But the 'person' doesn't control anything. 'Person' is a general term, a broad reference to our body, brain, mind, thoughts and actions: personhood. Rather than the 'person' it is specifically the brain of the 'person' that determines decisions, thoughts and actions.
We've demonstrated that it doesn't really matter what you call it. We can call it "X" if you want. But the facts are that these:
X walked into the restaurant.
X browsed the menu.
X chose what to order.
X told the waiter "I will have the Chef Salad, please".
X was given the salad.
X was expected to pay the bill.
Conventionally, X is replaced with "the person".
But we can just as easily replace X with "the person's brain".
Or, we can replace X with "the person's neural architecture".
Or, we can replace X with "the person's unconscious brain activity".
It makes no difference to the analysis of the event. "Something" reduced the menu to a single dinner order. "Something" told the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please". And "Something" ate the salad and is therefore expected to pay the bill.
"Something" was free of coercion and undue influence while choosing what to order, therefore, "Something" chose what it would order of its own ordinary, and operational, freely chosen will.
The fact that this event was perfectly determined by antecedent events does not excuse "Something" from paying the bill, because "Something" was the final, responsible, prior cause of the dinner order.
This is performed unconsciously with no input from consciousness, will or wish.
I'm sorry, but it is time to call B.S. on that claim. The person was conscious of its intent to have dinner at the restaurant. The person was conscious while reading the menu. The person was conscious of the reasons why it chose the salad instead of the steak. The person was conscious of its responsibility to pay the bill.
The activity within the brain that occurred below conscious awareness cannot concern us here for these reasons:
First, because we do not know what happened beneath awareness.
Second, because it does not contradict any of the facts of the events that happened consciously.
Third, because, whether conscious or unconscious, something chose to order the salad and will be expected to pay the bill.
There is no element of 'free will' at work to make a difference in outcome.
So, you are defining "free will" as "something that works to make a difference in the outcome". The specific something that is doing the work that determines the outcome is the person's own brain. You may recall that "choosing" what we will have for dinner is a function of the brain's own decision making architecture.
Free will refers to the person's own brain being free from coercion and undue influence during its decision making process. It is not some separate entity that actually does the work of making a decision. That entity is the actual brain. But the brain may either be free to make this decision itself, or someone may be pointing a gun at it, forcing it to go along with the will of the brain holding the gun.
In these discussions, it would be helpful if you stopped replacing my definition of free will with your own.
The action that is taken is the action that is determined.
You say that as if it actually meant something. ALL events are ALWAYS determined by prior events. So what?
It is the only possible action in that instance in time. There are no alternatives in any instance in time.
(1) That is still a false claim. Every item on the restaurant menu is a realizable alternative throughout the entire time that the restaurant and its menu continue to exist. This is easy to prove. Simply walk into the restaurant and order any item from the menu. Or, have a group of people who each order a different item on the menu. Everyone will realize their chosen alternative, thus proving that every item on the menu is, in fact, a realizable alternative.
(2) The fact that we ordered the salad, and did not order the steak, does not imply in any fashion, that we could not have ordered the steak, or that the steak was not a real possibility. It is a logical error to confuse what "will" or "does" happen with what "can" happen. Only one thing "will" happen, but any number of things "can" happen. Both the salad and the steak "can" happen. The fact that the steak did not happen does not imply that it "could not" have happened, but only that it "would not" have happened given the actual circumstances. When someone says, "I could have ordered the steak instead", they are logically implying two things: (1) that they did not order the steak, and, (2) that they would only have ordered the steak under different circumstances.
It is important to keep these things straight, because confusing them leads to false statements.
If you can't remember where you placed your keys in one instance in time, that is your condition in that instance in time, and nothing can change that condition in that instance in time.
When we are uncertain as to where we placed our keys, we switch to the language of possibilities. "Where
did I place my keys?" becomes "where
could I have placed them?" And we think of the
many places where we have left our keys in the past, and then begin looking in each of those places. We
could have left them on the dresser in the bedroom. We
could have left them in the pocket of the pants we just tossed in the laundry. We
could have left them on the table in the dining room.
Ah, I found them! They were on the table in the dining room. But what if someone asks us why we were rifling through the laundry, our response is, "I could have left my keys in my pants". Is that a true statement or are we lying?
That is precisely the same sense of "could have" that we find in the statement "I chose the salad, but I could have chosen the steak". And that is why incompatibilists are being a bit silly when claiming that people who say "I could have done otherwise" are making some metaphysical claim against reliable causation. That is nonsense. They are simply using the language and logic of possibilities, because that is always the context of things that "can" happen, but may or may not actually happen.
That you recall where you placed your keys a moment later is your condition in that moment in time, the memory is brought to consciousness. You did not will the memory into consciousness, the brain came to that point as information became available, then made conscious.
Ah! But you forget that I was conscious of the fact that my keys were missing, and also conscious of my desperation to find them. That intention to find them is what centered my brain upon the task of pulling up relative data from memory, until the correct detail appeared.
There is a test-taking technique called "prime and wait". You encounter a question on the test, and you feel you should know the answer, but it just won't come to you. So, you think about it for a while (prime), and then forget about that question and move on (wait). When you come back to the unanswered question, the answer will usually pop into your mind. Apparently, the conscious desire to answer the question triggers the unconscious processes that form the neural path to the answer, such that it appears, as if by magic, the second time around.
This is not a free will process. It is information processing at work producing conscious thoughts and actions. At no point is the 'person' aware of the activity of the means of production.
Employing the "prime and wait" technique was a deliberate choice, and a better choice than just giving up and leaving the question unanswered. The person is not aware of the unconscious neural activity forming the pathway to the memory containing the answer. But the person is certainly conscious of the need to find the answer in order to get a good grade on the test.
Again, you're oversimplifying the process, by trying to exclude conscious intent from its role of motivating specific unconscious activity.
Therefore associating the 'person' with the means of production is a tactic used to support the notion of free will....which has nothing to do with the means of production, what is experienced, thought or done.
Oh, and thanks for the gif. It does seem very appropriate after that last comment.
