The Science and Mechanics of Free Will

[Speakpigeon]

The bee, smarter than the dog, or the infant, knows there is a permanent "world" beyond it's immediate perceptions.

We don't need to assume that they do.

It's good enough that they should have, as we would expect, some basic behavioural mechanisms that provide a working substitute to actual knowledge.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I understand the problem of how the lamprey discriminates visual perception of a moving target as food rather than just an image. That problem is wrapped up in the evolution of the nervous system as a fit system interpreting stuff into nutrition through development of integrated perceptive, awareness, and digestive systems permitting each organism to prosper in its environment.

Your 'free will' conceit is no more than a self congratulating judgement about human capability vis a vis the rest of life. Understanding that a neural system by its organization resolves edges and motion into objects, memes, archetypes, memories that lead to different behaviors through their perceived presence that enable the animal in question to sustain itself, protect itself, compete, live, provides all the information necessary to explain the rise of consciousness, will, even the mind conceit.

Science is making progress on explaining objective consciousness. It has made no progress at all on explaining phenomenal consciousness.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

The world in which we live responds to material inputs which can be demonstrated by any number of tests. Presuming, then. it is true we live in a material world it follows that we are material beings

These assumptions are based on the way things are presented in your mind (or so I presume).

The mind being something in that material world

Metaphysical speculation.

The mind <...> must have a location, a material representation, and be manipulable in material ways.

Metaphysical speculation.

Unless of course if by "mind" you mean whatever objective phenomena we can observe in relation to our mental activities, such memory capabilities in humans, reports of state of mind by subjects, etc.

What will remain to be explained when science has explained objective consciousness will be phenomenal consciousness. If it ever can.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

My view is that the 'mind is a collection of activity used by humans as a convenience for representing that activity as a unity for discussion sake and simplicity.

This is really the concept of mind used by Descartes: the mind as a thinking thing where thinking includes all conscious mental activities such as feeling, remembering, reflecting, computing mentally etc.

So nothing terribly new here.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Until a better specification of mind becomes apparent a functional one is all we have.

It's pretty dumb to claim it's all we have when any normal human being can enjoys the subjective experience of a working mind. Your claim makes you look like some Ayatollah of bad science.
EB

 

[Treedbear]

...
Still, scientists talking about phenomenal consciousness is a clear progress from only a few years ago when some people, not least a Mr. Fromderinside himself, would state that consciousness was but "an illusion".
...

Phenomenal consciousness, as you refer to it, is an "illusion" in the same sense in which Descartes suggested knowledge of the external world could be an illusion. And going back to Plato's analogy of the cave, like the mere shadows of a reality as if projected on a wall. In the same way the self, I would say, is the shadow of who we really are whenever we stand in the light. One of many shadows. I prefer to interpret the experience as the the natural proclivity of the brain to (somehow!) create models of its environment, with the understanding that everything we understand ourselves to be should also be considered as part of that environment.

 

[untermensche]

....Phenomenal consciousness, as you refer to it, is an "illusion" in the same sense in which Descartes suggested knowledge of the external world could be an illusion....

If consciousness is a deception what is doing the deceiving and what is being deceived? And why the deception?

It doesn't serve the brain to deceive about the external world. Survival is served with accurate representations, not deception.

 

[fromderinside]

Using recent data from general anesthesia in humans, we suggest that the arousal centers in the brainstem and diencephalon—in conjunction with even limited neocortical connectivity and recurrent processing—can result in primitive phenomenal consciousness. By “reverse engineering,” we postulate that early mammals and birds possessing these structures (or their equivalents) are capable of phenomenal consciousness

These claims are very different in nature. The first one involves the term "consciousness". As the word is used in neurosciences, consciousness should be understood here as an objective phenomenon, i.e. a phenomenon that can be studied in the way that science mostly study phenomena, i.e. in the same way that you would study the memory capabilities in humans, or the ability to recognise patterns in the natural environment etc. The first claim is therefore standard fare in science in the sense that we can at least conceive that scientists could develop an experimental protocol to try and falsify the claim. Of course, the creatures talken about here have long disappeared but we might for example retrieve their DNA, recreate the organism and work on this basis. Not entirely satisfactory but good enough for practical purposes. So I'm fine with the first claim as "scientific claim" (although still to be confirmed).

The second claim involves the expression "phenomenal consciousness". Phenomenal consciousness is another way of talking about subjective experience. It's the subjective experience the subject is having. Typically, the scientists conducting the study would not be able to observe it, would not have the subjective experience, or the phenomenal consciousness, of the subjects taking part in the study. Essentially, the subject has to report to the scientists whatever s/he is experiencing subjectively, in their own words and as far as they could remember. Consciousness, in the sense used in the first extract, and phenomenal consciousness are therefore to be considered different things as long as we haven't found a way of showing they are, somehow, the same thing.

Still, scientists talking about phenomenal consciousness is a clear progress from only a few years ago when some people, not least a Mr. Fromderinside himself, would state that consciousness was but "an illusion".

It should be noted that the wording in the second extract shows the scientists concerned seem to understand the distinction involved between (objective) consciousness and phenomenal consciousness (i.e. subjective consciousness, A.K.A. subjective experience). Something also reassuring when others here have tried to deny that there was such a distinction. Well, here you have it, by scientists.
EB

There is no need to get excited or celebrate anything since consciousness is always phenomenal. The differences are whether the referenced experiential phenomena are subjective (what one makes of what is one has collected as an awareness scene), or objective (neural processed experiences translated to speech). Neither are science.


As for there being as distinction between the two as science, as I said, neither are. Consciousness is a collective convenience the same as referring to a situational collection of stars as galaxy is a collective experience. Neither is required to deal with the physics involved.

 

[fromderinside]

My view is that the 'mind is a collection of activity used by humans as a convenience for representing that activity as a unity for discussion sake and simplicity.

This is really the concept of mind used by Descartes: the mind as a thinking thing where thinking includes all conscious mental activities such as feeling, remembering, reflecting, computing mentally etc.

So nothing terribly new here.
EB

Except Descartes was all about reconciling physics with Christianity. There is no God so Christianity is a the playing out of a folk tale at best, for which it is obvious there is no connection between it to knowing the mechanics and dynamics of man, life, existence.

 

[fromderinside]

Until a better specification of mind becomes apparent a functional one is all we have.

It's pretty dumb to claim it's all we have when any normal human being can enjoys the subjective experience of a working mind. Your claim makes you look like some Ayatollah of bad science.
EB

All I was talking about was that galaxy holding place for how man operates. Making sense of how man works using such terminology is about as useful as taking subjective in-the-moment feelings as a basis for communicating in a society.

 

[untermensche]

The bee, smarter than the dog, or the infant, knows there is a permanent "world" beyond it's immediate perceptions.

We don't need to assume that they do.

It's good enough that they should have, as we would expect, some basic behavioural mechanisms that provide a working substitute to actual knowledge.
EB

You can't find pollen with substitutes. You need real information about the external world.

 

[Treedbear]

....Phenomenal consciousness, as you refer to it, is an "illusion" in the same sense in which Descartes suggested knowledge of the external world could be an illusion....

If consciousness is a deception what is doing the deceiving and what is being deceived? And why the deception?

It doesn't serve the brain to deceive about the external world. Survival is served with accurate representations, not deception.

Good point, and my error in forgetting that Descartes depends on deception by some kind of evil entity as the cause of the illusion. Rather, there is illusion simply because the brain is an imperfect perceiver. It creates models using analogy and metaphor. But that should have been somewhat clarified in my second example from Plato. Note that although I find using these examples helpful in making my point, I don't agree with either of their conclusions. Both Descartes and Plato rely on the idea that there needs to exist some manner of absolute perfection. Descartes deduces that his perfect God must exist, while Plato establishes an authoritarian political system based on an elitist hierarchy of truth.

 

[fromderinside]

If consciousness is a deception what is doing the deceiving and what is being deceived? And why the deception?

It doesn't serve the brain to deceive about the external world. Survival is served with accurate representations, not deception.

Good point, and my error in forgetting that Descartes depends on deception by some kind of evil entity as the cause of the illusion. Rather, there is illusion simply because the brain is an imperfect perceiver. It creates models using analogy and metaphor. But that should have been somewhat clarified in my second example from Plato. Note that although I find using these examples helpful in making my point, I don't agree with either of their conclusions. Both Descartes and Plato rely on the idea that there needs to exist some manner of absolute perfection. Descartes deduces that his perfect God must exist, while Plato establishes an authoritarian political system based on an elitist hierarchy of truth.

...or ... one could say the human is a social animal that depends, in large degree, on interpreting intentions of other members of their group so that the one presents a facade not threatening to local members of the group. What one forms one believes is real enough, hopefully others as well, that one executes it.

Not really consciousness though. Just social coping behavior indistinguishable to one from what one is aware which is a compilation of selected attending performed by the nervous system. Awareness is a transitional experimental parameter here.

 

[Treedbear]

... What one forms one believes is real enough, hopefully others as well, that one executes it.

Not really consciousness though. Just social coping behavior indistinguishable to one from what one is aware which is a compilation of selected attending performed by the nervous system. Awareness is a transitional experimental parameter here.

Sorry but I do not grok. Pity me.

 

[fromderinside]

... What one forms one believes is real enough, hopefully others as well, that one executes it.

Not really consciousness though. Just social coping behavior indistinguishable to one from what one is aware which is a compilation of selected attending performed by the nervous system. Awareness is a transitional experimental parameter here.

Sorry but I do not grok. Pity me.

Has gloop been redesigned by the Navy?

 

[untermensche]

If consciousness is a deception what is doing the deceiving and what is being deceived? And why the deception?

It doesn't serve the brain to deceive about the external world. Survival is served with accurate representations, not deception.

Good point, and my error in forgetting that Descartes depends on deception by some kind of evil entity as the cause of the illusion. Rather, there is illusion simply because the brain is an imperfect perceiver. It creates models using analogy and metaphor. But that should have been somewhat clarified in my second example from Plato. Note that although I find using these examples helpful in making my point, I don't agree with either of their conclusions. Both Descartes and Plato rely on the idea that there needs to exist some manner of absolute perfection. Descartes deduces that his perfect God must exist, while Plato establishes an authoritarian political system based on an elitist hierarchy of truth.

It all depends on how you define "illusion".

There is representation and outright creation.

The brain that best represents the external world is the brain that will best survive in it.

But sometimes, like in the case of color, outright creation is better than representation for enhancing the odds of survival.

But none of this is deception. Deception does not help with survival. Accurate representation does.

 

[untermensche]

Good point, and my error in forgetting that Descartes depends on deception by some kind of evil entity as the cause of the illusion. Rather, there is illusion simply because the brain is an imperfect perceiver. It creates models using analogy and metaphor. But that should have been somewhat clarified in my second example from Plato. Note that although I find using these examples helpful in making my point, I don't agree with either of their conclusions. Both Descartes and Plato rely on the idea that there needs to exist some manner of absolute perfection. Descartes deduces that his perfect God must exist, while Plato establishes an authoritarian political system based on an elitist hierarchy of truth.

...or ... one could say the human is a social animal that depends, in large degree, on interpreting intentions of other members of their group so that the one presents a facade not threatening to local members of the group. What one forms one believes is real enough, hopefully others as well, that one executes it.

Not really consciousness though. Just social coping behavior indistinguishable to one from what one is aware which is a compilation of selected attending performed by the nervous system. Awareness is a transitional experimental parameter here.

When you move to social interaction you really move away from what is understood.

We don't understand how the mind moves the arm.

Forget about a physiological explanation of complex social behavior.

For that stories and faith are all we have.

 

[Speakpigeon]

The bee, smarter than the dog, or the infant, knows there is a permanent "world" beyond it's immediate perceptions.

We don't need to assume that they do.

It's good enough that they should have, as we would expect, some basic behavioural mechanisms that provide a working substitute to actual knowledge.
EB

You can't find pollen with substitutes. You need real information about the external world.

I'm sure you need information. My point was that this doesn't imply the organism involved knows there is a world out there.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

...
Still, scientists talking about phenomenal consciousness is a clear progress from only a few years ago when some people, not least a Mr. Fromderinside himself, would state that consciousness was but "an illusion".
...

Phenomenal consciousness, as you refer to it, is an "illusion" in the same sense in which Descartes suggested knowledge of the external world could be an illusion. And going back to Plato's analogy of the cave, like the mere shadows of a reality as if projected on a wall. In the same way the self, I would say, is the shadow of who we really are whenever we stand in the light. One of many shadows. I prefer to interpret the experience as the the natural proclivity of the brain to (somehow!) create models of its environment, with the understanding that everything we understand ourselves to be should also be considered as part of that environment.

I can only guess that you don't understand the concept of phenomenal consciousness. This is in fact confirmed by your point about the external world and Descartes.

I would agree with the idea that any impression that we know the external world, or something of it, is an illusion. However, it gets absurd to claim that the fact that you are having an illusion is itself an illusion. Let's say I have the impression that there's a red thing in front of me on a table. I agree it could be an illusion that there is a red thing on the table. However, the fact that I have the impression of a red thing cannot possibly be an illusion. So the illusion is that there is a red thing on the table. So phenomenal consciousness is precisely that which you are experiencing subjectively. It's no illusion.

The illusion may be in believing that what you so experience is indicative that there is something beyond the experience, something we conceive as being out there in some external world. The illusion is not phenomenal consciousness but whatever the experience seems to be evidence of.

In your example of Plato's cave, people in the cave see shadows and Plato says they have the illusion that the shadows are the world out there. However, the shadows themselves are no illusion in this case. The illusion is in taking the shadow for something else they are not. Shadows are only shadows and if you realise this then they are no longer an illusion.

Most people apparently fail to understand the distinction. The reason for that still eludes me.
EB

 

[untermensche]

The bee, smarter than the dog, or the infant, knows there is a permanent "world" beyond it's immediate perceptions.

We don't need to assume that they do.

It's good enough that they should have, as we would expect, some basic behavioural mechanisms that provide a working substitute to actual knowledge.
EB

You can't find pollen with substitutes. You need real information about the external world.

I'm sure you need information. My point was that this doesn't imply the organism involved knows there is a world out there.
EB

It is miles away from any understanding.

But we can speculate.

How does one bee tell another bee where to go without knowing about the external world?