What is free will?

[Marvin Edwards]

Sure, whatever we do consciously or unconsciously, the brain is doing it. The brain forms and generates us, our experience of self and sense of conscious agency.

Not only that, but the brain is also "that which experiences" its self and is "conscious of" its own agency. For example, if you ask the brain in the restaurant why it ordered the salad instead of the steak, it will tell you that it had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch, so the salad, rather than the steak, would be the better choice for dinner. The brain is aware of itself and conscious of the reasons for its choice.

As shown in numerous experiments, conscious will or agency is an illusion. An illusion that is exposed whenever something goes amiss with the underlying means of production.

It would be false to suggest that conscious will and agency are "illusions". They are part of the brain's model of reality. In the same way that the brain constructs a model of the chair you're sitting in, or the trees outside, or any other physical object in the world, it also constructs a model of its own body interacting with that world.

Without including that model of itself, as a real object in the real world, it could not navigate its body down the street to the restaurant and through the restaurant door and to the table where it sits with its friends and begins reading the menu, and choosing what it will order for dinner.

And it also experiences the relevant inner events that explain itself to itself. When it recalls what it had for breakfast, and what it had for lunch, it knows why it will not be ordering the steak or the lobster for dinner. If anyone asks it why it chose the salad for dinner, it knows the correct answer to that question, and feels no need to confabulate a response.

The brain carries in its short term memory the bad feelings that arose when it thought about the steak and the lobster and the good feelings that came when it thought about the salad. If it had a light breakfast and a healthy lunch, then the steak or the lobster would feel better when brought to conscious awareness.

The underlying means of production, as mentioned and supported by neuroscience, does not operate on the principles of will, wish or alternate action.

That's a very shallow and inaccurate understanding of what neuroscience is telling us. Neuroscience studies the neurology of decision making, which explicitly chooses between alternate actions (there is no such thing as choosing between a single possibility). Neuroscience studies the neurology of our thoughts and feelings, which include our wishes and desires. Neuroscience studies the underlying mechanisms that drive our conscious attention from one subject to the next. Doctors even write prescriptions for Attention Deficit Disorder. So they are very aware of the role of conscious awareness in the overall functioning of the brain.

Neuroscience does not eliminate the notions of will, wish or alternate action. It explains them. But it never "explains them away", it just explains them in terms of how the brain works.

You, on the other hand, seem to be arguing that motivation toward a specific goal (will) is entirely absent in the scheme of neuroscience. You seem to be arguing that we are sleep walking through life, finding ourselves in the restaurant with no knowledge of how or why we we are there. But neuroscience is not saying that at all.

As will doesn't operate the system, the label of 'free will' is incorrect.

Conscious will does not produce itself. It is obviously a product of the brain. However, it is a product of which the brain is also the consumer. Having decided to have dinner at the restaurant, the brain directs the body to walk down the street to the restaurant, sit at the table, browse the menu, and tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please". And it keeps memory notations on the thoughts and feelings that led to the choice.

Being incorrect, there is no case to argue. Free will is just an ideology.

Okay, then, "being incorrect, there is no case to argue". Incompatibilism is just an ideology.

Deliberate and intentional is determined by neural networks and information processing - antecedents

Correct.

- not free will.

Again, if the antecedent events include coercion or undue influence, then that is not free will. But if there is no coercion and no extraordinary influences at play, then it is free will.

The choice is always reliably caused. But we need to know more than that to assess a person's responsibility for that choice. Did the person only make that choice because someone was pointing a gun at him?

Causal necessity cannot be used to sweep significant details under the rug of a generalization.

Free will doesn't run the show, neural networks do.

It is not "free will" versus "neural networks". That's a false dichotomy. When the neural networks decide what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, then that is free will. When the neural networks decide what we will do, while a guy is pointing a gun at them, then that is not free will.

At this point, you are just playing word games, which is exactly what you accused others of doing.

Form and function determines deliberate and intentional actions.....actions - being determined -

True.

that have no alternatives, no freedom to have done otherwise,

Then menu was literally filled with alternatives, therefore False.
The salad was chosen even though I was free to choose the steak, therefore False.

therefore necessitated, not freely willed.

False dichotomy. All choices are causally necessitated. Some choices are freely chosen and some are coerced or unduly influenced.

We've been over these repeatedly, and you have yet to show the truth of anything that I have shown to be false.

 

[steve_bank]

Jarhyn

Go right ahead, no one is stopping you. You do have free will, right?

Free will is not objectively testable. Same with happiness and sadness. When I wet to a hosita; in pain I was asked to rate my pain on a scale from 1-10. 1 tolerable 10 excruciating. Pain med dosage was increased until the number I have went below a number. There is no way to objectively measure and access pain.

To me objectively it would be free will is a,b,c and d,e,f how it is demonstrated.

Regadless, every day we have to make real decisions that affect ourselves and others, so to me the question is irrelevant.

The issue does have some relevance. If there is no free will is someone becoming criminal predetermined? It was touched on in the old Law And Order TV show, a criminal defende based on a claim the criminal is genetically disposed to violence.

That's the thing: free will is determined as the result of an objective test.

I would pose that a defendant "genetically predisposed" to a certain trait is arguing for MORE oversight and necessity of confinement: you are saying they are OBJECTIVELY likely to behave badly. It makes them more impugned as a causal agent, not less.

Really, "will" is held as a state with a relationship to some requirement. Whether the will is free or not depends on whether the system will determine that the requirement is satisfied.

Take for example my stupid dwarf game ya? Entities, well defined ones, hold some thing called "will": they have a task which is "assigned" by whatever mechanism with a "goal", and then the task itself is formed as a series of steps linked to that will.

Each step is itself a "sub-will" which is itself a "will": the major will is broken into minor wills each with its own intermediate requirements.

One such will will be "open door".

Whether or not the door is locked some time after the task is decided upon and launched determines, in a fundamental way, whether their will to open the door was "free". Either the door was locked, and their will was constrained, or the door was unlocked and their will was free.

Now, when the door opens, THEY are in that moment THE causal agent for THE door being opened. They are "responsible" for opening the door.

There is, as I mentioned, also an available distinction here between "free will" and "freely held will".

These are thusly concepts upon which tight calculus is available for tight systems, and so sloppier calculus is available for sloppier things.

B- for creative philosophical invention. You are using terms like system and objective without defintion.

Still does nor define free will and a way to test the definition.

It comes down to how the brain works and we do not have a comprehensive model, yet.

In his book on quantum mechanics David Bohm in the ibtro intro made a brief hypotheses for an Uncertainty Principle of the mind.

You go into a store to buy shoes. Yiu amke a free choice of one brand and a style. What is the basis of choice in the brain? The choice if s fe ree in that no one is forcing you what to choose. However, you are subjected to long term advertisng and soical images conecting the barnds and styles to a certain image. Your subconscious brain storing all those images factors into your choice, your choice is biased by forves out of your control. Subliminal conditioning.

You are plugged into a subconscious collective social consciousness like we all are. Call it a collective or The Matrix if you want.

 

[Jarhyn]

a way to test the definition

You're basking for a way to test a primitive concept. It's asking for a way to "test" addition.

"Free" is not something you test, free IS the test.

It is the property. You can test FOR the property but the only test of if it is "a property" is whether that property is coherent.

I think I've shown that it is, at the very least, a coherent concept.

As for "system", https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/System

We don't need a comprehensive model of HOW the brain encodes Algorighms to understand whether a "will" is "free", it merely needs to be shown that this is a valid calculus which assigns causal responsibilities to localities at a given time with respect to an event.

Without such being possible we could not possibly understand such ideas as "deterministic". The basic definition is that all events have causal antecedents which have intermediate causal responsibility to the outcome

 

[Marvin Edwards]

a way to test the definition

You're basking for a way to test a primitive concept. It's asking for a way to "test" addition.

"Free" is not something you test, free IS the test.

It is the property. You can test FOR the property but the only test of if it is "a property" is whether that property is coherent.

I think I've shown that it is, at the very least, a coherent concept.

As for "system", https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/System

We don't need a comprehensive model of HOW the brain encodes Algorighms to understand whether a "will" is "free", it merely needs to be shown that this is a valid calculus which assigns causal responsibilities to localities at a given time with respect to an event.

Without such being possible we could not possibly understand such ideas as "deterministic". The basic definition is that all events have causal antecedents which have intermediate causal responsibility to the outcome

Freedom is the ability to do something that you want to do. The objective test for any specific freedom is to simply do it.

If you cannot do it, then you're not free to do it. If you can do it, then you are free to do it. Pretty straightforward.

 

[steve_bank]

a way to test the definition

You're basking for a way to test a primitive concept. It's asking for a way to "test" addition.

"Free" is not something you test, free IS the test.

It is the property. You can test FOR the property but the only test of if it is "a property" is whether that property is coherent.

I think I've shown that it is, at the very least, a coherent concept.

As for "system", https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/System

We don't need a comprehensive model of HOW the brain encodes Algorighms to understand whether a "will" is "free", it merely needs to be shown that this is a valid calculus which assigns causal responsibilities to localities at a given time with respect to an event.

Without such being possible we could not possibly understand such ideas as "deterministic". The basic definition is that all events have causal antecedents which have intermediate causal responsibility to the outcome

In a sense yes, free will is a definition that should describe properties of free will. Without a list of properties there is nothing to test and the definition has no meaning.

 

[steve_bank]

a way to test the definition

You're basking for a way to test a primitive concept. It's asking for a way to "test" addition.

"Free" is not something you test, free IS the test.

It is the property. You can test FOR the property but the only test of if it is "a property" is whether that property is coherent.

I think I've shown that it is, at the very least, a coherent concept.

As for "system", https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/System

We don't need a comprehensive model of HOW the brain encodes Algorighms to understand whether a "will" is "free", it merely needs to be shown that this is a valid calculus which assigns causal responsibilities to localities at a given time with respect to an event.

Without such being possible we could not possibly understand such ideas as "deterministic". The basic definition is that all events have causal antecedents which have intermediate causal responsibility to the outcome

Sounds like a tuatology, 'it is what it is'.

Are you defining free choice as equivalent to free will?

In our liberal western democracies free choice is more of a defined right. You have a right to choose between alternatives without coercion. It is a social definition not necessarily fundamental to our human nature.

I take free will to be something else, a fundamental aspect of human nature. In the USA or North Korea you may have free will, but in North Korea you do not have free choice.

 

[DBT]

therefore necessitated, not freely willed.

False dichotomy. All choices are causally necessitated. Some choices are freely chosen and some are coerced or unduly influenced.

It can't be a false dichotomy.

Logically, if an action is necessitated, meaning it is neither, willed or freely selected, it is not an example of free will.

Not being willed or freely selected, a necessitated action cannot be held up as an example of free will.

Necessitation is a far greater restriction on freedom than mere influence or coercion.

You can't that coercion or being unduly influenced is restriction of 'free will' yet necessitation is OK when the latter is a greater restriction than the former.

We've been over these repeatedly, and you have yet to show the truth of anything that I have shown to be false.

I can understand your frustration, but from my perspective it is you who is dismissing or ignoring the issues with compatibilism being raised.

The above is an example; coercion and undue influence are seen as restricting 'free will,' yet elements that are not willed, that necessitate actions, shaping and forming behavior, are being casually dismissed because it doesn't suit the compatibilist narrative.

If actions are determined independently from will, and will has no say in the matter, that is the ultimate in 'undue influence' on freedom of will.

It essentially eliminates the idea of free will.

 

[Jarhyn]

It can't be a false dichotomy

Welcome to religiousity!

an action is necessitated, meaning it is neither, willed or freely selected,

Begging the question...

"Necessitated" does not mean neither willed nor freely selected, so long as willing (which is to say, having a plan for what to do), and free selection are involved in the process that is necessitated.

Causality has vectored directional waves of events, which means that among the primary activity of our universe, locations operate choice functions in the present.

We are restricted in whether our actions are "free" or "constrained", whether paths MAY be walked or whether they MAY not on the basis of locally available knowledge of circumstance. "Whether" is a strict binary, and so a real observable property of the locality.

coercion and undue influence are seen as restricting 'free will,' yet elements that are not willed, that necessitate actions, shaping and forming behavior, are being casually dismissed because it doesn't suit the compatibilist narrative

They are being dismissed because they are not contextual. The compatibilist admits that there are MANY things that cannot be willed freely to come about or be, and many more things that are as they are as a result of no person's will.

The compatibilist does not say "most things are caused through mechanics of that which has no mind to freely hold or reject that will therefore nothing must be the product of our freely held will and we may not freely hold it".

In fact you are going so far as to conflate freely held will with free will.

The only "special" thing necessary for freely held will is that will (a plan) describes a requirement as pertains to wills, a meta-will that is itself willed.

This doesn't require a form of unavailable operation, it just requires an available level of abstraction within the local system.

One does not need to freely hold their will (the momentary state which causally determines their behavior against all possible contexts) for that will to be free, either. What determines whether the will is free is the requirement, and whether it is satisfied.

I could program a "will" into a robot to find and follow any "brightly painted line on the floor". In reality "brightly painted line on the floor" and "follow" are defined by a set of physical requirements: switches with activation energies and some operational logic.

Whether it's will is free depends on a lot of things: foremost whether there is a brightly painted line on the floor at all (really, some thing that validates it's requirements), whether that line can be 'followed' by the control logic, etc.

I Could even then write another robot which can tell me whether the other robot's unfreely held will is itself free: is the first robot on a line in this moment? Can it reach such a line? Did it get launched off the line by external vectors?

At any rate, I can also determine in any moment whether the failure of that freedom is due to external forces and events to the robot (was it picked up and moved) or the model function of the robot itself (does it have a hard time following around this corner such that it loses the line and must search for it, indicating a failure of state due to "stupidity" rather than "maliciousness").

I can both observe when "that thing fucked up the robot" in which case I can do nothing directly and also when "the robot was unable to corner here because..." and then change that unfreely held will to include different plans or requirements that allow it to more readily follow the damn line.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It can't be a false dichotomy.
Logically, if an action is necessitated, meaning it is neither, willed or freely selected, it is not an example of free will.
Not being willed or freely selected, a necessitated action cannot be held up as an example of free will.
Necessitation is a far greater restriction on freedom than mere influence or coercion.
You can't that coercion or being unduly influenced is restriction of 'free will' yet necessitation is OK when the latter is a greater restriction than the former.

Let's be clear on "causal necessity". Causal necessity is a universal constant. There are no uncaused events. Every event that ever happens is the reliable result of prior events. From my perspective, these are indisputable logical facts. There are no such things as "uncaused" events, but only events for which the causes may as yet remain unknown.

There is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity". Are we in agreement on that (at least within the context of determinism)?

But there are such things as freedom from coercion, freedom from undue influence, freedom from covid-19, freedom from censorship, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, freedom from brainwashing, freedom from manipulation, freedom to choose for yourself what you will do, free of charge, freedom to marry, freedom from persecution, freedom from invasion by another nation, etc., etc., etc. All the items in this list are things that one can actually be either free from or not free from, or, either free to do or not free to do.

All of these possible freedoms exist within the context of not being free from causal necessity. Causal necessity remains a fact throughout all of these freedoms. So, none of these freedoms are constrained by not being free from causal necessity. They each have their own specific constraints.

In no case is there a logical requirement that we either choose causal necessity or we choose the freedom. That would be a false dichotomy. We have tons of freedoms, all within the context of universal causal necessity/inevitability.

Covid-19 is something that a person can actually be free of, or not free of, based on test results. But whether we have covid-19 or whether we are free of it, it will always have been causally necessary. To be free from covid-19 does not require being free from causal necessity.

To say, "logically, if something is necessitated, it cannot be free, thus it cannot be free of covid-19" would be false, because it will either by causally necessary that you have covid-19 or causally necessary that you don't.

To say, "a necessitated condition cannot be held up as an example of being free from covid-19" would be false, because if it was causally necessary that you would be free from covid-19 then that is a necessitated condition of that freedom from the disease.

To say, "necessitation is a far greater restriction on freedom than merely having covid-19" would be false, because causal necessity itself is neither a meaningful nor a relevant restriction. Having covid-19 can restrict you to staying home from work and restrict you to wearing a mask in public. But causal necessity never makes you do anything that you wouldn't have done anyway.

To say, "you can't say that not being free of covid-19 is OK when the latter is a greater restriction than the former" would be false, again, because causal necessity itself is neither a meaningful nor a relevant restriction.

The above is an example; coercion and undue influence are seen as restricting 'free will,' yet elements that are not willed, that necessitate actions, shaping and forming behavior, are being casually dismissed because it doesn't suit the compatibilist narrative.

That too, is false. I've fully embraced both causal necessity and neuroscience. But I've also pointed out that free will has a simple, operational definition, that everyone understands and correctly uses when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

Free will is an event in which someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less. It does not require a disembodied soul. It does not claim to be uncaused.

If actions are determined independently from will, and will has no say in the matter, that is the ultimate in 'undue influence' on freedom of will. It essentially eliminates the idea of free will.

You are still using the definition of a mythical beast, not the definition of free will.

Free will is a deterministic event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Reliable causation, in itself, is neither coercive nor undue. Our past (nurture) and our genetics (nature) are neither coercive nor undue. Rather, they are "that which is us at this moment", deciding for ourselves what we will do.

It really is us, our own brains, our own neural architecture, evolved over millions of years, choosing whether to have the steak or the salad. And not any other object in the physical universe.

 

[DBT]

It can't be a false dichotomy

Welcome to religiousity!

Sour grapes.

an action is necessitated, meaning it is neither, willed or freely selected,

Begging the question...

Simply a statement of fact. All the evidence supports brain agency. Which means neural architecture at work. Which is information processing, not will, not free will. Decisions are made through inputs acting upon networks being integrated with memory, which provided the criteria.

You need to consider it from the perspective of neuroscience, not ideology. Compatibilism is not science, it is an ideology.

 

[DBT]

It can't be a false dichotomy.
Logically, if an action is necessitated, meaning it is neither, willed or freely selected, it is not an example of free will.
Not being willed or freely selected, a necessitated action cannot be held up as an example of free will.
Necessitation is a far greater restriction on freedom than mere influence or coercion.
You can't that coercion or being unduly influenced is restriction of 'free will' yet necessitation is OK when the latter is a greater restriction than the former.

Let's be clear on "causal necessity". Causal necessity is a universal constant. There are no uncaused events. Every event that ever happens is the reliable result of prior events. From my perspective, these are indisputable logical facts. There are no such things as "uncaused" events, but only events for which the causes may as yet remain unknown.

Which goes against the idea of free will. Eliminates it, in fact.

There is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity". Are we in agreement on that (at least within the context of determinism)?

Sure, I have never said otherwise.

But there are such things as freedom from coercion, freedom from undue influence, freedom from covid-19, freedom from censorship, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, freedom from brainwashing, freedom from manipulation, freedom to choose for yourself what you will do, free of charge, freedom to marry, freedom from persecution, freedom from invasion by another nation, etc., etc., etc. All the items in this list are things that one can actually be either free from or not free from, or, either free to do or not free to do.

Yes, freedom from coercion is a distinction. Yes, absence of force or undue influence are distinctions.

But there is still one inescapable distinction that is being downplayed or dismissed; inner necessitation. Which is just as much a restriction on freedom as external factors.

If we are being shaped and formed by determinants, elements that are out of our control, and our thoughts and actions flow from our non-chosen condition, our thoughts and actions are not freely chosen, our thoughts and action are not freely willed.

Our [non coerced] thoughts and actions not being freely willed, it is false to label them as examples of free will.

Inner necessitation is not free will, it does not permit the right kind of regulatory control to qualify as freely willed thoughts and actions.

Therefore, free will is not compatible with determinism, and compatibilism is more accurately described as a definition designed to give an impression of compatibility.

''Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.[1] It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define 'free will' in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism.'' - wiki.

 

[Jarhyn]

Sour grapes

Religiousity.

Simply a statement of fact.

It is a simple statement of fact that you are begging the question.

information processing, not will, not free will.

"Information processing" can be will.

I have in this thread shown what is will. You even admit that it is willed in the other thread.

What we think and believe and hope for is not necessarily the way things are, or how they will go

And here even a recognition that it is both a will and free or not-free ("not necessarily the way things are or how they will go")

neuroscience, not ideology.

And then you fall off again. You are making a foolish claim that does not support your declaration (that neurons cannot hold "the necessary form of regulatory control").

You cannot defend your clam with neuroscience. You have to actually defend your claim with math and fundamental systems theory because it is a claim about fundamental systems theory.

This is because systems theorists have shown, PROVEN that neurons can implement any Algorighm within their degree of network complexity.

As neurons can implement any Algorithm, it is your job to prove that no algorithm has "the right kind of regulatory control".

Of course the problem with THAT is that then I get to whip up some simple algorithms that clearly DO have the right kind of regulatory control: the dwarf holds a will, a plan, and that plan is measurable in it's vector either towards or away from it's goal through causality.

Compatibilism is not science

True, technically it's a logic of causal responsibility.

In many ways, freedom of will is a "primitive concept" moving towards an axiomization of language around "causal responsibility".

It's one of the reasons this is about math and systems theory rather than about neurons.

Logics are not something that prove or fails in the arena of "science".

Rather they are something that allows statements of a particular form to be judged as "true" or "false", this particular one dealing with "what agent (or what hierarchy of agency) was 'responsible' for causing that event to happen?" Or in other terms "where were the wills and which wills were left 'free' such that this happened?"

Your arguments are like someone screaming loudly that "math" is nonsense because there's no "real" way to "add" two things, because when you get two quarks together they don't form a 2-quark particle, and they don't change at all, and so that "physics does not allow the right kind of regulatory control" for "addition" to be a thing, and that when something moves in a direction you can't calculate how far it moved because all points are....

You realize how foolish that kind of sophistry is, ya?

Of course when you inject nonsense into a system of axioms (nonsense like your broke definition of "free will"), the system of axioms trivializes... So stop trying to inject nonsense into the axioms. There is clearly a formulation which does not trivialize said axioms.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Let's be clear on "causal necessity". Causal necessity is a universal constant. There are no uncaused events. Every event that ever happens is the reliable result of prior events. From my perspective, these are indisputable logical facts. There are no such things as "uncaused" events, but only events for which the causes may as yet remain unknown.

Which goes against the idea of free will. Eliminates it, in fact.

Well, that would depend upon your definition of free will. If you define free will as the absence of causal necessity, then you would be correct. But, then again, if you define free will in a way that deliberately makes free will impossible, then your definition is suspect of being designed to do nothing more than eliminate it.

So, the question is, why would anyone define free will as "freedom from causal necessity", which they know is an impossible freedom? No one on earth uses that definition outside of this silly debate.

The definition that most people use is the first definition given in the dictionary, a voluntary or unforced choice. And what are they talking about? They are talking about being free from coercion and other forms of undue influence. And how do we know that? Because courts use this definition when evaluating a person's responsibility for their actions. And so do parents.

The notion of free will is used to distinguish a deliberate act from a coerced act, or an insane act, or an accident. We've all heard the question, "Did you do that on purpose?"

The younger Tsarnaev brother's lawyer tried to argue that he was unduly influenced by his older brother, so he should not be held to the same level of responsibility:

"The trial began on January 5, 2015; Tsarnaev pleaded not guilty to all thirty charges laid against him. The proceedings were led by Judge George O'Toole.[140][141] Tsarnaev's attorney Judy Clarke admitted in her opening statement that Tsarnaev committed the acts in question, but sought to avert the death penalty by showing that his brother Tamerlan was the mastermind behind the acts.[142] Counter-terrorism expert Matthew Levitt also gave testimony."

So, the ability to decide for ourselves what we will do is the key element of the notion of free will, and it also links free will to responsibility.

Every child grows up desiring the freedom to make their own choices; and every child is taught that they will be held responsible for their deliberate actions. Those are the benefits and the costs of free will.

If "freedom from causal necessity" was required in order to convict anyone of a crime, everyone would always be found innocent. But have you seen anyone arguing that in court?

Just to remind you, there are two definitions of "free will" in most general dictionaries, including your favorite Merriam-Webster. I presume you've seen these, because you repeatedly posted the definition of "freedom" while ignoring their definitions of "free will".

In the definitions of "free will", each dictionary clearly separates freedom from causal necessity into a separate definition, because it is not the usual meaning of free will, as most people understand it.

Free Will Definition #1:
Merriam-Webster: 1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'
Oxford English Dictionary: 1.a. Spontaneous or unconstrained will; unforced choice; (also) inclination to act without suggestion from others. Esp. in of one's (own) free will and similar expressions.
Wiktionary: 1. A person's natural inclination; unforced choice.

Free Will Definition #2:
Merriam-Webster: 2: freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention
Oxford English Dictionary: 2. The power of an individual to make free choices, not determined by divine predestination, the laws of physical causality, fate, etc.
Wiktionary: 2. (philosophy) The ability to choose one's actions, or determine what reasons are acceptable motivation for actions, without predestination, fate etc.

So, the question remains as to why on earth any practicing philosopher would be claiming that free will requires freedom from causal necessity?

Yes, freedom from coercion is a distinction. Yes, absence of force or undue influence are distinctions.

And they are especially meaningful and significant distinctions when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

But there is still one inescapable distinction that is being downplayed or dismissed; inner necessitation. Which is just as much a restriction on freedom as external factors.

What you call "inner necessitation" is simply our own brain determining whether we will have steak or salad for dinner.

If we are being shaped and formed by determinants, elements that are out of our control, and our thoughts and actions flow from our non-chosen condition, our thoughts and actions are not freely chosen, our thoughts and action are not freely willed.

There's the paradoxical dualism again. You insist that we must be free of the workings of our own brain, and the evolution of our species, and other things over which we have no control, before we can be said to control whether we will have the steak or the salad for dinner.

All of those things that we did not control, are now integral parts of who and what we are right now. It is truly us, and no other object in the physical universe, that is deciding whether we will have the steak or the salad for dinner.

The many things that we did not control do not in any way cancel out the many things that we now do control. The claim that the things we did not choose eliminates the things we now do choose is a logical fallacy.

Our [non coerced] thoughts and actions not being freely willed, it is false to label them as examples of free will.

Another word game, specifically a "riddle". If we are not controlling our thoughts, then how are we controlling our actions? Riddle solution: We are our thoughts. Our thoughts control our action. So, the control is still us.

This is also that same old paradoxical dualism, where we are expected to step out of ourselves in order to exercise control of ourselves. It's B.S. We only need to BE ourselves in order to exercise control of our actions.

Inner necessitation is not free will, it does not permit the right kind of regulatory control to qualify as freely willed thoughts and actions.

And that would be because you insist that we step out of ourselves and exercise control from the outside, which is the same paradoxical dualism. Once you stop this dualistic thinking the answer to your riddle will become clear. It's kind of like this:

Before I had studied Chan (Zen) for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and rivers once again as rivers.[2]

''Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.[1] It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define 'free will' in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism.'' - wiki.

Yes. And incompatibilists define 'free will' in a way that prevents it from co-existing with determinism. This causes an interminable debate. So, compatibilism offers a reasonable end to the endless silly debate.

Free will is not "freedom from causal necessity". Free will is a deterministic event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while "free of coercion and other forms of undue influence". Nothing more. Nothing less.

 

[Jarhyn]

So, the ability to decide for ourselves what we will do is the key element of the notion of free will

"Free will", even without "freely held will", exists. This is a problem that allows DBT to attack your notions.

Indeed "freely held will" is a key element in our ethical calculus because it obligates people to self-review.

You may want to consider training yourself to a more disciplined discernment of these two concepts.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So, the ability to decide for ourselves what we will do is the key element of the notion of free will

"Free will", even without "freely held will", exists. This is a problem that allows DBT to attack your notions.

Indeed "freely held will" is a key element in our ethical calculus because it obligates people to self-review.

You may want to consider training yourself to a more disciplined discernment of these two concepts.

I think you may be introducing unnecessary qualifications that simply make the issue more complex.
"Holding a will" sounds like "willpower". And I believe it is a separate issue.

 

[Jarhyn]

So, the ability to decide for ourselves what we will do is the key element of the notion of free will

"Free will", even without "freely held will", exists. This is a problem that allows DBT to attack your notions.

Indeed "freely held will" is a key element in our ethical calculus because it obligates people to self-review.

You may want to consider training yourself to a more disciplined discernment of these two concepts.

I think you may be introducing unnecessary qualifications that simply make the issue more complex.
"Holding a will" sounds like "willpower". And I believe it is a separate issue.

No, it's pretty necessary. "Free will" is going to end up reducing here to an axiomatic element revolving around "requirement".

Much like a set may contain other sets, a will may be held by "a system" because that system out it there versus an outside system.

What put the will there has nothing to do with whether it is free of constraint:

As observed of the robot, the robot has a thing I've been calling a "will" and that "will" is observable as "free" or "constrained", yet it did not need to select that will for this linguistic treatment to be applicable.

It comes down to the availability of axiomization(s) of such descriptive language which do not "prove all sentences", here dealing with the axiomization of language that produces sentences discussing "responsibility".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So, the ability to decide for ourselves what we will do is the key element of the notion of free will

"Free will", even without "freely held will", exists. This is a problem that allows DBT to attack your notions.

Indeed "freely held will" is a key element in our ethical calculus because it obligates people to self-review.

You may want to consider training yourself to a more disciplined discernment of these two concepts.

I think you may be introducing unnecessary qualifications that simply make the issue more complex.
"Holding a will" sounds like "willpower". And I believe it is a separate issue.

No, it's pretty necessary. "Free will" is going to end up reducing here to an axiomatic element revolving around "requirement".

Much like a set may contain other sets, a will may be held by "a system" because that system out it there versus an outside system.

What put the will there has nothing to do with whether it is free of constraint:

As observed of the robot, the robot has a thing I've been calling a "will" and that "will" is observable as "free" or "constrained", yet it did not need to select that will for this linguistic treatment to be applicable.

It comes down to the availability of axiomization(s) of such descriptive language which do not "prove all sentences", here dealing with the axiomization of language that produces sentences discussing "responsibility".

Free will is an empirical description of the deterministic event called "choosing". Was the choosing event free of coercion and undue influence? If so, then it is a freely chosen "I will". If not, then the "I will" is not freely chosen.

How long one holds onto that will is a separate question. Usually, we hold onto it until we have done what we decided we would do.

Responsibility identifies the most meaningful and relevant causes of the doing. If what was done harmed others, then we want to take steps to prevent it from happening again. This brings us back to the choosing event. We would want the person to choose to do something else in the future, something that does not harm others.

If the bank teller hands over the money to the robber pointing a gun at her, we can correct her future behavior by simply removing that threat (arresting the robber). But correcting the bank teller will not be so simple.

I don't know what axioms you feel are missing from this description.

 

[Jarhyn]

Free will is an empirical description of the deterministic event called "choosing".

I disagree.

Choice function has a very particular relationship free will in any logical ethical framework.

Will prescribes choices most certainly, but will is not the choice or even the choosing. Will is a state mechanism that describes a state which prescribes the choice on the basis of requirements.

deciding what we will do is on a level of "meta" above this, on the subjects of "which wills are freely held?"

at some point, though, the "will" held in one "memory" will be set by another "memory". In this way "freely held will" is contextual to level of hierarchy one looks at. If one considers "the robot system" rather than the robot, then the robot system freely holds the will. It is the freely held will of the second robot acting as an agency at that point, though an indirect agency with hierarchy in which the will is freely decided on by one (with a measured degree of freedom; within constraints of its own programming), and unfreely held by the other except in momentary fulfilment of states.

If one looks at it on a level of transistors, though, problem becomes much harder to view: you need to simplify it to dwarves to get any closer to the problem.

Still, it does not abrogate that there is a chain of processes which review these things and that one can identify that "will" which placed "held will" which is in observation.

Your observations about the hierarchy of responsibility ultimately flow from the fact that in the moment, responsibility for causality of a salad (and bill) landing on a plate in front of YOU comes down to the fact that YOU held a free will to place the will of 'salad', and the will YOU held was free.

If you did not place the will in yourself to order the salad, the bill would go elsewhere. If the will to have salad was not free, the salad you wish to have would not appear when requested.

In a very real way, the waiter is delivering the bill to the big bang: most specifically the most relevant event stream of it that precipitated into the words "the salad please". It's just that this calculus allows us to identify this set of "big bang" results rather than any other as "responsible". This piece is what held the free will and freely held the will to "salad"

Your confusion, and I think a lot of the conversation, revolves around this failure to acknowledge the complexity in the problem: that free will is different from "freely held will".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

...
Your observations about the hierarchy of responsibility ultimately flow from the fact that in the moment, responsibility for causality of a salad (and bill) landing on a plate in front of YOU comes down to the fact that YOU held a free will to place the will of 'salad', and the will YOU held was free.
...

Free of what?

 

[Jarhyn]

Choice, generally, is a corollary of "will". It is a very particular application of the concept insofar as choice requires will, and is a function of it.

I "will" of "choices". This is fundamental to the will held by a system (which may be this particular system of address).

It may even relate to the intersection of this ethical responsibility calculus and fundamental set theory as relates choice function!

...
Your observations about the hierarchy of responsibility ultimately flow from the fact that in the moment, responsibility for causality of a salad (and bill) landing on a plate in front of YOU comes down to the fact that YOU held a free will to place the will of 'salad', and the will YOU held was free.
...

Free of what?

Free of impediment of its course (or set of courses) towards fulfilment of requirement. "Is fulfillment (in the frame of the will) inevitable on the basis of global knowledge?"