However, the evidence on whether compensation is related to future firm performance is decidedly mixed. For example, Abowd (1990), Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum (1992), and Tai (2004) find a positive relation between pay and future stock returns. Other papers document an equally strong negative relation between executive pay and future returns (see for example, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999, or Brick, Palmon, and Wald, 2006). The former set of papers attributes the positive relation between executive compensation and future performance to incentive alignment between the shareholders and the executives, while the latter set of papers attributes the negative relation between compensation and firm performance to agency issues.
Both sets of papers typically assume that managers are rational economic actors who understand the incentives provided by the board and act accordingly, either to maximize shareholder value or their own private benefits. During the past decade however, an increasing number of papers have argued that managers are prone to behavioral biases that have real effects on firm actions and performance. One particular behavioral bias is overconfidence.
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In this paper, we bring these two streams together. We hypothesize that overconfident CEOs are more likely to accept particular types of pay contracts, those that involve long-term commitments to increasing the value of the firm, and are also significantly more likely to subsequently underperform, creating a negative relationship between pay and future stock performance. In a broad cross-section of Execucomp S&P1500 firms over the 1994-2015 period, we analyze the relation between CEO compensation and future firm performance, using details of the pay contracts, proxies for CEO overconfidence, investment, merger and acquisition data, and controls for measures of potential firm agency problems and show that a negative relation holds in the cross-section of firms over this time period.
We first show that CEO compensation is correlated with variables associated with overconfidence. Using two measures of “excess” incentive compensation (“peer-adjusted incentive compensation”, computed after adjusting pay for industry and size controls and “modeladjusted incentive compensation,” estimated using a model that controls for standard economic determinants of pay), we find that pay is positively correlated with a popular measure of overconfidence, the proportion of unexercised in-the-money options to total compensation, a measure similar to that used in Malmendier and Tate (2005). Managers in the top pay deciles typically exhibit a significantly greater level of overconfidence than do managers in the lower deciles. Further, consistent with the characteristics of overconfident managers in Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013), high paid CEOs, relative to lower paid CEOs, invest more, engage in more mergers, and use more debt.