“Reality Goes Beyond Physics,” and more

[Jarhyn]

“I could propose some radical method of creating the universe last Thursday, by stopping time, making a copy in a separate instance of Spinoza's God or whatever, that starts Last Thursday, without having processed Last Wednesday there.”

It is no trivial thing to make an identical copy. One tiny electron of deviation and the butterfly effect will gitcha. God obviously meant for copies to improve over time on average, so that they might evolve into things that are more amusing to God.

We're assuming our electrons are "digital" here or something as precise to an analog critter as digital is to us.

Fully "Quantized".

 

[Elixir]

We're assuming our electrons are "digital" here or something as precise to an analog critter as digital is to us.

Right down to electrons? Quarks too? And quantum effects?
I think things are very fractal. To the extent that things are self-replicable, they still vary in reproduction, whether large or small. Seems to be the nature of nature. Self replicators evolve or die out. The chance of a copy universe being exact would be like the chance of identical twins being exact.
I don’t see why universes should be any different from drosophila that way.

 

[bilby]

I don’t see why universes should be any different from drosophila that way.

Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana.

 

[DBT]

Determinism doesn’t eliminate choices, it generates options, and brains are able to choose among those options. A rock cannot choose what to do after being pushed down a hill. Humans can try to break or avoid or ease the fall, and will. The hard determinists owes an explanation of the difference between rocks and animals. Granted some of our survival behaviors are instinctual and reflexive, but others are clearly a matter of planning, thinking and choosing. And, as one of the referenced articles indicates, the hard determinist owes an explanation of how future human behavior was encoded at the Big Bang, or the Last Scattering Surface, as the article would have it. I asked this a number of times and never received a satisfactory explanation as to how, for example, the jazz improv composer did not create his piece — rather, it was created by Hard Determinism. This is the hard determinist Jerry Coyne’s stance, who also calls humans “meat robots.” This view of hard determinism seems quasi-theological to me, and also a category error itself — determinism is a description of how things broadly go at the classical scale, and never a prescription.

If any other members would care to go down this rabbit hole, feel free.

If choice is defined as permitting someone to take any one of a number of possible actions in any given instance in time, that is not determinism. And if a compatibilist believes that, they are not a compatibilist, they are a Libertarian.

The options exist, but what is selected by someone in any given instance is determined, not freely willed or chosen.

At dinner, where according your taste and proclivities, in the instance of decision making you select steak and red wine, while your wife selects salad and white wine, each according to their tastes and needs.

 

[Elixir]

I don’t see why universes should be any different from drosophila that way.

Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana.

When you’re having a terrible experience, time flies like a banana.

 

[pood]

Determinism doesn’t eliminate choices, it generates options, and brains are able to choose among those options. A rock cannot choose what to do after being pushed down a hill. Humans can try to break or avoid or ease the fall, and will. The hard determinists owes an explanation of the difference between rocks and animals. Granted some of our survival behaviors are instinctual and reflexive, but others are clearly a matter of planning, thinking and choosing. And, as one of the referenced articles indicates, the hard determinist owes an explanation of how future human behavior was encoded at the Big Bang, or the Last Scattering Surface, as the article would have it. I asked this a number of times and never received a satisfactory explanation as to how, for example, the jazz improv composer did not create his piece — rather, it was created by Hard Determinism. This is the hard determinist Jerry Coyne’s stance, who also calls humans “meat robots.” This view of hard determinism seems quasi-theological to me, and also a category error itself — determinism is a description of how things broadly go at the classical scale, and never a prescription.

If any other members would care to go down this rabbit hole, feel free.

If choice is defined as permitting someone to take any one of a number of possible actions in any given instance in time, that is not determinism. And if a compatibilist believes that, they are not a compatibilist, they are a Libertarian.

I’ve addressed this many times. You need not agree with what I say, but it would be nice if you would address the substance of it.

The standard compatibilist position (there are variations, such as neo-Humean compatibilism) is that if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always choose X. The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise. As I have tried to explain, this must be understood in terms of modalities — the modalities of actuality, contingency, and necessity. The only necessarily true propositions are those that cannot be false under any circumstances; it can never be false that triangles have three sides, for example.

If I choose x — Coke, say, over Pepsi — I am acting on a string of precise antecedents that motivated my choice. But if y is Pepsi, it is clearly within my power, at the time of choice, to choose y — it’s right there in the refrigerator, at my fingertips. Hard determinism is not an agent that stays my hand to prevent me from choosing Pepsi. It’s just that given the relevant antecedents, I choose Coke because I want to, and not because I have to.

The options exist, but what is selected by someone in any given instance is determined, not freely willed or chosen.

The error, of course, is to overlook the fact that I, as the chooser, am part of the deterministic stream, and it is therefore I myself who determines what I choose, based on relevant antecedents.

At dinner, where according your taste and proclivities, in the instance of decision making you select steak and red wine, while your wife selects salad and white wine, each according to their tastes and needs.

Right, which is perfectly compatible with compatibilism.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice

Determinism is not necessarily a matter of modal necessity. Determinism as nomological determinism simply denies the actuality of what appears to be the indeterminateness which is necessary for there to be an opportunity for selecting between apparently actualizable alternatives. In effect, determinism as nomological determinism asserts that what seems to be - or what is experienced as an occasion of there being - actual indeterminateness is, in fact, non-actual and illusory.

 

[Jarhyn]

We're assuming our electrons are "digital" here or something as precise to an analog critter as digital is to us.

Right down to electrons? Quarks too? And quantum effects?
I think things are very fractal. To the extent that things are self-replicable, they still vary in reproduction, whether large or small. Seems to be the nature of nature. Self replicators evolve or die out. The chance of a copy universe being exact would be like the chance of identical twins being exact.
I don’t see why universes should be any different from drosophila that way.

Yes, all the way down. I'm asking you to use an analogy to model the concept. Of course it's ridiculous and a huge scale of magnitude, but it's a thought exercise.

Oftentimes people have to go to such lengths of thinking about utterly *absurd* things when trying to make sense of some seemingly sensible things.

After all, I want to say proving Fermat's Last Theorem, took using math around *inaccessible cardinalities*.

We can make an exact copy of all the petabytes of human data, all it takes is direct access to true state information and for that state information to be represented to be granular and capable of being placed in precise terms.

Of course there are a lot of "bits" in play, but checksums and RAID arrays make it fairly difficult to get transcription errors through...

And even if there is some transcription errors in the save/load that doesn't crash the whole load due to observable data corruption, that actually supports my point more, rather than less, because maybe now, the serial killer is observably (exactly one particle transcription) different from the other and we can observe this having NO impact on their property of "being a psychopath". The difference in microstate still doesn't necessarily mean a difference in the responsibilities and freedoms of the psychopath in deliberating what to do about their psychopathy, since *that* particle, let's say, happens to only be instrumental.in whether they would rather have a tea or a coffee that either way is unavailable to them as they stand trial.

 

[pood]

The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice

Determinism is not necessarily a matter of modal necessity. Determinism as nomological determinism simply denies the actuality of what appears to be the indeterminateness which is necessary for there to be an opportunity for selecting between apparently actualizable alternatives. In effect, determinism as nomological determinism asserts that what seems to be - or what is experienced as an occasion of there being - actual indeterminateness is, in fact, non-actual and illusory.

There are those who argue for a form of necessity called nomological, or physical, necessity. I don’t agree with them, though of course they can muster their best arguments. The only form of necessity I recognize is logical necessity, and no contingent act can ever be necessary in that sense.

 

[pood]

To put it another way, one would have to offer a candidate act or event as an example of nomological necessity, and explain how that differs from standard contingency.

 

[pood]

One might argue that, for example, the inverse square is nomologically necessary. I think it would be simpler to say it is a contingent truth of this world that depends on antecedents. In a spatially 4D world the inverse cube would hold. Then, too, other “laws” of nature could be different in such a way that the inverse square would not hold in our world.

 

[Elixir]

Yes, all the way down. I'm asking you to use an analogy to model the concept. Of course it's ridiculous and a huge scale of magnitude, but it's a thought exercise.

Okay, fair enough, except something feels wrong about that. Your "analogy" uses the entire universe as an analog. Most analogies use things within our universe to refer to other things within that universe. Like you might be foisting off an analogy as metaphoric.

We can make an exact copy of all the petabytes of human data

In what medium are we able to do that, or is this totally hypothetical?

all it takes is direct access to true state information and for that state information to be represented to be granular and capable of being placed in precise terms.

I don't think that's "ALL" it takes. It also takes the ability to create NEW information that is identical to the OLD information, NOT in the OLD universe that is thus represented. IOW, there has to already be a pre-existing "blank" universe in which to place the copied information. If that universe isn't a null set, the copy is contaminated. If it's not in a "new" null set universe, the copy exists within the universe you're copying, and so must be included in the original, and must be copied again. Ad infinitum.

And even if there is some transcription errors in the save/load that doesn't crash the whole load due to observable data corruption, that actually supports my point more, rather than less, because maybe now, the serial killer is observably (exactly one particle transcription) different from the other and we can observe this having NO impact on their property of "being a psychopath".

It still means the ensuing outcomes will be different. Did I lose track of the original question?

 

[pood]

Wittgenstein:

That the sun will rise tomorrow, is an hypothesis; and that means that we do not know whether it will rise.

A necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only logical necessity.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Pood said:

"The only form of necessity I recognize is logical necessity ..."

Okay, then you surely realize that there is no sort of necessity (logical, entailment, or otherwise) in your earlier statement: "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always choose X." A closer to necessity form of that statement would be "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always do X." It is closer to necessity in the sense that it is more trans-perspectival. The revised statement is more trans-perspectival in that it is a statement which is coherent both from the modal determinism and the nomological determinism viewpoints. The revised statement also avoids begging the question with regards to those who regard the act of choosing as presuming an actual indeterminateness which provides for actual (and, typically, actualizable) alternatives.

But, then, there is this earlier statement: "The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise."

First of all, given that the modal approach is not logically necessary, the cited statement is more accurately expressed as "... there is no modal necessity in this choice". Secondly, the remark "contingent ... automatically means it could have been otherwise" is also not logically necessary. From the nomological determinism perspective, even granting the contingency, it is false that "it could have been otherwise" insofar as "otherwise" at least implies there having been the very sort of indeterminateness which is denied under nomological determinism.

For that matter, and certainly from the perspective of the nomological determinists, there is nothing about the modal perspective which necessarily entails that "it could have been otherwise" within the context of this universe.

 

[pood]

Pood said:

"The only form of necessity I recognize is logical necessity ..."

Okay, then you surely realize that there is no sort of necessity (logical, entailment, or otherwise) in your earlier statement: "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always choose X." A closer to necessity form of that statement would be "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always do X." It is closer to necessity in the sense that it is more trans-perspectival. The revised statement is more trans-perspectival in that it is a statement which is coherent both from the modal determinism and the nomological determinism viewpoints. The revised statement also avoids begging the question with regards to those who regard the act of choosing as presuming an actual indeterminateness which provides for actual (and, typically, actualizable) alternatives.

But, then, there is this earlier statement: "The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise."

First of all, given that the modal approach is not logically necessary, the cited statement is more accurately expressed as "... there is no modal necessity in this choice". Secondly, the remark "contingent ... automatically means it could have been otherwise" is also not logically necessary. From the nomological determinism perspective, even granting the contingency, it is false that "it could have been otherwise" insofar as "otherwise" at least implies there having been the very sort of indeterminateness which is denied under nomological determinism.

For that matter, and certainly from the perspective of the nomological determinists, there is nothing about the modal perspective which necessarily entails that "it could have been otherwise" within the context of this universe.

To me, “nomological determinism” just means “physical determinism,” and that is what determinism is — physical. A more intriguing life of thought is whether there exists nomological, or physical, necessity, and that is what I deny, though it seems to be what the hard determinist requires for his argument to go through. I agree with Wittgenstein that only logical necessity exists.

To say, “it could have been otherwise,” or, “I could have chosen otherwise,” means, to the compatibilist using modal logic, “I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.” Even though he DID NOT choose otherwise, he COULD have done so.

 

[pood]

A fire extinguisher lasts five to 15 year before it must be replaced or refurbished. Suppose I have a fire extinguisher in my kitchen for 15 years, but never use it, because no fire breaks out. Also, I never even test it. At the end of 15 years I get a new fire extinguisher.

Because the fire extinguisher was never used, does that mean it could not have been used? This seems to be what the hard determinist is saying, and it strikes me as surpassingly strange. Of course it could have been used, but was not, because a fire never broke out. Had different antecedents prevailed — had a fire broken out — it would have been used.

From a logical standpoint, you cannot say it necessarily was not used — necessarily, as a matter of logic, means that there is no possible world in which it could have been used, even in a world in which a fire broke out in my kitchen.

Surely the hard determinist does not mean this. So what does he mean? What form of “necessarily not used” does he have in mind, if not logical necessity? The only form that remains is this posited “nomological necessity,” but that would be the crux of a new dispute — with Wittgenstein, I see no valid category called “nomological necessity.” As with not ever using the fire extinguisher, so it goes with my not ever choosing Pepsi.

But I am glad to see we appear to have a new denizen of the rabbit hole.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Pood said:

"The only form of necessity I recognize is logical necessity ..."

Okay, then you surely realize that there is no sort of necessity (logical, entailment, or otherwise) in your earlier statement: "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always choose X." A closer to necessity form of that statement would be "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always do X." It is closer to necessity in the sense that it is more trans-perspectival. The revised statement is more trans-perspectival in that it is a statement which is coherent both from the modal determinism and the nomological determinism viewpoints. The revised statement also avoids begging the question with regards to those who regard the act of choosing as presuming an actual indeterminateness which provides for actual (and, typically, actualizable) alternatives.

But, then, there is this earlier statement: "The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise."

First of all, given that the modal approach is not logically necessary, the cited statement is more accurately expressed as "... there is no modal necessity in this choice". Secondly, the remark "contingent ... automatically means it could have been otherwise" is also not logically necessary. From the nomological determinism perspective, even granting the contingency, it is false that "it could have been otherwise" insofar as "otherwise" at least implies there having been the very sort of indeterminateness which is denied under nomological determinism.

For that matter, and certainly from the perspective of the nomological determinists, there is nothing about the modal perspective which necessarily entails that "it could have been otherwise" within the context of this universe.

To say, “it could have been otherwise,” or, “I could have chosen otherwise,” means, to the compatibilist using modal logic, “I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.”

If the compatibilist actually means “I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different", then that is what the compatibilist should say instead of "I could have chosen otherwise." I expect that the nomological determinist can agree wholeheartedly with the would have expression. Indeed, that manner of expression well captures the nomological determinist notion that all contexts are fully determinate and without indeterminateness whatsoever - specifically the indeterminateness associated with the experience of choosing, i.e., selecting amongst alternatives (which are, after all, and from the determinist perspective, nothing but illusions or fancies of the imagination).

Is imagination sufficient to justify the above "could" in place of the "would"? Or, from the determinist perspective, is the "would" always more accurate and coherent than the "could"?

 

[pood]

Pood said:

"The only form of necessity I recognize is logical necessity ..."

Okay, then you surely realize that there is no sort of necessity (logical, entailment, or otherwise) in your earlier statement: "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always choose X." A closer to necessity form of that statement would be "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always do X." It is closer to necessity in the sense that it is more trans-perspectival. The revised statement is more trans-perspectival in that it is a statement which is coherent both from the modal determinism and the nomological determinism viewpoints. The revised statement also avoids begging the question with regards to those who regard the act of choosing as presuming an actual indeterminateness which provides for actual (and, typically, actualizable) alternatives.

But, then, there is this earlier statement: "The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise."

First of all, given that the modal approach is not logically necessary, the cited statement is more accurately expressed as "... there is no modal necessity in this choice". Secondly, the remark "contingent ... automatically means it could have been otherwise" is also not logically necessary. From the nomological determinism perspective, even granting the contingency, it is false that "it could have been otherwise" insofar as "otherwise" at least implies there having been the very sort of indeterminateness which is denied under nomological determinism.

For that matter, and certainly from the perspective of the nomological determinists, there is nothing about the modal perspective which necessarily entails that "it could have been otherwise" within the context of this universe.

To say, “it could have been otherwise,” or, “I could have chosen otherwise,” means, to the compatibilist using modal logic, “I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.”

If the compatibilist actually means “I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different", then that is what the compatibilist should say instead of "I could have chosen otherwise."

But “would” presupposes “could.” If I could not have done otherwise, then obviously I would not have done otherwise.

I expect that the nomological determinist can agree wholeheartedly with the would have expression. Indeed, that manner of expression well captures the nomological determinist notion that all contexts are fully determinate and without indeterminateness whatsoever - specifically the indeterminateness associated with the experience of choosing, i.e., selecting amongst alternatives (which are, after all, and from the determinist perspective, nothing but illusions or fancies of the imagination).

Well I certainly contest that. Faced with Coke vs. Pepsi at a vending machine, the possible choice of Pepsi is very real, not an illusion at all. But I must choose one or the other (by hypothesis for simplicity’s sake; I could choose both), and if I choose Pepsi, that means I wanted to do so based on determined antecedents, including the workings of my own mind. The fact that I did not choose Pepsi does not mean I lacked the power to do so; literally nothing would stay my hand to choose it. By contrast, the hard determinist says I could not choose it, and I see no reason to believe this at all.

My position has been that if determinism REALLY precluded (compatibilist) free will, then if I tried to choose Pepsi the Invisible Hand of Hard Determinism would stay my hand, guide it back in the direction of Coke, and say, “Nope, nope, you must choose this!”

 

[pood]

I’d say that the term “nomological determinist” is redundant in this context, since it really just means physical or causal determinism, as distinct from other types of determinism such as epistemic, logical, or relativistic determinism.

As mentioned, if you want to invoke the concept of nomicity, I think the key question is whether nomological determinism entails nomological necessity. Such necessity, if it can be had, is what the hard determinist needs to support his claim that my choosing Coke over Pepsi is somehow necessitated. Logical necessity will not support the claim.

Are you of the opinion that — for example — your choosing the Packers to defeat the Lions in Week 14 was somehow nomologically necessary? And if so, how would you justify that claim? Simply appealing to hard determinism would be circular.

 

[Elixir]

You guys would make terrible football announcers.
"They need to call time out!"
"They can't, yet!"
"Why not? Time's running out, if they don't call it now this will be the last play! It's fourth and ONE!"
"They don't want to because -"
"That's it. They should have kicked the field goal on third down."
"But that would have meant completely different conditions, with seconds still on the clock!"
"BUT THEY LOST!"
"There's no guarantee they would have won -"
"But it's guaranteed they would have lost, if they did what they did do. At least they could have won!"
<producer breaks in and sends it to commercial>
.