“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

[pood]

Our “inner forces” ARE us, in part, so we are not constrained by ourselves.

We most certainly are constrained by our inner forces which inform us what choice is in our best interest …

IOW, we inform ourselves what choice is in our best interest. Got it.

Of course we do. How do you make decisions without informing yourself what choice to make based on your options? What is so surprising about this Pood?

There is nothing surprising about it. I agree with. It’s called “compatibilist free will.”

 

[pood]

Compatibilism is just an effort to hold people responsible for their actions.

No, it isn’t. It’s the concept that free will is compatible with determinism, and says nothing about how we should design the criminal justice system, for example. Myself, I don’t believe in retributive justice. I believe if a man commits a crime, even a serious crime, he should be separated from society but held in humane conditions. They do this in Norway. I should imagine most hard determinists would agree with me on this, if they are consistent in their reasoning.

We cannot do otherwise and not do otherwise.

Of course we can’t. Who said we could both do, and not do something, at the same time? But you are obviously confused. What we are talking about is not doing and not doing something at the same time. We are talking about the fact that all contingent truths are timelessly contingent, which means that AFTER I pick Coke over Pepsi, my act, now in the past, could have been different. It will always remain true that I COULD have picked Pepsi.

 

[pood]

. I cannot move forward to show what happens when we extend these principles,

Of course you can move forward. I’ve already explained this to you, but you don’t listen.

“Man’s will is not free” is a PREMISE. In a philosophical discussion, what you want to do is first establish your argument: your premises, and what conclusion follows from them. Your interlocutors, if they themselves are versed in how philosophical discussions go, will accept your premises arguendo — for the sake of further discussion. It means that at this point, it does not matter whether your premises are true or not — what matters is whether your conclusion logically follows from the premises you present. If it does, the argument is held to be VALID. But, as I have explained, that is Step One.The next step is to ascertain whether your argument is SOUND — which means that not only must the conclusion logically follow from the stated premises, but that all the stated premises must be TRUE. It’s at this point we can discuss whether the premise “man’s will is not free” is true or not. We can accept all the premises arguendo for the time being.

 

[peacegirl]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

There is no modal fallacy. A definition of determinism is given.

A definition of HARD determinism is given, by you. As noted upthread, your whole argument is question-begging. My argument is also deterministic — soft determinism. The whole point in dispute is whether HARD determinism or SOFT determinism more accurately captures reality. You cannot legitimately incorporate your conclusion into your premise and claim victory.

Again, be it compatibilist or incompatibilist, the definition of determinism is the same. 'Hard determinism' just refers to incompatibilism, that the notion of free will is not compatible with determinism.

Either way, the given definition of determinism - being the same for both sides of the debate - does not permit alternate actions in either case.

If that's what you are trying to argue, the modal fallacy is yours.

It is you who have confused necessarily true propositions with contingently true propositions, hence the modal fallacy is yours, not mine. What you are arguing for is called modal collapse.

So, two fallacies: circular reasoning and modal fallacy.

Nah. In principle, this is not difficult.

The definition of determinism as given by either compatibilists or incompatibilists (being one the same definition), does not permit alternate actions, where it is the terms of the given definition of determinism that does not permit alternate actions.

For instance, where do you see the possibility of alternate actions within constant conjunction?

Where ''constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.''

Where does an alternate choice or action fit into constant conjunction?


''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. - Brittanica

Given how determinism is defined, how or where do you see the possibility of alternate actions or choices being present within the system?

Round and round the merry-go-round.

It is. With you as a willing participant.

The last question in the above bit I’ve already answered dozens of times over various threads.

I don't see that you have shown that alternate choices and actions are possible within a deterministic system, just as definined by the definition you endorsed. Which includes compatibilists in general.

Some of whom appear to argue for alternate actions regardless of the terms and conditions of their own definition of determinism........closet Libertarians as someone labelled them.

The thing is, you don’t generally respond to what others write. You just repeat your mantras about the “given” definition of determinism, which is not a given, then you cherry pick some quote or other, most often from compatibilists like David Hume. Then you call it a day. I see no reason to endlessly repeat answers I’ve already given. Suffice it to say you once again commit a standard modal fallacy, and long ago I gave you supporting material to help clarify this, and I’m sure you ignored it all.

It works both ways. It has been you and other compatibilists that tend to repeat the mantra of alternate actions within a deterministic system, which in turn compels me to point out - time and time again - that alternate choices actions contradict the terms and conditions of your very own definition of determinism.

You say that you and other compatibilists have given answers, and of course you have replied, but the problem is that the reply that you offer does nothing to address or explain the contradiction of claiming that alternate actions are possible within a deterministic system as you define it to be.

So I ask again: how is an alternate choice or action possible in the face of inevitability? Which means everything that happens within a deterministic system, happens necessarily, inevitably, implacably

Our “inner forces” ARE us, in part, so we are not constrained by ourselves.

We most certainly are constrained by our inner forces which inform us what choice is in our best interest …

IOW, we inform ourselves what choice is in our best interest. Got it.

Of course we do. How do you make decisions without informing yourself what choice to make based on your options? What is so surprising about this Pood?

There is nothing surprising about it. I agree with. It’s called “compatibilist free will.”

Compatibilist free will does not give you an alternate choice, once it's made. Before you make a choice, you have an option (A or B). If that's what you want to call that compatibilist free will, be my guest. But when you say a person didn't have to do what he did because he had a free choice, that's where you go off the rails. More importantly, the moral responsibility that you believe this person has and therefore is deserving of punishment only goes so far. Look what is happening in our world with the possibility of a nuclear accident. You asked me what good is this discovery if it doesn't help change anything. Everything takes an about face for the better, which will be the ultimate proof that neither compatibilist nor libertarian free will exists. Until then, we need blame and punishment because it's all we have, but there is a much better way to prevent that for which blame and punishment were previously necessary.

 

[DBT]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

There is no modal fallacy. A definition of determinism is given.

A definition of HARD determinism is given, by you. As noted upthread, your whole argument is question-begging. My argument is also deterministic — soft determinism. The whole point in dispute is whether HARD determinism or SOFT determinism more accurately captures reality. You cannot legitimately incorporate your conclusion into your premise and claim victory.

Again, be it compatibilist or incompatibilist, the definition of determinism is the same. 'Hard determinism' just refers to incompatibilism, that the notion of free will is not compatible with determinism.

Either way, the given definition of determinism - being the same for both sides of the debate - does not permit alternate actions in either case.

If that's what you are trying to argue, the modal fallacy is yours.

It is you who have confused necessarily true propositions with contingently true propositions, hence the modal fallacy is yours, not mine. What you are arguing for is called modal collapse.

So, two fallacies: circular reasoning and modal fallacy.

Nah. In principle, this is not difficult.

The definition of determinism as given by either compatibilists or incompatibilists (being one the same definition), does not permit alternate actions, where it is the terms of the given definition of determinism that does not permit alternate actions.

For instance, where do you see the possibility of alternate actions within constant conjunction?

Where ''constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.''

Where does an alternate choice or action fit into constant conjunction?


''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. - Brittanica

Given how determinism is defined, how or where do you see the possibility of alternate actions or choices being present within the system?

Round and round the merry-go-round.

It is. With you as a willing participant.

The last question in the above bit I’ve already answered dozens of times over various threads.

I don't see that you have shown that alternate choices and actions are possible within a deterministic system, just as definined by the definition you endorsed. Which includes compatibilists in general.

Some of whom appear to argue for alternate actions regardless of the terms and conditions of their own definition of determinism........closet Libertarians as someone labelled them.

The thing is, you don’t generally respond to what others write. You just repeat your mantras about the “given” definition of determinism, which is not a given, then you cherry pick some quote or other, most often from compatibilists like David Hume. Then you call it a day. I see no reason to endlessly repeat answers I’ve already given. Suffice it to say you once again commit a standard modal fallacy, and long ago I gave you supporting material to help clarify this, and I’m sure you ignored it all.

It works both ways. It has been you and other compatibilists that tend to repeat the mantra of alternate actions within a deterministic system, which in turn compels me to point out - time and time again - that alternate choices actions contradict the terms and conditions of your very own definition of determinism.

You say that you and other compatibilists have given answers, and of course you have replied, but the problem is that the reply that you offer does nothing to address or explain the contradiction of claiming that alternate actions are possible within a deterministic system as you define it to be.

So I ask again: how is an alternate choice or action possible in the face of inevitability? Which means everything that happens within a deterministic system, happens necessarily, inevitably, implacably

Our “inner forces” ARE us, in part, so we are not constrained by ourselves.

We most certainly are constrained by our inner forces which inform us what choice is in our best interest …

IOW, we inform ourselves what choice is in our best interest. Got it.

Of course we do. How do you make decisions without informing yourself what choice to make based on your options? What is so surprising about this Pood?

There is nothing surprising about it. I agree with. It’s called “compatibilist free will.”

Compatibilist free will does not give you an alternate choice, once it's made. Before you make a choice, you have an option (A or B). If that's what you want to call that compatibilist free will, be my guest. But when you say a person didn't have to do what he did because he had a free choice, therefore he's deserving of punishment, that's where you go off the rails and, more importantly, your blame and punishment doesn't help. You asked me what good is this discovery if it doesn't help change anything. Everything takes an about face for the better, which will be the ultimate proof that free will doesn't exist.

Compatibilitist free will fails to make a case for a number of reasons, including the notion that there is a choice before a decision is made. As there is no possibility of an alternate decision or action, the decision that is taken is inevitable, where if option A is determined, option B, C, D or whatever were never a possibility in that instance of decision making.

This is according the terms and conditions of determinism as defined by compatibilists.

 

[pood]

So I ask again: how is an alternate choice or action possible in the face of inevitability? Which means everything that happens within a deterministic system, happens necessarily, inevitably, implacably.

For the hundredth time: Because stuff in a deterministic system does NOT happen NECESSARILY. It happens CONTINGENTLY. (And I don’t care if Marvin Edwards endorsed yoiur version of physical necessity — I’m not Marvin Edwards. I recognize only LOGICAL necessity.)

Necessary truths are confined to those propositions that are true at all (logically) possible worlds, and false at no (logically) possible world.

“Triangles have three sides” is a NECESSARY truth — true at all possible worlds. It CANNOT be false.

“Today I picked Coke over Pepsi” is a CONTINGENT truth — true at some possible worlds, false at others. This just MEANS, as a matter of logic, that is possible for me to have picked Pepsi over Coke, even though in fact I picked Coke. And it will always remain true, even after the fact, that I COULD HAVE picked Pepsi, even though I picked Coke.

Humans in a deterministic system receive deterministic inputs that present an array of OPTIONS. All those options are fully within our power to choose. I chose Coke over Pepsi, but nothing — certainly not the invisible beast Hard Determinism — was staying my hand from picking Pepsi.

Since I can imagine a world in which I picked Pepsi without logical contradiction, my choosing Coke is by definition CONTINGENT — could have been otherwise, and WOULD HAVE been otherwise, under slightly different antecedent conditions.

Gravity operates universally and the same without known exception, but gravity is still a CONTINGENT truth about the world, because one can imagine, without logical contradiction, a world in which things fall up. So gravity is true at some possible worlds and false at others.

When I output the choice “Coke,” I am PART OF the deterministic system, and I, and I alone, deterministically output “Coke” as the end of a deterministic chain. I NEED determinism to be true in order to that, or anything, because otherwise none of my choices would be reliable.

Finallly, and to repeat yet again, this business about “you could not have done other than what you did,” stated after the fact, is a red herring, because there is only one time line, one history. This means that “could not have done otherwise” collapses to, “did not do otherwise,” and that is simply — compatibilism.

Because if we could replay the history of the world right up the the present moment, the EXACT history of the world, right up the present moment, and I still pick Coke — great! Why would I do otherwise? That is what I WANTED to do, at that time, under those conditions. Nothing in this experiment, if it hypothetically could be run, would empirically or logically show that I HAD TO pick Coke.

Of course, I have explained all this, many times.

 

[peacegirl]

Our “inner forces” ARE us, in part, so we are not constrained by ourselves.

We most certainly are constrained by our inner forces which inform us what choice is in our best interest …

IOW, we inform ourselves what choice is in our best interest. Got it.

Of course we do. How do you make decisions without informing yourself what choice to make based on your options? What is so surprising about this Pood?

There is nothing surprising about it. I agree with. It’s called “compatibilist free will.”

No, it is not. Just because we can choose between options is not equivalent to having the compatibilist free will to choose either/or, which is what you are saying. According to compatibilism, a person could have chosen B instead of A (when it comes to doing the right thing) because he had the free will to do so, right? Isn't that what your compatibilist free will means? You say that because our choices are contingent, that looking back we could have chosen another alternative. That is true but only if the conditions were different. We know that we can't prove that under the exact time and place, we could have chosen another option because in order to prove libertarian or compatibilist free will, we would have to undo what has already been done, which is impossible. What we can do is show that we are under a compulsion, every moment in time, to choose only that which [we believe] is the best possible choice given our limited knowledge and what options are available. How can you judge what is right for someone else when you are not them? Just follow me instead of jumping to the conclusion that without threats of punishment to deter people, the thieves and murderers would have a field day. I don't think you have understood anything I've posted because you don't want to, not because you aren't capable, or you are so ingrained with your belief that 1=1=11, that there is no chance in hell that I'm going to convince you that 1=1=2. The most I can do is plant a seed.

 

[pood]

This is according the terms and conditions of determinism as defined by compatibilists.

No, it is not. See my post above. I do not accept PHYSICAL NECESSITY as any part of the world, only LOGICAL NECESSITY. Gravity, though universal, is not NECESSARY.

 

[pood]

Our “inner forces” ARE us, in part, so we are not constrained by ourselves.

We most certainly are constrained by our inner forces which inform us what choice is in our best interest …

IOW, we inform ourselves what choice is in our best interest. Got it.

Of course we do. How do you make decisions without informing yourself what choice to make based on your options? What is so surprising about this Pood?

There is nothing surprising about it. I agree with. It’s called “compatibilist free will.”

No, it is not. Just because we can choose between options is not equivalent to having the compatibilist free will to choose either/or, which is what you are saying. According to compatibilism, a person could have chosen B instead of A (when it comes to doing the right thing) because he had the free will to do so, right? Isn't that what having your compatibilist free will means. You say because it is contingent, that looking back we could have chosen another alternative. That is true but only if the conditions were different.

Right. That IS compatibilism, with the proviso that we WOULD HAVE (not COULD HAVE) chosen differently, UNDER DIFFERENT CONDITIONS.

 

[pood]

I might add, though this is not very germane to this particular topic, but very interesting nonetheless, that a scientific study I read just yesterday suggests that quantum mechanics is operating in the brain and the thesis is that wave-function collapse CAUSES consciousness. If this is correct, then if we replayed the EXACT history of the world, right up to the present moment, then from time to time, even under IDENTICAL antecedent conditions, I would choose Pepsi over Coke. A quantum theory of consciousness replaces determinism even at the human-scale level with the probabilistic Born rule.

 

[pood]

Peacegirl, did you read this post? As I explained in it, we can accept your premise “man’s will is not free” arguendo. Read the post I just linked if you have not done so already, and get on with your argument. For reasons I explained, at this point, you do not need to PROVE your premise that “Man’s will is not free.” That comes later.

 

[pood]

You would save yourself ever so much time and agita if you would just follow my advice on how to present an argument.

 

[peacegirl]

. I cannot move forward to show what happens when we extend these principles,

Of course you can move forward. I’ve already explained this to you, but you don’t listen.

“Man’s will is not free” is a PREMISE. In a philosophical discussion, what you want to do is first establish your argument: your premises, and what conclusion follows from them. Your interlocutors, if they themselves are versed in how philosophical discussions go, will accept your premises arguendo — for the sake of further discussion. It means that at this point, it does not matter whether your premises are true or not — what matters is whether your conclusion logically follows from the premises you present. If it does, the argument is held to be VALID. But, as I have explained, that is Step One.The next step is to ascertain whether your argument is SOUND — which means that not only must the conclusion logically follow from the stated premises, but that all the stated premises must be TRUE. It’s at this point we can discuss whether the premise “man’s will is not free” is true or not. We can accept all the premises arguendo for the time being.

That's the only way that I will be able to move forward. I still have my doubts that this thread will go anywhere, so it's on borrowed time, not that anyone cares.

It seems so incredible to hear someone say he is going to remove all evil from the entire earth, that I cannot help but be in disbelief. Well, what is your first step? How do you go about making a start?”

“The first step is to prove conclusively, beyond a shadow of doubt, and regardless of any opinions to the contrary, that the will of man is not free.”

“But if you plan to use the knowledge that man’s will is not free as a point from which to start your chain of reasoning, couldn’t you get the same results without demonstrating that man’s will is not free, simply by showing what must follow as a consequence?”

“Yes I could, and that was a very sharp question, but my purpose in proving that man’s will is not free is not so much to have a sound basis from which to reason, but to show exactly why the will of man is not free.”

 

[peacegirl]

Peacegirl, did you read this post? As I explained in it, we can accept your premise “man’s will is not free” arguendo. Read the post I just linked if you have not done so already, and get on with your argument. For reasons I explained, at this point, you do not need to PROVE your premise that “Man’s will is not free.” That comes later.

That's fine, but I have posted Chapter Two and Three. Did you read anything? Do you understand the two-sided equation? You seem to understand some of it but not all. Do you understand why, under changed environmental conditions, man can find no satisfaction being responsible for a serious accident (let's say where children were killed by his carelessness), let alone being responsible for intentionally taking chances that could hurt someone due to collateral damage?

 

[pood]

Peacegirl, did you read this post? As I explained in it, we can accept your premise “man’s will is not free” arguendo. Read the post I just linked if you have not done so already, and get on with your argument. For reasons I explained, at this point, you do not need to PROVE your premise that “Man’s will is not free.” That comes later.

That's fine, but I have posted Chapter Two and Three. Did you read anything? Do you understand the two-sided equation? You seem to understand some of it but not all. Do you understand why, under changed environmental conditions, man can find no satisfaction being responsible for a serious accident (let's say where children were killed by his carelessness), let alone being responsible for intentionally taking chances that could hurt someone due to collateral damage?

Peacegirl, I’ve read all this stuff and understand the author’s argument. Please present the argument for others. Notice that posting by others has slipped to virtually nothing. Present your premises and conclusion to see if the argument is valid. If it is, then we can test whether it is sound (all premises true). This is the only way you are going to attract contributors, and not by pasting up walls of text.

 

[peacegirl]

So I ask again: how is an alternate choice or action possible in the face of inevitability? Which means everything that happens within a deterministic system, happens necessarily, inevitably, implacably.

For the hundredth time: Because stuff in a deterministic system does NOT happen NECESSARILY. It happens CONTINGENTLY. (And I don’t care if Marvin Edwards endorsed yoiur version of physical necessity — I’m not Marvin Edwards. I recognize only LOGICAL necessity.)

Necessary truths are confined to those propositions that are true at all (logically) possible worlds, and false at no (logically) possible world.

“Triangles have three sides” is a NECESSARY truth — true at all possible worlds. It CANNOT be false.

“Today I picked Coke over Pepsi” is a CONTINGENT truth — true at some possible worlds, false at others. This just MEANS, as a matter of logic, that is possible for me to have picked Pepsi over Coke, even though in fact I picked Coke. And it will always remain true, even after the fact, that I COULD HAVE picked Pepsi, even though I picked Coke.

Humans in a deterministic system receive deterministic inputs that present an array of OPTIONS. All those options are fully within our power to choose. I chose Coke over Pepsi, but nothing — certainly not the invisible beast Hard Determinism — was staying my hand from picking Pepsi.

Since I can imagine a world in which I picked Pepsi without logical contradiction, my choosing Coke is by definition CONTINGENT — could have been otherwise, and WOULD HAVE been otherwise, under slightly different antecedent conditions.

Gravity operates universally and the same without known exception, but gravity is still a CONTINGENT truth about the world, because one can imagine, without logical contradiction, a world in which things fall up. So gravity is true at some possible worlds and false at others.

When I output the choice “Coke,” I am PART OF the deterministic system, and I, and I alone, deterministically output “Coke” as the end of a deterministic chain. I NEED determinism to be true in order to that, or anything, because otherwise none of my choices would be reliable.

Finallly, and to repeat yet again, this business about “you could not have done other than what you did,” stated after the fact, is a red herring, because there is only one time line, one history. This means that “could not have done otherwise” collapses to, “did not do otherwise,” and that is simply — compatibilism.

Because if we could replay the history of the world right up the the present moment, the EXACT history of the world, right up the present moment, and I still pick Coke — great! Why would I do otherwise? That is what I WANTED to do, at that time, under those conditions. Nothing in this experiment, if it hypothetically could be run, would empirically or logically show that I HAD TO pick Coke.

Of course, I have explained all this, many times.

 

[peacegirl]

So I ask again: how is an alternate choice or action possible in the face of inevitability? Which means everything that happens within a deterministic system, happens necessarily, inevitably, implacably.

For the hundredth time: Because stuff in a deterministic system does NOT happen NECESSARILY. It happens CONTINGENTLY. (And I don’t care if Marvin Edwards endorsed yoiur version of physical necessity — I’m not Marvin Edwards. I recognize only LOGICAL necessity.)

Necessary truths are confined to those propositions that are true at all (logically) possible worlds, and false at no (logically) possible world.

“Triangles have three sides” is a NECESSARY truth — true at all possible worlds. It CANNOT be false.

“Today I picked Coke over Pepsi” is a CONTINGENT truth — true at some possible worlds, false at others. This just MEANS, as a matter of logic, that is possible for me to have picked Pepsi over Coke, even though in fact I picked Coke. And it will always remain true, even after the fact, that I COULD HAVE picked Pepsi, even though I picked Coke.

Humans in a deterministic system receive deterministic inputs that present an array of OPTIONS. All those options are fully within our power to choose. I chose Coke over Pepsi, but nothing — certainly not the invisible beast Hard Determinism — was staying my hand from picking Pepsi.

Since I can imagine a world in which I picked Pepsi without logical contradiction, my choosing Coke is by definition CONTINGENT — could have been otherwise, and WOULD HAVE been otherwise, under slightly different antecedent conditions.

Gravity operates universally and the same without known exception, but gravity is still a CONTINGENT truth about the world, because one can imagine, without logical contradiction, a world in which things fall up. So gravity is true at some possible worlds and false at others.

When I output the choice “Coke,” I am PART OF the deterministic system, and I, and I alone, deterministically output “Coke” as the end of a deterministic chain. I NEED determinism to be true in order to that, or anything, because otherwise none of my choices would be reliable.

Finallly, and to repeat yet again, this business about “you could not have done other than what you did,” stated after the fact, is a red herring, because there is only one time line, one history. This means that “could not have done otherwise” collapses to, “did not do otherwise,” and that is simply — compatibilism.

Because if we could replay the history of the world right up the the present moment, the EXACT history of the world, right up the present moment, and I still pick Coke — great! Why would I do otherwise? That is what I WANTED to do, at that time, under those conditions. Nothing in this experiment, if it hypothetically could be run, would empirically or logically show that I HAD TO pick Coke.

Of course, I have explained all this, many times.

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

There is no modal fallacy. A definition of determinism is given.

A definition of HARD determinism is given, by you. As noted upthread, your whole argument is question-begging. My argument is also deterministic — soft determinism. The whole point in dispute is whether HARD determinism or SOFT determinism more accurately captures reality. You cannot legitimately incorporate your conclusion into your premise and claim victory.

Again, be it compatibilist or incompatibilist, the definition of determinism is the same. 'Hard determinism' just refers to incompatibilism, that the notion of free will is not compatible with determinism.

Either way, the given definition of determinism - being the same for both sides of the debate - does not permit alternate actions in either case.

If that's what you are trying to argue, the modal fallacy is yours.

It is you who have confused necessarily true propositions with contingently true propositions, hence the modal fallacy is yours, not mine. What you are arguing for is called modal collapse.

So, two fallacies: circular reasoning and modal fallacy.

Nah. In principle, this is not difficult.

The definition of determinism as given by either compatibilists or incompatibilists (being one the same definition), does not permit alternate actions, where it is the terms of the given definition of determinism that does not permit alternate actions.

For instance, where do you see the possibility of alternate actions within constant conjunction?

Where ''constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.''

Where does an alternate choice or action fit into constant conjunction?


''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. - Brittanica

Given how determinism is defined, how or where do you see the possibility of alternate actions or choices being present within the system?

Round and round the merry-go-round.

It is. With you as a willing participant.

The last question in the above bit I’ve already answered dozens of times over various threads.

I don't see that you have shown that alternate choices and actions are possible within a deterministic system, just as definined by the definition you endorsed. Which includes compatibilists in general.

Some of whom appear to argue for alternate actions regardless of the terms and conditions of their own definition of determinism........closet Libertarians as someone labelled them.

The thing is, you don’t generally respond to what others write. You just repeat your mantras about the “given” definition of determinism, which is not a given, then you cherry pick some quote or other, most often from compatibilists like David Hume. Then you call it a day. I see no reason to endlessly repeat answers I’ve already given. Suffice it to say you once again commit a standard modal fallacy, and long ago I gave you supporting material to help clarify this, and I’m sure you ignored it all.

It works both ways. It has been you and other compatibilists that tend to repeat the mantra of alternate actions within a deterministic system, which in turn compels me to point out - time and time again - that alternate choices actions contradict the terms and conditions of your very own definition of determinism.

You say that you and other compatibilists have given answers, and of course you have replied, but the problem is that the reply that you offer does nothing to address or explain the contradiction of claiming that alternate actions are possible within a deterministic system as you define it to be.

So I ask again: how is an alternate choice or action possible in the face of inevitability? Which means everything that happens within a deterministic system, happens necessarily, inevitably, implacably.

That is true DBT. It is a complete contradiction that an alternate action is possible within determinism which is the very foundation of their worldview. I don't like using the phrase "deterministic system" because it sounds as if we are automatons with no agency.

 

[pood]

That is true DBT. It is a complete contradiction that an alternate action is possible within determinism which is the very foundation of their worldview. I don't like using the phrase "deterministic system" because it sounds as if we are automatons with no agency.

Peacegirl, why do you quote huge walls of text only to make a brief reply to one particular bit? You do know you can delete all that other stuff before posting, right?

And yes, DBT does think we are automatons with no agency.

 

[peacegirl]

So I ask again: how is an alternate choice or action possible in the face of inevitability? Which means everything that happens within a deterministic system, happens necessarily, inevitably, implacably.

For the hundredth time: Because stuff in a deterministic system does NOT happen NECESSARILY. It happens CONTINGENTLY. (And I don’t care if Marvin Edwards endorsed yoiur version of physical necessity — I’m not Marvin Edwards. I recognize only LOGICAL necessity.)

Necessary truths are confined to those propositions that are true at all (logically) possible worlds, and false at no (logically) possible world.

“Triangles have three sides” is a NECESSARY truth — true at all possible worlds. It CANNOT be false.

“Today I picked Coke over Pepsi” is a CONTINGENT truth — true at some possible worlds, false at others. This just MEANS, as a matter of logic, that is possible for me to have picked Pepsi over Coke, even though in fact I picked Coke. And it will always remain true, even after the fact, that I COULD HAVE picked Pepsi, even though I picked Coke.

Humans in a deterministic system receive deterministic inputs that present an array of OPTIONS. All those options are fully within our power to choose. I chose Coke over Pepsi, but nothing — certainly not the invisible beast Hard Determinism — was staying my hand from picking Pepsi.

I hope you know that's not what DBT is saying. Now you're presenting a strawman.

Since I can imagine a world in which I picked Pepsi without logical contradiction, my choosing Coke is by definition CONTINGENT — could have been otherwise, and WOULD HAVE been otherwise, under slightly different antecedent conditions.

It doesn't have to be a necessary truth like a triangle with 3 sides for your choice to be necessary based on your movement in the direction of "greater" satisfaction. The drinking of either is contingent based on the factors being considered, but this does not mean you would have been able to choose otherwise. This is a logical trap. It isn't causal in the sense that fire causes smoke but rather it is causal in that you COULD NOT have chosen otherwise given those same conditions, not under slightly different antecedent conditions. That would present a new set of conditions which is not what we are discussing.

Gravity operates universally and the same without known exception, but gravity is still a CONTINGENT truth about the world, because one can imagine, without logical contradiction, a world in which things fall up. So gravity is true at some possible worlds and false at others.

When I output the choice “Coke,” I am PART OF the deterministic system, and I, and I alone, deterministically output “Coke” as the end of a deterministic chain. I NEED determinism to be true in order to that, or anything, because otherwise none of my choices would be reliable.

Finallly, and to repeat yet again, this business about “you could not have done other than what you did,” stated after the fact, is a red herring, because there is only one time line, one history. This means that “could not have done otherwise” collapses to, “did not do otherwise,” and that is simply — compatibilism.

The fact that there is only one timeline, and one history only goes to show that whatever was chosen could not have been otherwise. You cannot prove that it could have been any other way. It is not a red herring or distraction. It is what is proven to be the case. It doesn't matter what language you use; you cannot go back in time (if anyone believes in time machines, this discovery isn't for them), undo what has already been done, and show that your compatibilist notion of free will -- that conjures up a different outcome -- could have happened, except through your faulty logic. Therefore, compatibilism fails once again.

Because if we could replay the history of the world right up the the present moment, the EXACT history of the world, right up the present moment, and I still pick Coke — great! Why would I do otherwise? That is what I WANTED to do, at that time, under those conditions. Nothing in this experiment, if it hypothetically could be run, would empirically or logically show that I HAD TO pick Coke.

Of course, I have explained all this, many times.

That you chose Coke IS THE REASON you could not have chosen Pepsi at that time, and under those conditions. There is no experiment that could ever prove that you could have chosen the less satisfying choice, which was Pepsi at that moment in time. IOW, since Pepsi was out of the question given your options, choosing Coke was not a free choice.

 

[Janice Rael]

Hi all, I’d like to discuss a new take on the issue of free will and determinism that I think resolves this long-lasting controversy and has important implications for how people behave and treat one another. In fact, the implications are far reaching due to changes in our environment that are able to produce positive changes in human conduct. It is true that the free will/determinism debate has been exhausted, but I believe that this author has a novel approach and what this means for the betterment of our world.

Hi Janis!

I'm super busy so I may have to refer to the endless thread on FF where you tried to sell your theology and everyone kept explaining to you that since you state that GOD as an actual Being or Entity is an actual Mover of your [the idea you have], or since you stated that GOD as a Being or Entity was definitely involved in this idea you have, then your idea is actually theology.

Perhaps your theology is brilliant; I forget.

I will not forget how you were bewildered by my insistence that our names were similar. Well, maybe I've forgotten the exact details, but I remember my own bewilderment by your bewilderment!

omg is this thread both brand new and 17 pages long? I love homework! ohhh, thank you, Janis, I look forward to continuing our conversation. This is SO much better than saving myself from my own nonsense. Other people's nonsense is way more fun than mine. Okay, where are we? ohh, "Other Philosophical Discussions." Hmm, I don't usually see this subforum, so, I'm not sure how God-involved ideas are discussed here. ooh, one more thing to check on, yay! More homework! I sure did need a break from trying to survive. I don't even want to survive, ask anyone within earshot, literally! But enough about my disabled ass, let's see you! Whatcha got goin on over here?