I just finished Chapter III of Great Commanders of World War II: Volume II: the British by Charles E. Pfannes and Victor A. Salamone.
I've read a few books about WWII but never strove for expertise; I can't even name more than a few of the top Generals. My favorite books were the famous memoirs of Winston Churchill. I realized those memoirs are riddled with Churchill's opinions, right or wrong, but So what? He was fun to read and I was not aspiring to competent knowledge.
On a recent stroll I slowed down to check titles at the 40-baht shelf on the sidewalk next to a bookstore. Cheaper than a cup of coffee so I picked up afore-mentioned book. Chapter 3 is about Claude Auchinleck. Much of his career was spent as an officer in the Indian Army (and thus he was looked down on by British officers who served in "white man's" armies). He finished his career elevated to Field Marshall and presiding over the post-War Partition of India. The six chapters in the book cover six top Generals, but more pages are spent on Auchinleck than any other.
But the height of his career was the thirteen months he spent as (British) Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East. Even those unfamiliar with the details of the Desert War have probably heard Churchill's quote "Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat." The loss of Egypt would have been a major disaster, but at the height of Rommel's power, clerks in Cairo were shredding documents in anticipation of possible surrender! (But which "Battle of Alamein" do we speak of? Britain won both the 1st and 2nd Battles of Alamein.)
The opinions of Plannes-Salamone and of Churchill about Auchinleck could not be more different.
According to Plannes-Salamone, Auchinlech was almost universally admired, by ranks, subordinates and his peers. They quote experts who think North Africa would have been lost without him. After he took personal command of the Eighth Army he impressed Rommel with his strategies; and managed a reorganization into new infantry divisions, each with its own artillery and tanks.
Churchill OTOH continually blamed Auchinleck for not going on the offensive, hectored him, even asking him to report to London. Surely 1200 tanks were enough; but Churchill ignored the reply that less than half those tanks were fit for action. Just after the height of crisis, after British defeated Rommel at the 1st Battle of Alamein, Churchill replaced Auchinleck with Alexander as C-in-C, with the Eighth Army command given to Montgomery (after the 1st choice Gott was killed en route to command). Montgomery, an extreme narcissist, spread the lie that the Eighth Army was in shambles before he took over.
It's true that El Alamein was the great turning-point in the War, BUT Plannes-Salamone claim that the First Battle of Alamein (led by Auchinleck) was the turning-point with Rommel's failure at the Second Battle of Alamein (led by Montgomery) a fore-gone conclusion.
Plannes-Salamone provide thorough discussion. Auchinleck is strongly criticized for letting Ritchie command the Eighth Army. They do explain that decision but think Auchinleck should have taken personal command sooner.