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The Great Contradiction

One can google and readily find articles, papers and videos discussing how both modern neuroscience and genetics are undermining the concept of free will.
Sure. incompatibilist (libertarian) free will is the idea that for the will to be free it must be free from any deterministic causes. This is at odds with science and common sense. But, as you know, compatibilist free will is not the same as incomptaibilist free will.

As to my understanding of compatibilist free will, it's an oxymoron, imo. :)
Ok, but what exactly do you find oxymoronic about compatibilist notions of free will?

What more can I say?
You said science was chipping away at the foundations of compatibilism. Can you explain precisely what compatibilism says that is undermined by science?
 
But, as you know, compatibilist free will is not the same as incomptaibilist free will.

True. Imo, the former is a fudge. The latter appears to be awry for a different reason (determinism does appear to rule).

Ok, but what exactly do you find oxymoronic about compatibilist notions of free will?

The two things aren't compatible, it would seem, in the absence of an explanation as to how the process can (supposedly) get out of the clamp of being fully determined.

You said science was chipping away at the foundations of compatibilism. Can you explain precisely what compatibilism says that is undermined by science?

Compatibilism says we have free will. That's what science is undermining.

Now, I think I previously asked you some questions.

Here we are:

Are you a compatibilist? If so, why do you say there's free will, exactly? I can't see how there even possibly could be, in the final analysis. Can you?

Basically, how would it even work?

I make that 4 questions. I'm particularly interested in the last one, assuming full (causal) determinism.

Also, what did you think of my photo of God? Pretty cool, huh? Whoever thought god could be photographed? God's looking well for his/its age, don't you think?
 
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The two things aren't compatible, it would seem, in the absence of an explanation as to how the process can get out of the clamp of being fully determined.
But compatibilism doesn't require indeterminism so your objection makes no sense.

You said science was chipping away at the foundations of compatibilism. Can you explain precisely what compatibilism says that is undermined by science?

Compatibilism says we have free will. That's what science is undermining.
Science undermines incompatibilist free will. It says nothing about compatibilist free will.


Now, I think I asked you some questions.

Here we are:

Are you a compatibilist?
I think it's a sensible way of understanding what many people mean by the term free will (it's what I always thought was meant by the term).


If so, why do you say there's free will, exactly?
I don't understand the question. What exactly do you find problematic with the notion of compatibilist free will? I'm not sure you understand compatibilism.
 
But compatibilism doesn't require indeterminism so your objection makes no sense.

Compatibilism says we have free will. That's what science is undermining.
Science undermines incompatibilist free will. It says nothing about compatibilist free will.


Now, I think I asked you some questions.

Here we are:

Are you a compatibilist?
I think it's a sensible way of understanding what many people mean by the term free will (it's what I always thought was meant by the term).


If so, why do you say there's free will, exactly?
I don't understand the question. What exactly do you find problematic with the notion of compatibilist free will? I'm not sure you understand compatibilism.

Ok, I think I've tried to answer your questions. I really think it's more your turn than mine now. :)

I asked at least 5. You surely can't not understand all of them.

You haven't yet explained or defended compatibilist free will. Come to think of it I don't think anyone has. No wait, Hume's version was cited. But I've already explained why I think that is a very incomplete analysis.

And how would free will work? How would it actually be free will, I mean? Where's the freely willed part, if everything is fully determined?

And don't forget to comment on my god pic.

Oh sorry, I see you answered one. Why do you think it's sensible? Do you mean convenient and pragmatic? If so, fine. A convenient and pragmatic way to see and understand things. We could agree on that. I'm not dead set against pragmatism. When the weatherman comes on, I don't tend to shout 'but the sun doesn't actually rise over the earth!' at the tv. In many ways I broadly accept that it's convenient and pragmatic in that situation to accept that it appears to, for the intended purposes, by and large. Possibly with some caveats, most notably the also having an awareness that it doesn't actually rise over the earth.
 
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If someone who believes in free will would define 'will', that would be useful also. Some (eg Angra) appear to think it isn't necessarily anything conscious. If it can be non-conscious, then how is that freely willed by me, rather than just 'totally automatic' (albeit very complicated) and completely 'happening to me'? Surely I can't freely will a non-conscious brain decision in any meaningful sense?

The relevant contentious term is, after all, 'free will'. Not just 'free' and not just 'will'.

Not to mention that 'I' and 'me' are arguably contentious terms of themselves. In the final analysis, 'the system that for most humans calls itself me when it's operating in certain modes' is better, imo.
 
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So, if someone is confirmed to have this gene and has experienced the stressor, so that the gene is active, does that mitigate their personal responsibility for exhibiting some sort of anti-social behaviour in a certain situation? My intuition says, yes, it does.

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Personal responsibility? I don't know.

But one could easily argue that it indicates an increased need for punishment, because, in this violence-tempted individual, there is increased need for rehabilitation and/or isolation.
 
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So, if someone is confirmed to have this gene and has experienced the stressor, so that the gene is active, does that mitigate their personal responsibility for exhibiting some sort of anti-social behaviour in a certain situation? My intuition says, yes, it does.

...

Personal responsibility? I don't know.

But one could easily argue that it indicates an increased need for punishment, because, in this violence-tempted individual, there is increased need for rehabilitation and/or isolation.

‘Punishment’ as in rehabilitation and isolation yes. I’m not sure rehabilitation is punishment.

Punishment as in retribution, perhaps not.
 
I think it comes down to understanding causal determinism or determinism

From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

My understanding is very close to:
The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

For me the shimmy and shake comes when one tries to specify cause. Sure the way things are at time t - many things are proximal at time t - is imprecise relative to effect - many things are proximal to effect after time t and fixed - which leaves us pointing hither and yon. For me the notion of will to do otherwise can be traced from many of those other things one has selected as effect by one of the the things selected as cause at time t. Every aspect is fixed as a matter of natural law. There you have it.
 
ruby sparks said:
The two things aren't compatible, it would seem, in the absence of an explanation as to how the process can (supposedly) get out of the clamp of being fully determined.
But why? What is it about the meaning of the words that makes it so?

The vast majority of words in English - and expressions involving such words - are not defined by stipulation (English or any other language). Rather, people use those words to denote something, and others learn by looking at how they are used. The expressions 'of one's own accord' and 'of one's own free will' seem to identify some sort of phenomena in the world, and not others. For example, if A gives his wallet to B because B was pointing a gun at A and telling him to give up the wallet or die, then A did not act of his own accord. But if A decides to watch a movie because he likes it, and A's mind is functioning properly (no mental illness, like the paradigmatic kleptomaniac example but in reverse so to speak), then that's a paradigmatic example of A's acting of his own accord. The expression 'of his own free will' means the same.

That is also why asking for a definition, or a mechanism by which a person could act of their own accord is out of place. It is not a proper demand. It's like the example I provided before. If Bob says he has the ability to lift small pebbles and similar small objects in his vecinity, and he very much can see that he has that wholly ordinary ability - it is obvious to him and to those who look at him, really -, it would be out of place to say that somehow he has the burden of explaining how it is possible that he has that ability, by what mechanism, etc. Bob might live in 1500, before modern science. He may know nothing about neurons, particles, evolution, or whatever. He still knows that he has the ability to lift small pebbles.

Well, I say he also knows that he can do so of his own accord, as he can do that without feeling any compulsion or threats, and reckons that his mind is functioning properly - both by introspection and because other people aren't telling him otherwise, treating him unusually, etc. The demand for a mechanism or an explanation as to how a wholly ordinary ability works is not proper, unless there is a good reason to suspect that the person in question does not have that ordinary ability. But why would there be such a reason simply because (let us assume) the universe is deterministic?


Again, what is it about determinism that threatens the ability to lift pebbles of one's own free will, but not the abilty to lift pebbles?

If you insist on 'free' implying 'not determined', I would say that you would have to explain why that is so (by the way, the expression 'of one's own accord' does not even use the word 'free', even if it means the same as 'of one's own free will').

ruby sparks said:
Compatibilism says we have free will. That's what science is undermining.
Compatibilism says that determinism is compatible with people acting of their own accord/free will. How is science undermining that? Do you have any examples?

ruby sparks said:
Are you a compatibilist? If so, why do you say there's free will, exactly? I can't see how there even possibly could be, in the final analysis. Can you?
1. Yes, I am.
2. It is obvious to me that I'm writing of my own free will, but at any rate, I explained why I think so in several posts, recently this one

ruby sparks said:
Basically, how would it even work?
I also say there is consciousness. There is self-awareness. There is pain. And joy. I can tell all of that. I do not know how that even works. I haven't resolved the hard problem of consciousness, or generally of minds. Particles get together and clearly do it, but the mechanism? I do not know. I do not know anyone does. But regardless, it is obvious to me that there are such things, just as it is obvious to me that I have the ability to type on a keyboard, move a mouse, or walk 5 meters - and also, to do so of my own accord.
 
Ok, I think I've tried to answer your questions.
I've asked one question (how does science undermine compatibilist versions of free will). I've rephrased the question in an attempt to help but you still haven't given a straightforward answer.

Let me try to help you.

The reason science undermines incompatibilist free will (something we both agree on) is because incompatibilist free will requires freedom from deterministic causation and science strongly suggests the workings of the brain are essentially deterministic. Incompatibilist free will is therefore a non-starter.

However compatibilist theories of free will do not require indeterminism and so are not at odds with science. But you still maintain that science undermines compatibilist free will. Can you explain how?

You haven't yet explained or defended compatibilist free will.
Why should I? There are literally thousands of google entries on compatibilism so I doubt anything I could add would help you. In any event, I've no desire to defend or promote compatibilism - I couldn't care less if you think it's a terrible idea. My only concern is that your belief that science undermines compatibilism suggests that you don't understand compatibilism (you can prove that you do by explaining how science undermines compatibilism).
 
Ok, I think I've tried to answer your questions.
I've asked one question (how does science undermine compatibilist versions of free will). I've rephrased the question in an attempt to help but you still haven't given a straightforward answer.

Let me try to help you.

The reason science undermines incompatibilist free will (something we both agree on) is because incompatibilist free will requires freedom from deterministic causation and science strongly suggests the workings of the brain are essentially deterministic. Incompatibilist free will is therefore a non-starter.

However compatibilist theories of free will do not require indeterminism and so are not at odds with science. But you still maintain that science undermines compatibilist free will. Can you explain how?

You haven't yet explained or defended compatibilist free will.
Why should I? There are literally thousands of google entries on compatibilism so I doubt anything I could add would help you. In any event, I've no desire to defend or promote compatibilism - I couldn't care less if you think it's a terrible idea. My only concern is that your belief that science undermines compatibilism suggests that you don't understand compatibilism (you can prove that you do by explaining how science undermines compatibilism).


You've asked several questions, and I've tried to answer them.

Science undermines compatibilsm because compatibilism says we have free will. Science suggests we may not. It's that simple.

Yes, I have read extensively about compatibilism, so although I could be wrong, I'm of the opinion that I do understand it, but I'm also of the opinion that it's a complete fudge, for multifarious reasons already given several times in this thread.

Compatibilism claims that we can have free will, even with full determinism (even though Hume's version left out a host of determinants). But how? How can we have free will if everything is fully determined?

There are many different conceptions of compatibilism. Some, for example say that it can be a non-conscious process. It would help if you would just front up and give your understanding. The compatibilist claim is, 'we have free will'. Unless I'm mistaken, no one here is defending it, apart from citing Hume, and Hume's version is obviously very flawed indeed. People are saying to me, 'what's your problem with the claim' or 'prove a negative'. Fine. Try that with god. But what about defending the claim itself? I have never seen it properly and thoroughly analysed and still survive intact. Perhaps you can try. Include a definition of what compatibilist free will is, as you understand it, and an example of it maybe. Do you understand how it might be frustrating for me to hear the bald claim, including from Angra, 'we have free will' without anyone explaining how it could possibly be the actual case?

But if you're going to just avoid answering questions as well as asking them, what's the point of engaging with you? It should be a two-way process.

Also, god pic? Comments? I think I've asked you 3 times now.
 
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A hypothetical frictionless weather vane is free to rotate about a single, horizontal axis. But it is at the whim of determinants, most notably the wind.

A hypothetical frictionless child's cot mobile with, say, 20 items suspended on wires or strings, is free to move in 3 dimensions, albeit restricted by the length of the wires/strings, but it too is at the whim of determinants, eg gravity, or being pushed. Also, 'internally', one of the suspended items might bump another or the wires/strings become entangled.

A weather system has I don't know how many moving parts. But again, it's fully determined. The individual parts are not as interconnected as in a computer or a human brain.

A human brain has, let's say, 100 trillion, interconnected, 'moving parts', although that's only the estimated number of synapses (I read that the best supercomputer can only simulate 10% of that) and each of those might have 1000 'switches'. It's a vastly complicated biological machine, but still apparently obeying natural laws and still, it would seem, in the firm grip of being fully determined at every instant (plus the possibility of randomness), just as with the weather vane, the mobile, the supercomputer and the weather system. So how could it ever freely will itself to get out of that? Surely it must just seem like it does, but it doesn't actually, in the final analysis. How could it even possibly be otherwise?

That's where the problem of free will is at. And this is where someone suggesting that it can freely will itself should come in and offer an explanation.
 
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Science undermines compatibilsm because compatibilism says we have free will. Science suggests we may not. It's that simple.
Science undermines contra-causal (incompatibilist, libertarian) versions of free will. Compatibilism is not a contra-causal version of free will. Science does not, therefore, undermine compatibilism.

If you disagree, please provide evidence (an argument or a link to an argument/claim). Simply repeating your personal belief that science undermines compatibilism really doesn't help.
 
Science undermines compatibilsm because compatibilism says we have free will. Science suggests we may not. It's that simple.
Science undermines contra-causal (incompatibilist, libertarian) versions of free will. Compatibilism is not a contra-causal version of free will. Science does not, therefore, undermine compatibilism.

If you disagree, please provide evidence (an argument or a link to an argument/claim). Simply repeating your personal belief that science undermines compatibilism really doesn't help.

Ok I'm sorry but when people don't engage in a two-way dialogue process, including trying to answer questions put to them in turn, I start to lose interest in discussing things with them.

But, I did not just merely repeat a claim. In answering your questions and those of others, I have also explained my reasoning for it, in quite some detail, several times and in various ways, as have some others. I have done some legwork. You haven't. It's basically your turn if you disagree with any of the reasoning that I or they have offered. You could start by trying to explain how free will could possibly even exist, given complete, universal and causal determinism at every instant. How can a brain freely will itself out of that? This is one question I am getting tired of asking, given that I've asked it so many times. One example would suffice, so that it can be rigorously challenged, since it's much easier, in principle and with only one example, to prove, demonstrate or support a positive claim than a negative one, generally speaking, and compatibilism makes a positive claim. I am merely very skeptical of it, for various reasons given.

Also, god pic. Why are you refusing to comment? It seems slightly odd, given that I have now asked four times. I showed you a photo of god, ffs. That should be rather amazing. It's proof that god (like free will, supposedly) actually exists.
 
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If every single choice you make is always the one you were going to make anyway, the one that you were in fact fully and completely determined to make at the time (temporarily setting aside randomness), then where's the freely-willed decision?

I get that it's a choice. I get that part. The very, very complicated machine 'alogrithms' automatically make decisions, but how can the machine possibly freely will the decisions to happen in the circumstances if absolutely everything is caused by prior determinants affecting and fully (key word) constraining the machine at every single instant? It's no use merely saying the machine can automatically sift between options if the final one chosen is in the final analysis selected after an automatic process that apparently must obey and therefore be slave to natural, physical laws.
 
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Science undermines compatibilsm because compatibilism says we have free will. Science suggests we may not. It's that simple.
Science undermines contra-causal (incompatibilist, libertarian) versions of free will. Compatibilism is not a contra-causal version of free will. Science does not, therefore, undermine compatibilism.

If you disagree, please provide evidence (an argument or a link to an argument/claim). Simply repeating your personal belief that science undermines compatibilism really doesn't help.

Ok I'm sorry but when people don't engage in a two-way dialogue process...…...
Yes I know exactly what you mean.

I accept that you're unable to answer my straightforward question.
 
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Yet again, as often, the compatibilist claim is not thoroughly explained, examined or rigorously tested in a discussion.

Even commenting on a picture of god is repeatedly avoided, for some reason. One would think that an atheist of all people would accept evidence when it's available and presented. Apparently not.
 
From post 328:

Wiploc said:
... one could easily argue that it indicates an increased need for punishment, because, in this violence-tempted individual, there is increased need for rehabilitation and/or isolation.

And then Ruby Sparks said:
‘Punishment’ as in rehabilitation and isolation yes.

I'm wondering why the quotes around "punishment." Is it that you don't think sentencing someone to prison, to a reformatory or penitentiary, really counts as punishment?



I’m not sure rehabilitation is punishment.

The reasons for punishment: rehabilitation, isolation, deterrence, and vengeance. That last one, vengeance, isn't a legitimate function of government.

If you kill your rapist because you are angry, that may be acceptable, but government has no business hurting people based on irrational emotions. (Note: I'm not saying that killing a rapist would necessarily be irrational. One might hurt someone in anger (seeking vengeance) while also intending to keep that person from repeating an offense (rehabilitation or isolation). But here I'm trying to separate out the motives for punishment. It would be wrong to hurt someone for no benefit. It is irrational to hurt somebody out of anger (vengeance) -- without also intending rehabilitation (teaching the person not to repeat a hurtful behavior), isolation (separating the person from the situation in which he is likely to repeat the hurtful behavior), or deterrence (punishing one person to discourage others from repeating the hurtful behavior).

Prison and jail sentences are generally held to be forms of punishment. The primary purpose of incarceration is often held to be rehabilitation.

But perhaps your concern is that you don't believe incarceration actually accomplishes rehabilitation? An argument can be made for that position. Unfortunately, equally good arguments can be made against the effectiveness of isolation and deterrence. Which, if we entertain these arguments, leaves us with no justification for ever punishing anyone.

Since it seems implausible that society could function without punishment, we withhold credence from the claims that rehabilitation, isolation, and deterrence don't work.




Punishment as in retribution, perhaps not.

We have an advocate of retribution in this thread. It makes no sense to me.

Suppose Sara accidentally kills Joe's daughter in a car wreck. And now suppose Joe wants to kill Sara's daughter retributively, because it's "fitting," because it "fits the crime," because it's "just."

Is Joe's motive rehabilitation? No, because he already knows Sara won't do such a thing again. Sara is distraught over what she did; she's given up driving; and, in fact, Joe, her next door neighbor, has taken up driving her wherever she needs to go.

Is Joe's motive isolation? No, because killing Sara's daughter has no tendency to keep Sara from being able to have car accidents.

Is Joe's motive deterrence? No, it hasn't occurred to Joe that other people may drive more safely if he kills Sara's daughter.

Is Joe's motive vengeance? No, he's not acting in anger. He's acting only in the belief that retribution is somehow good.

Does Joe have any rational motive at all? I'd say no. Joe isn't hoping to accomplish any good thing. No deterrence, no isolation, no rehabilitation, nor any other benefit. He just thinks symmetry is fitting and proper. He thinks retribution is good for nothing.

That is, he thinks retribution is good in spite of the fact that it has no benefits.

Joe wants to do a great harm, but he has no offsetting benefit as a justifying goal.

I'm not on Joe's side. I think he's irrational. I do not favor retribution.
 
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