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There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.
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DBT
Contributor
You gave up long ago. You gave up integrity. You ignore (or fail to grasp)whatever does not suit your agenda and focus on whatever you feel you can interpret in a way that supports your needs, creating a contradiction between my remarks in your own mind while ignoring all attempts at explaining what I meant.
Throwing up your hands in a show of mock outrage whenever an explanation is given. Which makes it a display of poor integrity.
Again, here is what I said about references to freedom within a determined system;
Post #840
''These references are common usage based on limited observations the world and its objects and events, which does not take into account whether the World is Determined or not.....in other words, surface appearance. ''
Now if you refuse to accept explanations of what was meant, nothing can be done. You see what you want to see and disregard the rest.
However, I'll try one more example of the dichotomy, that I am talking about and trying to convey to The AntChris (who apparently cannot see it), that lies between perceptions and references to freedom by the subjects of determinism and the actual state of determinism;
In 1931, Einstein, in response to questions about belief in free will, responded with the following comparison of the will of the moon:
“If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord…. So would a being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man’s illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.”
The AntiChris
Senior Member
DBT
Contributor
Just observations based on the behaviour being displayed. A reasonable response would look different. It would have a different tone altogether.
The AntiChris
Senior Member
DBT still seems convinced, or wants to create the impression, that he's arguing with a free will advocate
Just to make things absolutely clear for any lurkers, I do not accept libertarian free will (it simply doesn't make sense). So this isn't an argument between a believer in libertarian free will and a denier of libertarian free will.
This is a dispute about certain aspects of the reasoning DBT uses to reach his conclusion.
fromderinside
Mazzie Daius
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I have no problems with one believing one is free to choose. Its irresistible to do so. Don't believe that? Try doing otherwise. Finding that to be true has nothing to do with the content of one's belief.
fast
Contributor
We could look at incompatibility as exclusionary. For example, a small fish can fit in a small fish bowl (since the size of the bowl can accommodate a fish of small size), but a large shark cannot fit in a small fish bowl. The small size of the bowl excludes a shark of a large size fitting. The two would be incompatible as the bowl's size excludes the physical possibility of the large shark fitting in it.
The question (the original controversial question) of the compatibility of free will and determinism can be answered by examining whether the presence of one excludes the presence of the other. Is there a physical impossibility of living in world where both all events are determined and we have free will?
"Derermined" can be inadvertently conflated with "predetermined." Just because there is a cause for an event to occur, that doesn't mean the cause necessitates events. For instance, my bumping into you may cause you to fall, but my bumping into you doesn't guarantee a future where you fall, so while an event may be determined, that's not to imply that the event was predetermined in the sense that an event that does occur implies that an event must occur.
The flaw that gives rise to thinking that free will is an illusion lies in thinking that events that do happen must happen (as if to say all events are necessary events with no room for contingency). If we proceed on the faulty assumption that events are necessary, then the acts of making choices are claimed to be illusory since the so-called choices made are purportedly necessitated.
Without the flaw in thinking, the question becomes more focused. If events are contingent, they are still caused/determined, just not necessitated/predetermined. That being said, if we act of our own free will (do as we please without compulsion (constraint to or restraint from)), is that compatible in a world where events are caused (but not necessitated)? Seems compatible to me.
ruby sparks
Contributor
In your example of me bumping you, you have only mentioned one cause. The sum of all the causes is what could be argued to make determinism incompatible, because they would make your fall necessary and guaranteed (unless randomness).
DBT
Contributor
I make no such assumption. I have asked you to provide something of your own several times over a number of threads and you have always been consistently evasive.
Your tactics have been consistent, just as described in my complaints about your manner of response.
I respond according to what you do say...and then the response is not related to what I say. When I give explanations of what I mean, they are ignored in favour of a snippet taken out of context and made to appear as a contradiction.
I doubt if anyone has made that assumption....your position has never been clear.
That is your claim....a claim you maintain regardless of any explanation to the contrary. Most of which you ignore in favour of brief remarks that taken out of context are used to assert a contradiction. Which you maintain regardless of what is said.
The prime example of that being the distinction made between the perspective of inhabitants of a determined system and their references to freedom and the perspective of the system as a whole, which means that perceptions of freedom are an illusion born of limited information and references to freedom are relative states within the system that have no possibility of being otherwise; chain on, chain off, etc, a progression of causal events..
The AntiChris
Senior Member
That's right. I dispute your claim that using the word 'free' to describe 'will' constitutes some kind of logical error. Your explanations thus far make no sense.
You could settle this now by producing a logical proof of your claim (i.e. a set of premises and valid conclusions). You know how to make this kind of argument (you did so for your agument against libertarian free will in your post #821)
fast
Contributor
When you switch from an event having a cause to speaking of the sum of all causes, it sounds like a corresponding switch between identifying necessary causes of an event to identifying sufficient causes of an event has flipped; are you not therefore in light of this also switching from determinism to predeterminism?
ruby sparks
Contributor
I'm not sure I would often say an event has a cause. Or I might say it colloquially (focusing mainly on one cause) or in particularly simple situations (such as one snooker ball striking another) but if I were being accurate I'd just have to say that an 'event was caused' since there will likely be multiple causes. That's determinism. Determinism doesn't mean just one cause. So, no I don't think talking about the sum of causes necessarily involves switching to predeterminism.
Not that I'm sure what the difference is to you. To me, if there were no randomness, determinism would effectively mean predeterminism. I allow for the possibility of there being a combo of determinism and random, so I tend not to speak of predeterminism. But it's only because of the possibility of randomness.
DBT
Contributor
To be specific, it makes no sense to you because despite numerous attempts at explaining the distinction between the perception of inhabitants and nature of the world itself, which their limited perception cannot encompass, you do not appear to understand the distinction that reduces references to freedom a matter of a progression of determined events rather than any sort of actual freedom, ie, the possibility of being able to have chose otherwise in any given instance of a decision being made.
The syllogism I posted relates to 'regulative control' - which may mean the ability to have chosen otherwise under the same circumstances as it relates to the common perception of free will as the ability to select options from a set of realizable alternatives.
Plus there are various versions of libertarian free will.
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will
My argument being that it the state and condition of the brain at any given moment in time that determines the decision that is made in any given moment in time, and that this has nothing to do with will or so called freedom, that decisions determined by brain state and condition can be described as free will decisions. They are simply decisions.
On the neurology of morals
[/B] ''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''
Based on the example given above;
1) A person may be self aware and intelligent and have the perception and the experience of making conscious choices, decisions that are based on his or her beliefs and desires.
2) A person may believe that he or she can consciously control their own behaviour.
3) Based on the evidence, a person's outward behaviour is a reflection of the state and condition of their neural architecture, not their conscious will .
4)The person is not in conscious control of his or her behaviour
5) It is the condition of the neural structures of the brain that determines human decision making and conscious behaviour.
6)The person's perception and experience of conscious control - free will - is an illusion.
DBT
Contributor
More;
''Consciousness is a complex process — too complex for anyone, most likely ever, to fully understand. “When you multiply 3 times 6 in your head,” Wegner writes, “the answer just pops into mind without any indication of how you did that" (67). Neither science nor any other institution or domain can claim to fully understand the workings of the human mind (or the mind of any other species for that matter).
We nevertheless feel that we understand consciousness at an intuitive level. This intuition arises in part from the correspondence between thought and action: the thought that we will soon act does regularly precede the act itself. And yet it is important to remember that correlation does not imply causality; just because X regularly precedes Y, even if X always precedes Y, that does not necessarily prove that a causal relation exists between the two. Wegner gives the following example: “Although day always precedes night… it is a mistake to say that day causes night, because of course both are caused in this sequence by the rotation of the earth in the presence of the sun.” (66)
And indeed, upon closer analysis, there are instances in which thought does not precede action, where the correspondence between thought and action breaks down. For example, hallucinations, dissociative identity disorder, crowd behavior, imaginary companions, spirit possession, hypnosis, sleep, etc. A good deal of Wegner’s book is devoted to the analysis of these neurological anomalies, which unquestionably do complicate the picture.
With respect to free will, the question, then, is not “what comes first, the thought or the action,” but “is the fact that thoughts (often) precede action proof that they are its true cause?”
The most direct approach to the question is through biology. Nervous impulses cascade through our brains and bodies causing actions. Do our thoughts exist independently of these nervous cascades? Or does prior nervous activity precede thought and thus cause it? This simple dichotomy is fundamental. For free will to exist, it ostensibly must be the case that thoughts function independently of biological nervous activity. Free will advocates thus posit an agent — the “self,” or the “I” — that exists independent of the laws of physics, that participates in the world without the world being able to participate in it.
Determinists have no need to invoke this trans material agency. The perception that thought precedes action is, they argue, no proof that thought actually causes action. Instead, determinists argue that prior nervous activity determines all nervous activity, including conscious thoughts. Consciousness emerges from nervous activity, not the other way around.''
''Consciousness is a complex process — too complex for anyone, most likely ever, to fully understand. “When you multiply 3 times 6 in your head,” Wegner writes, “the answer just pops into mind without any indication of how you did that" (67). Neither science nor any other institution or domain can claim to fully understand the workings of the human mind (or the mind of any other species for that matter).
We nevertheless feel that we understand consciousness at an intuitive level. This intuition arises in part from the correspondence between thought and action: the thought that we will soon act does regularly precede the act itself. And yet it is important to remember that correlation does not imply causality; just because X regularly precedes Y, even if X always precedes Y, that does not necessarily prove that a causal relation exists between the two. Wegner gives the following example: “Although day always precedes night… it is a mistake to say that day causes night, because of course both are caused in this sequence by the rotation of the earth in the presence of the sun.” (66)
And indeed, upon closer analysis, there are instances in which thought does not precede action, where the correspondence between thought and action breaks down. For example, hallucinations, dissociative identity disorder, crowd behavior, imaginary companions, spirit possession, hypnosis, sleep, etc. A good deal of Wegner’s book is devoted to the analysis of these neurological anomalies, which unquestionably do complicate the picture.
With respect to free will, the question, then, is not “what comes first, the thought or the action,” but “is the fact that thoughts (often) precede action proof that they are its true cause?”
The most direct approach to the question is through biology. Nervous impulses cascade through our brains and bodies causing actions. Do our thoughts exist independently of these nervous cascades? Or does prior nervous activity precede thought and thus cause it? This simple dichotomy is fundamental. For free will to exist, it ostensibly must be the case that thoughts function independently of biological nervous activity. Free will advocates thus posit an agent — the “self,” or the “I” — that exists independent of the laws of physics, that participates in the world without the world being able to participate in it.
Determinists have no need to invoke this trans material agency. The perception that thought precedes action is, they argue, no proof that thought actually causes action. Instead, determinists argue that prior nervous activity determines all nervous activity, including conscious thoughts. Consciousness emerges from nervous activity, not the other way around.''
The AntiChris
Senior Member
DBT
Contributor
Well, that's puzzling. Very strange. I have never made the claim that the word 'will' cannot be used to describe 'will' You are either not reading what I say, or you only see what you want to see.
Are you skimming? Perhaps looking for key words while brushing over everything else?
My claim includes word usage. I have provided working definitions of both ''free'' and ''will' in this thread.
The AntiChris
Senior Member
I mistyped. Corrected now.
Here's a hint: If you're going to provide a proof that the word 'free' cannot logically be used to describe 'will', then your conclusion must include the words "Therefore 'free' cannot be used to describe 'will'".
It's becoming clear that you're using the colloquial sense of "cannot logically" (i.e. 'it doesn't make sense to me') rather than the strict philosophical sense (i.e. it leads to a contradiction). This is confusing on a philosophy forum.
DBT
Contributor
A contradiction in logic means a contradiction between claims, principles and ideas.
Conscious will; conscious urge or impulse or desire to think and act.
Free;
a. Not affected or restricted by a given condition or circumstance: a healthy animal, free of disease; free from need.
b. Not subject to a given condition; exempt: income that is free of all taxes.
5. Not subject to external restraint: Unconstrained; unconfined:
*free; unrestrained; having a scope not restricted by qualification <a free variable>
7 a: not obstructed, restricted, or impeded <free to leave> b: not being used or occupied <waved with his free hand> c: not hampered or restricted in its normal operation
8 a: not fastened <the free end of the rope> b: not confined to a particular position or place.
1) Abnormal architecture and brain chemistry can radically alter consciousness and thought in ways that are not willed. Consciousness and thought are expressions of the state of the system. Neural architecture and its electrochemical activity is a deterministic system (with perhaps some degree of random quantum interference).
2)lesions and chemical changes alter perception, personality and conscious thought and will.
3)A failure of memory ( connectivity), means that this information is not consciously available, eg, you can't remember where you left your keys.
4)A progressive and permanent loss of memory results in a progressive breakdown of consciousness and consequently, conscious will.
5)Conscious will ( the perception of conscious decision making) is related to physical and information condition of a brain.
6)'Conscious will does not itself think or decide, it has no autonomy. Will, being determined by brain state and condition, is a reflection of the physical/informational condition of a brain from moment to moment.
7)Conscious will does not choose to lose memory, make irrational decisions, illusions, errors, glitches, etc, any more than it chooses rational thought or adaptive behaviour. These being reflections of the physical condition of a brain, not will, whether conscious or unconscious.
8) the term ''free'' - as defined above - does not represent the non chosen physical informational state of a brain: its structures and connections and electrochemical activity.
9)The word 'free' - as defined above- is in contradiction to the nature, role and function of 'will' - as defined - will being shaped and formed by brain state and condition not being free to do otherwise - free to do otherwise being the essence of freedom, to do this rather than that. Fixed by circumstances/ causality any given instance in time is not an example of freedom, as defined.
DBT
Contributor
More than that. You have proven what I say. That it is the condition and state of a brain in any given instance in time that is being expressed as output, what you see, think, feel and do.
You mistyped because that was how your brain represented and rendered the words in your mind in that instance in time. With the passage of time, new information altered your mind bringing with it the realization that you had made an error. Your will was not free to do otherwise in that instance in time, or any other given instance in time.