“Reality Goes Beyond Physics,” and more

[pood]

We are not talking about many worlds or there rather than here, which is just another lame excuse for observed reality. All you are doing is trying desperately to give determinism a bad rap due to your dislike for the implications.

This is classic ad hominem. I will start reporting all your ad hom posts if you keep this up.

You and your damn ad homs. You are no saint Pood. You have done more to purposely hurt me in the last decade than I could ever do to you. Your threats don’t scare me. I still am trying to understand your apparent unwillingness to see why logical necessity, according to modal logic, does not mean anyone, given the same exact circumstances, could do otherwise, which is what this whole argument is centered on.

Do not do ad hominem again, or I will start reporting all your ad hom posts. There have literally been dozens of them.

Go for it if it gives you greater satisfaction.

And doing what gives me greater satisfaction — that is, doing what I want to do, free of coercion or restraint, including from external forces or the past — is … compatibilism.

No, that is not the definition used in this debate. It's a bait and switch that you're proposing. Free will is the ability to choose otherwise, not the freedom (no external constraint) to weigh options. We have this attribute, and free of coercion is only half of the definition. We have internal as well as external constraint based on conscious and unconscious factors. Free from coercion is a colloquial expression used by the general public. Appearances are often wrong, and it is wrong to think that there is no compulsion to choose what is preferable when the very act of contemplation proves this to be the case or we wouldn't contemplate, ponder, ruminate, reflect, or think over. What would be the point of this attribute if not to decide our preferences where there can only be one possible choice each moment in time? This is the reason free will is a realistic mirage.

So you are asking, what would be the point of us contemplating, pondering, ruminating, reflecting, or thinking things over to decide our preferences, if there can be only possible choice each moment in time? If you mean by “one possible choice,” that some choices are mutually exclusive, that would be one thing; but that is not what you mean — you mean only one choice is possible to us, because we lack the will to freely choose. And so, yes, I have asked DBT the same question, and it is for YOU and HIM to answer, and not me — how did we evolve the ability to contemplate, ponder, ruminate, reflect, and think things over about what we will choose, when in reality we have no choice at all?

 

[pood]

... it makes perfect logical sense ...

Does it make sense in context? Does it make sense in all contexts? If it does not make sense in some context, can it still be logical in that context? Is it logical to say that something makes perfect logical sense and that it does not make sense in some of the same context(s) in which it makes perfect logical sense?

Not sure what post of mine you are referring to here.

#133

I stand by what I wrote. If the future is fixed, that is no more of a problem for compatibilist free will than the fixity of the past, because fixity is not fatalism. The song lyric goes, “What will be, will be,” not, “What will be, MUST be.”

 

[pood]

If it is not logically impossible for me to choose Pepsi instead of Coke — and it isn’t — then my choosing Coke was a contingent fact about the world and could have been otherwise.

If it is supposedly situationally impossible for you to choose Pepsi instead of Coke even with both Pepsi and Coke within your able reach, then does the question of logical possibility/impossibility matter at all?

Because you have not demonstrated any such “situational impossibility.” This would just be another name for what I talked about upthread, the concept of nomological, as opposed to logical, necessity. Unless one can establish nomological necessity, the hard determinist stand does not stand.

Incorrect. Logically, modally, hard determinism has not been demonstrated to be not possibly true. Likewise, it is proper to regard a situational impossibility as possibly true.

Of course there are situational impossibilities if by that we mean, for instance, it is not possible for me to sprout wings and fly, or to wish myself to teleport to the moon. However, here again, even these extreme cases are not logical impossibilities. But, now, if you wish to argue that it is situationally impossible for me to choose Pepsi over Coke, this is far different from saying it is situationally impossible for me to sprout wings and fly. You now have an extraordinary claim that demands extraordinary evidence, because I know full well that I can choose Pepsi anytime I want but that I cannot sprout wings and fly.

 

[peacegirl]

If it is not logically impossible for me to choose Pepsi instead of Coke — and it isn’t — then my choosing Coke was a contingent fact about the world and could have been otherwise.

If it is supposedly situationally impossible for you to choose Pepsi instead of Coke even with both Pepsi and Coke within your able reach, then does the question of logical possibility/impossibility matter at all?

Because you have not demonstrated any such “situational impossibility.” This would just be another name for what I talked about upthread, the concept of nomological, as opposed to logical, necessity. Unless one can establish nomological necessity, the hard determinist stand does not stand.

Of course it does. These definitions mean very little when seen for what they are. Logical necessity only means that under different conditions, another choice could be made (which no determinist denies, therefore it proves nothing insofar as whether a choice could have been otherwise in retrospect, which is the whole point of this discussion) versus a rock rolling down a hill that never changes because it cannot oppose gravity.

 

[pood]

Further, MIchael, please note that you cannot appeal to hard determinism to justify the claim that it is situationally impossible for me to choose Pepsi over Coke because that would be to beg the question.

 

[peacegirl]

... it makes perfect logical sense ...

Does it make sense in context? Does it make sense in all contexts? If it does not make sense in some context, can it still be logical in that context? Is it logical to say that something makes perfect logical sense and that it does not make sense in some of the same context(s) in which it makes perfect logical sense?

Not sure what post of mine you are referring to here.

#133

I stand by what I wrote. If the future is fixed, that is no more of a problem for compatibilist free will than the fixity of the past, because fixity is not fatalism. The song lyric goes, “What will be, will be,” not, “What will be, MUST be.”

What will be will be is true when defined properly. It does not mean that what will be MUST BE unless you want it to be. You are included in the decision making and are a central participant in what you accomplish or don't. I think people believe determinism is taking away one's motivation to reach a goal, but that's not true. It only takes away the pride of accomplishing something of one's own free will. We can only look back and say that something was predestined because there is no predictive value beforehand that can be 100% accurate.

 

[pood]

“Situational impossibility” is just another term for physical impossibility. Some things are physically impossible.

Here are three things that are logically possible:

That I sprout wings and fly.
That I teleport myself to the moon by mere wish.
That I choose Pepsi over Coke.

Here are two things that are physically impossible:

That I sprout wings and fly.
That I teleport myself to the moon by mere wish.

“That I choose Pepsi over Coke” is not on the second list. If one wishes to put it there, one owes a strong argument that cannot appeal back to hard determinism, which is the very point of contention.

 

[pood]

... it makes perfect logical sense ...

Does it make sense in context? Does it make sense in all contexts? If it does not make sense in some context, can it still be logical in that context? Is it logical to say that something makes perfect logical sense and that it does not make sense in some of the same context(s) in which it makes perfect logical sense?

Not sure what post of mine you are referring to here.

#133

I stand by what I wrote. If the future is fixed, that is no more of a problem for compatibilist free will than the fixity of the past, because fixity is not fatalism. The song lyric goes, “What will be, will be,” not, “What will be, MUST be.”

What will be will be is true when defined properly. It does not mean that what will be MUST BE unless you want it to be. You are included in the decision making and are a central participant in what you accomplish or don't.

Right. That is compatibilism.

 

[pood]

“I am a central participant in what I accomplish or don’t.” Exactly! I am the efficient and final cause of my acts, and I need determinism (distinct from hard determinism) to ensure that my choices are causally effectuated by me (as opposed to the big bang).

 

[peacegirl]

“I am a central participant in what I accomplish or don’t.” Exactly! I am the efficient and final cause of my acts, and I need determinism (distinct from hard determinism) to ensure that my choices are causally effectuated by me (as opposed to the big bang).

You're misconstruing what it means to have no free will. Yes, looking back, everything that happened had to happen going back to when this universe began. IOW, if we could go back in time and look at everyone's life before they were born and before their parents were born and so on and so forth, we would be able to identify what led people to make the choices they did. But the Big Bang does not directly have anything to do with the choices you are making in the here and now. You are leaving out what it means to base your decisions on contingent factors that play a huge role in your present choices but when you say you are the final cause, this only means that nothing has the power to force you, against your will, to make a choice that you don't want to make, not even determinism.

This is another reason why some people resent the thought that man’s will is not free, for how is it humanly possible to be proud of anything they have done unless they believe consciously or unconsciously in freedom of the will? In actual reality, no one is taking this achievement away from Durant, for this is certainly a worthwhile accomplishment. The only thing we are taking away is his pride that he did it of his own free will. For the first time, he is made to realize that God pushed him in this direction, which is the truth.

 

[pood]

“I am a central participant in what I accomplish or don’t.” Exactly! I am the efficient and final cause of my acts, and I need determinism (distinct from hard determinism) to ensure that my choices are causally effectuated by me (as opposed to the big bang).

You're misconstruing what it means to have no free will. Yes, looking back, everything that happened had to happen going back to when this universe began.

No, it did not have to happen. It just did happen.

 

[peacegirl]

“I am a central participant in what I accomplish or don’t.” Exactly! I am the efficient and final cause of my acts, and I need determinism (distinct from hard determinism) to ensure that my choices are causally effectuated by me (as opposed to the big bang).

You're misconstruing what it means to have no free will. Yes, looking back, everything that happened had to happen going back to when this universe began.

No, it did not have to happen. It just did happen.

Nah, looking back it had to have happened exactly as it did unless you believe there is an alternate world where the laws of this world don't apply.

 

[pood]

“I am a central participant in what I accomplish or don’t.” Exactly! I am the efficient and final cause of my acts, and I need determinism (distinct from hard determinism) to ensure that my choices are causally effectuated by me (as opposed to the big bang).

You're misconstruing what it means to have no free will. Yes, looking back, everything that happened had to happen going back to when this universe began.

No, it did not have to happen. It just did happen.

Nah, looking back it had to have happened exactly as it did unless you are pretending that there is another world where the laws of this world don't apply.

Laws don’t govern the world, they describe it.

 

[peacegirl]

“I am a central participant in what I accomplish or don’t.” Exactly! I am the efficient and final cause of my acts, and I need determinism (distinct from hard determinism) to ensure that my choices are causally effectuated by me (as opposed to the big bang).

You're misconstruing what it means to have no free will. Yes, looking back, everything that happened had to happen going back to when this universe began.

No, it did not have to happen. It just did happen.

Nah, looking back it had to have happened exactly as it did unless you are pretending that there is another world where the laws of this world don't apply.

Laws don’t govern the world, they describe it.

Laws that describe govern as well. We cannot move against the laws that we are part of. That does not mean the laws tell us what to do; but we are bound by them with absolutely no choice of our own.

 

[pood]

The claim that the world had to happen just as it did conflicts not just with logic, but with quantum mechanics.

 

[pood]

“I am a central participant in what I accomplish or don’t.” Exactly! I am the efficient and final cause of my acts, and I need determinism (distinct from hard determinism) to ensure that my choices are causally effectuated by me (as opposed to the big bang).

You're misconstruing what it means to have no free will. Yes, looking back, everything that happened had to happen going back to when this universe began.

No, it did not have to happen. It just did happen.

Nah, looking back it had to have happened exactly as it did unless you are pretending that there is another world where the laws of this world don't apply.

Laws don’t govern the world, they describe it.

Laws that describe govern as well. We cannot move against the laws that we are part of. That does not mean the laws tell us what to do; but we are bound by them with absolutely no choice of our own.

Funny then that I am “bound” by the “law” of gravity, but that didn’t stop us from landing on the moon or sending spacecraft to distant planets and even beyond the solar system. But there is a sense in which reality constrains us — how we are constrained, for example, to send spacecraft to distant worlds based on the fact of delayed-time seeing.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Further, MIchael, please note that you cannot appeal to hard determinism to justify the claim that it is situationally impossible for me to choose Pepsi over Coke because that would be to beg the question.

The first thing I want to note is that I am going to speak in terms of situationally not-possible instead of situationally impossible so that impossibility can be reserved as a modal necessity.

With that out of the way, it is also to be noted that I am not "appeal[ing] to hard determinism to justify the claim that it is situationally [not-]possible for [you] to choose Pepsi over Coke". As discussed previously, determinism (simpliciter shall we say?) refers in its assertions to a context which is utterly determinate, devoid of any indeterminateness that is ever relevant. Block spacetime is not a necessary aspect for or consequence of this determinism, but block spacetime is compatible with that determinism.

If there is any distinction between that described determinism and hard determinism, I guess that occurs when the question of free will, freedom, and such matters is raised. That would be to say that freedom is not necessary for the description/definition of determinism. But, when the freedom issue is raised, the hard determinist claim is that freedom is precluded under determinism whereas the soft determinist claim is that freedom is compatible with determinism of the simpliciter variety.

The truth of both hard and soft determinism, i.e., the truth of hard determinism and compatibilism, depends on the truth of determinism simpliciter. If determinism simpliciter is not possibly true, then hard determinism is not possibly true, and compatibilism is not possibly true. Contextually, under determinism simpliciter, all situations are everywhere and everywhen fully determinate, devoid of any relevant indeterminateness, regardless of whether block spacetime is actually true.

To say that in a given situation it is an always determinate matter that you drink the Pepsi even though the Coke (or the Thumbs Up, or the Sprite, or the Mountain Dew, or the Barq's, or whatever) is present, is to say that it is situationally not-possible for you to drink the otherwise than Pepsi.

So, you see, there is no MUST; there is no appeal to or dependence upon the truth of hard determinism. Furthermore, given that the truth of compatibilism depends on the truth of determinism simpliciter, if it is situationally not-possible for you to drink the otherwise than Pepsi under determinism simpliciter, then it is situationally not-possible for you to drink the otherwise than Pepsi under compatibilism.

I do not see anything in the above which a compatibilist would (should?) find objectionable. It still gives room for the compatibilist to say, "Ah, but I am free because - or insofar as - I am not coerced, and an utter determinateness devoid of relevant indeterminateness is not sufficient for establishing that I am coerced." Of course, it is not modally necessary to regard freedom/being free in that way. But that is a separate issue.

 

[pood]

Further, MIchael, please note that you cannot appeal to hard determinism to justify the claim that it is situationally impossible for me to choose Pepsi over Coke because that would be to beg the question.

The first thing I want to note is that I am going to speak in terms of situationally not-possible instead of situationally impossible so that impossibility can be reserved as a modal necessity.

First, what is the difference between “situationally not-possible” and “situationally impossible”?

With that out of the way, it is also to be noted that I am not "appeal[ing] to hard determinism to justify the claim that it is situationally [not-]possible for [you] to choose Pepsi over Coke". As discussed previously, determinism (simpliciter shall we say?) refers in its assertions to a context which is utterly determinate, devoid of any indeterminateness that is ever relevant.

Right, and part of the deterministic stream are humans determining choices.

Block spacetime is not a necessary aspect for or consequence of this determinism, but block spacetime is compatible with that determinism.

It is also compatible with compatibilism, which, after all, is also deterministic.

If there is any distinction between that described determinism and hard determinism, I guess that occurs when the question of free will, freedom, and such matters is raised. That would be to say that freedom is not necessary for the description/definition of determinism. But, when the freedom issue is raised, the hard determinist claim is that freedom is precluded under determinism whereas the soft determinist claim is that freedom is compatible with determinism of the simpliciter variety.

The truth of both hard and soft determinism, i.e., the truth of hard determinism and compatibilism, depends on the truth of determinism simpliciter. If determinism simpliciter is not possibly true, then hard determinism is not possibly true, and compatibilism is not possibly true. Contextually, under determinism simpliciter, all situations are everywhere and everywhen fully determinate, devoid of any relevant indeterminateness, regardless of whether block spacetime is actually true.

I suppose it should be noted at this point that determinism is not actually true, under Copenhagen quantum mechanics.

To say that in a given situation it is an always determinate matter that you drink the Pepsi even though the Coke (or the Thumbs Up, or the Sprite, or the Mountain Dew, or the Barq's, or whatever) is present, is to say that it is situationally not-possible for you to drink the otherwise than Pepsi.

This is not an argument. I determine that I drink Pepsi (or Coke or whatever) and I could just as easily determined to drink something else, being part of the deterministic stream and all. You owe an argument otherwise, and you are not giving one.

So, you see, there is no MUST; there is no appeal to or dependence upon the truth of hard determinism. Furthermore, given that the truth of compatibilism depends on the truth of determinism simpliciter, if it is situationally not-possible for you to drink the otherwise than Pepsi under determinism simpliciter, then it is situationally not-possible for you to drink the otherwise than Pepsi under compatibilism.

But it’s not situationally impossible to drink whatever I want.

I do not see anything in the above which a compatibilist would (should?) find objectionable. It still gives room for the compatibilist to say, "Ah, but I am free because - or insofar as - I am not coerced, and an utter determinateness devoid of relevant indeterminateness is not sufficient for establishing that I am coerced." Of course, it is not modally necessary to regard freedom/being free in that way. But that is a separate issue.

We are free to choose as we please, because we are part of the deterministic stream.

 

[pood]

As these discussion always go, we are chasing our tails round the mulberry bush, so to say. Just because I do not do that which is within my physical power to do, does not mean that I CANNOT do that thing. Certainly I CAN reach for the Pepsi, instead of the Coke, in a way that I CANNOT sprout wings and fly. It is both logically and physically possible for me to do that, even if I NEVER do so. This seems so obvious to me that it borders on being self-evident. The fact, if it is a fact, that I will ALWAYS choose Coke, based on genetics, upbringing, or anything else, does not obviate the fact that it is within my power, logically and physically, to choose Pepsi instead.

 

[DBT]

Determinism doesn’t eliminate choices, it generates options, and brains are able to choose among those options. A rock cannot choose what to do after being pushed down a hill. Humans can try to break or avoid or ease the fall, and will. The hard determinists owes an explanation of the difference between rocks and animals. Granted some of our survival behaviors are instinctual and reflexive, but others are clearly a matter of planning, thinking and choosing. And, as one of the referenced articles indicates, the hard determinist owes an explanation of how future human behavior was encoded at the Big Bang, or the Last Scattering Surface, as the article would have it. I asked this a number of times and never received a satisfactory explanation as to how, for example, the jazz improv composer did not create his piece — rather, it was created by Hard Determinism. This is the hard determinist Jerry Coyne’s stance, who also calls humans “meat robots.” This view of hard determinism seems quasi-theological to me, and also a category error itself — determinism is a description of how things broadly go at the classical scale, and never a prescription.

If any other members would care to go down this rabbit hole, feel free.

If choice is defined as permitting someone to take any one of a number of possible actions in any given instance in time, that is not determinism. And if a compatibilist believes that, they are not a compatibilist, they are a Libertarian.

I’ve addressed this many times. You need not agree with what I say, but it would be nice if you would address the substance of it.

I have addressed the substance of it.

Essentially, that is inner necessity that negates the Compatibilists definition of free will and makes Compatibilism a failed argument.

The standard compatibilist position (there are variations, such as neo-Humean compatibilism) is that if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always choose X. The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise. As I have tried to explain, this must be understood in terms of modalities — the modalities of actuality, contingency, and necessity. The only necessarily true propositions are those that cannot be false under any circumstances; it can never be false that triangles have three sides, for example.

If I choose x — Coke, say, over Pepsi — I am acting on a string of precise antecedents that motivated my choice. But if y is Pepsi, it is clearly within my power, at the time of choice, to choose y — it’s right there in the refrigerator, at my fingertips. Hard determinism is not an agent that stays my hand to prevent me from choosing Pepsi. It’s just that given the relevant antecedents, I choose Coke because I want to, and not because I have to.

The options exist, but what is selected by someone in any given instance is determined, not freely willed or chosen.

The error, of course, is to overlook the fact that I, as the chooser, am part of the deterministic stream, and it is therefore I myself who determines what I choose, based on relevant antecedents.

That's the very thing I don't do.

As an incompatibilist I point out that the decision maker is inseparable from the deterministic stream.

Consequently, every decision and action must proceed as determined, without deviation or the possibility of alternate decisions (which would make it a genuine choice) or actions.

At dinner, where according your taste and proclivities, in the instance of decision making you select steak and red wine, while your wife selects salad and white wine, each according to their tastes and needs.

Right, which is perfectly compatible with compatibilism.

But still wrong to label these necessitated decisions and actions as examples of free will.

Inner necessity, where the decision maker and their actions are inseparable from the deterministic stream of events is hardly a matter of free will, hence incompatibilism.

The very point I am trying to get you to address is, what do you mean by “inner necessitation” and “necessity”? Is there some form of “necessity” different from logical necessity? Surely you would not argue, I hope, that if I choose Coke over Pepsi, it was logically necessary that I do so? Surely I can imagine a world, different from our own, in which I choose Pepsi, without bringing about a logical contradiction? Surely I cannot imagine any world, different from our own, in which triangles have more or less than three sides, or in which bachelors are married? Therefore you must be positing some form of nomological necessity, and I am asking, where in the world is there such a necessity?

Necessity or necessitation is just another way of saying 'determinism,' as is constant conjunction, where event B necessary follows from event A.

The point is that a deterministic system only has one possible outcome, which is determined by antecedents in any given instance of decision making.

Which is why compatibilists define free will as acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced....and not the ability to freely select any one of aapparent options in any given instance.

Which is not how determinism is defined.