There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

[Subsymbolic]

Finding neural correlates to the consciousness is very important and sought after in the science of consciousness, and probably the most important and sought after thing.

I hope you don't mind me snipping this single point to respond to. I think it's the key one but if you feel shortchanged, I'll return to the others later.

Here's my problem, and I think, the problem for science: There is a problem of other minds which hasn't, to my knowledge been resolved. I think this matters, conscious experience is a private experience that it is assumed that we all have. The problem is that we are all inferring that from a single case and as philosophers like Wittgenstein have pointed out, we really cannot even know that it is the same case across people as we, individually and collectively, have no criterion for judging how similar our experiences are, beyond the judgements we express in words. That's one reason why linguistic behaviourism isn't flat out ridiculous - we really don't know that others are conscious, just that we judge ourselves to be conscious, a judgement that people like Dennett assert is an indefeasible error such that judging ourselves, in language, to be conscious is all there is to consciousness, the position he holds in Consciousness Explained.

I mention all this just to really make it clear that the only example we have of putative mental lives is our own. Now, the next step concerns the methodology of science. At the heart of science are the axioms that all experiments have to be repeatable by anyone and objective. My individual conscious experience is not only not objective, it's not even intersubjectively verifiable, hell, it's barely subjective as what seems to me is indefeasible rather than factual. As for repeatable? my conscious experience isn't, nor is yours and the notion that we all have the same experience is an act of faith that doesn't bear up to even the most cursory of inspections.


I'm red green colourblind - I didn't even realise until I was seventeen and even then all I knew about is my discriminatory abilities, no one can know how much my experience varies, (See all of the 'inverted qualia' argument) just that there are some colour distinctions I can't make and some colours that I cannot distinguish well when superimposed. The point here is that no one knows I'm colourblind unless I tell them - I can use colour language better than most (I like being a psych test subject and my alma had a huge vision department - who never noticed I was colour blind while running experiments on qualia - I was a partial colour zombie and no one noticed - my heterophenomenology, aided and abetted by a degree of expertise and perfectly good hue and saturation detection meant that my few errors were outriders and not noticed. Yeah, I didn't let on, because I was blinding them as much as they were blinding me, so as to speak.

However, there's a remarkable postscript, because my color blindness isn't dependent on a lack of ability to discriminate, but in a processing issue in which my eye doesn't filter wavelength gradients properly. Last year I was given some glasses that literally cure my sort of color blindness by the simple expedient of blocking critical chunks of wavelength to allow my brain to process the overwhelming majority of the signal in a opto-neurotypical manner. As a result, I'm in the rare position to know that even if I'm still not seeing what the opto-neurotypical see I'm seeing the colour difference between twilight and midday with every berry on a holly bush (rather than being a vague shadow) picked out in psychedelic relief. Yet still, in ordinary communication you wouldn't notice the difference (and again, I repeat, that's merely discrimination, that is clearly different. No one can tell if my mental experience is the same, merely that I will use the word 'scarlet' under certain conditions, I, as Wittgenstein pointed out, learned the grammar of Scarlet, not the phenomenal and entirely personal reality. (notice how much metaphorical language I needed just to communicate the possibility of such a difference.

So consciousness isn't objective, it isn't reproducible and as for falsification and the null hypothesis, how exactly would you put forward a falsifiable account of your own, let alone another's private experience? Whenever someone tells me they are looking for correlation or more between the mental and the physical as an empirical project then all I think they need to have a think about the scope, limits and methodologies of science. If they want to say it's a metaphysical or philosophical project then I want to hear about the project in detail - it's easy to be right, you only have to be sufficiently vague, or anecdotal...

There's a faint hope we might be able to correlate the neural correlates of nociception and discrimination in as much as they are not mental events, but the raw feels of consciousness - science has no way of proving they exist, let alone correlating physical events and mental events. That's phenomenology, when it gets to intentions, you have a very different and even more perplexing problem, But that's enough about this, I have a very silly Christian to school on motor mechanics and evolution yet! (and it's bed time, my best mate is over from Magyaristan and I have to set up a bass guitar for him before I go to bed).

 

[untermensche]

And who the hell is claiming it is totally scientific?

If you know my argument, you will know that I only ever argued for a possibility, an opening, logical possibility using scientific knowns and unknowns - philosophy!

This is a philosophy of science type argument, not a scientific one!

I support the position that quantum properties of matter probably, not just possibly, have something to do with the production of consciousness.

And while science is terribly flawed and very incomplete it is all we have to explain experienced phenomena.

Nothing else is able to explain anything.

From past posts I have read of yours I know this about you which is why I was so annoyed when you said this, "and silly little insignificant things like quantum properties of matter can't possibly be involved."

That is mocking people who think it isn't involved in some way.

 

[Subsymbolic]

From past posts I have read of yours I know this about you which is why I was so annoyed when you said this, "and silly little insignificant things like quantum properties of matter can't possibly be involved."

That is mocking people who think it isn't involved in some way.

What about maths and logic? Two formal disciplines that have quite a lot to say...

 

[untermensche]

From past posts I have read of yours I know this about you which is why I was so annoyed when you said this, "and silly little insignificant things like quantum properties of matter can't possibly be involved."

That is mocking people who think it isn't involved in some way.

What about maths and logic? Two formal disciplines that have quite a lot to say...

I can produce a video of Freeman Dyson saying he thinks it is likely quantum effects of matter are involved in the production of consciousness. Would be surprised if they were not.

Is he deficient in one of those disciplines?

Also I have no idea what mathematics tells us about the real world.

 

[Subsymbolic]

What about maths and logic? Two formal disciplines that have quite a lot to say...

I can produce a video of Freeman Dyson saying he thinks it is likely quantum effects of matter are involved in the production of consciousness. Would be surprised if they were not.

Is he deficient in one of those disciplines?

Also I have no idea what mathematics tells us about the real world.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

Freeman Dyson is an excellent physicist, Penrose is a fine mathematician. Neither can find their arse with both hands in the cognitive sciences.

 

[untermensche]

Nice dodge.

It is easy to have opinions.

Socrates? Moron! Plato? Idiot!

 

[Subsymbolic]

Nice dodge.

It is easy to have opinions.

Socrates? Moron! Plato? Idiot!

Ok, you explain why these two think what they think and I'll cheerfully explain why I say what I say.

 

[untermensche]

Nice dodge.

It is easy to have opinions.

Socrates? Moron! Plato? Idiot!

Ok, you explain why these two think what they think and I'll cheerfully explain why I say what I say.

Pure logic on Dyson's part.

 

[Treedbear]

That. ^ No agency required.

Now that is odd! you see I'd say that learning and error correction strategies are most of what agency means. I'll give that error correction is non obvious, I'll lean on Clark again for an explanation:

http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~karl/Whatever next.pdf

but learning? Perhaps a quick account of what you think learning is, and what it is for, if you don't think it is all about tuning (at a subsymbolic level) and informing (at a symbolic level) agency?

I can't possibly delve into such an intensive article as the one you referenced. I did read the summary and it mentions error correction. It seems to suggest a mechanical view of brain function, which I would welcome. But good for you! Agency defined as what it basically is, i.e.; one which represents the function and purpose of various and several clients. The self is just such an entity. An agent of the various functional brain functions. And its purpose is to communicate information between those processes. But I think that's not what most people mean by agency in this discussion. They see the agent as an active administrator. The originator of ideas and motivations. Actually the self is an image. A characterization used as a reference. The decisive processes are all distributed. (imho, as always).

 

[ryan]

Finding neural correlates to the consciousness is very important and sought after in the science of consciousness, and probably the most important and sought after thing.

I hope you don't mind me snipping this single point to respond to. I think it's the key one but if you feel shortchanged, I'll return to the others later.

Here's my problem, and I think, the problem for science: There is a problem of other minds which hasn't, to my knowledge been resolved. I think this matters, conscious experience is a private experience that it is assumed that we all have. The problem is that we are all inferring that from a single case and as philosophers like Wittgenstein have pointed out, we really cannot even know that it is the same case across people as we, individually and collectively, have no criterion for judging how similar our experiences are, beyond the judgements we express in words. That's one reason why linguistic behaviourism isn't flat out ridiculous - we really don't know that others are conscious, just that we judge ourselves to be conscious, a judgement that people like Dennett assert is an indefeasible error such that judging ourselves, in language, to be conscious is all there is to consciousness, the position he holds in Consciousness Explained.

I mention all this just to really make it clear that the only example we have of putative mental lives is our own. Now, the next step concerns the methodology of science. At the heart of science are the axioms that all experiments have to be repeatable by anyone and objective. My individual conscious experience is not only not objective, it's not even intersubjectively verifiable, hell, it's barely subjective as what seems to me is indefeasible rather than factual. As for repeatable? my conscious experience isn't, nor is yours and the notion that we all have the same experience is an act of faith that doesn't bear up to even the most cursory of inspections.


I'm red green colourblind - I didn't even realise until I was seventeen and even then all I knew about is my discriminatory abilities, no one can know how much my experience varies, (See all of the 'inverted qualia' argument) just that there are some colour distinctions I can't make and some colours that I cannot distinguish well when superimposed. The point here is that no one knows I'm colourblind unless I tell them - I can use colour language better than most (I like being a psych test subject and my alma had a huge vision department - who never noticed I was colour blind while running experiments on qualia - I was a partial colour zombie and no one noticed - my heterophenomenology, aided and abetted by a degree of expertise and perfectly good hue and saturation detection meant that my few errors were outriders and not noticed. Yeah, I didn't let on, because I was blinding them as much as they were blinding me, so as to speak.

However, there's a remarkable postscript, because my color blindness isn't dependent on a lack of ability to discriminate, but in a processing issue in which my eye doesn't filter wavelength gradients properly. Last year I was given some glasses that literally cure my sort of color blindness by the simple expedient of blocking critical chunks of wavelength to allow my brain to process the overwhelming majority of the signal in a opto-neurotypical manner. As a result, I'm in the rare position to know that even if I'm still not seeing what the opto-neurotypical see I'm seeing the colour difference between twilight and midday with every berry on a holly bush (rather than being a vague shadow) picked out in psychedelic relief. Yet still, in ordinary communication you wouldn't notice the difference (and again, I repeat, that's merely discrimination, that is clearly different. No one can tell if my mental experience is the same, merely that I will use the word 'scarlet' under certain conditions, I, as Wittgenstein pointed out, learned the grammar of Scarlet, not the phenomenal and entirely personal reality. (notice how much metaphorical language I needed just to communicate the possibility of such a difference.

So consciousness isn't objective, it isn't reproducible and as for falsification and the null hypothesis, how exactly would you put forward a falsifiable account of your own, let alone another's private experience? Whenever someone tells me they are looking for correlation or more between the mental and the physical as an empirical project then all I think they need to have a think about the scope, limits and methodologies of science. If they want to say it's a metaphysical or philosophical project then I want to hear about the project in detail - it's easy to be right, you only have to be sufficiently vague, or anecdotal...

There's a faint hope we might be able to correlate the neural correlates of nociception and discrimination in as much as they are not mental events, but the raw feels of consciousness - science has no way of proving they exist, let alone correlating physical events and mental events. That's phenomenology, when it gets to intentions, you have a very different and even more perplexing problem, But that's enough about this, I have a very silly Christian to school on motor mechanics and evolution yet! (and it's bed time, my best mate is over from Magyaristan and I have to set up a bass guitar for him before I go to bed).

Careful not to get infatuated with older "teachings" like from Wittgenstein. Science as you know moves relatively fast and philosophy even makes progress every once in a while.

That said, I will respect everything from the past until "better" logic is applied.

If you are interested, you can critique a specific method from the NYU report I linked, here again http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/final_revised_proof.pdf . It applies a relatively new "method" called "signal detection theory".

Or you can critique the author's justification here (NCC = Neural Correlates of Consciousness),

"Can the phenomenal NCC be studied empirically?
Doubts about whether phenomenal consciousness
(and hence its neural basis, the Phenomenal NCC) can
be studied empirically are common (see also Box 2), and
often based on the idea that ultimately, introspective
reports, that is, reports about one’s conscious experience,
are the fundamental epistemological basis of theories of
consciousness, the ‘gold standard’. [7,41,42]. Reports are
not supposed to be infallible, but any discounting of
reports as reporting too much or too little, will supposedly
have to be based solely on other reports. Reports inevitably
reflect the Access NCC, not just the Phenomenal NCC:
when people tell you about their conscious states, you only
hear about the ones that have won the winner-take-all
competition. Hence we can only study ‘access to consciousness’
[7], that is, access to experiential content, not experiential
content itself. I do not agree with this methodological
view for several reasons.
First, observed electrons can provide evidence about
electrons that cannot in principle be observed, for
example electrons that are too distant in space and time
(e.g. outside our light cone) to be observed. Why should we
suppose matters are any different for consciousness?
Second, there is no gold standard of evidence, here or in
any area of science. ... "

Something to work with.

 

[ryan]

From past posts I have read of yours I know this about you which is why I was so annoyed when you said this, "and silly little insignificant things like quantum properties of matter can't possibly be involved."

That is mocking people who think it isn't involved in some way.

Oh, I had no idea. It seemed quite serious given the rest of your post.

 

[untermensche]

From past posts I have read of yours I know this about you which is why I was so annoyed when you said this, "and silly little insignificant things like quantum properties of matter can't possibly be involved."

That is mocking people who think it isn't involved in some way.

Oh, I had no idea. It seemed quite serious given the rest of your post.

Well. Now you know.

The evolving brain has no limits placed on it as to what properties of matter it can randomly encounter.

If a certain arrangement and activity by sheer chance utilizes some quantum property of matter and it proves to serve a survival advantage that arrangement and activity has a chance to persist.

 

[fromderinside]

When y'all find that entanglement gene group then I'll pay attention. However since sensory masking works I'm pretty sure you won't. Hell, we can't even perceptually untangle a bar from rotating through a window.

 

[DBT]

What you fail to add is the most important part....the blogger is talking about a paper by neuroscientist Peter Clarke with quotes and references. The blogger is not important. The blogger is irrelevant. The necessary information is provided in reference to the neuroscientist and his paper;

Here is the paper from the link in the blog page, the blog page, if you like, being merely a conduit to the article;


Neuroscience, quantum indeterminism and the Cartesian soul.
Clarke PG1.

Abstract
Quantum indeterminism is frequently invoked as a solution to the problem of how a disembodied soul might interact with the brain (as Descartes proposed), and is sometimes invoked in theories of libertarian free will even when they do not involve dualistic assumptions. Taking as example the Eccles-Beck model of interaction between self (or soul) and brain at the level of synaptic exocytosis, I here evaluate the plausibility of these approaches. I conclude that Heisenbergian uncertainty is too small to affect synaptic function, and that amplification by chaos or by other means does not provide a solution to this problem. Furthermore, even if Heisenbergian effects did modify brain functioning, the changes would be swamped by those due to thermal noise. Cells and neural circuits have powerful noise-resistance mechanisms, that are adequate protection against thermal noise and must therefore be more than sufficient to buffer against Heisenbergian effects. Other forms of quantum indeterminism must be considered, because these can be much greater than Heisenbergian uncertainty, but these have not so far been shown to play a role in the brain.

I see that this was written in 2013 and it mentions, "To date, there is no evidence that such quantum processes are involved in neuron-to-neuron communication or brain function."

But in 2014 evidence was found by Hameroff and Penrose and found and confirmed later again by a university in Japan in 2016.

And it was also written after Fisher's 2015 research article that suggests the theoretical possibility of quantum coherence using entangled Posener molecules.

No it wasn't. If you consider the problem of physics of scale you'd realize that the macro brain does not work according to quantum principles, wave collapse, scale, etc. The brain is a macro scale structure where the role neurons, support cells and connections, signals between cells, etc, determines function and output

As I've pointed out numerous times, all brains have the same underlying quantum substructure, cat brains, dog brains, mouse brains, horse brains, human brains and so on....all with their underlying quantum substructure, yet all producing sets of behaviour not according to their quantum substructures but their macro scale architecture, their size and wiring and the information they acquire through memory and learning, each according to species and range between individuals, some smarter, some not.

That is where quantum consciousness fails.

 

[DBT]

DNT, also read a newer article, titled,

"Quantum Information Processes in Protein Microtubules of Brain Neurons"

And says in the abstract,

"This orchestrated OR activity (‘Orch OR’) is taken to result in moments of conscious awareness and/or choice. We analyze Orch OR in light of advances and developments in quantum physics, computational neuroscience and quantum biology. Much attention is also devoted to the ‘beat frequencies’ of faster microtubule vibrations as a possible source of the observed electroencephalographic (‘EEG’) correlates of consciousness."

from https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-287-736-9_60

Microtubules are not the decision makers. Information input and processing in relation to whole brain architecture and condition determines the decision that is made in any given instance in time. Microtubules play a role in architecture, enabling processing but not being aware or able to make or veto decisions.

And you are still left with the problem that consciousness does not have access to the underlying mechanisms and activity that forms and generates it.

Consciousness is representation and report. The brain being the decision maker. Decision making is not free will.

 

[fromderinside]

So DBT. I see you are still trying to tell the unwashed that Willie will never be free. Every time you do, they post some more signs with the words "Free Willie", In their little tubule minds, whatever that is. They guess they've done good for the cause, showed the flag, made their point. And having done that we should just fade away, Because it is for the cause and the cause is good. Because the cause is Jesus-ah. Jesus-ah. I say Jesus-ah.

That last almost made me feel I was in a tent where mint julips were being served.

Oh well. Like kidney stones, this too shall pass. Maybe they are having the same problem of which Dawkins accused the short eartheres. They see a number with more than three zeros and they see a great deal of time. I mean a year goes through a whole cycle of weather. A few thousand of those and all is washed away. It couldn't have been more than 1500 years before writing was invented that the world began could it. Of course not.

But then, there's reality. Macro world events scale all the way down to ten to the minus eighth meters (0.00000001 meters) which as got to be close to the micro world because we can't see either one with our eyes. Its about twenty five to thirty more Aeros between the decimal and the smallest macro event to the scale of the micro event. Eyup 0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000001 meters is where the micro world plays. Not far from that one ten millionth of a meter mentioned above, right.

So we put the never learners away and get on with living. Nice try though.

 

[ryan]

I see that this was written in 2013 and it mentions, "To date, there is no evidence that such quantum processes are involved in neuron-to-neuron communication or brain function."

But in 2014 evidence was found by Hameroff and Penrose and found and confirmed later again by a university in Japan in 2016.

And it was also written after Fisher's 2015 research article that suggests the theoretical possibility of quantum coherence using entangled Posener molecules.

No it wasn't. If you consider the problem of physics of scale you'd realize that the macro brain does not work according to quantum principles, wave collapse, scale, etc. The brain is a macro scale structure where the role neurons, support cells and connections, signals between cells, etc, determines function and output

As I've pointed out numerous times, all brains have the same underlying quantum substructure, cat brains, dog brains, mouse brains, horse brains, human brains and so on....all with their underlying quantum substructure, yet all producing sets of behaviour not according to their quantum substructures but their macro scale architecture, their size and wiring and the information they acquire through memory and learning, each according to species and range between individuals, some smarter, some not.

That is where quantum consciousness fails.

It is absolutely imperative that you read about aboutness (phenomenal intentionality) if you don't already know about it (pardon the puns) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/ .

Somehow information is in a deeply entangled state with matter inside and outside of the brain (doesn't have to be QM entanglement, but it is QM entanglement). Individual minds not only mysteriously have a nonphysical unified notion of an outside world but can have it in a moment of physical isolation. What outside physical information can represent that it is indeed from the outside; that is in no way a classical property of matter.

Really try to think about how the brain "connects" with a word, for example, outside of the brain while knowing it is outside of the brain. Taking unification for granted, the brain should only know about a word one state at a time in a unified brain space/structure. But it does more, so we have intentionality. And what physical correlate would nicely explain and mirror these mental mechanics, one good guess, QM entanglement.

Microtubules are not the decision makers. Information input and processing in relation to whole brain architecture and condition determines the decision that is made in any given instance in time. Microtubules play a role in architecture, enabling processing but not being aware or able to make or veto decisions.

And you are still left with the problem that consciousness does not have access to the underlying mechanisms and activity that forms and generates it.

Consciousness is representation and report. The brain being the decision maker. Decision making is not free will.

Here's just a quick quote where the author of that last link I posted actually uses the term "choice".

"This orchestrated
OR activity (‘Orch OR’) is taken to result in moments
of conscious awareness and/or choice."

It shouldn't be too hard to believe that the observer, who is always in some kind of quantum superposition, has options, predictions, memories and other information about the outside and is also entangled into a process while being simultaneously aware of it. QM entanglement nicely explains the mechanics correlating to the binding problem and intentionalism.

 

[untermensche]

When y'all find that entanglement gene group then I'll pay attention. However since sensory masking works I'm pretty sure you won't. Hell, we can't even perceptually untangle a bar from rotating through a window.

When you have a working model for the production of consciousness I'll pay attention.

What exactly prevents an evolving brain from encountering and potentially incorporating quantum properties of matter in the production of consciousness?

Is there an "electricity gene" that produces the electrical properties of the brain?

 

[DBT]

It is absolutely imperative that you read about aboutness (phenomenal intentionality) if you don't already know about it (pardon the puns) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/ .

Somehow information is in a deeply entangled state with matter inside and outside of the brain (doesn't have to be QM entanglement, but it is QM entanglement). Individual minds not only mysteriously have a nonphysical unified notion of an outside world but can have it in a moment of physical isolation. What outside physical information can represent that it is indeed from the outside; that is in no way a classical property of matter.

Really try to think about how the brain "connects" with a word, for example, outside of the brain while knowing it is outside of the brain. Taking unification for granted, the brain should only know about a word one state at a time in a unified brain space/structure. But it does more, so we have intentionality. And what physical correlate would nicely explain and mirror these mental mechanics, one good guess, QM entanglement.

Microtubules are not the decision makers. Information input and processing in relation to whole brain architecture and condition determines the decision that is made in any given instance in time. Microtubules play a role in architecture, enabling processing but not being aware or able to make or veto decisions.

And you are still left with the problem that consciousness does not have access to the underlying mechanisms and activity that forms and generates it.

Consciousness is representation and report. The brain being the decision maker. Decision making is not free will.

Here's just a quick quote where the author of that last link I posted actually uses the term "choice".

"This orchestrated
OR activity (‘Orch OR’) is taken to result in moments
of conscious awareness and/or choice."

It shouldn't be too hard to believe that the observer, who is always in some kind of quantum superposition, has options, predictions, memories and other information about the outside and is also entangled into a process while being simultaneously aware of it. QM entanglement nicely explains the mechanics correlating to the binding problem and intentionalism.

Intentionality doesn't help you, Ryan. You are attempting to circumvent what I said about brain architecture, function and agency.

You have not addressed what I said. Here it is again.

all brains have the same underlying quantum substructure, cat brains, dog brains, mouse brains, horse brains, human brains and so on....all with their underlying quantum substructure, yet all producing sets of behaviour, not according to their quantum substructures which is common to all, but their macro scale architecture, their size and wiring and the information they acquire through memory and learning, each according to species and range between individuals, some smarter, some not.

 

[ryan]

It is absolutely imperative that you read about aboutness (phenomenal intentionality) if you don't already know about it (pardon the puns) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/ .

Somehow information is in a deeply entangled state with matter inside and outside of the brain (doesn't have to be QM entanglement, but it is QM entanglement). Individual minds not only mysteriously have a nonphysical unified notion of an outside world but can have it in a moment of physical isolation. What outside physical information can represent that it is indeed from the outside; that is in no way a classical property of matter.

Really try to think about how the brain "connects" with a word, for example, outside of the brain while knowing it is outside of the brain. Taking unification for granted, the brain should only know about a word one state at a time in a unified brain space/structure. But it does more, so we have intentionality. And what physical correlate would nicely explain and mirror these mental mechanics, one good guess, QM entanglement.

Microtubules are not the decision makers. Information input and processing in relation to whole brain architecture and condition determines the decision that is made in any given instance in time. Microtubules play a role in architecture, enabling processing but not being aware or able to make or veto decisions.

And you are still left with the problem that consciousness does not have access to the underlying mechanisms and activity that forms and generates it.

Consciousness is representation and report. The brain being the decision maker. Decision making is not free will.

Here's just a quick quote where the author of that last link I posted actually uses the term "choice".

"This orchestrated
OR activity (‘Orch OR’) is taken to result in moments
of conscious awareness and/or choice."

It shouldn't be too hard to believe that the observer, who is always in some kind of quantum superposition, has options, predictions, memories and other information about the outside and is also entangled into a process while being simultaneously aware of it. QM entanglement nicely explains the mechanics correlating to the binding problem and intentionalism.

Intentionality doesn't help you, Ryan. You are attempting to circumvent what I said about brain architecture, function and agency.

You have not addressed what I said. Here it is again.

all brains have the same underlying quantum substructure, cat brains, dog brains, mouse brains, horse brains, human brains and so on....all with their underlying quantum substructure, yet all producing sets of behaviour, not according to their quantum substructures which is common to all, but their macro scale architecture, their size and wiring and the information they acquire through memory and learning, each according to species and range between individuals, some smarter, some not.

I somehow mixed up the replies. Switch my replies, and they should make more sense. Sorry.