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“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

I did thank him because I agreed with what he was saying.

Then, like him, you are a hard determinist.
The author never made a distinction between hard and soft determinism. We have no free will, period. If that makes me a hard determinist, so be it.
Looking back, our choices were predetermined. It could not have been otherwise when it is realized that the choices made throughout history were part of the continued causal chain of life…

Hard determinism
… but again, I'm using the term "cause" lightly. If you understand what I have been saying, we are not caused by antecedent events. We are remembering past events and using them to decide which options are more preferable in the present.

Sure.
We can't say, before something is done, that due to deterministic forces, we are caused to make a certain choice even if we are not consenting to it.

Compatibilism. Round and round we go.
This is not compatibilism. We are not going round and round. There is only one truth.
This is the confusion that the author was trying to clear up regarding the definition. Bear in mind, once again, that just because nothing is set in stone before it's even done does not mean we have free will.

Assertion.
We do not.

Assertion.
Being able to contemplate between alternatives doesn't give us a free choice either. It just gives us the ability to analyze possible outcomes, but the choice itself, once made, COULD NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE.

Modal fallacy and ARGUMENTUM ALL CAPS fallacy.
Only one choice is possible each and every moment, which feels unintuitive to most people who say, "What do you mean I don't have a free choice", but in actuality we don't, which is the very reason will is not free.
Writing in all caps was meant for emphasis, nothing more. I had no idea that there was such a thing as ARGUMENTUM fallacy. This proof is not a modal fallacy just because contingency is involved. You are back to the old definition. This is going to be harder than I thought. :(
It is
Yes, only one thing will be chosen among a range of options at any given moment, provided the choices are mutually exclusive. No one disputes that.
Provided there are meaningful differences. They don't have to be mutually exclusive. You can have similarities but one choice will win out unless there were no meaningful differences so either choice would suffice.
Your author’s argument, by contrast, certainly has elements that are consistent with compatibilism — such as, for example, that no one can makes us do, what we don’t want to do — unless, presumably, one holds a gun to our heads.
I never said that. Even if we had a gun to our head, we still have a choice …

I thought we didn’t have any choice in what we do?


Of course we have a choice. We choose every day, all day, but the choices we make are not free.

The word ‘choice’ itself indicates there are meaningful differences; otherwise, there would be no choice in the matter at all as with A and A. The reason you are confused is because the word choice is very misleading, for it assumes that man has two or more possibilities, but in reality this is a delusion because the direction of life, always moving towards greater satisfaction, compels a person to prefer of differences what he, not someone else, considers better for himself, and when two or more alternatives are presented for his consideration, he is compelled by his very nature to prefer not that one which he considers worse, but what gives every indication of being better or more satisfying for the particular set of circumstances involved. Choosing, or the comparison of differences, is an integral part of man’s nature, but to reiterate this important point, he is compelled to prefer of alternatives that which he considers better for himself, and though he chooses various things all through the course of his life, he is never given any choice at all. Although the definition of free will states that man can choose good or evil without compulsion or necessity, how is it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a tremendous amount of compulsion to choose the most preferable alternative each and every moment of time?

“I agree with all this, but how many times in your life have you remarked, ‘You give me no choice’ or ‘it makes no difference?’”

Just because some differences are so obviously superior in value where you are concerned that no hesitation is required to decide which is preferable, while other differences need a more careful consideration, does not change the direction of life which moves always towards greater satisfaction than what the present position offers. You must bear in mind that what one person judges good or bad for himself doesn’t make it so for others, especially when it is remembered that a juxtaposition of differences in each case presents alternatives that affect choice.

“But there are many times when I have been terribly dissatisfied with things that I have done, and at that exact moment, isn’t it obvious that I am not moving in the direction of satisfaction because I am very dissatisfied? It seems to me that it is still possible to give an example of how man can be made to move in the direction of dissatisfaction. If I could do this, all your reasoning would be shot to hell.”

“That’s true, but I defy you or anyone else to give me an example of this. Go ahead and try.”

although a difficult one. When a person says, "You gave me no choice", he doesn't mean he really didn't have a choice; it's just that the choice was so obviously extreme that it felt as if he had no choice. Depending on the circumstance, a person may do what the perpetrator with a gun to his head wants, or he may not. For example, no one could make the person with a gun to his head give up information, if by doing so his family would be killed instantly.

As Elixir noted, maybe they don’t like their family. ;)
That is a compatibilist position. But, fine, you don’t have to call your argument compatibilist. There are other arguments on offer, such as libertarianism and neo-Humean compatibilism. Call your argument something else, because after all the author himself argues that it is completely novel.
His discovery is novel, but determinism is not. It is only tweaked to be more accurate. We are not being caused, by an external force, to do what we do which implies a choice is set even if it's against our will. It seems like you are defending compatibilism even after I explained why a semantic shift in the phrase "free will" doesn't cut it.

But you didn’t “explain” anything, you just asserted it.
There is no free will that is compatible, not neo-Humean compatibilism or libertarianism, or any other term you throw in. These are just words with no corresponding accuracy. I hope you can accept the fact that free will is nowhere to be found, not in any free will philosophy; not even in neuroscience can they pinpoint an area in the brain that would indicate we have free will. Yet interestingly, doing things of one's own accord, along with the fact that we are compelled to move in only one direction, is reconciled without having any free will at all. The only reason people believe so strongly in free will is that they feel this is the only way to hold people morally responsible. That is the crux of this issue.
It isn't even logical to say we have both free will and determinism; we cannot do otherwise and not do otherwise, which is the issue that is under debate. We can't be alive and dead at the same time either.

The opposite of determinism isn’t free will. It’s indeterminism.
Maybe in the QM world, but you cannot use this to tell me that our choices are indetermined and therefore we have a little bit of free will slipped in. Show me that we can move in a different direction other than "greater satisfaction," which he proves in an airtight way. If you can do this, I'll concede.
And, since the quantum world is indeterminist under wave-function collapse interpretations, and everything in the world is made of quantum particles and has particle-wave duality, including us, it seems probable that the world is actually indeterministic and probabilities of outcomes must be calculated according to the Born rule.

Anyway, enough for now, as I mentioned this is a message board, and people have only so much time to respond to giant walls of text. I have football games to attend to in my bets with my friend on the other side of the continent. Not having a good week so far. :confused:
Again, you cannot use the QM world to justify your belief that humans work in the same way. This is not about probability. No one knows exactly how someone, according to his life and circumstances, will react in every situation, but we can predict, given a changed environment, that no one will get greater satisfaction hurting others, as the better choice. If you don't want to read what I posted, it's no wonder you will fight me tooth and nail. I hope we can still be friends even if we disagree :) Good luck with your bet. My 3 sons love football. One of my sons is a sports agent. He's teaching his kids about fantasy football. He doesn't promote gambling. It's all for fun.
 
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Peacegirl, I think you’ve messed up the quote tags again, and I can’t easily discern what is a new response or something old in that huge wall of text. Please try to sort it if you want a response.

The bit about neuroscience was discussed in another thread. Compatibilists are perfectly OK with neuroscience.
 
Looking back, it was preset or predestined when it is realized that the choices made throughout history could not have been otherwise. But we can't say, before something is done, that it has to be a certain way before it even takes place. That's the confusion that this author was trying to correct regarding the definition. But just because nothing is set in stone before it's even done does not mean we have a free choice. In reality, we don't. Being able to contemplate doesn't give us a free choice either. It just gives us the ability to analyze different possibilities before making a choice, but the choice itself, once it's made, COULD NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE.

So you assert, without evidence or argument, unless you think ALL CAPS is an argument. DBT commits one modal fallacy, conflating contingency with necessity, and you commit another: violation of the principle of modal fixity. All necessarily true propositions are timelessly true, as are all contingently true propositions. Put another way, contingent propositions are necessarily contingently true, and necessary propositions are necessarily necessary. If yesterday I ordered Coke, it remains true today, and will always remain true, that I could have ordered a Pepsi instead.

You could have ordered a Pepsi instead if you had wanted to, but you didn't want to, so you could not have at that instant ordered Pepsi.

Correction. I did not order Pepsi because I did not want to do so. That’s true. What’s not true is that I COULD not have ordered Pepsi. It’s self evidently absurd.

You are misrepresenting my words. No one is saying you couldn't have chosen the Pepsi, but after deciding what you wanted and you chose the Coke, you could not have done otherwise. Free will states you could have done otherwise. How can that be so when you can't number one prove it, and number two, you can only move in one direction rendering the option to choose the Pepsi (after the fact), a realistic mirage.
It was obviously in my power to do so; the Pepsi was right there in the freezer, all I had to do was open it, take the Pepsi out, and pay at the counter.
It was in your power before you chose Coke, but after you chose the Coke, you could not have chosen Pepsi. I thought you understood why, but obviously you don't. It's like you keep going back to the scratch in the record that prevents you from really seeing the validity and soundness of his proof.

“Let us imagine that of two apples, a red and a yellow, I prefer the yellow because I am extremely allergic to the red; consequently, my taste lies in the direction of the latter, which gives me greater satisfaction. In fact, the very thought of eating the red apple makes me feel sick. Yet in spite of this, I am going to eat it to demonstrate that even though I am dissatisfied and prefer the yellow apple, I can definitely move in the direction of dissatisfaction.”

In response to this demonstration, isn’t it obvious that regardless of the reason you decided to eat the red apple, and even though it would be distasteful in comparison, this choice at that moment of time gave you greater satisfaction; otherwise, you would have definitely selected and eaten the yellow? The normal circumstances under which you frequently ate the yellow apple in preference were changed by your desire to prove a point, therefore, it gave you greater satisfaction to eat what you did not normally eat in an effort to prove that life can be made to move in the direction of dissatisfaction. Consequently, since B (eating the yellow apple) was an impossible choice (because it gave you less satisfaction under the circumstances), you were not free to choose A.

Regardless of how many examples you experiment with, the results will always be the same because this is an immutable law. From moment to moment all through life, man can never move in the direction of dissatisfaction, and that his every motion, conscious or unconscious, is a natural effort to get rid of some dissatisfaction or move to greater satisfaction; otherwise, as has been shown, not being dissatisfied, he could never move from here to there. Every motion of life expresses dissatisfaction with the present position. Scratching is the effort of life to remove the dissatisfaction of the itch, as urinating, defecating, sleeping, working, playing, mating, walking, talking, and moving about in general are unsatisfied needs of life, pushing man always in the direction of satisfaction. It is easy, in many cases, to recognize things that satisfy, such as money when funds are low, but it is extremely difficult at other times to comprehend the innumerable subconscious factors often responsible for the malaise of dissatisfaction. Your desire to take a bath arises from a feeling of unseemliness or a wish to be refreshed, which means that you are dissatisfied with the way you feel at that moment; and your desire to get out of the bathtub arises from a feeling of dissatisfaction with a position that has suddenly grown uncomfortable. This simple demonstration proves conclusively that man’s will is not free because satisfaction is the only direction life can take, and it offers only one possibility at each moment of time.

Now, as it happens, I don’t like Pepsi, and I do like Coke, though I almost never drink any soft drink. But if in the future I happen to want a soft drink, it will be Coke over Pepsi every time.
How does this change anything? We are talking about the fact that given the same time, conditions, and place, you could not have chosen otherwise, not at some future point in time.
 

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

There is no modal fallacy. A definition of determinism is given.

A definition of HARD determinism is given, by you. As noted upthread, your whole argument is question-begging. My argument is also deterministic — soft determinism. The whole point in dispute is whether HARD determinism or SOFT determinism more accurately captures reality. You cannot legitimately incorporate your conclusion into your premise and claim victory.

Again, be it compatibilist or incompatibilist, the definition of determinism is the same. 'Hard determinism' just refers to incompatibilism, that the notion of free will is not compatible with determinism.

Either way, the given definition of determinism - being the same for both sides of the debate - does not permit alternate actions in either case.


If that's what you are trying to argue, the modal fallacy is yours.
It is you who have confused necessarily true propositions with contingently true propositions, hence the modal fallacy is yours, not mine. What you are arguing for is called modal collapse.

So, two fallacies: circular reasoning and modal fallacy.

Nah. In principle, this is not difficult.

The definition of determinism as given by either compatibilists or incompatibilists (being one the same definition), does not permit alternate actions, where it is the terms of the given definition of determinism that does not permit alternate actions.

For instance, where do you see the possibility of alternate actions within constant conjunction?

Where ''constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.''

Where does an alternate choice or action fit into constant conjunction?


''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. - Brittanica

Given how determinism is defined, how or where do you see the possibility of alternate actions or choices being present within the system?
 

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

There is no modal fallacy. A definition of determinism is given.

A definition of HARD determinism is given, by you. As noted upthread, your whole argument is question-begging. My argument is also deterministic — soft determinism. The whole point in dispute is whether HARD determinism or SOFT determinism more accurately captures reality. You cannot legitimately incorporate your conclusion into your premise and claim victory.

Again, be it compatibilist or incompatibilist, the definition of determinism is the same. 'Hard determinism' just refers to incompatibilism, that the notion of free will is not compatible with determinism.

Either way, the given definition of determinism - being the same for both sides of the debate - does not permit alternate actions in either case.


If that's what you are trying to argue, the modal fallacy is yours.
It is you who have confused necessarily true propositions with contingently true propositions, hence the modal fallacy is yours, not mine. What you are arguing for is called modal collapse.

So, two fallacies: circular reasoning and modal fallacy.

Nah. In principle, this is not difficult.

The definition of determinism as given by either compatibilists or incompatibilists (being one the same definition), does not permit alternate actions, where it is the terms of the given definition of determinism that does not permit alternate actions.

For instance, where do you see the possibility of alternate actions within constant conjunction?

Where ''constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.''

Where does an alternate choice or action fit into constant conjunction?


''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. - Brittanica

Given how determinism is defined, how or where do you see the possibility of alternate actions or choices being present within the system?
You are correct. Determinism does not allow for alternate possibilities, and whether it's constant conjunction where the relationship is invariably followed by the other (which obviously shows a cause-and-effect relationship), or if it's a situation where you cannot trace back to a single cause) doesn't mean the system doesn't work. It just means, once again, that choices occur in the present. There may be varied reasons for a person's decision, but that does not negate the fact that only one choice is possible each and every moment of time. The reason this debate has gone on for centuries is due to the problem of moral responsibility. How can we blame and punish someone who didn't have a choice to do otherwise? If determinism is defined as causal, this obviously is going to cause a backlash. On the other hand, libertarianism as defined as having no cause, is obviously inaccurate because we know that people use their experiences to make choices, which come from previous experiences. This is where compatibilism was born, trying to make both ideologies true which cannot be done without contradiction. It's impossible without changing the meaning of "free will". It's a bait and switch if I ever saw one. They then say we could have done otherwise because we had a free choice. A free choice to do what? To choose what they deem appropriate? Who are these people doing the judging of someone else's life experiences? They fail to understand that when contemplating, people have a choice to do this or that up until they make a decision. That alternative could not have been otherwise looking back because compulsion is always involved when there are meaningful differences in which to choose. Only one choice is possible, rendering free will false. I just hope people can hear each other out without anger, which always seems to occur anytime this subject comes up.

The fact that will is not free demonstrates that man, as part of nature or God, has been unconsciously developing at a mathematical rate, and during every moment of his progress, was doing what he had to do because he had no free choice. But this does not mean that he was caused to do anything against his will, for the word cause, like choice and past, is very misleading as it implies that something other than man himself is responsible for his actions. The expression ‘I did it of my own free will’ has been seriously misunderstood, for although it is impossible to do anything of one’s own free will, HE DOES EVERYTHING BECAUSE HE WANTS TO, since absolutely nothing can make him do what he doesn’t want to.

They then say that not being able to do otherwise is not the issue. They use an example of how they can change their choice at a later date. We are not talking about a future point in time. We are talking about whether a person "could have chosen otherwise" given the same exact place and time that he was given at that moment he made the choice. Of course, free will can't be proven because we cannot go back in time which is necessary for proof. They will say it's not necessary, and it goes on and on... Then they say they are determinists. It's a glaring flaw but they will not budge. Here Pood agreed with me on all the points I made, but when the rubber met the road, he reverted right back to "we have a choice" and tried to prove it by using the fact that he could choose Coke over Pepsi every time. That doesn't prove anything. It's like teaching someone that one plus one is two and showing them why this is so -- and they say they understand -- but when it's time to move on to show how this equation works in real life, they resist and revert right back to their original belief that one plus one is eleven and there is no convincing them that it's two. Sorry Pood, please don't take this personally. This was not meant to belittle you, but I need to show where you are mistaken. ;)
 
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Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

There is no modal fallacy. A definition of determinism is given.

A definition of HARD determinism is given, by you. As noted upthread, your whole argument is question-begging. My argument is also deterministic — soft determinism. The whole point in dispute is whether HARD determinism or SOFT determinism more accurately captures reality. You cannot legitimately incorporate your conclusion into your premise and claim victory.

Again, be it compatibilist or incompatibilist, the definition of determinism is the same. 'Hard determinism' just refers to incompatibilism, that the notion of free will is not compatible with determinism.

Either way, the given definition of determinism - being the same for both sides of the debate - does not permit alternate actions in either case.


If that's what you are trying to argue, the modal fallacy is yours.
It is you who have confused necessarily true propositions with contingently true propositions, hence the modal fallacy is yours, not mine. What you are arguing for is called modal collapse.

So, two fallacies: circular reasoning and modal fallacy.

Nah. In principle, this is not difficult.

The definition of determinism as given by either compatibilists or incompatibilists (being one the same definition), does not permit alternate actions, where it is the terms of the given definition of determinism that does not permit alternate actions.

For instance, where do you see the possibility of alternate actions within constant conjunction?

Where ''constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.''

Where does an alternate choice or action fit into constant conjunction?


''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. - Brittanica

Given how determinism is defined, how or where do you see the possibility of alternate actions or choices being present within the system?

Round and round the merry-go-round.

The last question in the above bit I’ve already answered dozens of times over various threads.

The thing is, you don’t generally respond to what others write. You just repeat your mantras about the “given” definition of determinism, which is not a given, then you cherry pick some quote or other, most often from compatibilists like David Hume. Then you call it a day. I see no reason to endlessly repeat answers I’ve already given. Suffice it to say you once again commit a standard modal fallacy, and long ago I gave you supporting material to help clarify this, and I’m sure you ignored it all.
 
HE DOES EVERYTHING BECAUSE HE WANTS TO, since absolutely nothing can make him do what he doesn’t want to.
Right, that’s compatibilism. He WANTS to do it, and is not FORCED to do it. Hard determinism certainly doesn’t force him to do something. If hard determinism FORCED people to do stuff, you’d see me reaching for the Coke, only to have the invisible hand of the mythical Hard Determinism beast forcing my hand to choose what I don’t want, which is the Pepsi. Needless to say no such phenomenon has ever been reported by anyone, ever.

Except, of course, he CAN be made to do something he doesn’t want to do, such as when one holds a gun on the bank teller and demands all the money in the till. The bank teller doesn’t WANT to give up the money, but he DOES, because even more he doesn’t want to die.

And, I know, I know, the “direction of greater satisfaction” in this case is not wanting to die, so the teller chooses the lesser of two evils, which is turning over the money. And that’s also a compatibilist position.

This “always moving in the direction of greater satisfaction” bit is also of course vacuous. Your author simply DEFINES whatever choice we make as “moving in the direction of greater satisfaction.” What work does that do? What new knowledge is being advanced here?
 

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

There is no modal fallacy. A definition of determinism is given.

A definition of HARD determinism is given, by you. As noted upthread, your whole argument is question-begging. My argument is also deterministic — soft determinism. The whole point in dispute is whether HARD determinism or SOFT determinism more accurately captures reality. You cannot legitimately incorporate your conclusion into your premise and claim victory.

Again, be it compatibilist or incompatibilist, the definition of determinism is the same. 'Hard determinism' just refers to incompatibilism, that the notion of free will is not compatible with determinism.

Either way, the given definition of determinism - being the same for both sides of the debate - does not permit alternate actions in either case.


If that's what you are trying to argue, the modal fallacy is yours.
It is you who have confused necessarily true propositions with contingently true propositions, hence the modal fallacy is yours, not mine. What you are arguing for is called modal collapse.

So, two fallacies: circular reasoning and modal fallacy.

Nah. In principle, this is not difficult.

The definition of determinism as given by either compatibilists or incompatibilists (being one the same definition), does not permit alternate actions, where it is the terms of the given definition of determinism that does not permit alternate actions.

For instance, where do you see the possibility of alternate actions within constant conjunction?

Where ''constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.''

Where does an alternate choice or action fit into constant conjunction?


''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. - Brittanica

Given how determinism is defined, how or where do you see the possibility of alternate actions or choices being present within the system?

Round and round the merry-go-round.

The last question in the above bit I’ve already answered dozens of times over various threads.

The thing is, you don’t generally respond to what others write. You just repeat your mantras about the “given” definition of determinism, which is not a given, then you cherry pick some quote or other, most often from compatibilists like David Hume. Then you call it a day. I see no reason to endlessly repeat answers I’ve already given. Suffice it to say you once again commit a standard modal fallacy, and long ago I gave you supporting material to help clarify this, and I’m sure you ignored it all.

HE DOES EVERYTHING BECAUSE HE WANTS TO, since absolutely nothing can make him do what he doesn’t want to.
Right, that’s compatibilism. He WANTS to do it, and is not FORCED to do it.

Just because the past cannot make someone do anything he doesn't want to, or against his will, does make his will free. This was explained to you. How quickly it goes in one ear and out the other. To repeat: Although nothing from the past can make man choose something against his will, he is nevertheless under a compulsion to do everything he does, which is why man's will is not free.

Since I can’t be made to do anything against my will, doesn’t this make my will free? And isn’t it a contradiction to say that man’s will is not free, yet nothing can make him do what he doesn’t want to do?”

“How about that, he brought out something I never would have thought of.”

All he said was that you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink, which is undeniable; however, though it is a mathematical law that nothing can compel man to do to another what he makes up his mind not to do — this is an extremely crucial point — he is nevertheless under a compulsion during every moment of his existence to do everything he does. This reveals, as your friend just pointed out, that man has absolute control over the former but absolutely none over the latter because he must constantly move in the direction of greater satisfaction. It is true that nothing in the past can cause what occurs in the present, for all we ever have is the present; the past and future are only words that describe a deceptive relation. Consequently, determinism was faced with an almost impossible task because it assumed that heredity and environment caused man to choose evil, and the proponents of free will believed the opposite, that man was not caused or compelled; he did it of his own accord; he wanted to do it; he didn’t have to. The term ‘free will’ contains an assumption or fallacy, for it implies that if man is not caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not mathematical, conclusions. The expression, ‘I did it of my own free will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed, for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact, I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself, which only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words have deceived everyone?


Compatibilists want to judge the wrongness of someone's choice if it is in keeping with their arbitrary definition of what makes that choice free. On an intellectual level (because we do have to judge people in this world or we would have utter chaos and was not what the author was proposing), who are they to judge someone's actions based on his particular circumstances? They haven't walked in his shoes. I have asked this before. Where does this judgment lead to? What good does it do other than keeping the status quo. Doesn't it go right back to the justification to blame and punish those whom they deem guilty of making the wrong choice, according to them? Believing that man's will is not free, they had to find a way to fit free will in so they could justify holding people accountable. It would create major cognitive/dissonance otherwise. Compatibilism would make total sense, if it weren't for the fact that it is wrong. :cautious:
Hard determinism certainly doesn’t force him to do something. If hard determinism FORCED people to do stuff, you’d see me reaching for the Coke, only to have the invisible hand of the mythical Hard Determinism beast forcing my hand to choose what I don’t want, which is the Pepsi. Needless to say no such phenomenon has ever been reported by anyone, ever.

Except, of course, he CAN be made to do something he doesn’t want to do, such as when one holds a gun on the bank teller and demands all the money in the till. The bank teller doesn’t WANT to give up the money, but he DOES, because even more he doesn’t want to die.

And, I know, I know, the “direction of greater satisfaction” in this case is not wanting to die, so the teller chooses the lesser of two evils, which is turning over the money. And that’s also a compatibilist position.
This author doesn't separate behaviors such that some people are pardoned while others are not depending on what the compatibilists judge is worthy of being pardoned. Again, they are slicing the definition of determinism according to their arbitrary definition. We either have no free will or we do. By the same token we cannot be dead and alive at the same time either. You can't divvy up who is not responsible and who isn't based on the strength of the compulsion.

How many times in your life have you remarked, ‘You give me no choice’ or ‘it makes no difference?’”

Just because some differences are so obviously superior in value where you are concerned that no hesitation is required to decide which is preferable, while other differences need a more careful consideration, does not change the direction of life which moves always towards greater satisfaction than what the present position offers. You must bear in mind that what one person judges good or bad for himself doesn’t make it so for others, especially when it is remembered that a juxtaposition of differences in each case presents alternatives that affect choice.
This “always moving in the direction of greater satisfaction” bit is also of course vacuous. Your author simply DEFINES whatever choice we make as “moving in the direction of greater satisfaction.” What work does that do? What new knowledge is being advanced here?
I guess I assumed too much when I thought people would understand this much quicker. I've been with this knowledge a long time and I forget that other people have not. First of all, moving toward greater satisfaction is not circular reasoning just is any choice an individual makes is his choice in the direction of satisfaction. We are all different and therefore, based on our individual makeup and environment, our choices may be different than someone else's. This does not change the direction which is a one-way street. This is of tremendous importance because the author demonstrated that if we had free will, we could freely choose to hurt others regardless of the environmental conditions, but that is not so. I'm thankful that man does not have free will or we would be in more trouble than we are now, if that is even possible given the state of affairs we are in.
 
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Just because what a person does is not against his will does not grant him free will. This was explained to you and I gave a quote. How quickly it goes in one ear and out the other. Although nothing can make man choose something against his will, he is nevertheless under a compulsion to do everything he does, which is why man's will is not free.

Peacegirl, you haven’t EXPLAINED anything. You’ve simply ASSERTED it.
 

Just because what a person does is not against his will does not grant him free will. This was explained to you and I gave a quote. How quickly it goes in one ear and out the other. Although nothing can make man choose something against his will, he is nevertheless under a compulsion to do everything he does, which is why man's will is not free.

Peacegirl, you haven’t EXPLAINED anything. You’ve simply ASSERTED it.
The fact that we move in the direction of what offers greater satisfaction is not an assertion, it’s an astute observation.

In reality, we are carried along on the wings of time or life during every moment of our existence and have no say in this matter whatsoever. We cannot stop ourselves from being born and are compelled to either live out our lives the best we can or commit suicide. Is it possible to disagree with this? However, to prove that what we do of our own free will, of our own desire because we want to do it, is also beyond control, it is necessary to employ mathematical (undeniable) reasoning. Therefore, since it is absolutely impossible for man to be both dead and alive at the same time, and since it is absolutely impossible for a person to desire committing suicide unless dissatisfied with life (regardless of the reason), we are given the ability to demonstrate a revealing and undeniable relation.

Every motion, from the beating heart to the slightest reflex action, from all inner to outer movements of the body, indicates that life is never satisfied or content to remain in one position for always, like an inanimate object, which position shall be termed ‘death.’ I shall now call the present moment of time or life here for the purpose of clarification, and the next moment coming up there. You are now standing on this present moment of time and space called here, and you are given two alternatives: either live or kill yourself; either move to the next spot called there or remain where you are without moving a hair’s breadth by committing suicide.

“I prefer...”

Excuse the interruption, but the very fact that you started to answer me or didn’t commit suicide at that moment makes it obvious that you were not satisfied to stay in one position, which is death or here and prefer moving off that spot to there, which motion is life. Consequently, the motion of life, which is any motion from here to there, is a movement away from that which dissatisfies; otherwise, had you been satisfied to remain here or where you are, you would never have moved to there. Since the motion of life constantly moves away from here to there, which is an expression of dissatisfaction with the present position, it must obviously move constantly in the direction of greater satisfaction. It should be obvious that our desire to live, to move off the spot called here, is determined by a law over which we have no control, because even if we should kill ourselves, we are choosing what gives us greater satisfaction; otherwise, we would not kill ourselves. The truth of the matter is that at any particular moment, the motion of man is not free, for all life obeys this invariable law. He is constantly compelled by his nature to make choices, decisions, and to prefer of whatever options are available during his lifetime that which he considers better for himself and his set of circumstances. For example, when he found that a discovery like the electric bulb was for his benefit in comparison to candlelight, he was compelled to prefer it for his motion, just being alive, has always been in the direction of greater satisfaction. Consequently, during every moment of man’s progress, he always did what he had to do because he had no choice. Although this demonstration proves that man’s will is not free, your mind may not be accustomed to grasping these type relations, so I will elaborate.

Supposing you wanted very much of two alternatives, A, which we shall designate as something considered evil by society, instead of B, the humdrum of your regular routine; could you possibly pick B at that particular moment of time if A is preferred as a better alternative when nothing could dissuade you from your decision, not even the threat of the law? What if the clergy, given two alternatives, choose A, which shall now represent something considered good, instead of B, that which is judged evil; would it be possible for them to prefer the latter when the former is available as an alternative? If it is utterly impossible to choose B in this comparison, are they not compelled, by their very nature, to prefer A? And how can they be free when the favorable difference between A and B is the compulsion of their choice and the motion of life in the direction of greater satisfaction? To be free, according to the definition of free will, man would be able to prefer of two alternatives, either the one he wants or the one he doesn’t want, which is an absolute impossibility because selecting what he doesn’t want when what he does want is available as an alternative is a motion in the direction of dissatisfaction. In other words, if man were free, he could actually prefer of several alternatives the one that gives him the least satisfaction, which would reverse the direction of his life and make him prefer the impossible.
 

if man were free, he could actually prefer of several alternatives the one that gives him the least satisfaction, which would reverse the direction of his life and make him prefer the impossible

“Prefer” just means to like one thing better than another. So by definition of the word, you can’t “prefer” that which you don’t prefer. So what? Man’s will is free, precisely BECAUSE he is able to pick, without impediment, that which he prefers.
 

if man were free, he could actually prefer of several alternatives the one that gives him the least satisfaction, which would reverse the direction of his life and make him prefer the impossible

“Prefer” just means to like one thing better than another. So by definition of the word, you can’t “prefer” that which you don’t prefer.
Thats exactly right. Though people will still say that you can prefer that which you don’t. You can, but only if it’s the least unpreferable of the available options. That means the choice that was made was still the most preferable given that all the choices available were distasteful. It doesn’t change the direction of greater satisfaction in any way. No matter how you try to dispute this invariable law of our nature, it cannot be done.
So what? Man’s will is free, precisely BECAUSE he is able to pick, without impediment, that which he prefers.
Prefer means exactly that and it’s an important observation not when you’re choosing between eggs or cereal for breakfast, but, for example, whether you would prefer to steal from a jewelry store when they accidentally left the alarm off.
 

if man were free, he could actually prefer of several alternatives the one that gives him the least satisfaction, which would reverse the direction of his life and make him prefer the impossible

“Prefer” just means to like one thing better than another. So by definition of the word, you can’t “prefer” that which you don’t prefer.
Thats exactly right. Though people will still say that you can prefer that which you don’t. You can, but only if it’s the least unpreferable of the available options. That means the choice that was made was still the most preferable given that all the choices available were distasteful. It doesn’t change the direction of greater satisfaction in any way. No matter how you try to dispute this invariable law of our nature, it cannot be done.
So what? Man’s will is free, precisely BECAUSE he is able to pick, without impediment, that which he prefers.
Prefer means exactly that and it’s an important observation not when you’re choosing between eggs or cereal for breakfast, but, for example, whether you would prefer to steal from a jewelry store when they accidentally left the alarm off.
I’m not sure what you mean by “without impediment.” An impediment is something that hinders, which goes back to the compatibilist idea that if there are no external forces acting upon us, we are free. That’s baloney! We are constrained by inner forces. We can prefer what we don’t prefer if that is our only choice. I don’t prefer eating leftovers but I’m hungry so this will have to do because I prefer eating leftovers more than than being hungry.
 
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Our “inner forces” ARE us, in part, so we are not constrained by ourselves.
 
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Our “inner forces” ARE us, in part, so we are not constrained by ourselves.
We most certainly are constrained by our inner forces which inform us what choice is in our best interest, even if it doesn’t appear that way to others. If you do not want to hurt someone, you are constrained by your very nature which prevents you from hurting them. Constraint just means holding back from doing something because it doesn’t serve you.
 
Our “inner forces” ARE us, in part, so we are not constrained by ourselves.
We most certainly are constrained by our inner forces which inform us what choice is in our best interest …
IOW, we inform ourselves what choice is in our best interest. Got it.
Of course we do. How do you make decisions without informing yourself what choice to make based on your options? What is so surprising about this Pood? You can't win here. Compatibilism is just an effort to hold people responsible for their actions. I understand their motives, but they are incorrect that man has any kind of free will, even their kind. They want to believe the person had a choice that is consistent with determinism, or they would have cognitive/dissonance. So they created a definition that appears to be consistent, but if you look closely, their definition is arbitrary. It's made up. We cannot have no free will and free will. We cannot do otherwise and not do otherwise. It is a complete and total contradiction. It's very hard talking to people who have their minds made up and are convinced their version of free will is the answer. I cannot move forward to show what happens when we extend these principles, if we can't get past square one. I offered the first three chapters and people say, "We aren't going to read that; explain it in your own words or we aren't listening. I am sorry but I cannot abide by their demands. Most discussions about a book come after the book is read. This is not happening here because the author was unknown. Why should they waste their time? Isn't that what they're thinking? I am definitely a glutton for punishment. I'm not sure how long I'm going to last. :(
 
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Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

There is no modal fallacy. A definition of determinism is given.

A definition of HARD determinism is given, by you. As noted upthread, your whole argument is question-begging. My argument is also deterministic — soft determinism. The whole point in dispute is whether HARD determinism or SOFT determinism more accurately captures reality. You cannot legitimately incorporate your conclusion into your premise and claim victory.

Again, be it compatibilist or incompatibilist, the definition of determinism is the same. 'Hard determinism' just refers to incompatibilism, that the notion of free will is not compatible with determinism.

Either way, the given definition of determinism - being the same for both sides of the debate - does not permit alternate actions in either case.


If that's what you are trying to argue, the modal fallacy is yours.
It is you who have confused necessarily true propositions with contingently true propositions, hence the modal fallacy is yours, not mine. What you are arguing for is called modal collapse.

So, two fallacies: circular reasoning and modal fallacy.

Nah. In principle, this is not difficult.

The definition of determinism as given by either compatibilists or incompatibilists (being one the same definition), does not permit alternate actions, where it is the terms of the given definition of determinism that does not permit alternate actions.

For instance, where do you see the possibility of alternate actions within constant conjunction?

Where ''constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.''

Where does an alternate choice or action fit into constant conjunction?


''determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. - Brittanica

Given how determinism is defined, how or where do you see the possibility of alternate actions or choices being present within the system?

Round and round the merry-go-round.

It is. With you as a willing participant.


The last question in the above bit I’ve already answered dozens of times over various threads.

I don't see that you have shown that alternate choices and actions are possible within a deterministic system, just as definined by the definition you endorsed. Which includes compatibilists in general.

Some of whom appear to argue for alternate actions regardless of the terms and conditions of their own definition of determinism........closet Libertarians as someone labelled them.

The thing is, you don’t generally respond to what others write. You just repeat your mantras about the “given” definition of determinism, which is not a given, then you cherry pick some quote or other, most often from compatibilists like David Hume. Then you call it a day. I see no reason to endlessly repeat answers I’ve already given. Suffice it to say you once again commit a standard modal fallacy, and long ago I gave you supporting material to help clarify this, and I’m sure you ignored it all.

It works both ways. It has been you and other compatibilists that tend to repeat the mantra of alternate actions within a deterministic system, which in turn compels me to point out - time and time again - that alternate choices actions contradict the terms and conditions of your very own definition of determinism.

You say that you and other compatibilists have given answers, and of course you have replied, but the problem is that the reply that you offer does nothing to address or explain the contradiction of claiming that alternate actions are possible within a deterministic system as you define it to be.

So I ask again: how is an alternate choice or action possible in the face of inevitability? Which means everything that happens within a deterministic system, happens necessarily, inevitably, implacably.
 
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