“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

[pood]

Meanwhile, peacegirl, interest in this thread seems to have significantly waned. Maybe it’s time to introduce all the good stuff?

 

[pood]

That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.

Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.

So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.

Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)

The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.

Given antecedents x, y, z, Paul HAS TO choose Coke.

There is your modal fallacy RIGHT THERE, see? The bold part.

As I say, take it up with modal logic, not me. Want me to link you to an entire text book on the subject?

 

[peacegirl]

''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''

It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.

What else can I say?

Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?

I’ll show you.

Here is the argument again:

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.

The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.

The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).

Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.

HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:

☐P =df ~◊~P

This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).

By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”

From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.

However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?

The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”

The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.

Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.

The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.

Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:

Unsound and invalid:

If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.

Corrected argument, valid and sound:

Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.

And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.

So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.

Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.

That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.

Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.

So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.

Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)

The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.

LOL, you don’t even know what a modal fallacy is. I just SHOWED you what it is — and YOU commit it ALL THE TIME.
You just committed it AGAIN.

He is right. According to definition of determinism, there is no "will do." But again, the word cause is confusing as well because nothing from the past causes anything. Everything happens in the present.

You still don’t know anything about a topic you talk about endlessly. But go ahead and follow peacegirl down her rabbit holes. That should be fun.

He knows a lot more than you.

Your argument is no longer with me. It’s with cold, hard modal logic, which not only shows that Paul choosing Coke is contingent (could have been otherwise) but that it is NECESSARILY contingent, rendering your position a fortiori not just wrong but worthless.

But do find more quotes from Tricky Dick Slattery. HIs bullshit is always amusing.

Contingent does not mean "could have done otherwise". It actually means the very opposite, according to the definition of determinism that compatibilists have agreed upon. It could NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE AFTER THE FACT.

 

[peacegirl]

Meanwhile, peacegirl, interest in this thread seems to have significantly waned. Maybe it’s time to introduce all the good stuff?

Don't do this Pood just because you're pissed.

 

[DBT]

''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''

It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.

What else can I say?

Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?

I’ll show you.

Here is the argument again:

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.

The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.

The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).

Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.

HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:

☐P =df ~◊~P

This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).

By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”

From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.

However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?

The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”

The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.

Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.

The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.

Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:

Unsound and invalid:

If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.

Corrected argument, valid and sound:

Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.

And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.

So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.

Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.

That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.

Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.

So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.

Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)

The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.

LOL, you don’t even know what a modal fallacy is. I just SHOWED you what it is — and YOU commit it ALL THE TIME.
You just committed it AGAIN.

He is right. According to definition of determinism, there is no "will do." But again, the word cause is confusing as well because nothing from the past causes anything. Everything happens in the present.

You still don’t know anything about a topic you talk about endlessly. But go ahead and follow peacegirl down her rabbit holes. That should be fun.

He knows a lot more than you.

Your argument is no longer with me. It’s with cold, hard modal logic, which not only shows that Paul choosing Coke is contingent (could have been otherwise) but that it is NECESSARILY contingent, rendering your position a fortiori not just wrong but worthless.

But do find more quotes from Tricky Dick Slattery. HIs bullshit is always amusing.

Contingent does not mean "could have done otherwise". It actually means the very opposite, according to the definition of determinism that compatibilists have agreed upon. It could NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE AFTER THE FACT.

''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''

It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.

What else can I say?

Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?

I’ll show you.

Here is the argument again:

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.

The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.

The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).

Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.

HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:

☐P =df ~◊~P

This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).

By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”

From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.

However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?

The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”

The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.

Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.

The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.

Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:

Unsound and invalid:

If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.

Corrected argument, valid and sound:

Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.

And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.

So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.

Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.

That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.

Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.

So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.

Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)

The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.

LOL, you don’t even know what a modal fallacy is. I just SHOWED you what it is — and YOU commit it ALL THE TIME.
You just committed it AGAIN.

He is right. According to definition of determinism, there is no "will do." But again, the word cause is confusing as well because nothing from the past causes anything. Everything happens in the present.

You still don’t know anything about a topic you talk about endlessly. But go ahead and follow peacegirl down her rabbit holes. That should be fun.

He knows a lot more than you.

Your argument is no longer with me. It’s with cold, hard modal logic, which not only shows that Paul choosing Coke is contingent (could have been otherwise) but that it is NECESSARILY contingent, rendering your position a fortiori not just wrong but worthless.

But do find more quotes from Tricky Dick Slattery. HIs bullshit is always amusing.

Contingent does not mean "could have done otherwise". It actually means the very opposite, according to the definition of determinism that compatibilists have agreed upon. It could NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE AFTER THE FACT.

Yes, it's just a play on words.

Semantics designed to give the impression of compatibilism as a valid argument.

Yet compatibilism is not defined by the possibility of 'could have done otherwise.'

So what the point may be is anyone's guess.

 

[DBT]

''If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son. Paul has one daughter and two sons. Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.''

It's puzzling that you would use this as an argument for compatibilism or a refutation of incompatibilism.

What else can I say?

Maybe you can explain the connection? For instance, what, if anything, does this have to do with free will and determinism as compatibilists define these things?

I’ll show you.

Here is the argument again:

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has to have at least one son.

The problem is that you, and peacegirl especially, are throwing around all sorts of words like “necessary,” “possible,” “contingent,” “actual,” and the like, that are notoriously imprecise, vague, slippery, and ambiguous in natural language, because natural language is like that. That is why we have formal symbolic logic, to clear up these discrepancies. The above arguments needs to be treated in formal modal symbolic logic, and I can’t here reproduce all the required modal symbols, though I can reproduce some for them. So I’ll mostly make do with English to clarify inconsistencies in English words.

The above argument is invalid (conclusion does not follow from premises) and unsound (premise one is false).

Paul does not HAVE TO have at least one son. He just DOES.

HAVE TO means “necessary.” In modal logic, necessity is denoted by ☐. Here, in formal modal logic, is the formal definition of necessity, and not the sloppy way you and peacegirl use the word:

☐P =df ~◊~P

This means P (a proposition) is necessary if and only if (iff) its negation (that is, “~P”) is impossible (where “=df” stands for “is by definition” and ◊ stand for “possible”).

By the word “impossible,” we mean, “not possible at any time, anywhere, under any conditions whatsoever.” Another way to say “impossible” is “necessarily false.” Another way to say that is, “false at all logically possible worlds.”

From this, it follows that “necessary” means, “P is true at all logically possible worlds, and cannot fail to be true at any of them.” Clearly, that is not the case for Paul having at least one son.

However, in the Paul argument, it’s plain that something is necessary, but what?

The corrected argument shows that it is not necessary for Paul to have at least one child, because obviously, we can imagine a possible world where Paul does NOT have at least one child. Paul having at least one child is possible (◊) and also contingent (∇), which means, “could have been otherwise.”

The necessity in the Paul argument is a relative and not an absolute necessity. The modal fallacy you repeatedly commit in these discussions to ascribe the modal necessity operator ☐ to the consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the antecedent AND the consequent together.

Correcting premise one, we get, in natural language, as follow:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son. Another way to put this is, Paul having at least one son, is a NECESSARY PRECONDITION for him having two sons.

The corrected argument, which becomes both valid and sound, is straightforward:

Necessarily, (If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has [but does HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.)

Paul has one daughter and two sons.

Therefore, Paul has [but does not HAVE TO HAVE] at least one son.

Now we can treat the parallel argument to hard determinism:

Unsound and invalid:

If antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul has to choose Coke.

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul has to choose Coke.

Corrected argument, valid and sound:

Necessarily (if antecedents are x, y, and z, then Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.)

Antecedents are x, y, and z.

Therefore, Paul will [but does not HAVE TO] choose Coke.

And, the corrected argument is … soft determinism, also known as compatibilism.

So, when you say, “don’t get hung up on the word ‘necessity,’ that’s wrong, because that is the whole crux of the matter. If it is not NECESSARY for Paul to choose Coke, then the proposition “Paul chooses Coke,” is, was, and always will be, CONTINGENT (could have been otherwise). And if that is true, and it is, as I have just shown, the argument to hard determinism fails as a matter of cold, hard logic.

Note, finally, that contra peacegirl, propositions can never change their modal status on pain of logical contradiction, so her claim that a human act is contingent before it is carried out and necessary afterward is utter logical BS. Modal logic yields ☐☐P and ☐∇P.

That doesn't work. You are just restating the logic of your argument, where the premises have no apparent relationship to compatibilism or incompatibilism as it relates to determinism as it is defined, which entails that whatever Paul does is fixed by antecedent without the possibility of alternate actions.

Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice, selecting Coke is the only possible action in that moment of selection without the possibility of any other option being realized.

So, on the contrary, the only possible action that Paul can take in that instance, is to select Coke.

Anything else contravenes the terms of your definition of determinism, where 'will do' is must necessarily do (a constant conjunction of events)

The Paul argument is therefore flawed, essentially a modal fallacy.

LOL, you don’t even know what a modal fallacy is. I just SHOWED you what it is — and YOU commit it ALL THE TIME.
You just committed it AGAIN.

Lol? What you do is try to alter the terms and conditions of determinism in order to give the impression of freedom of choice or free will where none exists.

I don't care what you want to call it, it's a fallacy plain and simple.

modal
[ˈməʊdl]
adjective
1 - relating to mode or form as opposed to substance:

Modal logic, contingency, possibility or 'had conditions been different' doesn't help you alter the nature and conditions of a deterministic system.

Call it whatever you like, the label doesn't matter, the fallacy is yours. It was from the beginning.

You still don’t know anything about a topic you talk about endlessly. But go ahead and follow peacegirl down her rabbit holes. That should be fun.

Funny, I could say the same about you. I have supported everything that I have said. I have used the given definition of determinism and free will as defined by compatibilists....yet you continue to impose your own version, a version that is more Libertarian than Compatibilist.

Now it's sour grapes, resorting to ad homs, insults and ridicule.

Your argument for compatibilism fails. It fails because you drift into the realm of Libertarian free will,

I fails because you don't take the given terms and conditions into account. Where determinism, constant conjunction entails strict necessitation, where each and every event inevitably follows its antecedents.

Your argument is no longer with me. It’s with cold, hard modal logic, which not only shows that Paul choosing Coke is contingent (could have been otherwise) but that it is NECESSARILY contingent, rendering your position a fortiori not just wrong but worthless.

Modal logic doesn't help you. Modal logic cannot alter the described terms and conditions of compatibilist free will in relation to determinism as compatibilists define it.

But do find more quotes from Tricky Dick Slattery. HIs bullshit is always amusing.

Which just show that it is you who doesn't understand the subject matter or the given parameters of compatibilism and determinism.

This may help give you a better understanding;

Free Will and the Problem of Causal Determinism

''Compatibilism emerges as a response to a problem posed by causal determinism. But what problem is that? Well, suppose, as the thesis of causal determinism tells us, that everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past. If this is the case, then everything human agents do flows from the laws of nature and the way the world was in the distant past. But if what we do is simply the consequence of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past—then we cannot do anything other than what we ultimately do. Nor are we in any meaningful sense the ultimate causal source of our actions, since they have their causal origins in the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Determinism therefore seems to prevent human agents from having the freedom to do otherwise, and it also seems to prevent them from being the sources of their actions. If either of these is true, then it’s doubtful that human agents are free or responsible for their actions in any meaningful sense.''

And in relation to this, Compatibilists define free will as a matter of acting without external force, coercion or undue influence.

Where your rationale of 'had conditions been different,' contingency, modal logic, etc, do not apply.

 

[DBT]

Meanwhile, peacegirl, interest in this thread seems to have significantly waned. Maybe it’s time to introduce all the good stuff?

Don't do this Pood just because you're pissed.

The free will debate appears to stir up some strong emotions, resentment, a sense of threat, anger. It feels like arguing with theists.

 

[DBT]

​

The modal fallacy​

​

Introduction​

The following argument appears to be valid and to have true premises; yet its conclusion is false.

If Paul has one daughter and two sons, then Paul has to have at least one son.
Paul has one daughter and two sons.
—————————

Paul has to have at least one son.

The problem is that although Paul (my brother) does have a son (he in fact has two sons), he does not have to have any. His having any children at all, as well as the exact number, are contingent matters, not matters of logical necessity.



There are a great number of fallacious arguments which, in one way or another, misuse modal concepts and thereby seem to establish conclusions which are not warranted at all.

'The' Modal Fallacy - Prof. Norman Swartz

'The' Modal Fallacy

www.sfu.ca

 

[peacegirl]

This video caught my eye. It indirectly relates to this thread in regard to how we make choices. Of course, he doesn't discuss it in the same way this author discusses moving in the direction of greater satisfaction, but it's close enough. He also talks about why jail time is not as helpful as rehabilitation in changing behavior.

 

[peacegirl]

Is this it? Does everyone think man’s will is free because of a modal fallacy that would ruin our chances of peace on earth? If anyone here has misgivings or proof that we cannot have free will at the same time we have free will (a complete contradiction), please come forward! I need help! DBT, if it were not for you, I would have given up with this thread entirely.

 

[DBT]

Is this it? Does everyone think man’s will is free because of a modal fallacy that would ruin our chances of peace on earth? If anyone here has misgivings or proof that we cannot have free will at the same time we have free will (a complete contradiction), please come forward! I need help! DBT, if it were not for you, I would have given up with this thread entirely.

I think the thread is cooked. Each participant was set in the position they had held before the dispute even began, and how it proceeded 'fixed as a matter of natural law.'

""Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature."

That's the nature of determinism.

 

[Janice Rael]

Is this it? Does everyone think

I think the thread is cooked. Each participant was set in the position they had held before the dispute even began, and how it proceeded

I wasn't set in my position, @DBT .

I don't believe that any of my position was addressed, at all.

I may as well sing karaoke, or something. idk.

My sister
My sister
My sister

I hate my sister, she's such a bitch
She acts as if she doesn't even know that I exist
But I would do anything to let her know I care
But I am only talking to myself 'cause she isn't there

My sister
I love my sister, she's the best
She's cooler than any other girl that I have ever met
She had the greatest band, she had the greatest guy
She's good at everything and doesn't even try

 

[DBT]

Is this it? Does everyone think

I think the thread is cooked. Each participant was set in the position they had held before the dispute even began, and how it proceeded

I wasn't set in my position, @DBT .

I don't believe that any of my position was addressed, at all.

I didn't have time to read everything. I was referring to those that I was responding to, some who have not changed their position in all the time that these threads have been going, a bit of a dig, a stir. I didn't mean to suggest that our minds cannot be changed, just given determinism, a change of mind is set by antecedents, where our minds are being constantly changed and we are different moment to moment.

''I don't believe that any of my position was addressed, at all.''

Just curious, what is your position? Sorry to ask, it's just to save me a search.

 

[Janice Rael]

Is this it? Does everyone think

I think the thread is cooked. Each participant was set in the position they had held before the dispute even began, and how it proceeded

I wasn't set in my position, @DBT .

I don't believe that any of my position was addressed, at all.

I didn't have time to read everything. I was referring to those that I was responding to, some who have not changed their position in all the time that these threads have been going, a bit of a dig, a stir. I didn't mean to suggest that our minds cannot be changed, just given determinism, a change of mind is set by antecedents, where our minds are being constantly changed and we are different moment to moment.

''I don't believe that any of my position was addressed, at all.''

Just curious, what is your position? Sorry to ask, it's just to save me a search.

Janice and Janis

 

[bilby]

Is this it? Does everyone

Hasty generalisation

think man’s will is free because of a modal fallacy

Non sequitur

that would ruin our chances of peace on earth?

Argument from consequences

If anyone here has misgivings

Appeal to emotion

or proof that we cannot have free will at the same time we have free will (a complete contradiction),

Question begging and poisoning the well

please come forward! I need help!

Evidently.

DBT, if it were not for you, I would have given up with this thread entirely.

Don't try to shift the blame.

 

[DBT]

Is this it? Does everyone think

I think the thread is cooked. Each participant was set in the position they had held before the dispute even began, and how it proceeded

I wasn't set in my position, @DBT .

I don't believe that any of my position was addressed, at all.

I didn't have time to read everything. I was referring to those that I was responding to, some who have not changed their position in all the time that these threads have been going, a bit of a dig, a stir. I didn't mean to suggest that our minds cannot be changed, just given determinism, a change of mind is set by antecedents, where our minds are being constantly changed and we are different moment to moment.

''I don't believe that any of my position was addressed, at all.''

Just curious, what is your position? Sorry to ask, it's just to save me a search.

Janice and Janis

That explains it.

 

[DBT]

Is this it? Does everyone

Hasty generalisation

think man’s will is free because of a modal fallacy

Non sequitur

that would ruin our chances of peace on earth?

Argument from consequences

If anyone here has misgivings

Appeal to emotion

or proof that we cannot have free will at the same time we have free will (a complete contradiction),

Question begging and poisoning the well

please come forward! I need help!

Evidently.

DBT, if it were not for you, I would have given up with this thread entirely.

Don't try to shift the blame.

We have decision-making. We have the ability to perceive the world and respond to its events. Given determinism, our abilities and attributes, how we respond to events has nothing to with the power of will, yet alone free will.