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There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

The inhabitants of a Determined World may not know that their thoughts and actions are determined, they may be under the impression of being free agents, that they have regulative control, which is not only a mistake but an illusion based on their narrow perspective of the World...their experience of the World being based on sensory experience;

illusion
ɪˈluːʒ(ə)n/
noun
an instance of a wrong or misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience.

So, to be quite clear, are you saying that all references to freedom (e.g. "freedom of the press", "freedom of movement ", "freedom of information" etc, etc..) are instances of "wrong or misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience"?

No, not all. Common references using the words 'free' or freedom can relate to relative conditions within the system. Examples I gave; the dog has slipped its chain, the dog is no longer tied up, the dog is free of its chain, etc.

Which says nothing about the ultimate condition of the dog, what brought it to the state of being tied up or how it came to be untied, perhaps slipping its collar, what goes through its head or why or what drives its behaviour. It's just a reference to chain on or chain off within the changing conditions of a determined system.

The participants know little or nothing about the causality of their thoughts and actions. They only express what they experience.

And I'm out of time.
 
We are now discussing whether INdeterminism is compatable with free will? Of course! That just means if we live in a world where not all events are caused, there would be room for free will.

As I've opined before, I'm not entirely convinced that we either need indeterminism to exercise what we often call our 'free will' or that it's useful. Imo, thinking that we do need it could just be a hangover reaction to the idea that everything is annoyingly predetermined.

What we arguably need is a system that can make decisions with some flexibility and useful, reliable information. So, to analogise, when we drive a car up to a road junction, we don't need (or arguably even want) the steering to fail, even for an instant. We just need the car (let's assume a driverless car) to choose. Indeterminism (or randomness) would arguably screw things up.

To err on the side of caution, I'm only going to say that I think the role of indeterminism might be overstated. :)
 
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So, to be quite clear, are you saying that all references to freedom (e.g. "freedom of the press", "freedom of movement ", "freedom of information" etc, etc..) are instances of "wrong or misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience"?

No, not all.
This is really quite frustrating. You said:


If the universe is deterministic, all references to freedom are an illusion.
So when you said "all" you didn't mean "all".

So my last 5 posts on this particular claim of yours were a complete waste of time.
 

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:

1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will
This is a succinct, logical refutation of libertarian (incompatibilist) free will. I have no problem with it.

You say "Compatibalism is a failed argument.". Can you produce a similar refutation of compatibilist free will?
 
I know this is going to sound controversial to you AntiChris, but imo you can't refute compatibilist free will any more than you can refute the claim that god is just the physical universe, which is also completely valid.

Iow, to me it's about what is arguably the wrong term.

I don't mind if you disagree, because it would only be a disagreement about a preferred label.
 
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I know this is going to sound controversial to you AntiChris, but imo you can't refute compatibilist free will
I agree.

'Compatibilist free will' is simply a label used in moral discourse. A compatibilist might say that an agent must have acted of their own free will (e.g. without external coercion) if we wish to assign moral responsibility.

It's not something that can be proven 'wrong' - you either accept its use or reject it.

However I'm as sure as I can be (which to be fair is not very sure) that DBT believes that compatibilism can be proven wrong
 
I know this is going to sound controversial to you AntiChris, but imo you can't refute compatibilist free will
I agree.

'Compatibilist free will' is simply a label used in moral discourse. A compatibilist might say that an agent must have acted of their own free will (e.g. without external coercion) if we wish to assign moral responsibility.

It's not something that can be proven 'wrong' - you either accept its use or reject it.

However I'm as sure as I can be (which to be fair is not very sure) that DBT believes that compatibilism can be proven wrong

I won't get into your debate with DBT (any more than I have done). :)

Suffice to say that I think there are ways in which you are both right, on the general issue.

On this:

"A compatibilist might say that an agent must have acted of their own free will (e.g. without external coercion) if we wish to assign moral responsibility."


Yes, that is what a compatibilist might say. Obviously, and I doubt you'll disagree, it (the bit in brackets) is an incomplete justification.

There are (pragmatic) arguments to be made for continuing with it nonetheless (even though it's not always applied I have to say, thinking for example of partial exculpability due to mental deficiency) but 'contuinuing with it' does not of course mean preserving it in aspic. It's already changing and has been, and I think future science, of more than one kind, is likely to continue to undermine the basis for it (and it's not hard to find legal articles online where this is being grappled with). Which I hope will be a 'good' thing (by good I mean that it will increase, for example, the overall level of happiness, of humans at least).

I don't want to sound like that's my mission. I'm mostly selfishly interested for personal and interpersonal reasons. Self-understanding or relationship guidance, if you like. Enlightenment. Wisdom. How better to navigate the mortal coil I didn't ask to be put on. Karma even, at a pinch, with caveats. :)
 
I know this is going to sound controversial to you AntiChris, but imo you can't refute compatibilist free will
I agree.

'Compatibilist free will' is simply a label used in moral discourse. A compatibilist might say that an agent must have acted of their own free will (e.g. without external coercion) if we wish to assign moral responsibility.

It's not something that can be proven 'wrong' - you either accept its use or reject it.

However I'm as sure as I can be (which to be fair is not very sure) that DBT believes that compatibilism can be proven wrong
Suffice to say that I think there are ways in which you are both right, on the general issue.
In what way do you think I'm wrong and DBT is right?

Please bear in mind I'm not arguing for compatibilism - I couldn't care less if anyone is unpersuaded by the concept. All I'm arguing is that compatibilism presents no logical error and is not "a failed argument" (nearly 60% of professional philosophers surveyed in 2009 "Accept or lean toward" compatibilism - this does not make it 'correct' but it certainly isn't a failed argument.)
 
In what way do you think I'm wrong and DBT is right?


Other than re-posting this, I'd rather not get into it:

....The principle on which compatibilism rests .........

Yes, but a leg isn't 'really' free to move either, so all I'm saying is that the word 'free' in free will can be validly used, in a provisional, limited or colloquial way, imo.

I can still say, if I want to, which I sometimes do, that at the end of the day it's the wrong word (for reasons given) and you can say that it cannot (reasonably) be used. Your saying that isn't arbitrary or irrational, nor is it a fallacy, but it is just your reasoned view, and strictly-speaking wrong in the absolute (non-subjective) sense, since the word free can (reasonably) be used, via different reasoning. Your view (and perhaps mine) might be special pleading in an informal sort of way. Or at least let me say I get that general objection. I think we should call them our reasoned opinions regarding labelling, not an absolute decree.
 
This is really quite frustrating. You said:


If the universe is deterministic, all references to freedom are an illusion.
So when you said "all" you didn't mean "all".

So my last 5 posts on this particular claim of yours were a complete waste of time.

Nothing that needs to be frustrating. I have pointed out that within a determined world any references to freedom relate to changing conditions within the determined system but not to the ultimate state off the system, which does not entail deviation or regulation in t
he sense that a person can do otherwise in any given instance in time.

Think of it as characters in Movie going about their business, talking about doing this or that, talking about freedom, but all of their actions are fixed, they have no freedom. Their actions can be replayed countless times and each and every time its exactly the same outcome.

What then is the nature of notion of ultimate freedom within a determined system?
 
This is really quite frustrating. You said:


If the universe is deterministic, all references to freedom are an illusion.
So when you said "all" you didn't mean "all".

So my last 5 posts on this particular claim of yours were a complete waste of time.

Nothing that needs to be frustrating.
You must be kidding!

You originally said that all references to freedom were an illusion (post #819) and, when I pressed you on this, without any apology you change your mind and casually say you didn't mean "all" (post #861).

You're wasting my time.
 
We are now discussing whether INdeterminism is compatable with free will? Of course! That just means if we live in a world where not all events are caused, there would be room for free will.

As I've opined before, I'm not entirely convinced that we either need indeterminism to exercise what we often call our 'free will' or that it's useful. Imo, thinking that we do need it could just be a hangover reaction to the idea that everything is annoyingly predetermined.

What we arguably need is a system that can make decisions with some flexibility and useful, reliable information. So, to analogise, when we drive a car up to a road junction, we don't need (or arguably even want) the steering to fail, even for an instant. We just need the car (let's assume a driverless car) to choose. Indeterminism (or randomness) would arguably screw things up.

To err on the side of caution, I'm only going to say that I think the role of indeterminism might be overstated. :)
Whether it's necessary is different from whether it's compatible.
 
We are now discussing whether INdeterminism is compatable with free will? Of course! That just means if we live in a world where not all events are caused, there would be room for free will.

As I've opined before, I'm not entirely convinced that we either need indeterminism to exercise what we often call our 'free will' or that it's useful. Imo, thinking that we do need it could just be a hangover reaction to the idea that everything is annoyingly predetermined.

What we arguably need is a system that can make decisions with some flexibility and useful, reliable information. So, to analogise, when we drive a car up to a road junction, we don't need (or arguably even want) the steering to fail, even for an instant. We just need the car (let's assume a driverless car) to choose. Indeterminism (or randomness) would arguably screw things up.

To err on the side of caution, I'm only going to say that I think the role of indeterminism might be overstated. :)
Whether it's necessary is different from whether it's compatible.


Ok.


Is it compatible? I don't actually know.

I think I could try to make a case that it's incompatible, as I've already alluded to, by saying it could frustrate or diminish our agency capacities.


I wouldn't bet on being right. I take on board Emily's comment about how AI scientists are, she says, finding that introducing randomness is improving decision-making abilities in artificial systems, and though I'm nowhere near up to speed on AI, it seems at least plausible and I have no good reason to doubt it.
 
Is it compatible? I don't actually know.
As far as I know, that's not a common question since it's not been presented as controversial. The question that's normally asked is if determinism is compatible with free will. The basic idea of determinism is simply that all (not some but all) events are determined. There's more to the story, but since you're not looking for an answer to the common question but instead whether indeterminsim is compatible with free will, we need only look to see if both can coexist. Indeterminism isn't to say no events are caused--just that not all events are.

I don't see an inconsistency with being in a world where not all evensts are caused and free will, so I would think they are compatible. That's not to say I believe we are in such a world; hence, I'm not espousing a personal view about what it is that I hold true but rather merely expounding upon the implications the way I see it.
 

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:

1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will
This is a succinct, logical refutation of libertarian (incompatibilist) free will. I have no problem with it.

You say "Compatibalism is a failed argument.". Can you produce a similar refutation of compatibilist free will?

Here it is in a nutshell.....I have posted this article in a previous discussion with you....it saves me the time and effort of repeating the problems of having it both ways. You can't have it both ways. Determinism is not compatible with freedom, not compatible with 'could have done otherwise under the same circumstances, not compatible with regulative control contra the determined course of events;

Quote;
''Still others, most notably David Hume and some prominent contemporary social psychologists, believe they can have it both ways: accept determinism while also postulating a type of non-libertarian, straight-jacketed “free” will that still enables moral judgment [I put the “free” in quotation marks because the semantics are drained from the word].

This is the compatibilist view of free will (see here (link is external) for an excellent article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). How is this supposed to work? First, we have to accept the view that prior events have caused the person’s current desire to do X. Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms. Exceptions occur, but are swiftly dismissed as errors of anthropomorphism.

Some aspiring compatibilists maintain that only humans are judged morally because only they could have acted differently. Those who try this argument must realize that they are not compatibilists at all; they are libertarians. The acceptance of determinism is a defining element of compatibilism. It forbids us to say that evil-doers could have done good if only they wanted to. Well yes, if they wanted to, but they were determined to not want to.''
 
Nothing that needs to be frustrating.
You must be kidding!

You originally said that all references to freedom were an illusion (post #819) and, when I pressed you on this, without any apology you change your mind and casually say you didn't mean "all" (post #861).

You're wasting my time.

You are wasting your own time. Your time is not mine to waste. You cannot see the overall picture because you only appear to see a bit of information here and a bit of information there, apparently never being able to see how it fits into big picture, a determined world with inhabitants that, like you, cannot see the big picture, cannot see that it is the world that is shaping/determining their thoughts and actions and that their references to freedom are related to changing relationships within their determined world - the prisoner is locked up, then the prisoner is freed from his cell, etc - and not to something that has an actual possibility of being different. The prisoner is locked in his cell because the events of the world and his own mental condition (poor decision making) put him there...he is free from his cell for the same reason, the progress of causality entails changing conditions, so with changing circumstances the day of his release rolls around. He is now free. But not free from his own flawed mind or the relentless pressure of a vast world that never ceases to act upon him.

How the words are used in reference to changing circumstances, free lunch, free travel, free from work, etc, may have no bearing on the nature of the world at large.

I had not changed my mind, I was simply trying to convey the distinction between phenomena within the system and the system as a whole.

That is the point at which you miss the mark.
 
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Nothing that needs to be frustrating.
You must be kidding!

You originally said that all references to freedom were an illusion (post #819) and, when I pressed you on this, without any apology you change your mind and casually say you didn't mean "all" (post #861).

You're wasting my time.

You are not making any sense.

Here is what I said in post #819;
''You are getting pedantic. It's just shorthand for ''it is the brain alone that is responsible for generating behaviour'' What your examples suggest is will as the generator or agent of behaviour, which is not supported by evidence.

You just need to know how to search and what to search for. That may be difficult if you aren't familiar with the subject matter, as appears to be the case;


The Agent Brain
''Many neural structures have been associated to specific attributes of agency experience or to specific steps of the process that leads to sense agency. The collection of neural structures that are thought to mediate agency-related processes is rather wide and includes: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the cingulate cortex (CC), the supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas (SMA and pre-SMA), the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and its inferior regions and the cerebellum (Gehring et al., 1990; Lee et al., 1999; Blakemore et al., 2001; Chaminade and Decety, 2002; Cunnington et al., 2002; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; Farrer et al., 2003; Lau et al., 2004, 2006; Synofzik et al., 2008a; Balconi and Crivelli, 2009, 2010a,b; Balconi and Scioli, 2012; Balconi et al., 2017). The plurality of those structures and their distribution over the whole brain (see Figure ​Figure1)1) likely mirrors the complexity of the phenomenon and the different methodological and experimental approaches devised to study its facets (for a review see also David, 2010). Again, they are due to the contribution of multiple mechanisms in the coupling of behavior with mental states and sensory effects. Those mechanisms—and the structures that subserve them—can be traced back to overarching functions: monitoring of sensorimotor congruence and multimodal integration, intentionalization (i.e., elaboration and implementation of intentions), action monitoring and ownership/agency attribution.


Stimulating The Agent Brain: Non-invasive Brain Stimulation Evidences

''Neuroimaging and electrophysiological methods can be both enlisted among the correlational techniques (Walsh and Cowey, 2000), which allow for qualifying and quantifying ongoing neural activity during implicit or explicit tasks to compare it with co-occurrent subjective experience, cognitive performances, or behavior. By superimposing and integrating those series of data, it is possible to draw conclusions on anatomical-functional correlates of investigated functions and processes by means of association. Conversely, non-invasive stimulation methods can be enlisted among interference or causal techniques, which grant the advantage of drawing conclusion on neural causation and on the effective role of neural structures in supporting or modulating a specific function or process (Woods et al., 2016). Indeed, NIBS can be used to perturb the ongoing activity of a target structure during implicit or explicit tasks and then observe the consequences of such perturbation on behavior and/or neural activity (e.g., by means of EEG). It is worth noting that conclusions that can be drawn thanks to NIBS studies also show fewer potential biases than those deriving from clinical lesion studies (Walsh and Cowey, 2000). Relevant for the present discussion, NIBS techniques then present notably greater cognitive resolution—defined as the ability to tell something new about brain processes and to answer a wide range of questions on cognitive functioning and its physiological correlates (Walsh and Pascual-Leone, 2003)—with respect to other investigation tools.''
__________________________________________

You shouldn't try to simplify it by extending what are references to specific states within a system to the whole universe. If the universe is deterministic, all references to freedom are an illusion.

We are talking about the condition of a specific attribute or feature of brain cognition, will, what does will do? What is the role of will. Well, it doesn't make decisions, it doesn't acquire and process information, it does think or initiate actions. The brain does all that Conscious will merely serves as a conscious prompt to act, a sense of urgency, a felt need to take action...will does not decide to do this, it is just a part of conscious response as represented by the brain in response to a given situation.

So, the Agent Brain...brain agency if you like. One and the same thing. ''

And here is what I said in post #861

''No, not all. Common references using the words 'free' or freedom can relate to relative conditions within the system. Examples I gave; the dog has slipped its chain, the dog is no longer tied up, the dog is free of its chain, etc.

Which says nothing about the ultimate condition of the dog, what brought it to the state of being tied up or how it came to be untied, perhaps slipping its collar, what goes through its head or why or what drives its behaviour. It's just a reference to chain on or chain off within the changing conditions of a determined system.

The participants know little or nothing about the causality of their thoughts and actions. They only express what they experience.''


So, for the life of me, I can't see where I have supposed to have contradicted myself.

Everything I have said relates to two perspectives. One from the world as a whole, a deterministic world and what it is doing. And secondly, from the perspective of the inhabitants of a Determined World, how they perceive events and how they communicate what they see....without being aware of the big picture, the process that brought them to wherever they are.

I thought I had made this distinction quite clear.
 
Is it compatible? I don't actually know.
As far as I know, that's not a common question since it's not been presented as controversial. The question that's normally asked is if determinism is compatible with free will. The basic idea of determinism is simply that all (not some but all) events are determined. There's more to the story, but since you're not looking for an answer to the common question but instead whether indeterminsim is compatible with free will, we need only look to see if both can coexist. Indeterminism isn't to say no events are caused--just that not all events are.

I don't see an inconsistency with being in a world where not all evensts are caused and free will, so I would think they are compatible. That's not to say I believe we are in such a world; hence, I'm not espousing a personal view about what it is that I hold true but rather merely expounding upon the implications the way I see it.

Yes, it's not a question I've heard before.

I suppose we should try to define 'compatible'. The first dictionary I found says "(of two things) able to exist or occur together without problems or conflict."

Temporarily using that definition (while being aware of the limitations of dictionary definitions) determinism would not be compatible with freedom (or free will), because it conflicts with it, to at least some extent. Equally, I think, randomness would not be compatible either.

However, 'without conflict' is a very high bar. Possibly no two things would in fact get over it, except perhaps two identical things (A is fully compatible with A, with no conflict at all whatsoever for example). I suspect that in the real world, we could use 'compatible' to be 'in some or many ways compatible' (not unlike a happily married couple). And so the question in both cases might be 'how compatible?' (or 'in what ways compatible and in what ways not?') since it's likely to be a question of degree and complexity, like most things are. So the way you put it, 'can they coexist?' seems more useful than, 'can they coexist without conflict?'.
 
So, for the life of me, I can't see where I have supposed to have contradicted myself.
Ok. I'll spell it out for you (again).

This is the sequence of events.

Your first claim:

If the universe is deterministic, all references to freedom are an illusion.

This is confirmation that you were indeed talking about freedom in general and not just freedom of the will:

Your original claim, and my response, was talking about "all references to freedom" but your response talks only about free will.

Clearly the word "freedom" is used in vastly more contexts than just freedom of the will. I'd assumed you were making a claim about the more general sense of freedom. Did you in fact only intend 'freedom of the will' when you said "freedom" in your original claim [in bold]?

No, I meant the status of freedom in general within a Determined World.

Here you clarify what you mean by illusion:
illusion
ɪˈluːʒ(ə)n/
noun
an instance of a wrong or misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience.

So as a final check I asked again (because if taken at face value this would be a remarkable claim):

So, to be quite clear, are you saying that all references to freedom (e.g. "freedom of the press", "freedom of movement ", "freedom of information" etc, etc..) are instances of "wrong or misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience"?

And Your response:

No, not all.
In case you still can't see the contradiction, you've gone from "all references to freedom...." to "no, not all".

This might seem petty but it's just another example of how frustratingly difficult it is to get any consistent clarity of thought from you.
 
Ok. I'll spell it out for you (again).

This is the sequence of events.

Your first claim:



This is confirmation that you were indeed talking about freedom in general and not just freedom of the will:

Your original claim, and my response, was talking about "all references to freedom" but your response talks only about free will.

Clearly the word "freedom" is used in vastly more contexts than just freedom of the will. I'd assumed you were making a claim about the more general sense of freedom. Did you in fact only intend 'freedom of the will' when you said "freedom" in your original claim [in bold]?

No, I meant the status of freedom in general within a Determined World.

Here you clarify what you mean by illusion:
illusion
ɪˈluːʒ(ə)n/
noun
an instance of a wrong or misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience.

So as a final check I asked again (because if taken at face value this would be a remarkable claim):

So, to be quite clear, are you saying that all references to freedom (e.g. "freedom of the press", "freedom of movement ", "freedom of information" etc, etc..) are instances of "wrong or misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience"?

And Your response:

No, not all.
In case you still can't see the contradiction, you've gone from "all references to freedom...." to "no, not all".

This might seem petty but it's just another example of how frustratingly difficult it is to get any consistent clarity of thought from you.

No, no, no, you miss the context, meaning and significance. When I said ''No, not all'' I was referring to the relative phenomena of 'the dog is chained, the dog is free of its chain'', etc. The dog is indeed free of its chain, the reference to freedom, the dog has no chain to restrain it, is correct.

But as I have repeatedly said and described, there are two conditions at play, temporal phenomena; chain on or chain off (the dog is free of its restraint) and the deterministic course of events of the world at large which determines when, how where the dog is chained and how, when and where the dog is free of its constraint.

As the dog has no option but to be either chained or not - the state of the dog at any given instance in time - which includes everything else, everything being determined in such a world, hence no alternatives at any given instance in time, hence nothing is ever free despite what limited perceptions of events may appear to tell us (illusion)

The references to freedom that we use in our daily conversations only relate to unfolding states, chain on, chain off, within the deterministic system and not to their determined nature.

In other words, we may use the word 'free' in a conditional sense but ultimately freedom is an illusion within a determined world.

You need to stop taking brief remark at face value and either ask for clarification or try to put them into context.

After all, I have repeatedly referred to two considerations, temporal phenomena as experienced by the inhabitants of a determined world, ''I am 'free' to take a walk' and the determined world at large where my so called 'free to walk' is determined by the causal progress of Determinism.

Now, I have said this repeatedly, so please do not misinterpret in a way that suits your agenda but misrepresents my position.

To confirm what I say here, you can check posts #851 #861 #870.....just to name a few.
 
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