Thoughts about the Consciousness

[bilby]

Our thoughts are just what the interactions between neurons and their structures happen to be doing, architecture (wiring), sensory inputs and memory. Anything else implies a seperate and distinct agency which orchestrates thought independantly of the information processing activity of neural structures.

That is the objective explanation; I have no problem with it. But what about subjectivity? If there is no subjectivity, then shouldn't all experiences be experienced and not just one? Surely there are other experiences happening now in the same frame of reference. Objectively speaking, there is only one experience happening right now; how can this be?

In what sense are experiences in other people's brains in my frame of reference? That's nonsensical.

 

[ryan]

As wacky as my ideas seem even I hate the idea of irreducibility. Given enough information, we should always be able to predict any emergent property. With this kind of emergence, something like a mind could never be predicted. That just does not happen. We may not be able to predict every emergent property, but we can always look back and see that we could have. I would rather believe that a quanta of mind exists with particles.

I don't think that this is irreducible at all. We just don't (yet) know all of the details.

There are lots of hints about where consciousness comes from; Anaesthesia provides a lot of clues, as it allows us to reversibly switch off consciousness by simply adding a few (often rather simple) molecules to the cell membranes of neurons. A drop of ether, or of ethanol eliminates consciousness, and consciousness returns when the ether or ethanol is purged from the cerebra-spinal fluid.

Because this is such a semantic nightmare, I am not sure what kind of conscious mind you are talking about. There seems to be 3 common positions on all of this. One, the mind is exactly what certain processes in the brain are; in other words, they are both completely interchangeable. Two, the mind is an emergent property extrinsic (for example the weight of an object is extrinsic because it depends on external factors, but its mass would be an intrinsic property because mass in inherent to an object) to the brain (this second option is allowed in physicalism because it is completely dependent on the brain). Three, the mind is similar to an emergent property, has its own distinct and collective nature and is only dependent on the brain in certain ways.

I am obviously 3. DBT seems to be 1 (If you are reading this DBT, correct me if I am wrong). But you seem somewhere between one and two. Or is the conscious property more of an intrinsic property (like the mass of an object)? Or do you believe something else?

 

[ryan]

That is the objective explanation; I have no problem with it. But what about subjectivity? If there is no subjectivity, then shouldn't all experiences be experienced and not just one? Surely there are other experiences happening now in the same frame of reference. Objectively speaking, there is only one experience happening right now; how can this be?

In what sense are experiences in other people's brains in my frame of reference? That's nonsensical.

If someone is a rest relative to you, they are in you frame of reference.

 

[bilby]

In what sense are experiences in other people's brains in my frame of reference? That's nonsensical.

If someone is a rest relative to you, they are in you frame of reference.

Oh, I see. In that case, your thinking that the frame of reference is relevant is nonsensical.

 

[Mindlab Expositor]

Food for thought:

Emergence—dynamic and static. It is similar to subjectivity and objectivity respectively.

We live in an static, objective world. However, due to the interrelatedness of all things and their pseudo-isolated experiences, there is a subjective experience from the vantage point of each object. I say "pseudo" because because the apparent reality is that all things are inseparable from one another. Can absolute nothingness exist? This is like asking whether something can exist and not exist at the same time.

Metadata—information about information. Requires self-awareness to look back at the self in contemplation.

This is similar to two mirrors facing one another. You know. The fractal that appears; showing more images of yourself than you can count. Infinity. In a very real, metaphorical sense, our minds are those mirrors. We've most likely been reflecting (get it?) the entire time we have been alive. Maybe longer. I don't know. We might find, one day, that we ourselves are the Cosmos individually (subjective, dynamic experience) and collectively with All things (objective, static experience).

We can't escape the the Cosmos because it is part of us and we are part of the it—apparently inseparable while we live.

I don't believe we live in harmony with our environment when we insist on 100% objectivity at the expense of subjectivity; likewise when we insist on subjectivity.

Without the static nature of the Cosmos, there could be no science. How could we repeat an experiment?

Without the dynamic nature of the Cosmos, there is no art. Our hearts die. No music. No stories to help us reflect. What need would we have to interpret our experiences without a subjective experience?

All this relates to the chicken or the egg question. Well, what if the answer is both from eternity past? The one becomes many, yet the many have always been one—changing and changing, yet one static Cosmos. Is the Cosmos one single organism?

Is the Cosmos reflecting? Well, we are. And what are we if all things above are true?

If all this accords with reality, there is no wonder why we should be clueless about ourselves and where it all came from. The Cosmos would have nothing else to which it could compare itself. It would be left to form its own story in a completely closed system. If the Cosmos is all there is or was, how could it distinguish itself by what is already itself? That would like putting a white dot on white paper.

 

[DBT]

I don't think that this is irreducible at all. We just don't (yet) know all of the details.

There are lots of hints about where consciousness comes from; Anaesthesia provides a lot of clues, as it allows us to reversibly switch off consciousness by simply adding a few (often rather simple) molecules to the cell membranes of neurons. A drop of ether, or of ethanol eliminates consciousness, and consciousness returns when the ether or ethanol is purged from the cerebra-spinal fluid.

Because this is such a semantic nightmare, I am not sure what kind of conscious mind you are talking about. There seems to be 3 common positions on all of this. One, the mind is exactly what certain processes in the brain are; in other words, they are both completely interchangeable. Two, the mind is an emergent property extrinsic (for example the weight of an object is extrinsic because it depends on external factors, but its mass would be an intrinsic property because mass in inherent to an object) to the brain (this second option is allowed in physicalism because it is completely dependent on the brain). Three, the mind is similar to an emergent property, has its own distinct and collective nature and is only dependent on the brain in certain ways.

I am obviously 3. DBT seems to be 1 (If you are reading this DBT, correct me if I am wrong). But you seem somewhere between one and two. Or is the conscious property more of an intrinsic property (like the mass of an object)? Or do you believe something else?

Based on the available evidence, the subjective experience of conscious sensations is an aspect of neuronal activity.

It is not known how a brain forms subjective conscious experience, but that it does is demonstrated by chemical changes within the process that alter experience in specific ways, effecting sensory experience, vision, etc, and thought processes.

If consciousness was a non material element, you would not expect it to be altered by physical changes in the brain.

Some just say that the brain is a receiver, and as the receiver is effected, so is 'reception' in terms of conscious experience. But there is no evidence for non material mind, or how non material could form a mind, nor how non material could interact with material if by some miracle non material had formed mind.

The idea seems to be a dead end.

 

[Malintent]

Er...

Seriously?

If consciousness and experiences are characteristics of brains, why would they NOT be localised to the brain that generates them?

DBT says that there is no 'you', just a brain. That is purely objective. If true, then how are experiences isolated from other brains? Why aren't all experiences being experienced at the same time in the same frame of reference? There is something very different about the experience that is going on in Edmonton Canada in the home of the person they call Ryan than anyone else.

The problem seems to be that your side of the argument jumps from subjectivity to objectivity when it is convenient for your argument (I put "seems" in bold italic because I am not sure what exactly is the discrepancy). If you are, you probably don't realize that you're doing this.

How are YOU able to distinguish what other people experience versus what you experience? Heck.. how do you even DETECT what other people experience at all?

 

[ryan]

Because this is such a semantic nightmare, I am not sure what kind of conscious mind you are talking about. There seems to be 3 common positions on all of this. One, the mind is exactly what certain processes in the brain are; in other words, they are both completely interchangeable. Two, the mind is an emergent property extrinsic (for example the weight of an object is extrinsic because it depends on external factors, but its mass would be an intrinsic property because mass in inherent to an object) to the brain (this second option is allowed in physicalism because it is completely dependent on the brain). Three, the mind is similar to an emergent property, has its own distinct and collective nature and is only dependent on the brain in certain ways.

I am obviously 3. DBT seems to be 1 (If you are reading this DBT, correct me if I am wrong). But you seem somewhere between one and two. Or is the conscious property more of an intrinsic property (like the mass of an object)? Or do you believe something else?

Based on the available evidence, the subjective experience of conscious sensations is an aspect of neuronal activity.

It is not known how a brain forms subjective conscious experience, but that it does is demonstrated by chemical changes within the process that alter experience in specific ways, effecting sensory experience, vision, etc, and thought processes.

If consciousness was a non material element, you would not expect it to be altered by physical changes in the brain.

Some just say that the brain is a receiver, and as the receiver is effected, so is 'reception' in terms of conscious experience. But there is no evidence for non material mind, or how non material could form a mind, nor how non material could interact with material if by some miracle non material had formed mind.

The idea seems to be a dead end.

I admit that my thought experiments have failed, but I think I finally thought of one that will work. Here is why I believe that subjectivity is nonphysical.

Imagine aliens made a perfect clone of you right down to the particle at a moment while you were sleeping. Then they swap you with the clone that they made. Let's say for a full second after the switch, both of your bodies are identical.

For the second after the switch, assume that your clone is exactly the same as it would have been if the aliens didn't make the switch.

So here is where empiricism fails and ultimately science does too. Physically, there will be no difference between the clones for that second after the switch. Except the reality is that your mind is in the alien ship and your clone is in your bed.

 

[ryan]

DBT says that there is no 'you', just a brain. That is purely objective. If true, then how are experiences isolated from other brains? Why aren't all experiences being experienced at the same time in the same frame of reference? There is something very different about the experience that is going on in Edmonton Canada in the home of the person they call Ryan than anyone else.

The problem seems to be that your side of the argument jumps from subjectivity to objectivity when it is convenient for your argument (I put "seems" in bold italic because I am not sure what exactly is the discrepancy). If you are, you probably don't realize that you're doing this.

How are YOU able to distinguish what other people experience versus what you experience? Heck.. how do you even DETECT what other people experience at all?

My point is that we can't. Notice that there is a "Ryan experiencing ..." in your question. That should not make sense at all in a purely objective reality. Physicalism is about an indistinguishable difference between two realities with the exact same physical properties. My points use the same universe that is somehow also different in ways that we cannot detect, specifically the mental aspects.

 

[Juma]

Based on the available evidence, the subjective experience of conscious sensations is an aspect of neuronal activity.

It is not known how a brain forms subjective conscious experience, but that it does is demonstrated by chemical changes within the process that alter experience in specific ways, effecting sensory experience, vision, etc, and thought processes.

If consciousness was a non material element, you would not expect it to be altered by physical changes in the brain.

Some just say that the brain is a receiver, and as the receiver is effected, so is 'reception' in terms of conscious experience. But there is no evidence for non material mind, or how non material could form a mind, nor how non material could interact with material if by some miracle non material had formed mind.

The idea seems to be a dead end.

I admit that my thought experiments have failed, but I think I finally thought of one that will work. Here is why I believe that subjectivity is nonphysical.

Imagine aliens made a perfect clone of you right down to the particle at a moment while you were sleeping. Then they swap you with the clone that they made. Let's say for a full second after the switch, both of your bodies are identical.

For the second after the switch, assume that your clone is exactly the same as it would have been if the aliens didn't make the switch.

So here is where empiricism fails and ultimately science does too. Physically, there will be no difference between the clones for that second after the switch. Except the reality is that your mind is in the alien ship and your clone is in your bed.

Nah. If the switch was exact then I'm still in the bed and I'm also in the ship.
The two "I" will then drift because of having different experiences.

 

[DBT]

The latter example is still an example of brain generated experience....that there are two or more sets of identical experiences being generated by clones doesn't alter the nature of the source of experience....

 

[ryan]

I admit that my thought experiments have failed, but I think I finally thought of one that will work. Here is why I believe that subjectivity is nonphysical.

Imagine aliens made a perfect clone of you right down to the particle at a moment while you were sleeping. Then they swap you with the clone that they made. Let's say for a full second after the switch, both of your bodies are identical.

For the second after the switch, assume that your clone is exactly the same as it would have been if the aliens didn't make the switch.

So here is where empiricism fails and ultimately science does too. Physically, there will be no difference between the clones for that second after the switch. Except the reality is that your mind is in the alien ship and your clone is in your bed.

Nah. If the switch was exact then I'm still in the bed and I'm also in the ship.
The two "I" will then drift because of having different experiences.

No, you would be in the ship because the break in symmetry will happen to you in the ship. You don't get to be in some kind of superposition just because everything is the same.

 

[ryan]

The latter example is still an example of brain generated experience....that there are two or more sets of identical experiences being generated by clones doesn't alter the nature of the source of experience....

It can still be generated by the brain. I still believe that the mind is mostly dependent on the brain.

The point is that there can be two physically identical systems that are different in another way.

 

[Juma]

Nah. If the switch was exact then I'm still in the bed and I'm also in the ship.
The two "I" will then drift because of having different experiences.

No, you would be in the ship because the break in symmetry will happen to you in the ship. You don't get to be in some kind of superposition just because everything is the same.

Superposition? You must have misunderstood. If an exact copy of A is made then there will be two bodies, each of them having the exact same experience of being A. Both of them will experience being the "I" of A.

 

[ryan]

No, you would be in the ship because the break in symmetry will happen to you in the ship. You don't get to be in some kind of superposition just because everything is the same.

Superposition? You must have misunderstood. If an exact copy of A is made then there will be two bodies, each of them having the exact same experience of being A. Both of them will experience being the "I" of A.

But the body is physically traced to the alien ship. There is nothing about him in his house.

 

[Juma]

Superposition? You must have misunderstood. If an exact copy of A is made then there will be two bodies, each of them having the exact same experience of being A. Both of them will experience being the "I" of A.

But the body is physically traced to the alien ship. There is nothing about him in his house.

There is an exact copy in the house.

Can you get into your head that if you make a exact copy that copy will experience an exact copy of the "I"? That copy will also think it is A since it has the exact same memories!

 

[ryan]

But the body is physically traced to the alien ship. There is nothing about him in his house.

There is an exact copy in the house.

Can you get into your head that if you make a exact copy that copy will experience an exact copy of the "I"? That copy will also think it is A since it has the exact same memories!

But there is also an objective truth about where the original body is. The alien knows that the original body is on the ship. The original person is conscious on the ship, not in his house.

 

[Juma]

There is an exact copy in the house.

Can you get into your head that if you make a exact copy that copy will experience an exact copy of the "I"? That copy will also think it is A since it has the exact same memories!

But there is also an objective truth about where the original body is. The alien knows that the original body is on the ship. The original person is conscious on the ship, not in his house.

Your question was where A:s mind is. Since there now are two copies of A there are also two copies of A:s mind: one in the spaceship and one in the house.

There are no magical connection or superposition. There are now two very similar persons with a lot of common memories.

 

[ryan]

But there is also an objective truth about where the original body is. The alien knows that the original body is on the ship. The original person is conscious on the ship, not in his house.

Your question was where A:s mind is. Since there now are two copies of A there are also two copies of A:s mind: one in the spaceship and one in the house.

There are two minds; why would it become one mind?

 

[Juma]

Your question was where A:s mind is. Since there now are two copies of A there are also two copies of A:s mind: one in the spaceship and one in the house.

There are two minds; why would it become one mind?

???? Yes there are two minds. I have not said that there is only one mind.