“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

[pood]

Nothing becomes necessary or impossible before the act because we cannot predict with complete accuracy what a person will decide to do. It becomes categorically false that the act was not a necessary one after the act was decided upon based on how determinism is defined which meansC that once an act is performed, the individual was compelled to that action due to internal and external reasons.

You just don’t understand, either because you don’t want to or are unable to do so. Even if it were true that the individual were “compelled” in any way to do something, the act was still not necessary.

Actually it does. You are mixing up the meaning of necessary which makes it appear that it was necessary that you choose Pepsi before you chose it.

I’ve said nothing even CLOSE to that. I’ve said JUST THE OPPOSITE. You can’t even follow a simple argument.

What do you think compelled means? I have explained to you, without success, that preference is the driving force when two or more alternatives are being considered. It is necessary when choosing between meaningful differences that we choose the more satisfying option, not the less.

No, it is not. I’ve already explained this. You’ve either not read my posts, or you haven’t understood them. Either way, you do not know what NECESSARY means.

Someone might get greater satisfaction risking his life to save someone in trouble. This is not the pleasure principle. I don't think you understand a word I've written. Back to the example you gave, it was necessary that you choose Coke over Pepsi but not before you chose it.

Wrong. That is not what NECESSARY means.

Looking back, it was predetermined

It was NOT predetermined. Predetermined is NOT the same thing as DETERMINED.

because, given the same exact conditions and what considerations you were using to make your choice, you would have always chosen Coke over Pepsi. There is no parallel world where you would have chosen Pepsi.

I never said there was a “parallel world.”

It's all imaginary. You keep bringing up the fact that you could choose Pepsi at a later date.

Although it is true you could choose Pepsi at a later date, that has NEVER been part of my argument. Learn to read for comprehension, please.

Of course you could. We are not talking about a later date;

Nor am I!

we are talking about the same exact conditions that led you to choose Coke. I already said you cannot prove compatibilist free will just as you can't prove libertarian free will because you can't go back in time, undo what has already been done, to prove a person could have chosen otherwise.

You have not understood a word of my argument, and are hopelessly lost in a garden of word salad.

If you don't like what I'm saying, continue with your flawed modal logic.

AD HOM AGAIN. Please stop using ad homs, or I will start reporting your posts. I have a whole slew of them that I could report, but have refrained from doing so, so far.

For the umpteenth time, it wasn't necessary that you choose Coke if you hadn't wanted to, but you wanted to since choosing Pepsi at that moment gave you less satisfaction; therefore, it was an impossible choice.

Nonsense word salad.

To repeat: you were free to choose Pepsi, but your desire to choose Coke won out after thinking it through, which then made Pepsi an impossible choice.

Lol, no, it was NOT an “impossible” choice.

If it was impossible to choose B (Pepsi) at that moment because it gave you less satisfaction, you were not free to choose A (Coke).

But it was not impossible, so the argument collapses. You do not understand AT ALL the modal categories actual, possible, impossible, contingent and necessary. You just don’t understand any of this.

Choosing what you prefer more over what you prefer less is a compulsion over which we have no control. BTW, using Norman Swartz as being some kind of authority because he is emeritus in philosophy is an "appeal to authority," which will get you nowhere.

Wrong AGAIN. I did NOT make an appeal to authority. I quoted his ARGUMENT, and then noted his CREDENTIALS, which is NOT an appeal to authority. An appeal to authority is when you say an argument is correct BECAUSE OF his credentials, and I did NOT do that!

Please stop embarrassing yourself.

 

[pood]

This will no doubt further confuse peacegirl, but perhaps she would like to reflect on it.

It is possibly true that the Beatles landed on the moon in 1964.

It is both possibly true and possibly false that Lincoln was shot in 1865.

The truth value of Goldbach’s Conjecture is possibly true and possibly false. If it is true, it is necessarily true, and if it is false, it is impossible.

See if you can work all that out.

Meanwhile, would you like to tackle the Paul argument?

 

[pood]

I should amend one thing. The truth value of Goldbach’s Conjecture is unknown.

 

[peacegirl]

And, for the thousandth time, the opposite of determinism is not free will. The opposite of determinism is INdeterminism.

False! Again, you’re playing word games. Free and determined are opposites. We may call something UNdetermined because we don’t know the causes but that is not the opposite of determinism. You’re all mixed up!

No, it’s you who are mixed up. You can’t even follow a simple argument.

You can't even accept the simple fact that free will is the opposite of determinism. We have absolutely no basis for communication if you can't even accept this truth.

You don’t get to DECLARE something is true. You have to DEMONSTRATE it.

The opposite of determinism is INdeterminism. If you say the opposite is “free will,” you are BEGGING THE QUESTION — do you have any clue what that means?

Call it whatever you want. There is only one truth. It can't be both. Indeterminism is not the opposite of determinism.

indeterminism​

noun​

in·de·ter·min·ism ˌin-di-ˈtər-mə-ˌni-zəm

1
philosophy
a
: a theory that the will is free and that deliberate choice and actions are not determined by or predictable from antecedent causes.

BUT THEY ARE DETERMINED EVEN IF THEY AREN'T PREDICTABLE.
b
: a theory that holds that not every event has a cause

ALL HUMAN CHOICE HAVE CAUSES BASED ON REASON.

2
: the quality or state of being indeterminate
especially : unpredictability

UNPREDICTABILITY DOES NOT RULE OUT DETERMINISM

determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.

Freedom of the will is the idea that a person could have done otherwise in a given situation123. It is a condition for moral responsibility, and a person is considered morally responsible for an act only if they could have acted otherwise24.

 

[peacegirl]

This will no doubt further confuse peacegirl, but perhaps she would like to reflect on it.

It is possibly true that the Beatles landed on the moon in 1964.i'M

It is both possibly true and possibly false that Lincoln was shot in 1865.

The truth value of Goldbach’s Conjecture is possibly true and possibly false. If it is true, it is necessarily true, and if it is false, it is impossible.

See if you can work all that out.

Meanwhile, would you like to tackle the Paul argument?

I'm not interested in this baloney. All the propositions based on modal logic turn into logical cobwebs.

 

[peacegirl]

And, for the thousandth time, the opposite of determinism is not free will. The opposite of determinism is INdeter minism.

False! Again, you’re playing word games. Free and determined are opposites. We may call something UNdetermined because we don’t know the causes but that is not the opposite of determinism. You’re all mixed up!

No, it’s you who are mixed up. You can’t even follow a simple argument.

You can't even accept the simple fact that free will is the opposite of determinism. We have absolutely no basis for communication if you can't even accept this truth.

You don’t get to DECLARE something is true. You have to DEMONSTRATE it.

The opposite of determinism is INdeterminism. If you say the opposite is “free will,” you are BEGGING THE QUESTION — do you have any clue what that means?

It has been demonstrated, and it went right over your head. You have too many definitions rolling around to know which ones CANNOT be true, and which one IS 100% true. I'm not begging the question because I'm not creating a premise that depends on or is equivalent to the argument's conclusion. Where does my premise that we have no free will depend on any particular conclusion other than once a choice is made, it could not have been otherwise? I'm not presupposing that any particular conclusion must be made to support my premise. Again, you are trying to disprove these accurate observations with faulty logic. It's an easy thing to do.

Begging the question is a logical fallacy that occurs when an argument’s premise depends on or is equivalent to the argument’s conclusion1234. It is also known as petitio principii or circular reasoning124. In other words:

• It attempts to support a claim with a premise that itself restates or presupposes the claim1.
• The argument takes for granted what it's supposed to prove3.

 

[DBT]

It appears that neither DBT nor peacegirl are going to address the argument about Paul’s son. I wonder why that is?

It's been addressed. Too many times. Whenever the issue is explained, it is promptly dismissed, ignored or misrepresented and the same pseudo compatibilist/ closet libertarian rationale trotted out as if nothing has been said in the past few years.

Nor does the argument for compatibilism entail choice or the possibility of doing otherwise, just a matter of acting without external force, coercion or undue influence.

Why the 'soft determinism' definition fails has been thoroughly explained.

 

[DBT]

You see, DBT and peacegirl have charged me with playing word games with respect to this discussion, and compatibilism in particular. The exact opposite is true: THEY are playing word games. I am playing LOGIC games.

Not so. For the given reasons, your logic and your argument for free will and choice in relation to determinism contradict the conditions of your definition of determinism.

You have a contradiction in your argument.

The contradiction is entirely yours, as you will see if you can figure out why the argument about Paul’s son is invalid and unsound. But you have not even tried to figure it out.

''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''

It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.

What else can I say?

Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?

 

[peacegirl]

Nothing becomes necessary or impossible before the act because we cannot predict with complete accuracy what a person will decide to do. It becomes categorically false that the act was not a necessary one after the act was decided upon based on how determinism is defined which meansC that once an act is performed, the individual was compelled to that action due to internal and external reasons.

You just don’t understand, either because you don’t want to or are unable to do so. Even if it were true that the individual were “compelled” in any way to do something, the act was still not necessary.

Actually it does. You are mixing up the meaning of necessary which makes it appear that it was necessary that you choose Pepsi before you chose it.

I’ve said nothing even CLOSE to that. I’ve said JUST THE OPPOSITE. You can’t even follow a simple argument.

What do you think compelled means? I have explained to you, without success, that preference is the driving force when two or more alternatives are being considered. It is necessary when choosing between meaningful differences that we choose the more satisfying option, not the less.

No, it is not. I’ve already explained this. You’ve either not read my posts, or you haven’t understood them. Either way, you do not know what NECESSARY means.

Someone might get greater satisfaction risking his life to save someone in trouble. This is not the pleasure principle. I don't think you understand a word I've written. Back to the example you gave, it was necessary that you choose Coke over Pepsi but not before you chose it.

Wrong. That is not what NECESSARY means.

Looking back, it was predetermined

It was NOT predetermined. Predetermined is NOT the same thing as DETERMINED.

You were predetermined to do something because of life moving in one direction. Predetermination only means that whatever occurred was determined looking back. It's impossible to predict the future perfectly but when looking back it can be seen that every single solitary movement through life is predetermined, therefore determined. Human decision-making gets confusing because it looks like we have more than one choice and for that reason we are free to choose either/or, but that is false which I've gone over too many times to count. Predetermination also does not mean that nature forces a particular outcome against our will. Both DBT and I said that our decisions (based on antecedents) are part of the deterministic process. It doesn't leave human decision-making out. I think the confusion is thinking that there is only one antecedent, but there could be many depending on what the individual is using to make his decision.

because, given the same exact conditions and what considerations you were using to make your choice, you would have always chosen Coke over Pepsi. There is no parallel world where you would have chosen Pepsi.

I never said there was a “parallel world.”

It's all imaginary. You keep bringing up the fact that you could choose Pepsi at a later date.

Although it is true you could choose Pepsi at a later date, that has NEVER been part of my argument. Learn to read for comprehension, please.

Of course you could. We are not talking about a later date;

Nor am I!

we are talking about the same exact conditions that led you to choose Coke. I already said you cannot prove compatibilist free will just as you can't prove libertarian free will because you can't go back in time, undo what has already been done, to prove a person could have chosen otherwise.

You have not understood a word of my argument, and are hopelessly lost in a garden of word salad.

If you don't like what I'm saying, continue with your flawed modal logic.

AD HOM AGAIN. Please stop using ad homs, or I will start reporting your posts. I have a whole slew of them that I could report, but have refrained from doing so, so far.

I have never attacked you personally. I have refuted your logic. I will continue to show where your logic is flawed. Now all of a sudden you are not even accepting that determinism is the opposite of free will. Indeterminism doesn't save you from anything. It just means we don't know how two things may connect. QM doesn't save free will. It does not translate to human decision-making.

Nonsense word salad.

To repeat: you were free to choose Pepsi, but your desire to choose Coke won out after thinking it through, which then made Pepsi an impossible choice.

Lol, no, it was NOT an “impossible” choice.

If it was impossible to choose B (Pepsi) at that moment because it gave you less satisfaction, you were not free to choose A (Coke).

But it was not impossible, so the argument collapses. You do not understand AT ALL the modal categories actual, possible, impossible, contingent and necessary. You just don’t understand any of this.

Choosing what you prefer more over what you prefer less is a compulsion over which we have no control. BTW, using Norman Swartz as being some kind of authority because he is emeritus in philosophy is an "appeal to authority," which will get you nowhere.

Wrong AGAIN. I did NOT make an appeal to authority. I quoted his ARGUMENT, and then noted his CREDENTIALS, which is NOT an appeal to authority. An appeal to authority is when you say an argument is correct BECAUSE OF his credentials, and I did NOT do that!

Please stop embarrassing yourself.

Why bring up his credentials at all Pood? You brought them up in because you wanted his credentials to be influential. You know this is true as well as I.

 

[pood]

It appears that neither DBT nor peacegirl are going to address the argument about Paul’s son. I wonder why that is?

It's been addressed. Too many times. Whenever the issue is explained, it is promptly dismissed, ignored or misrepresented and the same pseudo compatibilist/ closet libertarian rationale trotted out as if nothing has been said in the past few years.

Nor does the argument for compatibilism entail choice or the possibility of doing otherwise, just a matter of acting without external force, coercion or undue influence.

Why the 'soft determinism' definition fails has been thoroughly explained.

In other words, you are unable to address the Paul argument. Got it.

 

[pood]

''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''

It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.

What else can I say?

Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?

I’ll show you.

Here is the argument again:

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.

The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.

The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).

Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.

HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:

☐P =df ~◊~P

This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).

By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”

From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.

However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?

The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”

The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.

Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.

The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.

Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:

Unsound and invalid:

If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.

Corrected argument, valid and sound:

Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.

And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.

So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.

Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.

 

[peacegirl]

Here is the argument again:

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.

TRUE

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.

FALSE. Just because Paul has at least one son does not mean that determinism is saying that, before he has at least one son, that it must occur that way UNTIL HE HAS AT LEAST ONE SON. How many times has it said that determinism IS NOT prescriptive. You are misinterpreting the meaning of having no free will.

A decision is based on antecedents that are contingent, period. They are based on reasons and those reasons are based on the person's heredity, immediate environment, and previous experience. Everyone's decisions work in the same way. Furthermore, there may be contingencies that they are only privy to. For example, I don't know what is compelling you to be in this thread, but this doesn't take away from the fact that you're using what your brain has learned from the past to help you make your decision, which is to stay, otherwise your brain would inform you to move in a different direction for satisfaction. Determinism doesn't say you must be here as a necessary proposition. It is correct to say: You have decided to be here of your own accord (because you want to), which is out of necessity, since it is impossible to do otherwise given everything that has occurred up to this exact moment in time.

 

[pood]

Peacegirl, I am no longer reading or responding to your posts. Get someone else to follow you down your rabbit holes. Maybe DBT will oblige you.

 

[peacegirl]

Peacegirl, I am no longer reading or responding to your posts. Get someone else to follow you down your rabbit holes. Maybe DBT will oblige you.

I think you know you can't win. My guess is that you invited me here to prove the author wrong, but you haven't done it. If no one shows any interest in this discovery, then this thread will die a natural death.

 

[peacegirl]

''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''

It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.

What else can I say?

Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?

I’ll show you.

Here is the argument again:

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.

The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.

The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).

Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.

HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:

☐P =df ~◊~P

This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).

By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”

From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.

However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?

The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”

The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.

Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.

The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.

Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:

Unsound and invalid:

If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.

Corrected argument, valid and sound:

Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.

And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.

So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.

Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.

 

[peacegirl]

''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''

It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.

What else can I say?

Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?

I’ll show you.

Here is the argument again:

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.

Pood probably isn't participating anymore. This is in response to his last post which I wanted to understand and comment on.
Let's leave out "has to have" for argument's sake and just say "therefore Paul has at least one son." There's no confusion that way.

The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.

The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).

Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.

You're right. He isn't being forced to have at least one son. Determinism doesn't say that. It is not prescriptive. It doesn't tell a person what they must do; it just sets up the conditions that push them in a particular direction; the only direction they can possibly go. You are misconstruing what determinism means: The reality is that he has one daughter and two sons, therefore, he has at least one son. It doesn't say he "necessarily has to have two daughters and one son" before he even has them. Whatever the case may be, having one daughter and two sons had to happen under those exact circumstances. At the point of him having had one daughter and two sons, he could not not have had them (he could not have chosen otherwise) which you seem to dispute based on modal logic; If it is contingent, you claim, it is not necessary, and therefore "it could have been otherwise." If there were different laws in a different world where man had free will, maybe he could have chosen otherwise, but not in this world. This is glaringly false.

HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:

☐P =df ~◊~P

This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).

By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”

So again, what this modal logic states is that anything contingent cannot be necessary, which means a person "could have chosen otherwise, which is just not true. Your house of cards is beginning to fall. This whole idea of logically possible worlds is problematic. We don't live in an imaginary world where something could be possible if it doesn't follow modal logic rules. That is a made-up construct that you seem to accept as true. I don't accept the very proposition which states that if something is contingent on x, y, and z, it is therefore not necessary once it was chosen. According to modal logic, the outcome could have been different. I have shown you how that is impossible based on one's heredity, environment, and experiences. We are dealing with what is, with reality. To say you didn't have to type this today is correct, if you didn't want to, but you wanted to, and therefore that is the choice you acted upon, which ruled out all other possibilities. That's how it works Pood.

From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.

It was true that he had to have one daughter and two sons. It wasn't telling him in advance that he MUST HAVE two daughters and one son. The fact that he did, in fact, have at least one son meant that in all logically possible worlds he may have had two daughters and one son, but a logically possible world isn't real. It's imaginary.

However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?

The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”

The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.

Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.

The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.

Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:

Unsound and invalid:

If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.

If x, y, and z lead him to desire the Coke, he will be compelled to choose the Coke in the direction of greater satisfaction based on x, y, and z reasons.

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.

He will choose Coke because it satisfies him more than choosing Pepsi, which means that he could not have chosen Pepsi for the reasons he decided upon the Coke. Even though it's logically possible that he could have chosen Pepsi (he was free in that sense; he wasn't being coerced with a gun to his head to choose Coke) doesn't mean it's real that Paul could have chosen Pepsi at that moment, therefore the modal logic that says he could have chosen otherwise is incorrect. It is necessary in all logical possible worlds that triangles have three sides, and it is also necessary that every movement follows strict laws of causation where no alternative is possible, if you have followed DBTs correct reasoning. The word cause only means that there is no freedom anywhere to be found in our decision making. Every thought and every action that leads up to the here and now are determined by everything that came before it, and therefore could not have been any other way.

Corrected argument, valid and sound:

Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.

And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.

So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.

Contingent does not mean one "could have done otherwise." After contemplating and deciding that Coke was the better choice, it could not have been otherwise, and to extend this knowledge to some other logically possible world does not mean that it could have happened any differently in this world, today, at this very moment that the decision was made. You could not have done anything differently today other than typing this because you were compelled to be here, and no other logically possible world could make it possible for you to have done otherwise.

Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.

The modal status of necessity and contingency is flawed. Any decision made by a human is contingent on antecedents, and these antecedents which are being considered are also necessary which doesn't allow for free will or the option to do otherwise. How can a person who is contemplating their options do this in the past tense? It has to be contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward. This is not logical BS at all. It only is through pondering alternatives (in the present) that we can know what compelled us to choose that option (looking back). I know you disagree with this, but it's the modal fallacy at fault. We just don't know before the fact what that choice will be.

 

[peacegirl]

Pood, I don't hold anything against you even if you think (are sure) you're right and I'm wrong. What you believe is what you believe, but this shouldn't make us enemies. I hope we can still be friends. After all, our connection from ff goes way back.

 

[DBT]

It appears that neither DBT nor peacegirl are going to address the argument about Paul’s son. I wonder why that is?

It's been addressed. Too many times. Whenever the issue is explained, it is promptly dismissed, ignored or misrepresented and the same pseudo compatibilist/ closet libertarian rationale trotted out as if nothing has been said in the past few years.

Nor does the argument for compatibilism entail choice or the possibility of doing otherwise, just a matter of acting without external force, coercion or undue influence.

Why the 'soft determinism' definition fails has been thoroughly explained.

In other words, you are unable to address the Paul argument. Got it.

With the 'Paul argument,' I don't see that there is nothing to address. It doesn't look like an argument that supports compatibilism or anything that may refute incompatibilism.

It looks irrelevant.

But maybe I missed something, so perhaps you can give me a brief explanation on how it relates to compatibilism, incompatibilism and/or determinism?

 

[DBT]

''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''

It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.

What else can I say?

Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?

I’ll show you.

Here is the argument again:

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.

The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.

The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).

Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.

HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:

☐P =df ~◊~P

This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).

By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”

From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.

However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?

The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”

The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.

Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.

The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.

Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:

Unsound and invalid:

If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.

Corrected argument, valid and sound:

Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.

And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.

So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.

Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.

That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.

Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.

So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.

Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)

The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.

 

[pood]

''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''

It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.

What else can I say?

Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?

I’ll show you.

Here is the argument again:

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.

The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.

The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).

Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.

HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:

☐P =df ~◊~P

This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).

By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”

From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.

However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?

The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”

The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.

Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.

The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.

Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:

Unsound and invalid:

If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.

Corrected argument, valid and sound:

Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.

And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.

So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.

Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.

That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.

Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.

So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.

Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)

The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.

LOL, you don’t even know what a modal fallacy is. I just SHOWED you what it is — and YOU commit it ALL THE TIME.
You just committed it AGAIN.

You still don’t know anything about a topic you talk about endlessly. But go ahead and follow peacegirl down her rabbit holes. That should be fun.

Your argument is no longer with me. It’s with cold, hard modal logic, which not only shows that Paul choosing Coke is contingent (could have been otherwise) but that it is NECESSARILY contingent, rendering your position a fortiori not just wrong but worthless.

But do find more quotes from Tricky Dick Slattery. HIs bullshit is always amusing.