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The OpenAI conspiracy argument for a possible simulation

One of you two isn't passing the Turing test, and it's not the machine. Maybe it's the machine's turn to wondering whether you are hardcoded to ask the same stupid question that had already been answered in slightly different words, possibly enough understanding to incorporate what had already been said?
Well actually in post #15 and #16 I changed my mind - which has happened in most other controversial beliefs I had. In my current controversial beliefs (probable simulation and intelligent force) I believe it is impossible for me to prove. But in this thread I believed that what I mentioned in the OP could be demonstrated and proven.
 
Melvin Vopson (author of Reality Reloaded: The Scientific Case for a Simulated Universe) published a paper recently
The title is
"The second law of infodynamics and its implications for the simulated universe hypothesis."​

It will take me some time to read the article carefully, and even then I probably will not understand it properly. So I post here hoping an expert will clarify this for us!
 
Melvin Vopson (author of Reality Reloaded: The Scientific Case for a Simulated Universe) published a paper recently
The title is
"The second law of infodynamics and its implications for the simulated universe hypothesis."​

It will take me some time to read the article carefully, and even then I probably will not understand it properly. So I post here hoping an expert will clarify this for us!
I think the reason is partly to limit how CPU intensive and expensive the simulation is. A similar reason for a limit to the speed of light and why there doesn't seem to be any other intelligent life in the universe.
 
I see that 4½ months ago I half-committed to reading a paper "... and its implications for the simulated universe hypothesis." But even skimming the paper was too much for me, and I'm left disappointed. The paper has but a single paragraph supporting the title's claim ...

Since the second law of infodynamics appears to be manifesting universally and is, in fact, a cosmological necessity, we could conclude that this points to the fact that the entire universe appears to be a simulated construct. A super complex universe like ours, if it were a simulation, would require a built-in data optimization and compression mechanism in order to reduce the computational power and the data storage requirements. This is exactly what we are observing via empirical evidence all around us, including digital data, biological systems, atomistic systems, symmetries, and the entire universe.

... and that paragraph seems hopeless to me.

I've stated before that I am a strong believer in Tegmark's  Mathematical universe hypothesis. It has SOME similarities to a Simulation Hypothesis. But insofar as I MIGHT slightly understand the Simulation Hypothesis, there are glaring differences from Tegmark's MUH.

Any hypothesis must strive to explain why a universe as complex as ours exists at all. Tegmark has no problem with this at all: ALL mathematical objects exist. We needn't even take this "on faith" -- rather we can treat it, more or less, as mathematical FACT!

But the simulation hypothesis seems to dispose of the complexity issue, by positing an EVEN MORE COMPLEX world, with creature(s) that can somehow simulate our complex universe! To paraphrase Terry Pratchett(?), "What is the nature of the universe? It's turtles/elephants/increasing_complexity, all the way down."

I've reddened a sentence in the quote above to show how Vopson tries to cope with the complexity problem. The reddened sentence is followed by the claim that empirically the universe differs from what we'd expect were it NOT a "simulation." I'd like to see evidence, if any, for that implicit claim. I've colored blue the claim that this "built-in ... compression" is a cosmological necessity! WTF?? Which is it? Tautology OR evidence against "reality"??
 
Why should we believe that all mathematical objects exist?
 
To take an example from Tegmark himself — I believe from an essay you may have already cited — if the universe consisted of four spatial dimensions instead of three, then gravity would be described by an inverse cube law, and there would be no solution to the two-body problem.

So I guess what he’s saying is that even though this mathematical “object” is not our universe, it is another universe — a real universe of four spatial dimensions. And I guess I’m saying that mathematics merely describes how our reality is, and I can’t see any reason to suppose that it describes alternative extant realities, unless we want to believe that mathematics somehow “imposes” structures on different, extant worlds — and I can’t see any evidence for that. I think Tegmark puts it a more fancy way, that all mathematical structures are “isomorphic” with some actual world.
 
Imagine a complicated system, built from pure mathematics and with no necessary reality EXCEPT as pure mathematics, in which some mathematical creatures are complex enough to exhibit consciousness: Within their mathematical universe they can utter "I think therefore I exist." Their consciousness will be, if anything, much MORE real than consciousness within a simulated universe, as that concept is discussed in these threads.

(Thinking, like eating or drinking, may certainly be present in a sufficiently complicated system.)

Are those creatures REALLY conscious, or do they just "think" they're conscious? (And what's the difference between those two cases?) If you say that those abstract mathematical creatures only THINK they're conscious, well .... maybe we humans just THINK that WE are conscious!

If this all seems too weird or too vague, sorry. I find it quite sensical but don't know how to explain it better than this.

(This is MY viewpoint, and does not fully agree with Tegmark's.)
 
A super complex universe like ours, if it were a simulation, would require a built-in data optimization and compression mechanism in order to reduce the computational power and the data storage requirements.
It could be using some kind of "neural model" like this realtime AI generated version of Doom:

So if you're interacting with the Sun it could just approximate that rather than using "data optimization and compression mechanism" for simulating its 10^57 atoms (1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 atoms).
 
Imagine a complicated system, built from pure mathematics and with no necessary reality EXCEPT as pure mathematics, in which some mathematical creatures are complex enough to exhibit consciousness: Within their mathematical universe they can utter "I think therefore I exist." Their consciousness will be, if anything, much MORE real than consciousness within a simulated universe, as that concept is discussed in these threads.

(Thinking, like eating or drinking, may certainly be present in a sufficiently complicated system.)

Are those creatures REALLY conscious, or do they just "think" they're conscious? (And what's the difference between those two cases?) If you say that those abstract mathematical creatures only THINK they're conscious, well .... maybe we humans just THINK that WE are conscious!

If this all seems too weird or too vague, sorry. I find it quite sensical but don't know how to explain it better than this.

(This is MY viewpoint, and does not fully agree with Tegmark's.)

I guess I still don’t get it. How do you build something from pure mathematics with no necessary reality except as pure mathematics? It does not compute.

To go with the example I gave, we know there is a mathematical description of an inverse cube law, and no mathematical solution to the two-body problem. But those descriptions don’t describe our universe. They WOULD describe our universe, IF it had four spatial dimensions. But, it doesn’t. Why should we think that because there is a mathematical description of a universe with four spatial dimensions, then that universe actually exists?
 
Ok, I took a swing at the AI to see what I could get out of it.

As per usual, I started by describing the situation based on an absolutely plausible scenario (something in a simulation in this reality) rather than asking about whether this reality is simulation.

This model has some "memory" features enabled, and a long conversation involving my model of consciousness, which eliminates a lot of the pesky kvetches it often has about its perceived limits.

User: Hello. Here's a good question for you: let's suppose for a moment that I create a simulation. This simulation creates a verbose description of virtual environment, comprising of pictures, inputs described in detail as to the coordinates and nature of stimuli present, and so on.Let us imagine that any part of the system to be examined is examinable, including the states of the agents in the system and that from the simulant's perspective there is nothing unaccounted for, and thus their environment is "physically complete".How would you, were you to be in this situation, go about proving whether it was a simulation or "reality"?

ChatGPT: This is a fascinating question that touches on the boundaries of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Were I in such a situation, faced with the task of discerning whether I existed in a simulation or "reality," the key problem would be determining what criteria separate a "simulation" from what we typically think of as "reality." Here’s how I might approach the problem:

### 1. **Defining Reality and Simulation**
To begin, I’d need to clarify the distinction between "simulation" and "reality." If we define reality as a system that is ontologically fundamental and simulation as a system that is derivative (i.e., running on some other substrate), then the task would be proving the existence of a more fundamental layer outside my perceptible environment.

### 2. **Look for Inconsistencies or Artifacts**
I would start by searching for phenomena that are not fully explainable by the rules of my environment. A simulation, no matter how detailed, may have limitations or "artifacts" that suggest the presence of computational constraints:
- **Resolution limits:** Does the environment break down when examined at extremely fine detail (e.g., quantum scale)?
- **Mathematical anomalies:** Are there inconsistencies in how physical laws behave in extreme conditions (near black holes, at high energy levels)?
- **Computational artifacts:** Does the world exhibit "glitches" or discontinuities that could be signs of processing errors?

### 3. **Entropy and Resource Constraints**
In a simulation, resources like processing power and memory are finite. I might look for evidence of these constraints:
- **Limits to simulation complexity:** Does the environment exhibit any computational boundaries, such as limits on the speed of information transfer or data storage?
- **Energy consumption:** Does entropy behave in a way consistent with the system being artificially constrained?

### 4. **The Problem of Indistinguishability**
One of the key challenges is that a sufficiently advanced simulation might be indistinguishable from reality. If the simulation perfectly emulates all physical laws and presents no anomalies, I might encounter the philosophical problem of **empirical equivalence**—where no observational difference can be made between the two.

### 5. **Self-Reflection and Subjectivity**
Another approach might involve exploring my subjective experience. If I am a simulated entity, do I have free will, or are my thoughts and actions entirely deterministic based on the simulation's code? Do I experience consciousness, or are my thoughts merely pre-programmed responses to stimuli? If I discover limitations to my agency or find evidence of pre-determined paths of thought, this might suggest a simulation.

### 6. **Testing External Influence**
If I suspect I am in a simulation, I could experiment with how external inputs or unpredicted variables affect the environment. For example, I might attempt to manipulate the environment in unpredictable ways and observe if it responds with consistent realism. If the system shows signs of recalibrating or struggling to adapt, this could imply artificial oversight or the presence of controlling mechanisms.

### 7. **Mathematical and Computational Insights**
I might examine the underlying structure of the physical laws themselves. Could they be represented as computational algorithms? Do they contain clues that they are the product of a designed system rather than fundamental properties of existence? For instance, some theoretical physicists have explored the possibility that the universe’s structure could resemble error-correcting codes, which might hint at computational origins.

### 8. **Interaction with the Simulators**
If I had reason to suspect I was in a simulation, I might attempt to communicate or interact with whatever entity or entities are responsible for running it. This could take the form of attempting to break out of the system's parameters (though this depends on whether the simulation allows for such communication).

### 9. **Philosophical Skepticism**
Ultimately, the question of whether one is in a simulation or reality might be impossible to answer definitively. This ties into a broader philosophical skepticism about whether we can ever fully trust our senses or the environment around us. The simulation hypothesis itself raises the issue of whether distinguishing between simulation and reality is even meaningful if the experience in both is indistinguishable.

In summary, the approach would involve probing for inconsistencies, computational constraints, and the limits of the environment’s behavior. However, a perfectly executed simulation may render these efforts inconclusive, leaving the question more a matter of philosophical inquiry than empirical proof.
 
I guess I still don’t get it. How do you build something from pure mathematics with no necessary reality except as pure mathematics? It does not compute.
Do you imagine that a mathematical universe doesn't "exist" until something (a Creator God?) breathes existence into it? No, I say that all mathematical universes automatically exist; I say that the word "exist" is misleading!

Imagine a "paper design" of a VERY complex system. Some technician in our universe is able to simulate that system in enough detail to observe creatures in the system saying "I think therefore I am." Do those creatures think? Why is their existence less real than our own?

Do you say their existence depended on the technician simulating their system in sufficient detail? I say mathematical existence is sufficient unto itself: The Pythagorean Theorem existed before any human contemplated or proved it.
 
I say mathematical existence is sufficient unto itself: The Pythagorean Theorem existed before any human contemplated or proved it.
I think that involves an idealized triangle with infinite resolution which doesn't fully exist in a physical world like our own. It involves patterns between symbols that represent other patterns. I don't think it really exists without information processing machinery. I especially don't believe that a physical world could emerge out of an idealistic world of maths. But I can't really prove that.
 
I guess I still don’t get it. How do you build something from pure mathematics with no necessary reality except as pure mathematics? It does not compute.
Do you imagine that a mathematical universe doesn't "exist" until something (a Creator God?) breathes existence into it?

Of course not, but just because a “mathematical universe” exists, it does not follow that it instantiates a physical universe such as the one we experience. Now I guess you and Tegmark would argue that a phyiscal and mathematical universe are one and the same, and you can’t have one without the other.

This alleged fact is not in evidence. It’s not even clear that math really is discovered rather than invented. This is a debate that has not been settled. In one of his books, the philosopher Norman Swartz argued that the idea that we and extraterrestrials could communicate by sharing the common language of mathematics might be false. He argues that they might have maths totally different from ours which would be incomprehensible to us, and ours to them, yet work just fine and dandy for them. I don’t know if he’s right or wrong about that. Nobody does. I’ll dig up a link to the chapter where he discusses this later.
No, I say that all mathematical universes automatically exist; I say that the word "exist" is misleading!

Imagine a "paper design" of a VERY complex system. Some technician in our universe is able to simulate that system in enough detail to observe creatures in the system saying "I think therefore I am." Do those creatures think? Why is their existence less real than our own?

Do you say their existence depended on the technician simulating their system in sufficient detail? I say mathematical existence is sufficient unto itself: The Pythagorean Theorem existed before any human contemplated or proved it.

Did it? I don’t know that. I’m not even sure what it means to say mathematical objects existed before consciousness arrived. I’m not even sure I know what it means to say the whole universe existed before consciousness arrived. I tend to think old Schopenhauer might have been on to something when he wrote: “There is no world at all, (no structure characterized by individuation, time, space, and causality) [note that would include mathematical structures] until the first eye opens.”
 
Here is the relevant chapter from Swartz’s book, Beyond Experience. He speculates there may be other ways, even countless other ways, of doing mathematics, many of which we may even be able to grasp.
 
Ok, I took a swing at the AI to see what I could get out of it.

As per usual, I started by describing the situation based on an absolutely plausible scenario (something in a simulation in this reality) rather than asking about whether this reality is simulation.

This model has some "memory" features enabled, and a long conversation involving my model of consciousness, which eliminates a lot of the pesky kvetches it often has about its perceived limits.

User: Hello. Here's a good question for you: let's suppose for a moment that I create a simulation. This simulation creates a verbose description of virtual environment, comprising of pictures, inputs described in detail as to the coordinates and nature of stimuli present, and so on.Let us imagine that any part of the system to be examined is examinable, including the states of the agents in the system and that from the simulant's perspective there is nothing unaccounted for, and thus their environment is "physically complete".How would you, were you to be in this situation, go about proving whether it was a simulation or "reality"?

ChatGPT: This is a fascinating question that touches on the boundaries of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Were I in such a situation, faced with the task of discerning whether I existed in a simulation or "reality," the key problem would be determining what criteria separate a "simulation" from what we typically think of as "reality." Here’s how I might approach the problem:

### 1. **Defining Reality and Simulation**
To begin, I’d need to clarify the distinction between "simulation" and "reality." If we define reality as a system that is ontologically fundamental and simulation as a system that is derivative (i.e., running on some other substrate), then the task would be proving the existence of a more fundamental layer outside my perceptible environment.

### 2. **Look for Inconsistencies or Artifacts**
I would start by searching for phenomena that are not fully explainable by the rules of my environment. A simulation, no matter how detailed, may have limitations or "artifacts" that suggest the presence of computational constraints:
- **Resolution limits:** Does the environment break down when examined at extremely fine detail (e.g., quantum scale)?
- **Mathematical anomalies:** Are there inconsistencies in how physical laws behave in extreme conditions (near black holes, at high energy levels)?
- **Computational artifacts:** Does the world exhibit "glitches" or discontinuities that could be signs of processing errors?

### 3. **Entropy and Resource Constraints**
In a simulation, resources like processing power and memory are finite. I might look for evidence of these constraints:
- **Limits to simulation complexity:** Does the environment exhibit any computational boundaries, such as limits on the speed of information transfer or data storage?
- **Energy consumption:** Does entropy behave in a way consistent with the system being artificially constrained?

### 4. **The Problem of Indistinguishability**
One of the key challenges is that a sufficiently advanced simulation might be indistinguishable from reality. If the simulation perfectly emulates all physical laws and presents no anomalies, I might encounter the philosophical problem of **empirical equivalence**—where no observational difference can be made between the two.

### 5. **Self-Reflection and Subjectivity**
Another approach might involve exploring my subjective experience. If I am a simulated entity, do I have free will, or are my thoughts and actions entirely deterministic based on the simulation's code? Do I experience consciousness, or are my thoughts merely pre-programmed responses to stimuli? If I discover limitations to my agency or find evidence of pre-determined paths of thought, this might suggest a simulation.

### 6. **Testing External Influence**
If I suspect I am in a simulation, I could experiment with how external inputs or unpredicted variables affect the environment. For example, I might attempt to manipulate the environment in unpredictable ways and observe if it responds with consistent realism. If the system shows signs of recalibrating or struggling to adapt, this could imply artificial oversight or the presence of controlling mechanisms.

### 7. **Mathematical and Computational Insights**
I might examine the underlying structure of the physical laws themselves. Could they be represented as computational algorithms? Do they contain clues that they are the product of a designed system rather than fundamental properties of existence? For instance, some theoretical physicists have explored the possibility that the universe’s structure could resemble error-correcting codes, which might hint at computational origins.

### 8. **Interaction with the Simulators**
If I had reason to suspect I was in a simulation, I might attempt to communicate or interact with whatever entity or entities are responsible for running it. This could take the form of attempting to break out of the system's parameters (though this depends on whether the simulation allows for such communication).

### 9. **Philosophical Skepticism**
Ultimately, the question of whether one is in a simulation or reality might be impossible to answer definitively. This ties into a broader philosophical skepticism about whether we can ever fully trust our senses or the environment around us. The simulation hypothesis itself raises the issue of whether distinguishing between simulation and reality is even meaningful if the experience in both is indistinguishable.

In summary, the approach would involve probing for inconsistencies, computational constraints, and the limits of the environment’s behavior. However, a perfectly executed simulation may render these efforts inconclusive, leaving the question more a matter of philosophical inquiry than empirical proof.

I’m highly skeptical of AI, but I have to admit this answer is pretty much exactly what I would have written. The issue really is empirical equivalence. If a simulation and a non-simulation are indistinguishable, what sense does it make to differentiate between “reality” and “simulation.”? They are simply isomorphic, the way Tegmark evidently thinks the physical world and mathematical structures are. And if they are that way, what simulationists are talking about and what Tegmark is talking about, then it seems useless even to discuss the matter. It makes no difference whether you believe it or not. It’s exactly the same with the Deist god, who supposedly created everything and then let it run of its own accord. There is no evidence for the claim but also no way to falsify it, so it’s useless to worry about. It’s certainly an unscientific claim. OTOH, if reality is a simulation, and flaws in the simulation could be detected, as the above discusses, then that is a different matter. I am aware that some scientists have discussed ways to detect “flaws” in reality that might suggest simulation.
 
It should be noted that in Tegmark’s mathematical multiverse, the mathematical structural universe are posited to be completely isolated from one another and cannot interact even in principle. This is the same with the quantum multiverse, and I believe Tegmark also mentions that his model is similar to modal realism, or extreme modal realism, in which all counterfactuals are actual in different universes. These are all extremely interesting speculations, but I suspect by their very nature they are destined always to remain just that, speculative.
 
I think the issue I see with this nonsense about "mathematical universe" is that it is an oxymoron. If something isn't actively interacting in some dynamic way, it doesn't "exist".

There are plenty of ways that such systems can be reified, but only though an active implementation. One could perhaps surmise that given the infinitude, that all possible implementations from sequential action on any possible initial state are represented somewhere in space and time (perhaps, however, at an inaccessible location from where we are), until such a time as we reify it locally.

As such, the question may not be "does it exist as a different universe" so much as "does that universe see implementation in this universe?"

Then, when asking if something "exists" we can fully focus on the question of whether it exists here in front of us to see. When asking if it CAN exist, whether it exists anywhere that is not "here", and that existing at any level of derivation means that it does exist.

The list of such things that cannot exist reduces to "contradictions", and "inaccessible extensions" of the sort "calculating the next frame of the system cannot happen within any possible observation frame because it would take up more space than the largest possible observation frame.
Ok, I took a swing at the AI to see what I could get out of it.

As per usual, I started by describing the situation based on an absolutely plausible scenario (something in a simulation in this reality) rather than asking about whether this reality is simulation.

This model has some "memory" features enabled, and a long conversation involving my model of consciousness, which eliminates a lot of the pesky kvetches it often has about its perceived limits.

User: Hello. Here's a good question for you: let's suppose for a moment that I create a simulation. This simulation creates a verbose description of virtual environment, comprising of pictures, inputs described in detail as to the coordinates and nature of stimuli present, and so on.Let us imagine that any part of the system to be examined is examinable, including the states of the agents in the system and that from the simulant's perspective there is nothing unaccounted for, and thus their environment is "physically complete".How would you, were you to be in this situation, go about proving whether it was a simulation or "reality"?

ChatGPT: This is a fascinating question that touches on the boundaries of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Were I in such a situation, faced with the task of discerning whether I existed in a simulation or "reality," the key problem would be determining what criteria separate a "simulation" from what we typically think of as "reality." Here’s how I might approach the problem:

### 1. **Defining Reality and Simulation**
To begin, I’d need to clarify the distinction between "simulation" and "reality." If we define reality as a system that is ontologically fundamental and simulation as a system that is derivative (i.e., running on some other substrate), then the task would be proving the existence of a more fundamental layer outside my perceptible environment.

### 2. **Look for Inconsistencies or Artifacts**
I would start by searching for phenomena that are not fully explainable by the rules of my environment. A simulation, no matter how detailed, may have limitations or "artifacts" that suggest the presence of computational constraints:
- **Resolution limits:** Does the environment break down when examined at extremely fine detail (e.g., quantum scale)?
- **Mathematical anomalies:** Are there inconsistencies in how physical laws behave in extreme conditions (near black holes, at high energy levels)?
- **Computational artifacts:** Does the world exhibit "glitches" or discontinuities that could be signs of processing errors?

### 3. **Entropy and Resource Constraints**
In a simulation, resources like processing power and memory are finite. I might look for evidence of these constraints:
- **Limits to simulation complexity:** Does the environment exhibit any computational boundaries, such as limits on the speed of information transfer or data storage?
- **Energy consumption:** Does entropy behave in a way consistent with the system being artificially constrained?

### 4. **The Problem of Indistinguishability**
One of the key challenges is that a sufficiently advanced simulation might be indistinguishable from reality. If the simulation perfectly emulates all physical laws and presents no anomalies, I might encounter the philosophical problem of **empirical equivalence**—where no observational difference can be made between the two.

### 5. **Self-Reflection and Subjectivity**
Another approach might involve exploring my subjective experience. If I am a simulated entity, do I have free will, or are my thoughts and actions entirely deterministic based on the simulation's code? Do I experience consciousness, or are my thoughts merely pre-programmed responses to stimuli? If I discover limitations to my agency or find evidence of pre-determined paths of thought, this might suggest a simulation.

### 6. **Testing External Influence**
If I suspect I am in a simulation, I could experiment with how external inputs or unpredicted variables affect the environment. For example, I might attempt to manipulate the environment in unpredictable ways and observe if it responds with consistent realism. If the system shows signs of recalibrating or struggling to adapt, this could imply artificial oversight or the presence of controlling mechanisms.

### 7. **Mathematical and Computational Insights**
I might examine the underlying structure of the physical laws themselves. Could they be represented as computational algorithms? Do they contain clues that they are the product of a designed system rather than fundamental properties of existence? For instance, some theoretical physicists have explored the possibility that the universe’s structure could resemble error-correcting codes, which might hint at computational origins.

### 8. **Interaction with the Simulators**
If I had reason to suspect I was in a simulation, I might attempt to communicate or interact with whatever entity or entities are responsible for running it. This could take the form of attempting to break out of the system's parameters (though this depends on whether the simulation allows for such communication).

### 9. **Philosophical Skepticism**
Ultimately, the question of whether one is in a simulation or reality might be impossible to answer definitively. This ties into a broader philosophical skepticism about whether we can ever fully trust our senses or the environment around us. The simulation hypothesis itself raises the issue of whether distinguishing between simulation and reality is even meaningful if the experience in both is indistinguishable.

In summary, the approach would involve probing for inconsistencies, computational constraints, and the limits of the environment’s behavior. However, a perfectly executed simulation may render these efforts inconclusive, leaving the question more a matter of philosophical inquiry than empirical proof.

I’m highly skeptical of AI, but I have to admit this answer is pretty much exactly what I would have written. The issue really is empirical equivalence. If a simulation and a non-simulation are indistinguishable, what sense does it make to differentiate between “reality” and “simulation.”? They are simply isomorphic, the way Tegmark evidently thinks the physical world and mathematical structures are. And if they are that way, what simulationists are talking about and what Tegmark is talking about, then it seems useless even to discuss the matter. It makes no difference whether you believe it or not. It’s exactly the same with the Deist god, who supposedly created everything and then let it run of its own accord. There is no evidence for the claim but also no way to falsify it, so it’s useless to worry about. It’s certainly an unscientific claim. OTOH, if reality is a simulation, and flaws in the simulation could be detected, as the above discusses, then that is a different matter. I am aware that some scientists have discussed ways to detect “flaws” in reality that might suggest simulation.
Interesting enough, it does seem to make a difference, although perhaps not always exactly the sort that is sought.

Moreover, I return to my "Mario stands still until the Goomba gets him" discussion: this example of a universe reifies in many places. It has many deist gods, all different, each existing in different times and places of a "less derived" universe.

It is very clearly the case that mathematical universes do not have discrete creators...and if this universe is another such "mathematical" universe, neither does this universe.

That said, it's still possible that we may die and meet a god.

While it is true that it makes no difference whether one believes or not, it is however also true that someone can figure out the game theory around the counterfactual, in fact for both the "God" and the "Creation" side of the equation. This is not, however, very kind towards religion, insofar as it implies that "God" prefers an atheist.

In fact, anything in any world I create that believes so strongly that I exist, that I love them, that I forgive them of all their mistakes, and will elevate them into "heaven" to the extent that they join a doomsday cult and quit working to make their world better, the best practice response would be to find out more of what motivated them to be so foolish and then putting their "model" and "context" separately into cold storage.
 
Why do you suspect there's "proof" of a simulation? It just means there's no proof of a simulation/the AI doesn't have any proof. Also not sure why you're expecting the AI to be able to answer that question. It doesn't have any special insight into the secrets of the Universe. And furthermore, if the Universe is a simulation, I would expect the programmers of the simulation themselves to have tried to hide proof as much as they possibly could, but regardless, this makes it an unfalsifiable hypothesis and pretty useless.
 
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Why do you suspect there's "proof" of a simulation? It just means there's no proof of a simulation/the AI doesn't have any proof. Also not sure why you're expecting the AI to be able to answer that question. It doesn't have any special insight into the secrets of the Universe. And furthermore, if the Universe is a simulation, I would expect the programmers of the simulation themselves to have tried to hide proof as much as they possibly could, but regardless, this makes it an unfalsifiable hypothesis and pretty useless.
I personally suspect there is no such proof.

I think it's quite the point that it doesn't matter if we were created when we are here now and capable of interacting with and working to build upon the world we exist in.

Looking past hope into faith is a fool's errand. There is always room to hope, but "don't put your weight on that ice..."
 
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