What is free will?

[The AntiChris]

That determined actions - necessitation - are not willed actions, therefore determined action are not freely willed actions.

So the problem with free will is that it's neither free nor willed!

I'm not even going to attempt to deal with this insanity.

 

[DBT]

DBT, bollixing it all up again. What a surprise!

Nope. Just telling it as it is. Which of course goes against compatibilist teachings and faith.

Pood being invested in the compatibilist label is not willing to consider that 'rational' does not mean 'free will' - that rational and free will are entirely different things.....which the expert explained.....yet Pood insists that rational equates to free will and the expert doesn't know that she is a compatibilist....because, well, that is how compatibilists define their terms in order that freedom of will appears compatible with determinism.

Sigh.

Sigh away....in this instance in time you have no other option.

No. I have shown you this with Farah’s own words. She is arguing the compatibilist line, indeed whether she knows it or not. The fact that she is an “expert” in her field means she is an expert in neuroscience, not philosophy.

And I pointed out that you are interpreting from a compatibilists perspective. Claiming that Farah herself doesn't realize that she is a compatibilist.

Once more. A rational system does not equate to free will. A rational system functions on design (artificial information processors) or evolved neural networks/brains.

There is no will involved in information processing, a mechanical activity, inputs, memory integration, conscious experience, thoughts and actions, will.

Will doesn't drive the brain, will has no regulatory power within a determined system, yet free will is asserted as acting according to one will....which has no regulatory power.

Farah specifically addresses the dualist concept of free will, which is a libertarian and not a compatibilist concept. Here, she says that right here. Let’s look again:

All of the data of cognitive neuroscience are pushing us to replace the idea of mind-body duality, which is so intuitive, …

Bold by me.

There. Do you see that? Mind-body duality. Not compatibilism. Mind-body duality. She is addressing mind-body duality and not compatibilism.

I don't think you understand that it's not only mind-body dualism that she refers to. That is one aspect of the issue. That there is nothing within the system to give us the right kind of regulative control and a claim to free will.

Determinism doesn't allow compatibility, and there is no mind-body duality, homuculus or whatever to provide the right kind of regulatory control. What the brain does as a rational system is it, no alternate actions, no free will agency

Let me reiterate that she goes on to write:

I don’t think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will!

Right. The opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will. This is also the compatibilist position. Her use of “free will” is obviously directed toward dualist/libertarian free will. Because again, she goes on to write:

The compatibilist position asserts that 'acting in accordance with one's will, without external force or coercion' is an example of free will....regardless of the fact that will itself is fixed prior to action, that will has no agency beyond the conscious drive or prompt to act.

Once again:

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.'' - cold comfort in compatibilism.


''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

 

[DBT]

That determined actions - necessitation - are not willed actions, therefore determined action are not freely willed actions.

So the problem with free will is that it's neither free nor willed!

I'm not even going to attempt to deal with this insanity.

Did you miss the part where information is acquired and processed before will is formed and determined by neuronal interactions within the system, which do not involve will?

Don't act obtuse. The order of events from input to experience has been thoroughly explained.


Motor action
''Almost all of behavior involves motor function, from talking to gesturing to walking. But even a simple movement like reaching out to pick up a glass of water can be a complex motor task to study. Not only does your brain have to figure out which muscles to contract and in which order to steer your hand to the glass, it also has to estimate the force needed to pick up the glass. Other factors, like how much water is in the glass and what material the glass is made from, also influence the brains calculations. Not surprisingly, there are many anatomical regions which are involved in motor function.''

 

[The AntiChris]

Did you miss the part ...

Nope.

You assume all the terms you use are all well defined, well understood and accepted . They're not.

 

[DBT]

Did you miss the part ...

Nope.

You assume all the terms you use are all well defined, well understood and accepted . They're not.

That's not an argument. Nor have you ever given an argument of your own. You just complain. Meanwhile everything you do say indicates that you have not understood a thing about incompatibilism.

Can you answer a simple question? Is a determined action freely chosen or willed or not? Yes or No?

 

[Jarhyn]

Did you miss the part where information is acquired and processed before will is formed and determined by neuronal interactions within the system, which do not involve will?

Did you miss the part where the system which acquires and processes the information is itself operating on a series of instructions, will unto a requirement?

You want to find something that isn't a "will" driving these things, but you won't, because like in set theory, it's wills all the way down.

Don't act obtuse: The order of events from input to experience has been thoroughly explained and the steps in the middle there, all of them from input to experience, are "wills" in this framework.

Most wills' requirements as such are "null" so their freedom value is "trivially free".

The physical "will" of the rock, for example, lacks any requirement to do as it does, pushing a kinetic wave from one end to the other. It is a "trivial will". Most people would probably call that "unwilled" but I don't get to make that distinction except when I clarify that "unwilled really means 'trivially willed'", and using that language would just complicate the discussion with points at which folks like yourself could kick mud into the water around it. So I call them "trivially willed" rather than "unwilled".

The physical "will" of the dwarf, however, has a requirement. That requirement will either be met or it won't. This will is not "trivially free" but is in fact "observably not free" because the "door" of "open that door" is "locked". If the door was not locked, the will would be "free". As the door must have always been locked, this particular will must have always been destined to be unfree.

But in the deterministic universe the same as this other one except for the difference of "the door doesn't get locked, and so also the difference of all events unfolding thereafter", the will is free and this particular will must have always been destined to be free, within this second deterministic universe.

Now that you are at the point where you are acknowledging at least the presence of a "will" in some respect, though, we can get on maybe to discussing the calculus of "freedom" and the utility of calculating it on provisional terms?

I think we both agree in fact that "the agent" does not decide the freedom of their wills. The provisional freedom is based on contingents which are not necessarily real and cannot be assured to be so. At best they can assume. It will be the case that either it was free or it wasn't, though. Everyone here in fact agrees (I think) that an individual cannot decide to be free with respect to some given will: they either always will have been free or always won't have been. But understanding whether and why is valuable insofar as it tells us whether "don't bother".

It is also useful in determining "this will ought not be free, as this will being free makes all these other wills including all of mine, including the will 'to live', 'not free'; let us gin up a will that is very likely to be free which is 'stop that guy before he can murder anyone else'". It allows us to calculate contingents which make for more effective, more free, wills.

You, for example are "not free" with respect to wishing freedom to not exist. I'm pretty sure that as long as contingents exist in the universe ("Event A is contingent upon Event B"), freedom is going to be there, real and calculable and observable.

Until you recognize that "the agent may hold a will" "the will may or may not be 'free' as determined by causal necessity", we will continue having this discussion.

Once you are ready to accept "the definition of 'free' is a description which applies to a 'will' exactly when that 'will' contains a requirement that SHALL be met" we can get to discussing more interesting things about the game theory around "will" and "freedom", like opposed action or justice or discussing why some wills "cannot be accepted in any way to be allowed to remain 'apparently free'" or why this particular (and admittedly counter-intuitive) definition of "free" is correct, and completely sufficient for its role in discussing ethics in "hard math" terms.

 

[The AntiChris]

Can you answer a simple question? Is a determined action freely chosen or willed or not? Yes or No?

Free from what?

You obviously can't mean free from deterministic influences because you've stipulated that the action is determined. So. free from what?

 

[pood]

DBT, bollixing it all up again. What a surprise!

Nope. Just telling it as it is. Which of course goes against compatibilist teachings and faith.

Pood being invested in the compatibilist label is not willing to consider that 'rational' does not mean 'free will' - that rational and free will are entirely different things.....which the expert explained.....yet Pood insists that rational equates to free will and the expert doesn't know that she is a compatibilist....because, well, that is how compatibilists define their terms in order that freedom of will appears compatible with determinism.

Sigh.

Sigh away....in this instance in time you have no other option.

No. I have shown you this with Farah’s own words. She is arguing the compatibilist line, indeed whether she knows it or not. The fact that she is an “expert” in her field means she is an expert in neuroscience, not philosophy.

And I pointed out that you are interpreting from a compatibilists perspective. Claiming that Farah herself doesn't realize that she is a compatibilist.

Once more. A rational system does not equate to free will. A rational system functions on design (artificial information processors) or evolved neural networks/brains.

There is no will involved in information processing, a mechanical activity, inputs, memory integration, conscious experience, thoughts and actions, will.

Will doesn't drive the brain, will has no regulatory power within a determined system, yet free will is asserted as acting according to one will....which has no regulatory power.

Farah specifically addresses the dualist concept of free will, which is a libertarian and not a compatibilist concept. Here, she says that right here. Let’s look again:

All of the data of cognitive neuroscience are pushing us to replace the idea of mind-body duality, which is so intuitive, …

Bold by me.

There. Do you see that? Mind-body duality. Not compatibilism. Mind-body duality. She is addressing mind-body duality and not compatibilism.

I don't think you understand that it's not only mind-body dualism that she refers to. That is one aspect of the issue. That there is nothing within the system to give us the right kind of regulative control and a claim to free will.

Determinism doesn't allow compatibility, and there is no mind-body duality, homuculus or whatever to provide the right kind of regulatory control. What the brain does as a rational system is it, no alternate actions, no free will agency

Let me reiterate that she goes on to write:

I don’t think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will!

Right. The opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will. This is also the compatibilist position. Her use of “free will” is obviously directed toward dualist/libertarian free will. Because again, she goes on to write:

The compatibilist position asserts that 'acting in accordance with one's will, without external force or coercion' is an example of free will....regardless of the fact that will itself is fixed prior to action, that will has no agency beyond the conscious drive or prompt to act.

Once again:

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.'' - cold comfort in compatibilism.


''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

How amazing (though unsurprising) that in your latest response to me about Farah, you ignored the falling compatibilist quotes from Farah:

MF:__ Depends what you mean by agency... If you think of a computer selecting certain actions based on a combination of inputs and stored information about goals etc, then there is a (not too head-spinny) sense in which the computer is the agent selecting the actions.

Of course, what makes the computer that kind of agent that it is, making the selections that it does, is its whole history -- how it was designed, what kind of goals and knowledge have been programmed in, etc. -- But it is the computer, in its current state, that is selecting and so it seems reasonable to say it is the locus of the rational decision.)

One advantage of focusing on rationality rather than free will is that it enables us to retain the concept of moral and legal responsibility.

If someone is rational and is not under coercion (eg someone holds a gun to your head and says you'll be shot if you don't do X) then it is reasonable to hold him or her responsible...

Why did you not address those quotes?

These quotes show that she is a compatibilist (whether she describes herself that way or not) and that her positions align with ours and not yours.

 

[pood]

And I note, of course, that you still fail to withdraw your baseless claim that I said or implied that in order for us to have free will, then we cannot be computers or like computers. I never said or implied this, as I’ve shown.

 

[pood]

You see, when she writes, “One advantage of focusing on rationality rather than free will is that it enables us to retain the concept of moral and legal responsibility,” etc., this just IS the definition of compatibilism, and she then says exactly the same thing that Marvin and I and others have been saying. She does not address “regulative control” and other such nonsense — you are putitng words into her mouth. Her position is entirely compatibilist. She prefers to call it “rationality” in opposition to libertarian/contra-causal/dualist accounts of free will, and she explicitly says that.

 

[Jarhyn]

You see, when she writes, “One advantage of focusing on rationality rather than free will is that it enables us to retain the concept of moral and legal responsibility,” etc., this just IS the definition of compatibilism, and she then says exactly the same thing that Marvin and I and others have been saying. She does not address “regulative control” and other such nonsense — you are putitng words into her mouth. Her position is entirely compatibilist. She prefers to call it “rationality” in opposition to libertarian/contra-causal/dualist accounts of free will, and she explicitly says that.

Indeed it is. I find this position of hers that discounts the words "free" and "will" as useful elements of an applicable "hard math" (as opposed to say, philosophy, a form of "soft math") on the concept.

In short there needs to be a way to both discuss the instructions, (as a black box if you must, in any form they happen to take), and the requirement (much the same) of whatever "rationality process" one wishes to be invoking instead of "free" and "will".

It is a pointless aversion to a useful pair of words that frankly you still need words for to discuss the concept of moral and legal responsibility at its most fundamental levels.

Honestly, I would rather have discussions about moral and legal responsibility from these fundamental levels. Once we have "free" and "will" laid down as concepts within system theory, we can advance against solipsism, and discuss how the hierarchy of needs factors into all this, and then maybe get to "love your neighbor" in my preferred form "pursue mutually compatible self-actualization bounded on symmetrical informed consent". I would like to get there in a conversation here, within my lifetime. Probably not in this thread.

I could probably turn my contributions to this thread into a masters thesis though, which would be fun.

 

[DBT]

Did you miss the part where information is acquired and processed before will is formed and determined by neuronal interactions within the system, which do not involve will?

Did you miss the part where the system which acquires and processes the information is itself operating on a series of instructions, will unto a requirement?

A load of Crock. The system, as all the evidence shows, operates according to its physical makeup, neural architecture.....which if damaged or altered, chemical imbalances, lesions, connectivity failures, etc, etc, alters mind, consciousness and actions according to the nature and extent of the damage or change.

This is well supported, I have provided ample case studies, experiments, analysis by experts in the field.....yet you assert that BS.

You begin with a flawed assumption - to put it mildly - in an attempt to build a foundation for free will and it just goes downhill ever after.

Brain basics;

The Architecture of the Brain​

''The brain is like a committee of experts. All the parts of the brain work together, but each part has its own special properties. The brain can be divided into three basic units: the forebrain, the midbrain, and the hindbrain.

The hindbrain includes the upper part of the spinal cord, the brain stem, and a wrinkled ball of tissue called the cerebellum (1). The hindbrain controls the body’s vital functions such as respiration and heart rate. The cerebellum coordinates movement and is involved in learned rote movements. When you play the piano or hit a tennis ball you are activating the cerebellum. The uppermost part of the brainstem is the midbrain, which controls some reflex actions and is part of the circuit involved in the control of eye movements and other voluntary movements...''

 

[DBT]

Can you answer a simple question? Is a determined action freely chosen or willed or not? Yes or No?

Free from what?

You obviously can't mean free from deterministic influences because you've stipulated that the action is determined. So. free from what?

Free from what? I specified 'freely chosen' or 'freely willed.' Don't you understand what 'freely chosen or willed' implies? Does 'free to choose' not mean that you have multiple options available to you? That you are able to- being free to choose - pick any one of them as you will or please?

If not, what is freedom?

 

[DBT]

And I note, of course, that you still fail to withdraw your baseless claim that I said or implied that in order for us to have free will, then we cannot be computers or like computers. I never said or implied this, as I’ve shown.

Or maybe you are misinterpreting what I said. I don't recall the details. It would help if you quote the comment in question so that I can see what was said......

 

[DBT]

You see, when she writes, “One advantage of focusing on rationality rather than free will is that it enables us to retain the concept of moral and legal responsibility,” etc., this just IS the definition of compatibilism, and she then says exactly the same thing that Marvin and I and others have been saying. She does not address “regulative control” and other such nonsense — you are putitng words into her mouth. Her position is entirely compatibilist. She prefers to call it “rationality” in opposition to libertarian/contra-causal/dualist accounts of free will, and she explicitly says that.

Rationality does not equate to free will. The state and workings of the system determines output, not will, wish or free will, to be of sound mind. Sociopaths may have an otherwise functional brain, intelligent, but are unable to feel empathy or care for others, a deficiency in brain function that allows them to kill, steal, rape or torture with a clear conscience.

Legal responsibility is not a matter of free will, but a functional brain.

Again:
Free Will as a Matter of Law
''This chapter confronts the issue of free will in neurolaw, rejecting one of the leading views of the relationship between free will and legal responsibility on the ground that the current system of legal responsibility likely emerged from outdated views about the mind, mental states, and free will. It challenges the compatibilist approach to law (in which free will and causal determinism can coexist). The chapter argues that those who initially developed the criminal law endorsed or presupposed views about mind and free will that modern neuroscience will aid in revealing as false. It then argues for the relevance of false presuppositions embedded in the original development of the criminal law in judging whether to revise or maintain the current system. In doing so, the chapter shares the view that neuroscientific developments will change the way we think about criminal responsibility.''

 

[The AntiChris]

Can you answer a simple question? Is a determined action freely chosen or willed or not? Yes or No?

Free from what?

You obviously can't mean free from deterministic influences because you've stipulated that the action is determined. So. free from what?

Free from what? I specified 'freely chosen' or 'freely willed.' Don't you understand what 'freely chosen or willed' implies? Does 'free to choose' not mean that you have multiple options available to you? That you are able to- being free to choose - pick any one of them as you will or please?

You're absolutely correct - it's called compatibilism!

 

[Jarhyn]

A load of Crock

And yet every day, I sit down and make "the system" operate according to a will. My job, in fact, is to design the will by which that system operates such that the will SHALL be free with respect to it's requirements.

If you think it's a load of crock that this happens in reality you should get ahold of my employer and tell them they're paying me to make something for them that doesn't exist! I'm sure they'll get right on that and fire me right away.

The system, as all the evidence shows, operates according to its physical makeup, neural architecture...

... Which together contain and define "wills" and those wills shall be determined to either be "free" or "not free" with respect to the requirements of those "wills".

This is well supported, I have provided ample case studies, experiments, analysis by experts in the field.....yet you assert that BS

No, you have provided multiple assertions, none of which are actually pertinent to the discussion.

As has been pointed out all your experts are arguing against "libertarian free will" which has gone in the rubbish bin already.

You begin with a flawed assumption

The only "assumption" I begin with is seeing a guy with a piece of paper holding a list of things to do, each with a requirement after each thing and a place in the list to go to if and when that requirement is met or missed.

This is a concrete observable situation.

The list meets the definition of a "will" and trivially so, at least in the presence of a machine clearly capable of interpreting that list.

A question exists with an immediate, universal, binary answer: shall the driving requirement of the list be met?

As this is a calculable value, "freedom" is therefore a real property of the requirement. Note when I say "freedom is a property", it is a property in the form of "bool freedom;" and the value of that property may be false.

All the shit you post about the brain after that is a red herring. We can discuss how to design brains that produce and contain and hold wills and play internal games relating to contingent and provisional freedom calculations elsewhere.

But I'm not talking about that with you at this moment. Instead I'm talking about a "brain" that is already deconstructed, "the dwarf brain", which provably does not need any regulatory capacity at all other than 'will failed, process failure and generate new will (or) will succeeded process success and generate new will', and in either case this implies "freedom" as a property.

 

[DBT]

Can you answer a simple question? Is a determined action freely chosen or willed or not? Yes or No?

Free from what?

You obviously can't mean free from deterministic influences because you've stipulated that the action is determined. So. free from what?

Free from what? I specified 'freely chosen' or 'freely willed.' Don't you understand what 'freely chosen or willed' implies? Does 'free to choose' not mean that you have multiple options available to you? That you are able to- being free to choose - pick any one of them as you will or please?

You're absolutely correct - it's called compatibilism!

That's not the definition of compatibilism. Which does not allow alternate actions. I don't mean to sound harsh, but your remark suggests that you still don't understand compatibilism, determinism or incompatibilism.

Perhaps you can have a go at answering the question? Can a determined action be freely willed? Yes or no?

If yes, how is it freely willed? How does it work?

 

[Jarhyn]

That's not the definition of compatibilism

Not only assertion fallacies about what determinism must imply but now assertion fallacies about what compatibilism is and is not defined as!

Which does not allow alternate actions.

Does not allow alternative actions to be realized. Does allow alternative actions to be considered.

One will is (possibly) free, the rest are absolutely not free.

I don't mean to sound harsh, but your remark suggests that you still don't understand compatibilism, determinism or incompatibilism.

Perhaps you can have a go at actually operating the calculation of freedom on a will, and actually see of it makes sense and allows you to derive "responsibility" for an event.

how is it freely willed

The alternative that is chosen, assuming that alternative actually happens, is freely willed because it is "willed" and the will was "free" insofar as it met it's requirement.

We, or at least I and perhaps others, have explained how the logic and sentence construction works, indicates momentary universal binaries, does not involve any actual contradictions, and provides real leverage in the consideration of wills so as to prevent wasted effort and take measures to "unacceptable wills" from possibly being free.

We have presented you with a math that describes real properties and relationships such that the knowledge of these properties and relationships give real leverage so as to waste less energy and have fewer risks of being made dead or otherwise have a number of wills made permanently unfree.

 

[DBT]

A load of Crock

And yet every day, I sit down and make "the system" operate according to a will. My job, in fact, is to design the will by which that system operates such that the will SHALL be free with respect to it's requirements.

You remain confused over the distinctions between will and function, rationality and free will.

The brain operates according to its physical makeup, which is not chosen, not will. Will doesn't operate at that level. You don't will your genetic makeup, neural architecture or electrochemical activity. It is these things that shape and form you, your thoughts, will and actions. All determined before you are aware.

If you think it's a load of crock that this happens in reality you should get ahold of my employer and tell them they're paying me to make something for them that doesn't exist! I'm sure they'll get right on that and fire me right away.

Jarhyn running blindly through the brambles again.

A hint: nobody is claiming that we can't think or act, that we can't respond rationally to our environment - that is the evolutionary role of a brain - but the deterministic nature and means by which that interaction is achieved, that will doesn't play a regulatory role within the system. That will doesn't have the right regulative control to support a claim for free will.

All of this has been explained, experiments, case studies, expert analysis, etc, provided, yet your comments suggest that you haven't understood a word.