“Reality Goes Beyond Physics,” and more

[Michael S. Pearl]

Determinism means events reliably follow causes. This means an event is determined at the time of its cause. How else could it possibly be?

I mentioned somewhere that the hard determinist and biologist Jerry Coyne, at his blog, once recounted how he told an improv jazz musician that he didn’t compose his piece — hard determinism did. As Coyne relates it, the musician got so angry at this that he nearly attacked Coyne, until Richard Dawkins intervened to prevent fisticuffs.

First of all, I remember when Coyne wrote about that at his blog. Don't get me wrong, he has plenty of stuff there that I enjoy. However, when it comes to philosophical thinking, well, he has never struck me as especially adept (by the way, I regard philosophical thinking as distinct from - and more broadly useful than - philosophy in the more formal sense). Consequently, my reaction to Coyne's apparent pride in his tale was along the more immediate line of: What does the apparent pride in speaking to the musician in that way say about the character of the person doing the speaking? But then I decided to regard that as the sort of blip we all likely have in our persons at some time. Nonetheless, I am always repulsed whenever I recall that story. Frankly, if what Coyne expressed necessarily (in the sense of unavoidably) followed from holding to any sort of determinism, I would expect any right thinking person to regard Coyne's view as sufficient reason for dismissing that determinism - - even if that determinism is not just possibly true but actually true. As I have indicated, I do not think what Coyne expressed is an unavoidable consequence of asserting determinism. But maybe I am being excessively charitable towards determinism and its proponents. HehHeh.

Okay, so now back to our topic. Specifically, a semantic issue. The use of "is determined at the time of its cause" (and, yes, I know you posted a link to the Ellis paper about types of causes such that "cause" here has some ambiguity to it, but that does not yet matter) gives the impression that prior to that time, the event is not determined (meta)physically. If prior to being determined, the event is said to be not determined (as would make sense semantically given your manner of expression), the question then regards whether being (meta)physically not-determined means that there can be more than one possibility for what event/context/condition can (meta)physically follow from any prior determined state.

If, (meta)physically, there is not one and only one context possibility which follows with (let us say) sequential immediacy from each context/condition, then why describe that sequence as deterministic? The term deterministic does not strike me as a particularly good or as the most suitable term given the most common ways determinism is characterized. But, be that as it may, since no (interesting) concept has only one manner of expression, determinism and deterministic can be eschewed in favor of discussion in terms that characterize the sequencing of contexts and whether or not there is always only one possible context which unavoidably follows from any given already actual context. If options are actual, then, for reasons previously discussed, it would make no (semantic) sense to assert that only one possible context unavoidably follows (with sequential immediacy) from any given already actual context. If what is being asserted is that there is always only one possible context which unavoidably so follows from any given already actual context, then more appropriate and accurate than "is determined at the time of its cause" would be "is actualized at the time of its cause". To assert options is to assert actual indeterminateness, and I am unaware of any form of determinism which admits to (meta)physical indeterminateness at what I have referred to as human level.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Such free will only requires that it is within my power to ACTUALIZE past, preset, and future, and not CHANGE them.

I am only addressing the above remark, because I think I have sufficiently addressed the MUST/HAVE TO and WILL topic. When you say such free will, you are, of course, essentially indicating awareness that the referenced sort of "free will" is not a modally necessary depiction of free will or even free.

 

[pood]

Michael, I’ll respond to your posts above later, probably tomorrow when I have a bit more time, but I just wanted to remark about something else Coyne wrote that amused me. A few years back, Coyne, the hard determinist, wrote in a huff on his blog that someone had struck and damaged his parked car when he was not around and failed to leave a note or any contact information. A religious person (doubling the amusement) asked what his beef was, since on Coyne’s own metaphysics, the guy who hit his car was hard-determined to do so, and moreover hard-determined not to leave a note! Well, Coyne metaphorically stamped his foot and said something to the effect that, of course, but if enough people are hard-determined enough NOT to hit cars and also fail to leave a note, they may stop doing that! But, of course, whether enough peoole will be hard-determined that way has already been hard-determined on his own logic!

The upshot being that in real life, Coyne doesn’t act as if he believes in. hard determinism at all.

 

[pood]

The deeper point being that on hard determinism, people must reject basic desert. And if you reject basic desert, you wouldn’t kvetch about someone hitting your car and failing to leave a note, nor would you praise anyone for being good or smart, the latter of which Coyne also does all the time. I guess all we can say is that on his own metaphysics, Coyne is hard-determined to constantly contradict himself!

 

[pood]

@peacegirl, this is where you have an opening, because your author rejects dessert. But note there is a huge literature on this. Your author did not think of it first.

 

[pood]

lol @ above, not “dessert” but “desert.” Gotta disable this stupid auto-correct.

 

[pood]

Though maybe the author rejected dessert as well. Dunno.

 

[bilby]

You are saying that I don't make decisions, because I am a deterministic system, and so therefore cannot make decisions.

Determinism denies that it is ever as yet undetermined what the person will do; determinism denies the (meta)physical actuality of - but not the experience or sense of there being - human-level indeterminateness.

PRE-determinism denies that it is as yet undetermined that …

Pre-determinism is not the same as determinism.

An event is “determined” at the time it happens — although, as I argued above, it is perfectly OK for future contingent propositions to be true in advance of the event they describe.

But, now, say, the block universe theory is true, and the future exists along with the past and the present. In such a case, it is, so to say, “already” determined what I will do tomorrow, next week, next decade, what have you. To which I say, so what? It is still YOU doing the determining, at those times. Is it possible to CHANGE, somehow, what you will do in the future? No, anymore than it is possible to change what you already did in the past, but free will, as I discussed earlier, does not require you to be able to change anything, only to make things be, as they actually are.

It might be illustrative to "flip the script".

How well do you think you would get on in court, if your lawyer's defence was:

My client is charged that, on October 23rd 2024, he did wilfully murder Mr Smith. Your honour, this charge is absurd. The 23rd of October is in the past, and therefore cannot be altered in any way. Therefore clearly my client cannot have done anything on that date wilfully. I submit that the charges should be dismissed.​

Clearly this is nonsense. That the past is immutable tells us nothing about whether an act taken in the past was wilful or not.

Equally, that the future is immutable must therefore also tell us nothing about whether acts taken in the future are wilful or not.

 

[bilby]

You have to understand how thermodynamics is applied, I used it. It is not just idle theory.

Imagine a bubble around the Earth. Matter and energy leave and enter the bubble. Radiation from space comes in, radiation leaves the bubble. Matter such as meteors co me in, atmosphere escapes.

Conservation says the energy and mass leaving, the energy and mass entering. and the energy and mass stored in the bubble have to always add up, like a checking account.It is as simple as that.

That is the worst attempt to describe conservation laws I have ever seen. Each and every part of it is wrong.

 

[steve_bank]

Clan your eyeglasses and it should become clear.

I can only do so much of this before I start to tire of it .None of it is provable, it is all speculation.

 

[aupmanyav]

All trains run on time.

That is nice. Kudos to that system. But check the time-table. Are the departure times the same. Does the Northbound train departs from Platform #1.
That could be the reason.

 

[bilby]

All trains run on time.

That is nice. Kudos to that system. But check the time-table. Are the departure times the same.

Trains run regularly at one hour intervals in each direction.

Does the Northbound train departs from Platform #1.
That could be the reason.

No, it couldn't.

"All the information is in the task" - Alex Horne

 

[aupmanyav]

In any case, it does not matter whether or not the universe extends infinitely into the past. It may, or it may not. It could have had a different form before the big bang, or not. If it did not, the universe is still eternal.

I agree with you there. Whether manifest or not, Energy/Brahman, is likely to be eternal. The rules are there, whatever they be. Is there a time when Brahman is not manifested? Something like 'Pralaya' (the Great Dissolution), which the Hindus talk about? I am intrigued by the name of the serpent on which Lord Vishnu is supposed to rest after the great dissolution, 'Shesha Naga'. 'Shesha' means the remainder. So, let us search. In the process, we may learn new things.

 

[DBT]

When DBT repeatedly brings up “inner necessity” to claim we do not have compatibilist freedom, I simply ask again and again: What kind of “necessity” is he talking about?

It cannot be logical necessity, for reasons I have given. So what IS this necessity of which he speaks? I hold that it does not exist — that the only form of necessity is logical necessity.

But it is true, of course, that people use language in a loose and often slipshod manner, so we might say, for instance, that it is “necessary” to eat a big breakfast if you are doing to do a hard day’s work. But it’s not necessary at all; it’s just advisable.

I have explained what I mean by inner necessity multiple time: determinism. It just means that the brain as the means and mechanism by which decisions are made determines what is decided in any given instance of decision making.

That decisions being determined by neural information processing are just as much a restriction on freedom of will as the external terms defined by compatibilism; being forced, coerced or unduly influenced.

So are you saying there is no distinction between a proposition like, “Today I chose Coke over Pepsi” and “all triangles have three sides”?

It's a false analogy.

The issue lies in the distinction between selection and choice.

That, given determinism, a distinction is to be made between decision making and choice. Whether a decision that is necessarily made - determined - is a matter of choice.

This has nothing to do with triangles.

Freely choosing requires the possibility of taking an alternate option in any given instance of decision making.
Determinism does not permit alternate actions in any given instance of decision making, consequently, decisions that are made within a deterministic system are not an example choice.

So it’s not logically necessary that I choose Coke over Pepsi?

The terms of determinism have you deciding the option determined by your proclivities in relation to your circumstances and the options being presented.

A decision is made, but being inevitable/determined, a decision within a deterministic system is not a choice.

That is according to your constant conjunction, where each event is set by its antecedents, which includes the thought process that leads to the decision you make in any given situation.

 

[DBT]

PRE-determinism denies that it is as yet undetermined that …

Pre-determinism is not the same as determinism.

If pre-determinism is not the same as determinism, or if pre-determinism is not a variety of determinism, then is the distinction supposed to be that according to determinism (at the level of and in the context of human experience) there are matters that are (meta)physically undetermined? Does undetermined mean something other than not determined? If something is (meta)physically undetermined, does that mean there is - and it is an instance of - (meta)physical indeterminateness? Is the (meta)physical indeterminateness which humans sense ever an actual (meta)physical indeterminateness according to determinism? If that sensed/experienced indeterminateness is not actual according to determinism, then how is the determinism/pre-determinism alleged distinction at all relevant? If the sensed/experienced indeterminateness is actual (meta)physical indeterminateness according to determinism, then what is determinism other than the claim that what humans do is undetermined - a (meta)physically indeterminate matter - until humans resolve the indeterminateness?

Determinism means events reliably follow causes. This means an event is determined at the time of its cause. How else could it possibly be?

I mentioned somewhere that the hard determinist and biologist Jerry Coyne, at his blog, once recounted how he told an improv jazz musician that he didn’t compose his piece — hard determinism did. As Coyne relates it, the musician got so angry at this that he nearly attacked Coyne, until Richard Dawkins intervened to prevent fisticuffs.

I repeatedly cite this example because it is difficult for me to believe how anyone can believe what Coyne believes. If the improv jazz musician did not compose his piece, who or what did? Was it composed by the big bang, at the big bang?

How?

The hard determinist owes an answer to that question.

Of course it was composed by the composer, based on deterministic inputs that offered him a vast menu of options to choose from in composing the piece. You can say he composed just that piece because of just those antecedents, and — so? How else is he to compose the piece, except from determined antecedents? Out of thin air? By flipping a coin? Sure, had antecedents been different, he would have composed differently, because of different inputs, different choices offered, etc. But he composed the piece the way that he did, because that is how he wanted to compose, based on the antecedents that actually prevailed.

Determinism is neither hard or soft.

 

[Jarhyn]

determined by your proclivities

So, according to our own wants and desires. For which we are responsible. Because responding to them effectively eliminates or changes said provlivities (to the same extent responding to their precursors will in turn also eliminate, change or build proclivities).

The point being that today, they are not their preconditions but the proclivities themselves, and are part of the event of our choosing.

And when what we are doing is aligned not to our proclivities but the proclivities of something or someone else... We call that situation differently from the situation where there is no such leverage over is. One is constrained. The other is free.

Such is determined by the extent actions along with proclivities and by those proclivities others may discount or encourage us.

And when we lack the proclivity to filter our behavior based on whether our actions align with the proclivities of others, we say someone lacks personal responsibility, the ability to be a first responder not merely to others but self... And when this is the case, we act as if someone is incapable of moral action since they cannot preemptively filter their behavior to that end.

 

[pood]

When DBT repeatedly brings up “inner necessity” to claim we do not have compatibilist freedom, I simply ask again and again: What kind of “necessity” is he talking about?

It cannot be logical necessity, for reasons I have given. So what IS this necessity of which he speaks? I hold that it does not exist — that the only form of necessity is logical necessity.

But it is true, of course, that people use language in a loose and often slipshod manner, so we might say, for instance, that it is “necessary” to eat a big breakfast if you are doing to do a hard day’s work. But it’s not necessary at all; it’s just advisable.

I have explained what I mean by inner necessity multiple time: determinism. It just means that the brain as the means and mechanism by which decisions are made determines what is decided in any given instance of decision making.

That decisions being determined by neural information processing are just as much a restriction on freedom of will as the external terms defined by compatibilism; being forced, coerced or unduly influenced.

So are you saying there is no distinction between a proposition like, “Today I chose Coke over Pepsi” and “all triangles have three sides”?

It's a false analogy.

The issue lies in the distinction between selection and choice.

That, given determinism, a distinction is to be made between decision making and choice. Whether a decision that is necessarily made - determined - is a matter of choice.

This has nothing to do with triangles.

Freely choosing requires the possibility of taking an alternate option in any given instance of decision making.
Determinism does not permit alternate actions in any given instance of decision making, consequently, decisions that are made within a deterministic system are not an example choice.

So it’s not logically necessary that I choose Coke over Pepsi?

The terms of determinism have you deciding the option determined by your proclivities in relation to your circumstances and the options being presented.

Right.

A decision is made, but being inevitable/determined, a decision within a deterministic system is not a choice.

That is according to your constant conjunction, where each event is set by its antecedents, which includes the thought process that leads to the decision you make in any given situation.

So my choice is/is not logically necessary? If it is not, what other kind of “necessity” is it, because words like “inevitable” and “determined” are not synonyms for “necessary.”

 

[pood]

PRE-determinism denies that it is as yet undetermined that …

Pre-determinism is not the same as determinism.

If pre-determinism is not the same as determinism, or if pre-determinism is not a variety of determinism, then is the distinction supposed to be that according to determinism (at the level of and in the context of human experience) there are matters that are (meta)physically undetermined? Does undetermined mean something other than not determined? If something is (meta)physically undetermined, does that mean there is - and it is an instance of - (meta)physical indeterminateness? Is the (meta)physical indeterminateness which humans sense ever an actual (meta)physical indeterminateness according to determinism? If that sensed/experienced indeterminateness is not actual according to determinism, then how is the determinism/pre-determinism alleged distinction at all relevant? If the sensed/experienced indeterminateness is actual (meta)physical indeterminateness according to determinism, then what is determinism other than the claim that what humans do is undetermined - a (meta)physically indeterminate matter - until humans resolve the indeterminateness?

Determinism means events reliably follow causes. This means an event is determined at the time of its cause. How else could it possibly be?

I mentioned somewhere that the hard determinist and biologist Jerry Coyne, at his blog, once recounted how he told an improv jazz musician that he didn’t compose his piece — hard determinism did. As Coyne relates it, the musician got so angry at this that he nearly attacked Coyne, until Richard Dawkins intervened to prevent fisticuffs.

I repeatedly cite this example because it is difficult for me to believe how anyone can believe what Coyne believes. If the improv jazz musician did not compose his piece, who or what did? Was it composed by the big bang, at the big bang?

How?

The hard determinist owes an answer to that question.

Of course it was composed by the composer, based on deterministic inputs that offered him a vast menu of options to choose from in composing the piece. You can say he composed just that piece because of just those antecedents, and — so? How else is he to compose the piece, except from determined antecedents? Out of thin air? By flipping a coin? Sure, had antecedents been different, he would have composed differently, because of different inputs, different choices offered, etc. But he composed the piece the way that he did, because that is how he wanted to compose, based on the antecedents that actually prevailed.

Determinism is neither hard or soft.

Do you agree with fellow hard determinist Jerry Coyne that the improv jazz musician did not compose his piece?

 

[peacegirl]

PRE-determinism denies that it is as yet undetermined that …

Pre-determinism is not the same as determinism.

If pre-determinism is not the same as determinism, or if pre-determinism is not a variety of determinism, then is the distinction supposed to be that according to determinism (at the level of and in the context of human experience) there are matters that are (meta)physically undetermined? Does undetermined mean something other than not determined? If something is (meta)physically undetermined, does that mean there is - and it is an instance of - (meta)physical indeterminateness? Is the (meta)physical indeterminateness which humans sense ever an actual (meta)physical indeterminateness according to determinism? If that sensed/experienced indeterminateness is not actual according to determinism, then how is the determinism/pre-determinism alleged distinction at all relevant? If the sensed/experienced indeterminateness is actual (meta)physical indeterminateness according to determinism, then what is determinism other than the claim that what humans do is undetermined - a (meta)physically indeterminate matter - until humans resolve the indeterminateness?

Determinism means events reliably follow causes. This means an event is determined at the time of its cause. How else could it possibly be?

I mentioned somewhere that the hard determinist and biologist Jerry Coyne, at his blog, once recounted how he told an improv jazz musician that he didn’t compose his piece — hard determinism did. As Coyne relates it, the musician got so angry at this that he nearly attacked Coyne, until Richard Dawkins intervened to prevent fisticuffs.

I repeatedly cite this example because it is difficult for me to believe how anyone can believe what Coyne believes. If the improv jazz musician did not compose his piece, who or what did? Was it composed by the big bang, at the big bang?

How?

The hard determinist owes an answer to that question.

Of course it was composed by the composer, based on deterministic inputs that offered him a vast menu of options to choose from in composing the piece. You can say he composed just that piece because of just those antecedents, and — so? How else is he to compose the piece, except from determined antecedents? Out of thin air? By flipping a coin? Sure, had antecedents been different, he would have composed differently, because of different inputs, different choices offered, etc. But he composed the piece the way that he did, because that is how he wanted to compose, based on the antecedents that actually prevailed.

Determinism is neither hard or soft.

Do you agree with fellow hard determinist Jerry Coyne that the improv jazz musician did not compose his piece?

This response is so inadequate it makes me wonder where this is coming from. No determinist says this Pood. You cannot get away with this false representation of what determinism means!! It's crazy and is ruining progress!

 

[pood]

PRE-determinism denies that it is as yet undetermined that …

Pre-determinism is not the same as determinism.

If pre-determinism is not the same as determinism, or if pre-determinism is not a variety of determinism, then is the distinction supposed to be that according to determinism (at the level of and in the context of human experience) there are matters that are (meta)physically undetermined? Does undetermined mean something other than not determined? If something is (meta)physically undetermined, does that mean there is - and it is an instance of - (meta)physical indeterminateness? Is the (meta)physical indeterminateness which humans sense ever an actual (meta)physical indeterminateness according to determinism? If that sensed/experienced indeterminateness is not actual according to determinism, then how is the determinism/pre-determinism alleged distinction at all relevant? If the sensed/experienced indeterminateness is actual (meta)physical indeterminateness according to determinism, then what is determinism other than the claim that what humans do is undetermined - a (meta)physically indeterminate matter - until humans resolve the indeterminateness?

Determinism means events reliably follow causes. This means an event is determined at the time of its cause. How else could it possibly be?

I mentioned somewhere that the hard determinist and biologist Jerry Coyne, at his blog, once recounted how he told an improv jazz musician that he didn’t compose his piece — hard determinism did. As Coyne relates it, the musician got so angry at this that he nearly attacked Coyne, until Richard Dawkins intervened to prevent fisticuffs.

I repeatedly cite this example because it is difficult for me to believe how anyone can believe what Coyne believes. If the improv jazz musician did not compose his piece, who or what did? Was it composed by the big bang, at the big bang?

How?

The hard determinist owes an answer to that question.

Of course it was composed by the composer, based on deterministic inputs that offered him a vast menu of options to choose from in composing the piece. You can say he composed just that piece because of just those antecedents, and — so? How else is he to compose the piece, except from determined antecedents? Out of thin air? By flipping a coin? Sure, had antecedents been different, he would have composed differently, because of different inputs, different choices offered, etc. But he composed the piece the way that he did, because that is how he wanted to compose, based on the antecedents that actually prevailed.

Determinism is neither hard or soft.

Do you agree with fellow hard determinist Jerry Coyne that the improv jazz musician did not compose his piece?

This response is so inadequate it makes me wonder where this is coming from. No determinist says this Pood. You cannot get away with this false representation of what determinism means!! It's crazy and is ruining progress!

Again, I must ask, can you even read, or read for comprehension? I mean, look at the sentence! No determinist says this? The hard determinist Jerry Coyne said just that! And I am asking the hard determinist DBT whether he agrees with Jerry Coyne!