“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

[DBT]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

No doubt. It just doesn't relate all that well with the nature of determinism as it happens to be defined.

 

[pood]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

No doubt. It just doesn't relate all that well with the nature of determinism as it happens to be defined.

As you define it — hard determinism. I define it as soft determinism.

 

[peacegirl]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

You are making general statements in order to distinguish contingent from necessary, but this really doesn't relate to the individual movement from moment to moment in the direction of satisfaction. Of course, you can always say that a person could have chosen this instead of that IF HE HAD WANTED TO, but at that moment HE DIDN'T WANT TO, rendering any other choice, an impossibility, a realistic mirage that this possibility could have been chosen. Contingency only means that our decisions are based on what factors or antecedents we take into consideration. This whole argument of Swartz's centers around contingent versus necessary, which does not come close to proving that someone could have done otherwise or why a person was compelled to choose one thing over another. The purpose of contemplation itself is to decide which option is preferable or we wouldn't have this ability, but we have no control over our ultimate choice since it is a compulsion that pushes us in one direction only. We can't help but to move in the direction of what gives us greater satisfaction, which is Life's movement. We don't live in two parallel worlds where another choice, at that exact time and place, could have been made. It is obvious that a person's final choice will be contingent on what considerations he was grappling with to come to a decision. But, once again, to say that his choice, AT THAT MOMENT, could have been other than what it was because contingent truths allow for unrealized possibilities, is categorically false and just failed the litmus test.

 

[DBT]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

No doubt. It just doesn't relate all that well with the nature of determinism as it happens to be defined.

As you define it — hard determinism. I define it as soft determinism.

As compatibilists define it.

The given definition of determinism is not being disputed. I don't dispute it. To me it's just a question of whether the idea of free will as defined by compatibilists is compatible with their own definition of determinism, which I don't dispute.

Given the terms of their definition of free will, it may appear to be compatible with determinism, but is it a valid definition of free will?

That is the question, and the point of contention between compatibilism and incompatibilism.

 

[peacegirl]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

No doubt. It just doesn't relate all that well with the nature of determinism as it happens to be defined.

As you define it — hard determinism. I define it as soft determinism.

As compatibilists define it.

The given definition of determinism is not being disputed. I don't dispute it. To me it's just a question of whether the idea of free will as defined by compatibilists is compatible with their own definition of determinism, which I don't dispute.

Given the terms of their definition of free will, it may appear to be compatible with determinism, but is it a valid definition of free will?

That is the question, and the point of contention between compatibilism and incompatibilism.

Yes, as they define it, but definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned. Absolutely nothing. The definition of free will does not allow for this believed compatibility, if you carefully analyze it. If compatibilists were honest, they would not try to make it appear as if these two opposite ideologies were at all compatible because they are not, if you are thinking rationally. It's like saying we have free will and we don't have free will at the same time. One would cancel the other out. It's amazing to me how people don't get this. This IS trickery and people fall for it.

 

[DBT]

Whether compatibalism fails or not still doesn’t relate to 'light at the eye/instant vision,' transforming human nature or achieving world peace.

 

[peacegirl]

Whether compatibalism fails or not still doesn’t relate to 'light at the eye/instant vision,' transforming human nature or achieving world peace.

DBT, these are two different discoveries. His second discovery does play a part, but it's not the one that will prevent that for which blame and punishment were previously necessary. This is the two-sided equation, which people are either overlooking or handwaving away.