, bear with me as I try to further the discussion.

Let us start with pood's earlier statement:

To say, “it could have been otherwise,” or, “I could have chosen otherwise,” means, to the compatibilist using modal logic, “I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.”

Stating that I could have chosen otherwise means I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different is incorporated within (or, if you prefer, is a subset of) a re-statement as I could have done otherwise meaning I WOULD have done otherwise, had conditions been different.

Whether the issue is approached in terms of chosen or done makes no difference. In both cases, what is done is contingent upon conditions. The relevant conditions as put forth by the compatibilist are alleged to be fully determinate without any actually indeterminate aspects. Those conditions constitute a (relevant) context. Those conditions as a context are put forth as sufficient for - but also restrictive of - what can be done. Devoid of any actually indeterminate constituent aspects, that context restricts what can/could be done - what can/could follow - to one and only one contingent possibility.

When there is one and only one (even contingent) possibility which can be actualized given some context, it is both semantically and logically sensible to say something along the lines of: From some given fully determinate context (set of conditions), it is necessarily the case that the one and only (even if actually contingent) possibility can/could/will become actual.

With that in mind, we proceed to this part of one of my earlier postings:

If/when a hard determinist says that you could not choose, that can indicate an awareness of an indeterminateness as a necessary condition for a choice to be actual in conjunction with that hard determinist denying that there is any such indeterminateness.

To be consonant with my discussion in terms of chosen and done, my just-quoted remark can be re-stated as: If/when a hard determinist says that you could not do otherwise than what you do given the context/conditions, that can indicate an awareness of an indeterminateness as a necessary condition for doing otherwise than what you do in conjunction with that hard determinist denying that there is any such indeterminateness.

And what that re-statement indicates is that the context/conditions restrict what is and can be done to one (contingent) possibility which becomes an actuality upon the doing. This is all perfectly sensible and modally correct - even if it has not been expressed sufficiently well to effect successful communication.

Nevertheless, determinism in all usual forms asserts that, given some particular context constituted by a set of conditions devoid of all (relevant) indeterminateness, there is only one possible differing context which follows from - which actualizes out of - the given context.

And I am left still wondering: What was my alleged error? It is yet to be revealed. Go for it. Or not.

 

[Jarhyn]

Sorry, but I find your manner of expression unintelligible

Well, that tends to happen for some particular subset of folks. Given the fact that *peacegirl* is cheerleading you, I have little faith in your ability. Maybe you're going to surprise me but so far you haven't.

I could have done otherwise meaning I WOULD have done otherwise, had conditions been different

No, it means "that with me-property does otherwise when and where conditions are X"

It is not a statement that the immediate you exists in different conditions but that the *conditions* that define your actions, when presented different context, make different actions; or where some property is excluded from consideration.

This comes from the confused and ill-informed intent to try and treat set modalities as if they are uniquely positional.

This is literally the most tiresome and droll mistake that people approaching the topic of responsibility and causality make. Waves of people on Reddit make this error, as if born of the tides.

The waves come in. The waves go out. People commit the modal fallacy. The waves come in...

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Sorry, but I find your manner of expression unintelligible

Well, that tends to happen for some particular subset of folks. Given the fact that *peacegirl* is cheerleading you, I have little faith in your ability. Maybe you're going to surprise me but so far you haven't.

I could have done otherwise meaning I WOULD have done otherwise, had conditions been different

No, it means "that with me-property does otherwise when and where conditions are X"

It is not a statement that the immediate you exists in different conditions but that the *conditions* that define your actions, when presented different context, make different actions; or where some property is excluded from consideration.

This comes from the confused and ill-informed intent to try and treat set modalities as if they are uniquely positional.

This is literally the most tiresome and droll mistake that people approaching the topic of responsibility and causality make. Waves of people on Reddit make this error, as if born of the tides.

The waves come in. The waves go out. People commit the modal fallacy. The waves come in...

Your reference to peacegirl is - how can I put this as gently as possible? - a most unrespectable form of ad hominem remark. That does not speak well for you. It does not bode well for your possibilities. Be that as it may. You say that my statement, "I could have done otherwise [means] I WOULD have done otherwise, had conditions been different", does not mean what I say it means. pood said, "'I could have chosen otherwise,' means ... 'I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.'" Are you also saying that pood's statement does not mean what he says it means? If you assert that pood's statement means what he says it means, then it is incumbent upon you - i.e., it is necessary for you - to distinguish relevant differences between his statement and mine. To this point, I have no reason to think that you are at all familiar with modal logic - specifically with its utility.

 

[DBT]

It remains that determinism does not permit alternate actions, which negates choosing otherwise in any given instance of decision making (the no choice principle).

Which is why compatibilists define free will as acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced, with no reference to being able to have done otherwise in any given situation.

As this ignores inner necessity, the underlying mechanism and process that generates thought and action, Compatibilism fails to make a case for the reality of free will.

 

[Jarhyn]

Sorry, but I find your manner of expression unintelligible

Well, that tends to happen for some particular subset of folks. Given the fact that *peacegirl* is cheerleading you, I have little faith in your ability. Maybe you're going to surprise me but so far you haven't.

I could have done otherwise meaning I WOULD have done otherwise, had conditions been different

No, it means "that with me-property does otherwise when and where conditions are X"

It is not a statement that the immediate you exists in different conditions but that the *conditions* that define your actions, when presented different context, make different actions; or where some property is excluded from consideration.

This comes from the confused and ill-informed intent to try and treat set modalities as if they are uniquely positional.

This is literally the most tiresome and droll mistake that people approaching the topic of responsibility and causality make. Waves of people on Reddit make this error, as if born of the tides.

The waves come in. The waves go out. People commit the modal fallacy. The waves come in...

Your reference to peacegirl is - how can I put this as gently as possible? - a most unrespectable form of ad hominem remark. That does not speak well for you. It does not bode well for your possibilities. Be that as it may. You say that my statement, "I could have done otherwise [means] I WOULD have done otherwise, had conditions been different", does not mean what I say it means. pood said, "'I could have chosen otherwise,' means ... 'I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.'" Are you also saying that pood's statement does not mean what he says it means? If you assert that pood's statement means what he says it means, then it is incumbent upon you - i.e., it is necessary for you - to distinguish relevant differences between his statement and mine. To this point, I have no reason to think that you are at all familiar with modal logic - specifically with its utility.

Go to the Other Philosophical Discussions forum.

Read her 120 post long screed + advertisement wherein she spends most of the time defending her favorite author's "Efferent Vision" theory.

Go ahead.

Please.

I'll wait for you.

 

[peacegirl]

Sorry, but I find your manner of expression unintelligible

Well, that tends to happen for some particular subset of folks. Given the fact that *peacegirl* is cheerleading you, I have little faith in your ability. Maybe you're going to surprise me but so far you haven't.

I could have done otherwise meaning I WOULD have done otherwise, had conditions been different

No, it means "that with me-property does otherwise when and where conditions are X"

It is not a statement that the immediate you exists in different conditions but that the *conditions* that define your actions, when presented different context, make different actions; or where some property is excluded from consideration.

This comes from the confused and ill-informed intent to try and treat set modalities as if they are uniquely positional.

This is literally the most tiresome and droll mistake that people approaching the topic of responsibility and causality make. Waves of people on Reddit make this error, as if born of the tides.

The waves come in. The waves go out. People commit the modal fallacy. The waves come in...

Your reference to peacegirl is - how can I put this as gently as possible? - a most unrespectable form of ad hominem remark. That does not speak well for you. It does not bode well for your possibilities. Be that as it may. You say that my statement, "I could have done otherwise [means] I WOULD have done otherwise, had conditions been different", does not mean what I say it means. pood said, "'I could have chosen otherwise,' means ... 'I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.'" Are you also saying that pood's statement does not mean what he says it means? If you assert that pood's statement means what he says it means, then it is incumbent upon you - i.e., it is necessary for you - to distinguish relevant differences between his statement and mine. To this point, I have no reason to think that you are at all familiar with modal logic - specifically with its utility.

Go to the Other Philosophical Discussions forum.

Read her 120 post long screed + advertisement wherein she spends most of the time defending her favorite author's "Efferent Vision" theory.

Go ahead.

Please.

I'll wait for you.

This is truly disgusting Karyn, to try to discredit this author because you didn’t like his claim regarding the eyes. It’s amazing how indoctrinated people can be to the point that they cannot dare question what is considered sacred. or ostracism awaits them. How many times in history has this happened? Now you’re trying to use this tactic to get Michael to turn on me!? How low can someone go?

 

[DBT]

It's not a matter of indoctrination. A claim such as 'light at the eye/instance vision' simply has no merit and only serves to discredit the book. It doesn't work, not logically, not physically. That is why anybody who has even a basic understanding of physics and how the eye and brain functions in terms of vision cannot take it seriously.

You need to drop it.