The relationship between Science and Philosophy

[Speakpigeon]

I would suggest distinguishing between the philosophy of logic, particular logics, and our sense of logic.

The philosophy of logic is the identification and specification of potential logics. This activity was carried out by the Ancient Greek philosophers, the philosophers of the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries, and by Frege at the end of the 19th century and Russell at the beginning of the 20th century and some more people, like Quine. Russell and Quine acted successively as philosopher and logician.

Particular logics include the classical (normal, conventional etc.) logic as used by mathematicians and scientists (if they do at all) as well as unorthodox or alternative logics such as the logic of possible worlds, three-valued logics etc. The latter are investigated both by philosophers and by some logicians. I don't believe they are really applicable. Scientists, mathematicians and ordinary mortals are essentially concerned with classical logic. However, they are not investigating it at all. They are using it, usually somewhat perfunctorily, if at all, like one would use a Kleenex or a Hoover. Logicians are investigating classical logic but only in the sense that they are trying to specify it completely. Novelties are only technical ones in this respect. If one investigates classical logic with a view to redefine it then this is a philosophical job.

The sense of logic is the ability that human beings, and other animals, have allowing them to demonstrate logical capabilities without prior formal training in logic. Toddlers have a sense of logic. Grey parrots as well as all species of the Corvidae family have a sense of logic. Apes do, also some monkeys. Dogs do. They all have been shown to perform logical operations. Personally, I think that many species beyond those listed here have a sense of logic. What the species mentioned here share is an ability to communicate with us through proto-linguistic capabilities.

Conventional logic broadly covers our sense of logic. However, it's not entirely accurate even though it seems good enough for practical purpose (maths, science, everyday life). Only philosophers and a few logicians seem to want to nit-pick. In that respect, only these people are still investigating logic. Most logicians seem to think that the fundamentals of classical logic (or formal logic) are correct. They are investigating developments of these fundamentals; they're not reconsidering them.
EB

 

[DBT]

Good points.

 

[Perspicuo]

Science is field/lab work.

Philosophy is thinking things through, with or without the use of deep scientific knowledge.

I find the distinction easy. Example: Carl Sagan is much more famous for his philosophy than for his science (notice I am not saying "Carl Sagan was much more famous as a philosopher than as a scientist", becuase that would be doubtlessly false. You are what you do, not what your credentials say.). His philosophy was a "two-way street", both based on scientific knowledge for understanding, and attempting to understand science for humans and for the human experience.

 

[fromderinside]

People were using science before the scientific method was verbalized. People traded techniques of doing things, trained one another, etc.

Creating a spearhead preceded commerce and engineering, unless I've been taught a backwards history of the world.

Does engineering need be named is it is being done? My only quibble is with whether the one(s) who created the spear head were doing engineering which is exactly what I believe they were doing.

Formality seems to dominate this whole thread when perhaps the philosopher should do another one of his acts and consider whether ad from whence their formalism arose. I'm impressed that a few chaps about 2500 years ago wrote about philosophy. I'm not convinced that what they discuss is either philosophy or their invention. Anyone who wonders is doing philosophy. My view is that wondering whether one should rape comes after wondering whether there is one and then finding one to be potentially raped.

All of this concerns reality. But did this lead to characterizing reality or discovering it. My money is on discovery.

 

[Togo]

I think it's worth distinguishing between these subjects as areas of academic study, and area of human concern. Science, engineering, philosophy etc. as academic subjects are relatively stand-alone - as academic subjects really need to be, or else they can't form a discreet area of study. And as academic subjects the academic qualfications are a matter of record, and we can look them up.

As areas of human concern they are much broader. We can classify making a spear as a form of engineering, for example. But we need to be clear that that's what we're doing. There are very few endevours in human history that can't be said to be related to something that could be called science, or history, or engineering, or philsophy. I've even seem attempts to cast the entirity of human history in terms of economics, management theory or politics. We might baulk at the idea that all human behaviour, science included, is a function of economics, but that's exactly the kind of assumption that economics relies on.

So we have two points of comparison. The academic, where what involves what is a matter of public record, and the more general, where the subjects are spread so thin as to be essentially meaningless. We can't draw any useful information about engineering the academic discpline from the idea that a proto-human making a spear is engaged in engineering activity. The two simply aren't being used in a comparable way.

What would give substance to the discussion is some idea of what the comparison is going to be used for. If there is a solid point to be made about the relationship between science and philosophy, then the boundaries of each need to be drawn up in a way that makes sense in the context of that point. If the idea is just to establish some kind of abstract bragging rights, then we'll never get anywhere, because the question is too vague to put any limits on how the terms are defined.

 

[Perspicuo]

↑ Correcto.

 

[fromderinside]

So we have two points of comparison. The academic, where what involves what is a matter of public record, and the more general, where the subjects are spread so thin as to be essentially meaningless. We can't draw any useful information about engineering the academic discipline from the idea that a proto-human making a spear is engaged in engineering activity. The two simply aren't being used in a comparable way.

What would give substance to the discussion is some idea of what the comparison is going to be used for. If there is a solid point to be made about the relationship between science and philosophy, then the boundaries of each need to be drawn up in a way that makes sense in the context of that point. If the idea is just to establish some kind of abstract bragging rights, then we'll never get anywhere, because the question is too vague to put any limits on how the terms are defined.

Well put Togo. But, gee I thought some things were self evident.

What leads to academics is the over generations accumulation of knowledge (whether by aural history or hand me down or by text isn't important beyond gauging the rate). What leads to making a point about whither science of philosophy first relative to man is how man came to be man. Littered through all of our physically evidenced history are markers suggesting one dominant thread, the thread of expanded mental and physical facility, in manipulating nature. So for whither first is to find markers in support of one, science, or the other, philosophy, at root of these developments.

The record is constrained by our lack of understanding of what capabilities we had and when we acquired those capabilities. Before man, fire was controlled and used as were tools used and made. Observation and use was probably at the root of control of fire for instance. Connections were made between materials and effects by experiment in the broad sense. Do I need to show more? 'cause before man and during man there's tool making, housing, hunting, agriculture, language, etc etc which suggest the same basis.

As for disciplines science is disadvantaged unless we look at texts of great achievement like pyramid building and the like. By the very nature of putting things down on more faithful and permanent material than memory some categorizing capabilities are favored. Its more of a discovery of process which lies at the base of engineering capability. Categorization usually follows.

 

[Speakpigeon]

So, let's come back from before the deluge and go back to the OP...

would you agree with a similar statement but with regards to Philosophy and Science?

"Philosophy is the handmaiden of Science; Philosophy helps elucidate Science and prevents it from falling into pseudoscience"

Would you agree with that assessment? Why, why not?

I disagree. Some philosophers can be capable of course of producing positive criticism of the processes of science but anybody could in principle. It is just that some philosophers have taken upon themselves to do that for a living and they should be expected to be better at it than most people. Big deal. Also, some scientific institutions do pay money to some philosophers and it would be interesting to be able to assess their jobs and contributions. Science is not in itself an object of science. Instead, scientists have come to adopt methods and standards and institutions through a long and tortuous historical process. Science is similar in this respect to other human social processes, such as industry, politics, or football. Nonetheless, many scientists, perhaps the better among them, do seem to like to spend part of their time thinking about science as a process. It doesn't seem to me however that they are doing science in this case. Rather, they are doing what is essentially philosophy, perhaps conceptual analysis, if only tentatively. That being said, I don't believe that they, or philosophers, could prevent science from falling into pseudo-science. Rather, science should be seen as a social process which will be as good as the social fabric it appears in will be effective at motivating good science. It's been argued that science didn't appear in the 17th century so much as a result of some philosophically induced Enlightenment but just because the economic and social conditions at the time had changed dramatically and become favourable to science as well as all sorts of intellectual and technical endeavours. Philosophy would have played a role but merely as a modality of the social process underway at that time. One just need to look at climate change deniers and other idiots to see that social conditions could change again, and not necessarily favourably again for science. Though, conceivably, in such a bad perspective, philosophers might be more helpful than not.

Of course, the elucidation of science's processes at a level more fundamental than what most scientists will ever be interested in would be a good thing but to do that you need good philosophers. Maybe there are but there is nothing to be taken for granted here as elsewhere.
EB

 

[Togo]

So, let's come back from before the deluge and go back to the OP...

would you agree with a similar statement but with regards to Philosophy and Science?

"Philosophy is the handmaiden of Science; Philosophy helps elucidate Science and prevents it from falling into pseudoscience"

Would you agree with that assessment? Why, why not?

I disagree.

Probably unsurprisingly, I do agree with the assessment. The term 'helps' makes the bar for qualification here extremely low. As long as philosophy can have a beneficial effect in some limited circumstances, then we're there. As such, it seems a hard position to oppose.

Some philosophers can be capable of course of producing positive criticism of the processes of science but anybody could in principle.

Well sure. You also don't need to be a scientist to mix chemicals, or build big ships, or aircraft. It helps though.

It is just that some philosophers have taken upon themselves to do that for a living and they should be expected to be better at it than most people. Big deal.

Well, unless you're arguing that they have no beneficial effect, then yes it is a big deal. It's a demonstration of the statement in the OP. Unless I'm missing something?

Science is not in itself an object of science.

Sure it is. Psychologists do experiments on the process of science all the time. From testing Popper's predictions, to the 'maze bright' rat experiments, to the metanalysis of studies along cultural grounds, to the measures of bias effects within a scientific context.

The effects of these experiments are then used to inform experimental design. Why wouldn't they be? So, yes, Science itself is the target of science, and benefits as a result. And you only have to look at the develoment of alchemy, and the simultaneous development of lab equipment from having symbolic shapes to having shapes developed over centuries of lab practice, to see that Science the process has always been a target for science, and indeed for philosophy. The great split between alchemical mystics, who focused on trying to instantiate theory, and alchemical practioners, who focused on refining equipment and technique, was at it's heart a phlisophical split about what the purpose and aims of the discipline were.

Nonetheless, many scientists, perhaps the better among them, do seem to like to spend part of their time thinking about science as a process. It doesn't seem to me however that they are doing science in this case. Rather, they are doing what is essentially philosophy, perhaps conceptual analysis, if only tentatively. That being said, I don't believe that they, or philosophers, could prevent science from falling into pseudo-science.

Well no, we know that nothing has prevented pseudo-science entirely, because psuedo-science exists. That's not to say that it didn't help.

Indeed I'd suggest that great strides have been taken in tightening up scientific practice in the last 50 or so years, from the treatment of patient accounts of symptoms, particularly in mental health and clinical psychology, to the operationalisation of experimental models that fromderinside regards as so vital, to the proper accounting for of computer models that appear to mimic human behaviour or neural patterns, to the abandoning of the 'black box' approach in favour of modelling cognitive functions on a modular basis. There have been huge advances, not just in theory and technical equipment, but also in the practice and process of behavioural science.

Rather, science should be seen as a social process which will be as good as the social fabric it appears in will be effective at motivating good science.

Cognitive modelling is just an aspect of the social fabric? Proper experimental controls are just a fad that will go away when social conditions change? I can't agree. Science evolves, and it does so not at random, or as a result of handwaved social schanges, but as series of concrete advances in the practice and associated metatheory of Science.

The question then becomes whether philosophy has played any part in that. I think it fairly obvious that has, even if only at the level of experiments carried out on the back of philosophical ideas, or the contribution of philosophers to the early theories if mind, or the later theories of computer modelling and artificial intelligence.

 

[fromderinside]

The question then becomes whether philosophy has played any part in that. I think it fairly obvious that has, even if only at the level of experiments carried out on the back of philosophical ideas, or the contribution of philosophers to the early theories if mind, or the later theories of computer modelling and artificial intelligence.

First, as Speakpigeon says most anyone could do that. Experiments carried out on the backs of philosophical ideas would be fine if philosophers adhered to the SM. They don't, thus the collapse of several efforts to constitute an experimental philosophy. As for early theories of mind they are at the crux of our continuing discussion on cognitive psychology where you eat whole cloth those philosophical notions while I keep countering with principles of evolution. As for computer modelling it is clear they are programmatic attempts to mimic the utility of list making as I've illustrated several times before from my aerospace experience.

 

[Togo]

The question then becomes whether philosophy has played any part in that. I think it fairly obvious that has, even if only at the level of experiments carried out on the back of philosophical ideas, or the contribution of philosophers to the early theories if mind, or the later theories of computer modelling and artificial intelligence.

First, as Speakpigeon says most anyone could do that. Experiments carried out on the backs of philosophical ideas would be fine if philosophers adhered to the SM. They don't, thus the collapse of several efforts to constitute an experimental philosophy. As for early theories of mind they are at the crux of our continuing discussion on cognitive psychology where you eat whole cloth those philosophical notions while I keep countering with principles of evolution. As for computer modelling it is clear they are programmatic attempts to mimic the utility of list making as I've illustrated several times before from my aerospace experience.

Hm.. But the fact the you don't approve of the science done on the back of philosophy, and think it would be better abandoned in favour of a more operationalised approach, is not in itself an arguement for that science not existing. And if it exists, then there has been a contribution. You may well argue whether it's a valuable contribution, but we can agree that it's there.

 

[Speakpigeon]

So, let's come back from before the deluge and go back to the OP...


I disagree.

Probably unsurprisingly, I do agree with the assessment. The term 'helps' makes the bar for qualification here extremely low. As long as philosophy can have a beneficial effect in some limited circumstances, then we're there. As such, it seems a hard position to oppose.

I didn't start from the premise that the term "helps" could be reasonably interpreted as suggesting an extremely low bar for agreeing with the proposed idea that "Philosophy helps elucidate Science and prevents it from falling into pseudoscience". I think we are talking instead of some substantial help. There wouldn't be cause for a debate otherwise.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

It is just that some philosophers have taken upon themselves to do that for a living and they should be expected to be better at it than most people. Big deal.

Well, unless you're arguing that they have no beneficial effect, then yes it is a big deal. It's a demonstration of the statement in the OP. Unless I'm missing something?

Yes, and it is that it's not going to be a big deal unless one can show that the help provided by philosophy is substantial.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Science is not in itself an object of science.

Sure it is. Psychologists do experiments on the process of science all the time. From <snip> to the metanalysis of studies along cultural grounds, to the measures of bias effects within a scientific context.

The effects of these experiments are then used to inform experimental design. Why wouldn't they be? So, yes, Science itself is the target of science, and benefits as a result.

So, did any of these people produce a theory of science, as opposed to a theory of the human mind applicable in principle to sundry social processes, science one among them? Is there a science of science as there is a philosophy of science?

testing Popper's predictions

What predictions?

'maze bright' rat experiments

What about them?
EB

 

[Togo]

Probably unsurprisingly, I do agree with the assessment. The term 'helps' makes the bar for qualification here extremely low. As long as philosophy can have a beneficial effect in some limited circumstances, then we're there. As such, it seems a hard position to oppose.

I didn't start from the premise that the term "helps" could be reasonably interpreted as suggesting an extremely low bar for agreeing with the proposed idea that "Philosophy helps elucidate Science and prevents it from falling into pseudoscience".

No, but I did. That may be part of why we disagree.

I think we are talking instead of some substantial help. There wouldn't be cause for a debate otherwise.
EB

'Substantial' meaning what? It's a purely a term of subjective evaluation, like 'important'. I'm not sure how to approach the subject if we're aiming for such a vague target. You could argue that 'behavioural science' is not a substantial part of science.

What this does seem to mean is that we agree both that philosophy has contributed to science, and that science does not depend on philosophy. That at least gives us some reference points. Can we narrow it down?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Nonetheless, many scientists, perhaps the better among them, do seem to like to spend part of their time thinking about science as a process. It doesn't seem to me however that they are doing science in this case. Rather, they are doing what is essentially philosophy, perhaps conceptual analysis, if only tentatively. That being said, I don't believe that they, or philosophers, could prevent science from falling into pseudo-science.

Well no, we know that nothing has prevented pseudo-science entirely, because psuedo-science exists. That's not to say that it didn't help.

Sure we know pseudo-science exists but the OP is not about pseudo-science or its existence. Nor is it about the occasional impropriety of idiots scientists falsifying results or some such.

The OP is about science and whether philosophy can prevents it from falling "whole" into pseudo-science, say like if string theory was pseudo-science. At least that's the only interesting debate to be had. So I would say that philosophy wouldn't help in this case as there are already plenty of physicits who see string theory with suspicion or even contempt.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Indeed I'd suggest that great strides have been taken in tightening up scientific practice in the last 50 or so years, from the treatment of patient accounts of symptoms, particularly in mental health and clinical psychology, to the operationalisation of experimental models that fromderinside regards as so vital, to the proper accounting for of computer models that appear to mimic human behaviour or neural patterns, to the abandoning of the 'black box' approach in favour of modelling cognitive functions on a modular basis. There have been huge advances, not just in theory and technical equipment, but also in the practice and process of behavioural science.

Regarding behaviourism (the 'black box' approach) I don't think it was science to begin with.

You seem to be talking about the fact that the pseudo-science psychology of 50 years ago or more is changing into a science.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Rather, science should be seen as a social process which will be as good as the social fabric it appears in will be effective at motivating good science.

Cognitive modelling is just an aspect of the social fabric?

What do you mean "just"?!

The fact is that scientists don't live in a vacuum. They are paid by governments and other social organisations. Scientific projects require money and politicians and managers ultimately decide on where the money goes. Obviously, very nearly only scientific bodies are doing science but compare Chinese science today and what it was when Mao ruled.

Equally, philosophy didn't appear in a vacuum. It appeared as society started to produce more educated people, when individuals became able to communicate more easily not only within one country but within the whole of Europe (Descartes again being a good example of that), when the bourgeois ideal of managing one's assets started to become prevalent, even with the kings of the time. You have to look at much more than philosophy in the 16th-18th centuries to explain the surprising development of science at the time.

Proper experimental controls are just a fad that will go away when social conditions change?

Misrepresentation ("fad").

Science evolves, and it does so not at random

Of course science evolves and therefore not at random.

or as a result of handwaved social schanges

Modern science only appeared once, in Europe in the 16th to 18th centuries period. Earlier tentative appearances eventually faltered. Based on that, and its continuing prosperity, I think it is legitimate to infer that social conditions are a prerequisite for the appearance and continuance of science. That's what I said and that's not even controversial.

but as series of concrete advances in the practice and associated metatheory of Science.

You are only saying that scientists contributed to the progress of science. I agree.

My point was that a few bright people are not enough. You need a lot of them and you need the right social conditions.

The question then becomes whether philosophy has played any part in that.

No. The only interesting question is whether it played any substantial part and that's of course a lot harder to argue properly.

I think it fairly obvious that has, even if only at the level of experiments carried out on the back of philosophical ideas, or the contribution of philosophers to the early theories if mind, or the later theories of computer modelling and artificial intelligence.

Well, I don't think it is obvious at all.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I didn't start from the premise that the term "helps" could be reasonably interpreted as suggesting an extremely low bar for agreeing with the proposed idea that "Philosophy helps elucidate Science and prevents it from falling into pseudoscience".

No, but I did. That may be part of why we disagree.

If that's it then there's no argument to be had. There is no point arguing that philosophy contributed some.

I think we are talking instead of some substantial help. There wouldn't be cause for a debate otherwise.

'Substantial' meaning what? It's a purely a term of subjective evaluation, like 'important'. I'm not sure how to approach the subject if we're aiming for such a vague target.

Substantial enough for it to be controversial, like, say, causing science's minions posting here to object.

You could argue that 'behavioural science' is not a substantial part of science.

Yes, I think it's arguable.

What this does seem to mean is that we agree both that philosophy has contributed to science, and that science does not depend on philosophy. That at least gives us some reference points. Can we narrow it down?

Sure but answer my other posts first, that should save time.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Hm.. But the fact the you don't approve of the science done on the back of philosophy, and think it would be better abandoned in favour of a more operationalised approach, is not in itself an arguement for that science not existing. And if it exists, then there has been a contribution. You may well argue whether it's a valuable contribution, but we can agree that it's there.

While I agree operations are better than ad hoc or self evident bases for decision making there must, as base be, evidence that is framed in whatever base. What I don't see in other approaches is that insistence on material evidence, most surprisingly, not found in many domains of my chosen field. As for whether or not operationalism is or is not an argument that can be used for science not existing (proving by counter method) can be since one can develop operations that are not material as tests.