The question, "do the ends justify the means?"

[fast]

This thread is not about whether or not the means justify the ends. It's about the invoking of the question itself. Results matter! At the same token (I'd concede), it's not untrue that how results occur matter. But, why bring it up? When the results are important, why does it matter how they are achieved? Maybe the ends don't justify the means, but since when does the need for justification trump the need for results? I'd suppose that when the means are more important than the results, justification would matter more than the results, but otherwise, what makes justification a consideration when it's the results and not the means that's more important?

There's this taken-for-granted idea that if the means is wrong, then the means doesn't justify the ends, but why is that so important that it trump the ends? In other words, why not disregard justification in cases where the ends are more important? To put it another way, if the ends are very important, then it just might not matter all that much if the means don't justify the ends unless you can support the notion that justification is necessarily more important than the results.

In a way, morality is (without argument) elevated to a higher hierarchy of human importance. I don't mean to lessen the importance of doing what's right--just looking for the basis for which justification is invoked as necessary. A wrong doer need not attempt to justify his actions if justification itself was not held with such high regard. It also side-steps the retort that one's actions doesn't justify the ends--the response would be, "so what?"

 

[Loren Pechtel]

Because people want to feel good about doing right.

Realistically one should weigh deeds committed by the good guys more heavily but there are some who would trade vast harms for avoiding committing a harm.

 

[bigfield]

By "the means justify the ends" you mean "the ends justify the means"? Otherwise the OP is nonsense.

 

[bigfield]

To say "the ends don't justify the means" is simply to say that one cannot justify a harmful action simply because the outcome was beneficial.

It isn't meant to be a universal truth that applies to everything, although it is a rejection of extreme consequentialism.

 

[Bronzeage]

Do two wrongs make a right?

In all cases, this is a subjective judgment and it's not possible to make a blanket statement. In all cases, a value must be assessed of the effects of the action, beyond the immediate results.

 

[Random Person]

I think it's mostly a justification that's invoked when somebody wants something really bad.

 

[Juma]

Sometimes it does, sometimes it doesnt. Not a big issue really.

 

[Bronzeage]

I think it's mostly a justification that's invoked when somebody wants something really bad.

It's more often invoked in the negative, when somebody doesn't like the method.

 

[fromderinside]

I wonder whether means ... ends is actually just a polite way for saying method ... madness, a political condemnation.

 

[EricK]

Something to bear in mind is that we very often don't know what all the results of our actions will be, so the "ends" are not always certain.

For example, we do know that torture inflicts direct harm on an individual. We do not know if torture will extract whatever information we want from our victim. So even if we deem getting that information more important than not inflicting harm on an individual, we still can not use "the ends justify the means" to legitimize our use of torture, as the particular end we are interested in not guaranteed by the particular means we a reusing.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

fast,

In the OP, did you mean to always talk about ends justifying (or failing to justify) means, or sometimes ends justifying means and sometimes means justifying ends?
I take it you always meant to talk about ends justifying or failing to justify means.
If so, an answer to the "so what?" question would be: "So, you're behaving immorally if you use those means to achieve those ends".
Of course, a person might still reply "so what?", and that's that. But the claim that the ends don't justify the means (in some context or another) is a moral claim, and it won't always have a significant effect on all people who accept the claim as true. Some might just say "Sure, I'm doing what I morally ought not to do, but so what?".

 

[Loren Pechtel]

Do two wrongs make a right?

In all cases, this is a subjective judgment and it's not possible to make a blanket statement. In all cases, a value must be assessed of the effects of the action, beyond the immediate results.

 

[Underseer]

As a consequentialist, I would say yes, but the problem is that we humans are inherently stupid and there are limits on how much we can know, so any time we make a moral decision, we never know all of the consequences of any one decision.

 

[fast]

fast,

In the OP, did you mean to always talk about ends justifying (or failing to justify) means, or sometimes ends justifying means and sometimes means justifying ends?
I take it you always meant to talk about ends justifying or failing to justify means.
If so, an answer to the "so what?" question would be: "So, you're behaving immorally if you use those means to achieve those ends".
Of course, a person might still reply "so what?", and that's that. But the claim that the ends don't justify the means (in some context or another) is a moral claim, and it won't always have a significant effect on all people who accept the claim as true. Some might just say "Sure, I'm doing what I morally ought not to do, but so what?".

I was drinking and didn't proof-read...my bad.

It is a moral claim, but there's this underlying feeling that the moral issues surrounding an issue leads to the settling of an issue, as if to say not only that we shouldn't act if such an act is wrong but that the moral component is a superior component. My understanding is that the word, "should" is not always morally relevant. For instance, I should charge 5000% interest on certain loans when the borrower can't bear to not do otherwise because it will lead to a superior net profit, even over the long term. One might bring up morals and counter argue that although it might on occasion lead to superior financial results, it's wrong to take advantage of others so egregiously, but why must the morality of an issue seem to in so many minds trump the results that can produced by doing so immorally?

Again, just in case it's missed, I'm not trying to espouse a view ... just trying to see the underlying argument that places morality on a higher plain.

The very mentioning that the ends do not justify the means is an indication that morality is of extreme high importance. The results we achieve by doing the things we do are very important as well. Yes, how we do things are important; I get that. But, which is more important? Is it never the case that the results are more important than an immoral methodology? If there is ever such a case, then the retort that our means are not justified is misplaced.

The idea that we shouldn't do something because it's wrong is a very good idea indeed, but can there not be times where unjustifiably achieving ends is right? By definition, no, but can there not be times where the results are more important than the moral issues? Invoking the comment that the means are unjustified seems to be a game-stopper. However, better is he that does wrong than not, if (an incredibly big if) it's better to act unjustifiably when the importance of the results far outweighs the wrongs of the means.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

It is a moral claim, but there's this underlying feeling that the moral issues surrounding an issue leads to the settling of an issue, as if to say not only that we shouldn't act if such an act is wrong but that the moral component is a superior component. My understanding is that the word, "should" is not always morally relevant. For instance, I should charge 5000% interest on certain loans when the borrower can't bear to not do otherwise because it will lead to a superior net profit, even over the long term. One might bring up morals and counter argue that although it might on occasion lead to superior financial results, it's wrong to take advantage of others so egregiously, but why must the morality of an issue seem to in so many minds trump the results that can produced by doing so immorally?

My understanding is that either there are different usages of 'should' that may be at play - or one that takes different goals into consideration.
For example, in the moral sense of 'should', it's tautological that one should not do what is immoral (whether this sort of 'should' can be analyzed as a means-to-end 'should' in which the goal is to avoid behaving immorally is a matter for another discussion).
On the other hand, there means-to-end "should" with respect to all sorts of goals, and one may consider what one should do in order to maximize value for an agent (i.e., with respect to the entire value system of the agent; that might be a bit problematic if different parts of the brain disagree, though, but I'll leave that aside for now). I'll call that "all things considered means-ends 'should'", or ACME-'should'

So, maybe you morally shouldn't charge 5000% interest, but whether you ACME-should do so is a further question.
Even so, when people make moral arguments, they usually intent to persuade others to behave in certain ways, so they implicitly hold that at least in the case of their interlocutors and in that particular situation, either what they morally shouldn't do is also something they ACME-shouldn't do, or at least that they will believe so.

The very mentioning that the ends do not justify the means is an indication that morality is of extreme high importance. The results we achieve by doing the things we do are very important as well. Yes, how we do things are important; I get that. But, which is more important? Is it never the case that the results are more important than an immoral methodology? If there is ever such a case, then the retort that our means are not justified is misplaced.

The key issues here do not seem to be about means and ends.
For example, a person might have immoral means and immoral ends too, but still say "so what?".

The key issues seem to be things like:

1. Is it necessarily the case that if agent A morally shouldn't X, then she ACME-shouldn't X?
2. Is it necessarily the case that if human agent A morally shouldn't X, then she ACME-shouldn't X?
3. Is it nearly always the case that if human agent A morally shouldn't X, then she ACME-shouldn't X?

And so on.

However, better is he that does wrong than not, if (an incredibly big if) it's better to act unjustifiably when the importance of the results far outweighs the wrongs of the means.

If "better" means "morally better", then clearly it's not morally better to act immorally than to refrain from acting immorally.
If "better" does not mean "morally better", then I'm not sure what it means in this context.

 

[fast]

If "better" does not mean "morally better", then I'm not sure what it means in this context.

It reminds me of post-analysis flip-flopping but without the flip-flopping. An action that is ordinarily considered an unjustified action can often instead be evaluated as being a justified action when new morally prevailing information is added to the analysis. For instance, it's wrong to walk up to someone to shoot and kill, but it might not be considered wrong if doing so was to save a life, so the very same physical action may or may not be a justified action; hence the flip-flopping from unjustified to justified--with the introduction of the new information. Such a thing without the flip flopping would lead us to conclude that the new information doesn't make the action justified but rather better because it's better to have a result of a life saved.

It seems like the result being better is itself the justification for calling the act justified. There's this weighing of factors that seem to tip the scale one way or the other. If in our analysis the result makes for a better world such that the awesomeness of the ends outweigh a meager wrongful means, then one may be inclined to flip flop from a conclusion that a means is unjustified to being justified because of the great disparity from the wrongful means and rightful ends, but if one still maintains that the ends do not justify the means, it's still the case that we've made for a better world with our so-called unjustified actions because the positive of the ends outweigh the negative of the means.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

However, better is he that does wrong than not, if (an incredibly big if) it's better to act unjustifiably when the importance of the results far outweighs the wrongs of the means.

If "better" means "morally better", then clearly it's not morally better to act immorally than to refrain from acting immorally.
If "better" does not mean "morally better", then I'm not sure what it means in this context.

It reminds me of post-analysis flip-flopping but without the flip-flopping. An action that is ordinarily considered an unjustified action can often instead be evaluated as being a justified action when new morally prevailing information is added to the analysis. For instance, it's wrong to walk up to someone to shoot and kill, but it might not be considered wrong if doing so was to save a life, so the very same physical action may or may not be a justified action; hence the flip-flopping from unjustified to justified--with the introduction of the new information. Such a thing without the flip flopping would lead us to conclude that the new information doesn't make the action justified but rather better because it's better to have a result of a life saved.

I'm not sure I understand what you're getting at, but if I get it right, I'd say there is a difference between whether a behavior is morally better, and whether the actual consequences turn out to be better.
In some scenarios, it's not wrong to walk up to someone to shoot and kill. But if it's wrong, it's not morally better to do it than not to.
But it might be that A immorally kills B just for fun, and it turns out that by doing so, A saves millions because B was planning to detonate an H-bomb in a big city. The situation resulting from A's immoral action turns out to be better than it would have been (all other things equal, but let's say it's extremely probable nothing else would have stopped B) if A hadn't killed B, but A's action is morally worse than A's refraining from killing B (say, for moral reasons) would have been.

On the other hand, if A acted in order to save those people, then his actions might be (it depends on other factors, such as alternative means, like calling the cops) morally justified.

It seems like the result being better is itself the justification for calling the act justified. There's this weighing of factors that seem to tip the scale one way or the other. If in our analysis the result makes for a better world such that the awesomeness of the ends outweigh a meager wrongful means, then one may be inclined to flip flop from a conclusion that a means is unjustified to being justified because of the great disparity from the wrongful means and rightful ends, but if one still maintains that the ends do not justify the means, it's still the case that we've made for a better world with our so-called unjustified actions because the positive of the ends outweigh the negative of the means.

If the action is morally justified, then the means are not wrongful, it seems, so that's a case in which the ends justify the means.

Still, one might ask the following question:

Let's say that A rationally predicts that the world will in the future (say, at a time t after X, and later) be much better if she does X than if she refrain from doing X. For that reason - i.e., to make the world much better -, A does X. Is it possible that, by doing X, A behaved immorally?

- - - Updated - - -

It reminds me of post-analysis flip-flopping but without the flip-flopping. An action that is ordinarily considered an unjustified action can often instead be evaluated as being a justified action when new morally prevailing information is added to the analysis. For instance, it's wrong to walk up to someone to shoot and kill, but it might not be considered wrong if doing so was to save a life, so the very same physical action may or may not be a justified action; hence the flip-flopping from unjustified to justified--with the introduction of the new information. Such a thing without the flip flopping would lead us to conclude that the new information doesn't make the action justified but rather better because it's better to have a result of a life saved.

I'm not sure I understand what you're getting at, but if I get it right, I'd say there is a difference between whether a behavior is morally better, and whether the actual consequences turn out to be better.
In some scenarios, it's not wrong to walk up to someone to shoot and kill. But if it's wrong, it's not morally better to do it than not to.
But it might be that A immorally kills B just for fun, and it turns out that by doing so, A saves millions because B was planning to detonate an H-bomb in a big city. The situation resulting from A's immoral action turns out to be better than it would have been (all other things equal, but let's say it's extremely probable nothing else would have stopped B) if A hadn't killed B, but A's action is morally worse than A's refraining from killing B (say, for moral reasons) would have been.

On the other hand, if A acted in order to save those people, then his actions might be (it depends on other factors, such as alternative means, like calling the cops) morally justified.

It seems like the result being better is itself the justification for calling the act justified. There's this weighing of factors that seem to tip the scale one way or the other. If in our analysis the result makes for a better world such that the awesomeness of the ends outweigh a meager wrongful means, then one may be inclined to flip flop from a conclusion that a means is unjustified to being justified because of the great disparity from the wrongful means and rightful ends, but if one still maintains that the ends do not justify the means, it's still the case that we've made for a better world with our so-called unjustified actions because the positive of the ends outweigh the negative of the means.

If the action is morally justified, then the means are not wrongful, it seems, so that's a case in which the ends justify the means.

Still, one might ask the following question:

Let's say that A rationally predicts that the world will in the future (say, at a time t after X, and later) be much better if she does X than if she refrain from doing X. For that reason - i.e., to make the world much better -, A does X. Is it possible that, by doing X, A behaved immorally?

 

[fast]

But it might be that A immorally kills B just for fun, and it turns out that by doing so, A saves millions because B was planning to detonate an H-bomb in a big city. The situation resulting from A's immoral action turns out to be better than it would have been (all other things equal, but let's say it's extremely probable nothing else would have stopped B) if A hadn't killed B, but A's action is morally worse than A's refraining from killing B (say, for moral reasons) would have been.

If I knew that "A" was planning to kill "B" for fun and knew that if he didn't that "B" would otherwise be successful, then even though it might be considered wrong for me to not turn "A" in (and supposing that turning "B" in would not prevent "B's" actions), then unjustified as my being quiet might be, I think you might forgive me for my immoral deed of silence.

Still, one might ask the following question:

Let's say that A rationally predicts that the world will in the future (say, at a time t after X, and later) be much better if she does X than if she refrain from doing X. For that reason - i.e., to make the world much better -, A does X. Is it possible that, by doing X, A behaved immorally?

I think the standard approach would be to argue that the presence of justification is what gives rise to rightfully claiming a moral position. If the prediction isn't rational (or rather rational but ugly in nature), you're going to argue that what she did was wrong despite the consequences of making for a better world, yet a better world it would be had she did what was wrong.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

If I knew that "A" was planning to kill "B" for fun and knew that if he didn't that "B" would otherwise be successful, then even though it might be considered wrong for me to not turn "A" in (and supposing that turning "B" in would not prevent "B's" actions), then unjustified as my being quiet might be, I think you might forgive me for my immoral deed of silence.

No, I would say that under those assumptions, your silence is justified - i.e., not immoral -, at least if you keep silent in order to prevent a worse outcome. But A's behavior remains immoral.

I think the standard approach would be to argue that the presence of justification is what gives rise to rightfully claiming a moral position. If the prediction isn't rational (or rather rational but ugly in nature), you're going to argue that what she did was wrong despite the consequences of making for a better world, yet a better world it would be had she did what was wrong.

I don't understand that part. I was just addressing some of the issues, and pointing out one that remained - and which seemed to me related to what you were saying, though the latter wasn't very clear to me.

Still, the answer to that question probably has little impact in realistic scenarios.

 

[fast]

Still, the answer to that question probably has little impact in realistic scenarios.

Probably right. Still, there's this nagging feeling that when the means are brought into question, the issue is elevated to morality related topics: right, wrong, justification. It's more than just an issue of morality but it's place on the pyramid of concern that grasps my attention.

Suppose I said, if we do X, then we can achieve y. You might say, just because we can do X, maybe we should step back and ask ourselves if we should. It's not just a moral question on lateral footing as if two topics (morality and results) are sitting side-by-side. There's a sense of hierarchy between the issues.

Consider legality versus morality. If an action is immoral and illegal on one hand and immoral yet legal on the other, the latter is further up the scale of admiration (a little, for at least it's legal), and if an action is moral yet illegal versus moral and legal, that latter is even higher still. Legal tends to trump illegal and moral trumps immoral, but in comparing the two, it's the morality (and not the legality) that wins favor. Throw results in the mix. Nothing ever seems to trump the morals of an issue.

If a company can save 100x on toxic disposal without fear of substantial financial reprisal, the results will not be appreciated by the masses simply because of their ability to achieve their ends through those means. If they could do it otherwise morally (not harming the environment) yet illegally (because the laws haven't adjusted to reflect their ability to not harm the environment by illegal disposal), there will be more unconcerned masses--the harm factor...morality's liberal cousin.

Always at the top seems to be the moral issue. The very notion that the achievement of results can sit above the importance of the moral aspects of an issue is probably mostly universally deniable, and what makes this discussion so problematic is how morality boosts up the moment results have a chance of gaining ground--the flip-flopping from unjustified to justified.

With language and it's tautologies lying in wait, I guess the 'so what' to 'that's that' is far as I can go with this, as never can I rightly say that unjustified actions are sometimes better and even more important than the moral underpinnings.