Understanding Consciousness: Awareness vs. Attention

[untermensche]

I can stop and start that movement on command.

I can make it rotate one way then the other on command.

The command is not an illusion.

Whatever you feel able to do, 'your' brain is doing it, the brain is generating your conscious experience in response to the stimuli/information it receives from the senses. All fine while the brain is healthy and functional but falls apart when normal function is in decline. You are what 'your' brain is doing.

The brain is not giving the command. "I" am.

"I", the thing that commands, am not a brain. "I", thing that commands, am not made of cells. "I", the thing that commands, have no visible structure.

And yes "I" lose control over the brain when the brain is damaged. Like the driver loses control when a tire goes flat.

 

[DBT]

The command is certainly indefeasibly how it seems to you. However, it's causal relation to all the processing going on in the brain rather suggests that it is. We might not be able to track mental states, but we certainly can track contentful states and the fact is that one defining feature of mental states is their aboutness - about content. Track the content and how it is processes and you are on top of the easy problem of consciousness and the easy problem does rather constrain the hard problem, because mental states cannot be in advance of the content that they represent.

Unless, of course, the central processing strategy of the brain is error correction and rather more of the processing going on in the brain is top down, and testing preexisting models of the world.

The fundamental function of the brain appears to be to acquire information from the senses, construct a 'mental model' of this information, what we call consciousness, and respond to it.

In relation to the optical illusion, the brain acquires information that can be interpreted in several ways, which presents a degree of ambiguity,
so the brain responds by switching perspectives, exploring possibilities, trying to make sense of the image being presented which is essentially a visual paradox.

Blind people have no such experience, they cannot be visually attentive, being blind, hence having no capacity of attention for visual cues.

There focus of attention and their awareness (mental but non visual) being related to their functioning senses, hearing, touch, etc...

 

[untermensche]

I can stop and start that movement on command.

I can make it rotate one way then the other on command.

The command is not an illusion.

The command is certainly indefeasibly how it seems to you. However, it's causal relation to all the processing going on in the brain rather suggests that it is. We might not be able to track mental states, but we certainly can track contentful states and the fact is that one defining feature of mental states is their aboutness - about content. Track the content and how it is processes and you are on top of the easy problem of consciousness and the easy problem does rather constrain the hard problem, because mental states cannot be in advance of the content that they represent.

Unless, of course, the central processing strategy of the brain is error correction and rather more of the processing going on in the brain is top down, and testing preexisting models of the world.

You have no idea how any brain activity is related to the command.

You do not have any clue what is giving the command or how it gives it.

All we know for certain is I can give a command with something and I can change the direction of movement.

I can directly do something at my choosing.

To say it is not my choosing would actually take an understanding of what "I", the thing that commands, is.

 

[DBT]

I can stop and start that movement on command.

I can make it rotate one way then the other on command.

The command is not an illusion.

Whatever you feel able to do, 'your' brain is doing it, the brain is generating your conscious experience in response to the stimuli/information it receives from the senses. All fine while the brain is healthy and functional but falls apart when normal function is in decline. You are what 'your' brain is doing.

The brain is not giving the command. "I" am.

"I", the thing that commands, am not a brain. "I", thing that commands, am not made of cells. "I", the thing that commands, have no visible structure.

And yes "I" lose control over the brain when the brain is damaged. Like the driver loses control when a tire goes flat.

There is no autonomous 'you' that 'loses control of the brain' The evidence does not support your interpretation

 

[untermensche]

The fundamental function of the brain appears to be to acquire information from the senses, construct a 'mental model' of this information, what we call consciousness, and respond to it.

The brain functions to create consciousness and to give consciousness experiences.

The brain services consciousness on a steady basis. It supplies consciousness with information so that consciousness can make decisions.

There is no other reason to have a consciousness and supply it with information.

If the brain is doing everything it has no need of a consciousness and no need to supply it with information. It has the information already.

- - - Updated - - -

The brain is not giving the command. "I" am.

"I", the thing that commands, am not a brain. "I", thing that commands, am not made of cells. "I", the thing that commands, have no visible structure.

And yes "I" lose control over the brain when the brain is damaged. Like the driver loses control when a tire goes flat.

There is no autonomous 'you' that 'loses control of the brain' The evidence does not support your interpretation

There is an autonomous "I".

It writes all my stuff.

 

[DBT]

There is an autonomous "I".

It writes all my stuff.

Not without the underlying architecture and its activity...which it is certainly not independent from, therefore what you call 'I' is not autonomous.

 

[untermensche]

There is an autonomous "I".

It writes all my stuff.

Not without the underlying architecture and its activity...which it is certainly not independent from, therefore what you call 'I' is not autonomous.

Knowing only the necessary conditions for phenomena to arise does not tell you anything about what that phenomena is capable of doing.

You have to actually know what the phenomena is and it's relationship with the brain to say what it can do to the brain.

You need a working testable model to say anything about natural phenomena.

In the absence of a model such claims are worthless.

But we know for certain that if we want to command that picture to rotate one way and then the other we can do it.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Clearly, we have to be aware of the picture, of the whole picture, for the brain to work out any interpretative representation.
EB

View attachment 14138

Reality disagrees. Again.

Again?

Then think again what that sentence means.

Then, just look, again, at the picture you posted.

See?

No?

Really!?

You do have a problem.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

How is it possible to be conscious without being aware? How is it possible to be aware without being conscious? We cannot be aware of anything when unconscious. We may be unaware of many things when conscious...but, necessarily, aware of something at least.

Consciousness is a broad term referring to a collection of attributes, features and abilities, awareness being an inseparable aspect of Consciousness/being conscious.

I know that that what I say is partly a problem of semantics.

While consciousness is very often defined by calling on awareness, awareness is usually not defined by calling on consciousness but instead on knowledge and information.

Consciousness has a broader meaning than awareness.

And, typically, the way consciousness is discussed here, it is about what consciousness is or its nature. Nobody is ever debating the nature of awareness.

Typically, we'll have no problem attributing awareness to animals, even small creatures. It goes without saying.

Attributing consciousness to animals, on the other hand, is much more controversial and, basically, we usually accept that we don't know if animals possess consciousness at all.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

Clearly, we have to be aware of the picture, of the whole picture, for the brain to work out any interpretative representation.
EB

View attachment 14138

Reality disagrees. Again.

Again?

Then think again what that sentence means.

Then, just look, again, at the picture you posted.

See?

No?

Really!?

You do have a problem.
EB

I give a visual counterexample, you give me rhetorical questions and insults. I see very clearly indeed.

Oh, and do I need to repost that declaration about animal consciousness by a significant chunk of the world's experts on the subject?

You keep saying things that are egregiously wrong and I'll keep pointing that out.

Keep digging.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I give a visual counterexample, you give me rhetorical questions and insults. I see very clearly indeed.

Not true. I suggested one simple way to move out of the hole you dug for yourself. But you seem to prefer ignoring this bit.

So, I repeat, think again what the sentence meant.

Clearly, if you don't try you'll stay at the bottom of this lovely hole you have all for yourself.

Oh, and do I need to repost that declaration about animal consciousness by a significant chunk of the world's experts on the subject?

Whenever you want to make suggestions that other people said something wrong, you'd need to quote the offensive pronouncement in question first so we know what you're talking about.

It's a question first of courtesy and second of intellectual honesty.

You should try that, it works.

You keep saying things that are egregiously wrong and I'll keep pointing that out.

Again, please provide relevant quotes and we'll see if we can have a conversation.

Keep digging.

No. I can't compete. You're much better at it.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

Not true. I suggested one simple way to move out of the hole you dug for yourself. But you seem to prefer ignoring this bit.

So, I repeat, think again what the sentence meant.

Clearly, if you don't try you'll stay at the bottom of this lovely hole you have all for yourself.



Whenever you want to make suggestions that other people said something wrong, you'd need to quote the offensive pronouncement in question first so we know what you're talking about.

It's a question first of courtesy and second of intellectual honesty.

You should try that, it works.

You keep saying things that are egregiously wrong and I'll keep pointing that out.

Again, please provide relevant quotes and we'll see if we can have a conversation.

Keep digging.

No. I can't compete. You're much better at it.
EB

I'm afraid that repeating back the charge laid at your own door isn't a terribly effective rhetorical device. However, I asked if I needed to repost the declaration. Apparently I do. As you said:

Attributing consciousness to animals, on the other hand, is much more controversial and, basically, we usually accept that we don't know if animals possess consciousness at all.

Certainly isn't something that 'we' accept, for those of us qualified to hold an opinion on the question.

http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf

Your peer group may differ.

Meanwhile, feel free to explain what is interesting about the image I posted and only then try to explain why it isn't a rebuttal of the silly claim that:

Clearly, we have to be aware of the picture, of the whole picture, for the brain to work out any interpretative representation.

Or just carry on with the slippery ad hominems while trying to lecture me about intellectual honesty and courtesy. Situational irony would seem more appropriate, at least you'd have plenty of examples to hand.

 

[Speakpigeon]

However, I asked if I needed to repost the declaration. Apparently I do. As you said:

Attributing consciousness to animals, on the other hand, is much more controversial and, basically, we usually accept that we don't know if animals possess consciousness at all.

Certainly isn't something that 'we' accept, for those of us qualified to hold an opinion on the question.

http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf

Your peer group may differ.

Sorry, but however much I personally sympathise with this "prominent international group of cognitive neuroscientists, neuropharmacologists, neurophysiologists, neuroanatomists and computational neuroscientists", I still don't see how this makes what I said false. I'd quite prepared to discuss this point with these people.

So, can you explain yourself?

Meanwhile, feel free to explain what is interesting about the image I posted and only then try to explain why it isn't a rebuttal of the silly claim that:

Clearly, we have to be aware of the picture, of the whole picture, for the brain to work out any interpretative representation.

I suggested one easy way to move out of the hole you've dug for yourself. But you still seem to prefer staying there.

Still, I can repeat: think again what this sentence means.

It's not really difficult. Just try it.

Or, just stay at the bottom of this lonely hole you have made for yourself, if that's what you prefer.

Or just carry on with the slippery ad hominems while trying to lecture me about intellectual honesty and courtesy. Situational irony would seem more appropriate, at least you'd have plenty of examples to hand.

Still, that's much, much better. You've condescended to exhibit relevant quotes.

See, you can learn.

But you're not quite there yet. I sense some reluctance there.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

Sorry, but however much I personally sympathise with this "prominent international group of cognitive neuroscientists, neuropharmacologists, neurophysiologists, neuroanatomists and computational neuroscientists", I still don't see how this makes what I said false. I'd quite prepared to discuss this point with these people.

So, can you explain yourself?

I can see that this must be confusing. When you assert that:

Attributing consciousness to animals, on the other hand, is much more controversial and, basically, we usually accept that we don't know if animals possess consciousness at all.

While a bloody great chunk of the world's experts in this field have all signed a declaration stating that we do know that animals possess consciousness and went into some detail about precisely why, then the one thing it isn't is controversial.

Most people would, at this point, concede the point. You apparently want to argue the point with them. At this point I can only assume that the 'We' is the Royal 'we, because it isn't much of a plural. As such, I have to ask, are you bald?
(A joke that will fall on deaf ears I suspect.)

Meanwhile, feel free to explain what is interesting about the image I posted and only then try to explain why it isn't a rebuttal of the silly claim that:

Clearly, we have to be aware of the picture, of the whole picture, for the brain to work out any interpretative representation.

I suggested one easy way to move out of the hole you've dug for yourself. But you still seem to prefer staying there.

Actually, I'd rather you explain precisely how I'm in a hole, rather than not responding to the content. As I said before, you can start by explaining precisely what is interesting about the picture I posted, a task you have signally failed to undertake. Sneering in advance of having demonstrated you even grasp what the objection is, is probably a little premature.

Still, I can repeat: think again what this sentence means.

It's not really difficult. Just try it.

How about how you explain why it doesn't mean that one has to be aware of the picture, of the whole picture, for the brain to work out any interpretative representation. Again. that's a minor task you seem to have overlooked.

Or, just stay at the bottom of this lonely hole you have made for yourself, if that's what you prefer.

You did get the point I made about repeating other people's devices not really working? Well outside of the Simpsons anyway.

 

[DBT]

How is it possible to be conscious without being aware? How is it possible to be aware without being conscious? We cannot be aware of anything when unconscious. We may be unaware of many things when conscious...but, necessarily, aware of something at least.

Consciousness is a broad term referring to a collection of attributes, features and abilities, awareness being an inseparable aspect of Consciousness/being conscious.

I know that that what I say is partly a problem of semantics.

While consciousness is very often defined by calling on awareness, awareness is usually not defined by calling on consciousness but instead on knowledge and information.

Consciousness is a broad term that includes all of its attributes and features, sight, sound, touch, smell, thought, feelings, emotions, etc....so consciousness does call on these things, it is composed of these things.

Consciousness has a broader meaning than awareness.

Yes, but inseparable from its attributes and features, sight for example must necessarily entail being aware of what is being seen....if you hear sounds, you are aware of the sounds you hear.

And, typically, the way consciousness is discussed here, it is about what consciousness is or its nature. Nobody is ever debating the nature of awareness.

Awareness cannot be separated from consciousness...someone who is blind cannot be visually aware of the surroundings, but be aware of where they are in terms of sounds, smells, air pressure and so on

Typically, we'll have no problem attributing awareness to animals, even small creatures. It goes without saying.

Attributing consciousness to animals, on the other hand, is much more controversial and, basically, we usually accept that we don't know if animals possess consciousness at all.
EB

Perhaps you mean 'self awareness?' - the issue is not that animals with sufficiently complex brains are not aware of their environment or that they are conscious, but whether they are self aware.

Consciousness, as a broad term representing a collection of attributes, sight, sound, smell, etc, need not include self awareness.


What do we mean by "conscious" and "aware"?

Abstract

''The concepts of consciousness and awareness are multifaceted, and steeped in cultural and intellectual history. This paper explores their complexities by way of a series of contrasts: (1) states of consciousness, such as wakefulness and sleep are contrasted with awareness, a term that picks out the contents of consciousness: these range across all our psychological capacities; the scientific background of the two concepts is briefly outlined; (2) consciousness is contrasted to self-consciousness, itself a complex term embracing self-detection, self-monitoring, self-recognition, theory of mind and self-knowledge; (3) "narrow" and "broad" senses of consciousness are contrasted, the former requiring mature human awareness capable of guiding action and self-report, the latter involving the much broader capacity to acquire and exploit knowledge; (4) an "inner" conception of consciousness, by which awareness is essentially private and beyond the reach of scientific scrutiny, is contrasted with an "outer" conception which allows that consciousness is intrinsically linked with capacities for intelligent behaviour; (5) finally "easy" and "hard" questions of consciousness are distinguished, the former involving the underlying neurobiology of wakefulness and awareness, the latter the allegedly more mysterious process by which biological processes generate experience: Whether this final distinction is valid is a focus of current debate. Varied interests converge on the study of consciousness from the sciences and the humanities, creating scope for interdisciplinary misunderstandings, but also for a fruitful dialogue. Health professionals treating disorders of consciousness should be aware both of its scientific complexities and of its broad cultural background, which influences the public understanding of these conditions.


Dictionary of problem words and expressions

aware, conscious

''Aware implies knowing something either by perception or through information: "The lecturer was aware that he had lost his audience." Conscious has much the same meaning but is more often applied to a physical situation: "The injured player was conscious but could not stand." In informal use, the words are employed interchangeably.
aware, conscious

 

[Kharakov]

What is paying attention to different pieces of this chaotic hodgepodge of awareness roiling around in the brain? What continuously changes the contrast between foreground and background?

I am not entirely sure that our brains present an entirely accurate representation of the world (including our bodies) to us.

Show

Sometimes I consider the possibility that the brains we perceive as existing (and the natural world itself) are deliberately crafted illusions, created by the consciousnesses that evolved from primordial conscious chaos, to give us some form of stability and teach us a bit of restraint and care, but that's crazy to assume as true when you're human, in a world in which rich pieces of shit live the good life, while the majority live a hellish life on the bottom. It could be worse for electrons.

I've been thinking about some form of a "spacetime as infinitesimal dust flow" type of General-relativistic consciousness, in which there are infinite consciousnesses in any volume of spacetime (they each occupy only a single point). However, the consciousnesses are all very similar to the consciousnesses closest to them- and share information, seemingly acting as one (unless a lot follow a separate path).

So an electron isn't actually a single entity, it's many of the fundamental consciousnesses acting over an area, acting as one, with one goal... revenge. Just joking.

But it's true. I can't help it.

 

[Speakpigeon]

While a bloody great chunk of the world's experts in this field have all signed a declaration stating that we do know that animals possess consciousness and went into some detail about precisely why, then the one thing it isn't is controversial.

controversy
n.
1. A dispute, especially a public one, between sides holding opposing views.

Clearly, you're part of the Untermensche clique where people like to make up their own private definitions and pretend they can carry on sensible conversations with the rest of us.

Er, no. Doesn't work like that. Grow up.
EB




Some controversy for you...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_consciousness#Cambridge_Declaration_on_Consciousness

<snip>

Philosopher Daniel Dennett counters that:

Consciousness requires a certain kind of informational organization that does not seem to be 'hard-wired' in humans, but is instilled by human culture. Moreover, consciousness is not a black-or-white, all-or-nothing type of phenomenon, as is often assumed. The differences between humans and other species are so great that speculations about animal consciousness seem ungrounded. Many authors simply assume that an animal like a bat has a point of view, but there seems to be little interest in exploring the details involved.[59]

Consciousness in mammals (including humans) is an aspect of the mind generally thought to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, sentience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment. It is a subject of much research in philosophy of mind, psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Some philosophers divide consciousness into phenomenal consciousness, which is subjective experience itself, and access consciousness, which refers to the global availability of information to processing systems in the brain.[60] Phenomenal consciousness has many different experienced qualities, often referred to as qualia. Phenomenal consciousness is usually consciousness of something or about something, a property known as intentionality in philosophy of mind.[60]

In humans, there are three common methods of studying consciousness, i.e. verbal report, behavioural demonstrations, and neural correlation with conscious activity. Unfortunately these can only be generalized to non-human taxa with varying degrees of difficulty.

<snip>

 

[Speakpigeon]

Consciousness is a broad term that includes all of its attributes and features, sight, sound, touch, smell, thought, feelings, emotions, etc....so consciousness does call on these things, it is composed of these things.

My point is that it remains unclear which of these attributes and features are necessary to a state of bare minimum consciousness.

I have personally experienced a state where I wasn't aware of anything, not my environment, not my own body, not my past life, not even my "self". No sensation at all. Only a state of mild anxiety, which I guess shouldn't be regarded as necessary to consciousness.

aware, conscious

''Aware implies knowing something either by perception or through information: "The lecturer was aware that he had lost his audience." Conscious has much the same meaning but is more often applied to a physical situation: "The injured player was conscious but could not stand." In informal use, the words are employed interchangeably.
aware, conscious

Not quite.

There isn't any extensive debate or controversy about awareness but people throughout the world, including us here at TFT, are still fighting over consciousness.

And that's enough to assume there's a difference in what people mean by "consciousness" and "awareness" and as to their personal experience of them.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

Clearly, you're part of the Untermensche clique where people like to make up their own private definitions and pretend they can carry on sensible conversations with the rest of us.

It's a nice insult, but yet again, just throwing the insults without the corresponding understanding of the subject never works too well. Because your stated position is:

Attributing consciousness to animals, on the other hand, is much more controversial and, basically, we usually accept that we don't know if animals possess consciousness at all.

Er, no. Doesn't work like that. Grow up.

Actually, nipping to wikipedia, desperate to find anyone who you can claim makes a controversy, isn't such a good idea when you don't understand the players involved.

Some controversy for you...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_consciousness#Cambridge_Declaration_on_Consciousness

Meh

Philosopher Daniel Dennett counters that:

Consciousness requires a certain kind of informational organization that does not seem to be 'hard-wired' in humans, but is instilled by human culture. Moreover, consciousness is not a black-or-white, all-or-nothing type of phenomenon, as is often assumed. The differences between humans and other species are so great that speculations about animal consciousness seem ungrounded. Many authors simply assume that an animal like a bat has a point of view, but there seems to be little interest in exploring the details involved.[59]

Actually, he doesn't counter, because the paper this is taken from is 'Animal consciousness: what matters and why' which was published in 1995, five years before 'The Parrot's Lament' and seventeen rather busy years before the Cambridge Declaration. More to the point, Dennett is a linguistic behaviourist, asserting that our experience of consciousness is merely the experience of describing consciousness in language. As such he's in fact disputing that anyone really has consciousness. Is that a position you assent to? That's the problem with digging in wikipedia without understanding what is said. His most recent position on animal consciousness, at the NYU Conference on Animal Consciousness was gradualist: animals certainly are conscious, but not like we are.

and access consciousness, which refers to the global availability of information to processing systems in the brain.[60] Phenomenal consciousness has many different experienced qualities, often referred to as qualia. Phenomenal consciousness is usually consciousness of something or about something, a property known as intentionality in philosophy of mind.[60]

So having demonstrated that you really don't understand the sources you are using, it's your turn - I've talked about Ned Block's distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness before, but it's clearly a distinction that you don't understand. As such, I'd be delighted if you can explain how the quote above, or indeed the paper it comes from:

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/1995_Function.pdf

counts as an objection to the Cambridge position - which is that animals have what Block Calls 'P' or 'phenomenal' consciousness. I know that this is something you cannot do for two entirely separate reasons, so I look forward to an ad hominem or two instead.

In humans, there are three common methods of studying consciousness, i.e. verbal report, behavioural demonstrations, and neural correlation with conscious activity. Unfortunately these can only be generalized to non-human taxa with varying degrees of difficulty.

Actually whatever problems exist for animals exist for humans. The claim above entirely misses the the fact that the only evidence we have for consciousness mental events is our own case. Our own case can never be more than anecdote and lacks replicability, verifiability and so on. Verbal reports are just that - Dennett demonstrates that our reports of how things seem can be in error in setting up his behaviourism.

Behaviour, again covertly relies on reasoning from our own unique case, as does correlation. The covert claim here is that other humans are like ME. The Cambridge declaration relies on the simple fact that in the ways that matter animals are like ME too. If my experience is good enough to assume all humans are conscious, then the overwhelming majority of theorists agree that my experience is good enough to assume all animals are conscious too. Animals scream when in pain and vocalise to express pleasure, sure it isn't words, but in extremeis neither are our voclaisations. The certainly behave much as we do and, most crucially, they share the overwhelming majority of the mechanisms for conscious awareness, if not talking about it.

There is overwhelming consensus among experts in the field. I'm sure you would want to argue with them but sadly internet experts don't count. Only those of us who are qualified to have an opinion.

 

[Speakpigeon]

It's a nice insult, but yet again, just throwing the insults without the corresponding understanding of the subject never works too well. Because your stated position is:

<snip>

There is overwhelming consensus among experts in the field. I'm sure you would want to argue with them but sadly internet experts don't count. Only those of us who are qualified to have an opinion.

Again, I'm really sorry, but however much I personally sympathise with the Cambridge group, I still don't see how this makes what I said false.

I asked you several times now to look again at this sentence of mine you take issue with and explain what's wrong with it. This is what you've not even tried to do and this over now several overlong and mostly irrelevant posts. At which point I guess I can just as well give up. You won't ever reconsider and this make disputation with you just boring and useless. A waste of time.


----------------------------------------------

Still, here are the basic elements again, just in case.

Typically, we'll have no problem attributing awareness to animals, even small creatures. It goes without saying.

Attributing consciousness to animals, on the other hand, is much more controversial and, basically, we usually accept that we don't know if animals possess consciousness at all.
EB

While a bloody great chunk of the world's experts in this field have all signed a declaration stating that we do know that animals possess consciousness and went into some detail about precisely why, then the one thing it isn't is controversial.

controversy
n.
1. A dispute, especially a public one, between sides holding opposing views.

And still more evidence that there still is a controversy about animal consciousness, and that it is not even in fact limited to us ordinary folks that have no right to an opinion.

Duncan, Lisbeth. (2018). A controversy about animal consciousness.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/33516205_A_controversy_about_animal_consciousness

Abstract
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2003
Descartes notoriously argued that non-human animals are unconscious automata, lacking both mentality and consciousness. Though Descartes's claim about animals has generally been viewed with scepticism, scientific opinion in the 20 th century tended to favor the Cartesian position with respect to animals, as exemplified by the long tenure of behaviorism. Today, despite the fact that behaviorism is no longer favored in science, Descartes's position is still far from dead. His views, and the controversy he started three hundred years ago, have been resurrected and given new life in a recent heated debate between biologists and ethologists. On one side of the debate are the "neobehaviorists" who argue that scientists should avoid describing or explaining animal behavior in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and conscious states. On the other side, the "neoanthropomorphists" claim there is no scientifically valid reason to assume that animals and humans are separated by some sort of unbridgeable gap when it comes to mental states and consciousness. Judging from this latest disagreement among scientists who study animals, it seems that we are no closer to resolving Descartes's controversy about animals in the 21st century than we were in the 17th century. Is it possible that Descartes was correct after all and animals really are not conscious?I argue in this thesis that there really are good reasons to believe that Descartes was wrong and that at least some animal species are conscious. But those reasons are not, for the most part, the ones usually cited by modern-day proponents of animal consciousness who rely on reasons based on behavioral evidence. Instead, we must adopt a completely different approach to the question of animal consciousness that draws support from neurobiology and neuroanatomy, the cognitive neurosciences, information processing theory, and adaptive evolutionary biology. I argue that with an interdisciplinary approach that draws on several sources of evidence, we can, in fact, provide scientifically valid reasons for claiming that at least some species of animal are most likely conscious

Lisbeth Duncan currently works at the Phantom Works, The Boeing Company. Lisbeth does research in Philosophy of Science, Applied Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lisbeth_Duncan

EB