What is free will?

[pood]

''Think of someone that you dislike. Let’s call this person X. Now, imagine that you were born with X’s “genetic material.” That is, imagine that you had X’s looks, body odor, inherent tastes, intelligence, aptitudes, etc. Imagine, further, that you had X’s upbringing and life experiences as well; so, imagine that you had X’s parents growing up, and that you grew up in the same country, city, and neighborhood in which X grew up, etc.

Would behave any differently from how X behaves?

Most people realize, perhaps after a moment of startled pause, that the answer to the question is “No.”

The question helps people realize that their thoughts and actions are determined entirely by their genetic and social conditioning. In other words, it helps people intuitively grasp the idea that free will is an illusion.''

Understanding that free will is an illusion means recognizing that people behave in the only way they know how. As such, it is important to realize that, when people act in harmful ways, it is because they are ignorant of the forces that actually shape their thoughts and behaviors.''

Hmm, written by an associate professor of … marketing? At a business school?

Why is this in Psychology Today?

But no matter. Just because he has no credentialed expertise in the subject under discussion, doesn’t mean he’s wrong. No. Rather, he’s wrong because he’s wrong, regardless of his credentials.

In fact, his whole essay is a big fat red herring, because no one disputes that we are products of our nature and nurture, our genes and upbringing. We didn’t get to choose those. We didn’t even get to choose to be born.

The question has never been whether we got to choose any of those things. The question is whether we can choose what to have for dinner, and many, many other things besides.

And we can! We do it every day!

The fact that we may be inclined to avoid liver for dinner, for example, because our particular DNA finds liver unsavory (too bitter, or whatever — I personally loathe liver) is totally irrelevant to the discussion at hand. The compatibilist agrees that our actions are based on antecedent causes, including our genetic makeup and how we were raised. It has to be that way — how else are we going to decide what to do? The compatibilist does not repudiate causally determined factors —he/she embraces them. We require determinism in order for our choices and acts to be causally efficacious.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I put it to you that you don't really understand either one. If you really understood compatibilism, you'd understand its fatal flaws and shaky foundation.

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof goes like this:

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Compatibilism is simple. It begins with the recognition that free will is a deterministic event, just like every other event in the causal chain. However, the meaningful and relevant causes of that freely chosen will happen to be located within us. Our own goals and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences. All of that makes up who and what we are. And all of that is the determinant that causally necessitates the chosen intent. In other words, the meaningful and relevant cause is us, and no other object in the physical universe.

Marvin, we have been through this a number of times. It's a matter of semantics, premises, brain function/the nature of decision making within a determined system, the role of will, agency, etc.....which does not point to free will as something that makes a difference within a determined system where all actions proceed as determined but not willed.

You've yet to understand the social function of free will. Free will distinguishes between a person's deliberate actions versus their coerced actions versus their insane actions. These are three separate causes, each with a different correction mechanism: Rehabilitation for the deliberate act, Remove the threat for coercion, Medically and psychiatrically treat the mental illness.

All three of these would be equally causally necessary from any prior point in time. However, they cannot be treated effectively using the same method.

Therefore, the distinction is meaningful and relevant, even in a fully deterministic universe.

 

[The AntiChris]

The wording doesn't change what is being asked.

Of course it does.

"Is X free?" is not the same as "can X be free?".

''Is x free'' assumes that x can be free.

And "Can X be free?" makes no such assumption. As I said, they're asking different things.

Just because you don't understand the question (or pretend not to)

I can assure that all my questioning is in good faith. As I told you earlier, I'm attempting to understand the reasoning behind your criticism of compatibilism.

The problem for me is that all your responses appear to be directed at debunking libertarian (contra causal) free will (which seems odd since compatibilists agree with you that libertarian free will makes no sense).

What I'm not at all convinced of is that you have the faintest clue about compatibilism.

I do understand it, far better than you. Which is why I am an incompatibilist.

I know bluster is your style but it really would be good if you could ask questions about compatibilism which demonstrated that you know your subject.

 

[fromderinside]

Why not presume what you find is determined by the how you measure it.

And then you misunderstood the slit experiment findings.

It is not determined by how it is measured, it is determined by what happened. It is not the "measurement" that determined it, but rather the constraining interaction.

In the double slit experiment the fundamental difference is that the particle has an interaction thus constraining the probability wave.

It is not about the "measurement", but rather about the "interaction".

Again you fail to understand the implications that "freedom" is about "what actually happened", not about "what someone thinks may happen" even if we have some idea of what we think may happen.

As I've discussed, the dwarf has "one systemic input one systemic output" yet still has a will and that will is still concretely free or concretely not-free determined by the actual physical arrangement of the machine at the time of execution.

It is nothing about "how you measure". To even have this conversation, the "real measurement" literally has to be considered by a "hypothetical superphysical god" who measures not by operating the system but by pausing it and looking at it's state, not by "interacting" as per the slit experiment.

It pertains to observing instantaneous state.

Of course, humans can't do that. Godel's Incompleteness Theorem states we cannot but moreover physics itself prevents us from looking because for us looking changes things.

When I observe whether the door is locked, I'm not observing whether a thing "returned" true or false. I'm not using the physical interactions of the system to "measure", as in a report and an interaction. Rather I'm discussing instantaneous field states observed universally and noninteractively.

This means that while there is in fact a freedom value, we can never ever look directly at it, at least for our own. Thanks Godel...

To be fair, there's a slight statistical chance that looking at the dwarf's freedom will alter it, but I can look at it with much more confidence on behalf of the statistical smoothing created by transistor activation thresholds: there's no reasonable way a change in that microstate will actually impact the simulation's microstate which is in our universe determined by a macrostate.

In short I'm not discussing "measuring", I discussing "extraphysically observed instantaneous field states".

Actually you're making up an explanation for accommodating different measurements of essentially the same phenomenon yielding different answers. Sabine explains it well.

 

[DBT]

''Think of someone that you dislike. Let’s call this person X. Now, imagine that you were born with X’s “genetic material.” That is, imagine that you had X’s looks, body odor, inherent tastes, intelligence, aptitudes, etc. Imagine, further, that you had X’s upbringing and life experiences as well; so, imagine that you had X’s parents growing up, and that you grew up in the same country, city, and neighborhood in which X grew up, etc.

Would behave any differently from how X behaves?

Most people realize, perhaps after a moment of startled pause, that the answer to the question is “No.”

The question helps people realize that their thoughts and actions are determined entirely by their genetic and social conditioning. In other words, it helps people intuitively grasp the idea that free will is an illusion.''

Understanding that free will is an illusion means recognizing that people behave in the only way they know how. As such, it is important to realize that, when people act in harmful ways, it is because they are ignorant of the forces that actually shape their thoughts and behaviors.''

Hmm, written by an associate professor of … marketing? At a business school?

Why is this in Psychology Today?

But no matter. Just because he has no credentialed expertise in the subject under discussion, doesn’t mean he’s wrong. No. Rather, he’s wrong because he’s wrong, regardless of his credentials.

So rather than consider what is being said, you question the credentials of the writer.....then whenever I posted quotes and articles by experts in their field....you reject that because they neither 'understand compatibilism,' they are compatibilists but don't know it, or - apparently - what they are talking about.

I guess that only compatibilists can be trusted, no matter their qualifications or lack of them.

In fact, his whole essay is a big fat red herring, because no one disputes that we are products of our nature and nurture, our genes and upbringing. We didn’t get to choose those. We didn’t even get to choose to be born.

Which means that what we do is determined by all these things....and not freely willed. That, in case you haven't yet grasped, being the whole point

The question has never been whether we got to choose any of those things. The question is whether we can choose what to have for dinner, and many, many other things besides.

And we can! We do it every day!

Nobody is suggesting that the brain constantly selects options, the issue is the nature of the process, freely willed or fixed by prior states and conditions of the system.

The latter being supported by both evidence from neuroscience and the implications of determinism, that there are no alternate actions within a determined system.

A computer is a rational system that can choose this or that option based on sets of criteria, each selection determined by the information with no possible alternate choice in any given instance.

Decisions are determined, not freely willed.

The fact that we may be inclined to avoid liver for dinner, for example, because our particular DNA finds liver unsavory (too bitter, or whatever — I personally loathe liver) is totally irrelevant to the discussion at hand. The compatibilist agrees that our actions are based on antecedent causes, including our genetic makeup and how we were raised. It has to be that way — how else are we going to decide what to do? The compatibilist does not repudiate causally determined factors —he/she embraces them. We require determinism in order for our choices and acts to be causally efficacious.

Proclivities are absolutely relevant because they, along with any number of other determinants, inform the decision to be made in that instance.

''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from 'hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states. So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.' - Prof. Richard Taylor

 

[Jarhyn]

whenever I posted quotes and articles by experts in their field....you reject that because they neither 'understand compatibilism,' they are compatibilists but don't know it, or - apparently - what they are talking about.

Pretty much. We have seen the actual deconstruction which PROVES this. He has posted several.

In some ways I expect the case is that only compatibilists "can be trusted" (and only some of them) to the extent here that compatibilists are right. Just like only materialists can generally be trusted to discuss certain matters relating to the material nature of reality because... Wait for it .. materialists are right.

It's not our fault that you picked a nonsensical religion to believe in.

Plenty of lauded physicists and even neuroscientists are Christians.

And those christians are generally dead fucking wrong.

Which means that what we do is determined by all these things....and not freely willed

And then you step back into false dichotomy with a not-even-wrong.

Again, it is determined by antecedent causes, yes, and one of those antecedent causes is WILL. The will has a requirement. If the requirement is missed, the will was not free with respect to the requirement but that doesn't mean the will didn't execute, was not still part of why the effect was caused.

As such will does not need to even be free to be an antecedent cause.

Your continuing desire to shoehorn "freely" in front of "willed" when we continue to tell you why this is not a valid construction reveals that you continue to not understand anything significant about the compatibilist position.

There is exactly one thing that could "disprove compatibilism". You can either attempt that thing, or you can continue to reveal yourself as a believer of a religion.

That thing is to actually take our definitions of "free" and "will", construct a valid sentence that evaluates to "true and false in same way".

No will is expected to be free of causal necessity by a compatibilist. None. It does not have to be free of it. In fact, in compatibilism, without causal necessity a will cannot be free nor constrained because there cannot be a will: you could not in any way imagine that an action could lead to a requirement, or of the requirement having any necessity of being met by the action!

freely willed or fixed by prior states and conditions of the system

See and you keep doing "the false dichotomy".

For something to be willed at all it is AND.

The dwarf is in a deterministic universe where it's actions are fixed by prior states and it's actions are willed. Whether those actions are "freely willed" depends on whether any individual will is free.

I have even given you a few examples of universes wherein no will is free or constrained except "the will to win" which is determined on entirely randomly (re: snakes and ladders)

with no possible alternate choice in any given instance.

With no REAL alternative free choice, but plenty of conditionally or provisionally free choices in plenty of instances.

We have discussed this, but to discuss it again, I'm going to use your example about "think about someone you dislike, then become them"

The compatibilist description of the operation, in completeness:

"Create a will to become Vlad".

"Somehow execute that will"

This means that in becoming becoming Vlad The Lobotomized, I will have executed exactly one free will.

In exercising that will ALL other wills I held will be determined as unfree, and ALL incoming wills will be "the set of Vlad the Lobotomized's wills".

And now I have will again... But now those are the wills Vlad had which amount to "react reflexively". Not very fun, I guess. I won't have wills anywhere near as likely to be free.

But I still have free wills: I'm not "free" to be anything other than what I am in that moment, but what I am is someone who holds wills, some of which are free.

Proclivities are absolutely relevant because they, along with any number of other determinants, inform the decision to be made in that instance

No, sorry, it's a red herring. It has already been discussed as not relevant once the will is held. It doesn't matter why it was held at this stage of the conversation. Discussing WHY someone did something WHY they hold THAT will is not germane to whether that will which they hold is "free".

The determinant of that is whether the will is fulfilled, or whether the will is unfulfilled, as per it's attached requirement.

At any rate, you are wrong insofar as we can decide our dominant proclivities and moreover, we each have within us the power of abnegation against our proclivities.

I'm entirely capable of having personal priorities over my body priorities.

In many cases this is a third definition of "will": how much leverage "you" have to override "your proclivities".

In this definition, it's really more of a scalar, the measurement between two opposed forces and a threshold between which decision is made.

Unless otherwise stated, this is also not what compatibilists are talking about when we discuss "will" or at least not what I discuss. That's actually "force of will", when I address it.

And before you try it, "force of free will" is not a valid construction either.

Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states

The agent is the thing cogitating on the will. Sometimes that does, in fact, exert control over what will impact their future cognitive state.

Just as I pointed out that the agent, in operation of a will, determined future wills such that the selective system was made more likely to pick wills that would be free.

We have occasion to determine our proclivities, even if in that occasion we could never have determined them any other way than they were.

 

[Jarhyn]

Actually

To be fair in guilty of the "akshully" too. But still.

No, I'm not discussing different ways of "measuring" it giving different results.

When the person inside the system is "measuring" they are not looking at the thing without corrupting the state They are corrupting the thing. You even discuss this, insofar as the neurons are not the thing either.
.

What the person measures is a neural weight that measures a... ...That measures a particle that interacted with the particle you wanted to 'measure'.

You are fundamentally not 'measuring' under even the same definition of 'measurement' as is necessary to discuss instantaneous field states.

One is an operation of a physical interaction and taking the causal implications of that information carrying through. It is not the measurement you would want to take of the double slit experiment.

You're taking your next best swing, when you "measure" through an interaction event.

One operation is "peek" and the other is "pop". Pop changes the system so is less than ideal, and Peek is not available to us.

We in our metaphysics and philosophy on the matter -- which you yourself posted a video to yourself which should have told you in your own words not to do that (and I don't give a shit what you tell me to do or not do so I ignore it) -- have looked at the hypothetical ideal from the view of a "god of simulation" who can hit stop, and do a peek.

In short you have yet again conflated.

This seems a theme among hard determinists.

And you don't seem to realize that I brought up "super determinism" myself already as "just-so determinism", and have several times explained why all stochastic systems can be treated as "just-so determinism" and even discussed all the particular reasons this poses no threat to letting "free" be "when requirements of the noun shall be met" and letting "will" be "a series of instructions unto a requirement" and operating on these to understand the continuity and incidental responsibility of localities of the determined system for given events.

It's almost like I understand her argument better than you do, perhaps...

 

[pood]

''Think of someone that you dislike. Let’s call this person X. Now, imagine that you were born with X’s “genetic material.” That is, imagine that you had X’s looks, body odor, inherent tastes, intelligence, aptitudes, etc. Imagine, further, that you had X’s upbringing and life experiences as well; so, imagine that you had X’s parents growing up, and that you grew up in the same country, city, and neighborhood in which X grew up, etc.

Would behave any differently from how X behaves?

Most people realize, perhaps after a moment of startled pause, that the answer to the question is “No.”

The question helps people realize that their thoughts and actions are determined entirely by their genetic and social conditioning. In other words, it helps people intuitively grasp the idea that free will is an illusion.''

Understanding that free will is an illusion means recognizing that people behave in the only way they know how. As such, it is important to realize that, when people act in harmful ways, it is because they are ignorant of the forces that actually shape their thoughts and behaviors.''

Hmm, written by an associate professor of … marketing? At a business school?

Why is this in Psychology Today?

But no matter. Just because he has no credentialed expertise in the subject under discussion, doesn’t mean he’s wrong. No. Rather, he’s wrong because he’s wrong, regardless of his credentials.

So rather than consider what is being said, you question the credentials of the writer.....then whenever I posted quotes and articles by experts in their field....you reject that because they neither 'understand compatibilism,' they are compatibilists but don't know it, or - apparently - what they are talking about.

I guess that only compatibilists can be trusted, no matter their qualifications or lack of them.

You know, this is really weird. You write this little preamble in which you begin, “rather than consider what is being said …” But I DID consider what was said, as you yourself acknowledged by going on to attempt to rebut my consideration of what the author said! So why did you write a preamble charging me with something I didn’t do?

I also explicitly said that I did not think that the author was wrong BECAUSE he lacked credentials -- that would be ad hom. I said he was wrong BECAUSE of his argument, not his credentials. And then I went on to show why, the very thing you falsely claimed I did not do. Why do you behave this way? Is it because the big bang made you do it?

I only raised his credentials because I find it odd that Psychology Today would publish a screed by a specialist in marketing. I would have assumed that they would publish stuff by psychologists. Still, I reiterate that I never said that he was wrong BECAUSE he is a specialist in marketing. It’s right there in my own words! How could you have overlooked them?

And yes, as a matter of fact, many of the people you quote are indeed addressing libertarianism and not compatiblism. I showed you that with Farah IN HER OWN WORDS. How did you overlook that? You know, the part about us being morally responsible for our actions provided that we are not coerced, which is almost WORD FOR WORD what we and espeically Marvin has been telling you hundreds of times? How can you possibly deny that Farah is a compatibilist? Her whole and entire target, as she said herself is a dualist conception of free will, and for the millionth time, compatibilists agree with her that dualism is false.

Finally, why do you keep posting that stupid, trollish little image? It’s very childish and no one else here drops in a dumb, taunting image in place of an argument. In fact, except for you, no one else here carpet bombs the thread with quotes from others, many of whom ironically do not even agree with you. We prefer to argue in our own words.

Oh, I know, the big bang makes you do that too, right?

 

[Jarhyn]

''Think of someone that you dislike. Let’s call this person X. Now, imagine that you were born with X’s “genetic material.” That is, imagine that you had X’s looks, body odor, inherent tastes, intelligence, aptitudes, etc. Imagine, further, that you had X’s upbringing and life experiences as well; so, imagine that you had X’s parents growing up, and that you grew up in the same country, city, and neighborhood in which X grew up, etc.

Would behave any differently from how X behaves?

Most people realize, perhaps after a moment of startled pause, that the answer to the question is “No.”

The question helps people realize that their thoughts and actions are determined entirely by their genetic and social conditioning. In other words, it helps people intuitively grasp the idea that free will is an illusion.''

Understanding that free will is an illusion means recognizing that people behave in the only way they know how. As such, it is important to realize that, when people act in harmful ways, it is because they are ignorant of the forces that actually shape their thoughts and behaviors.''

Hmm, written by an associate professor of … marketing? At a business school?

Why is this in Psychology Today?

But no matter. Just because he has no credentialed expertise in the subject under discussion, doesn’t mean he’s wrong. No. Rather, he’s wrong because he’s wrong, regardless of his credentials.

So rather than consider what is being said, you question the credentials of the writer.....then whenever I posted quotes and articles by experts in their field....you reject that because they neither 'understand compatibilism,' they are compatibilists but don't know it, or - apparently - what they are talking about.

I guess that only compatibilists can be trusted, no matter their qualifications or lack of them.

You know, this is really weird. You write this little preamble in which you begin, “rather than consider what is being said …” But I DID consider what was said, as you yourself acknowledged by going on to attempt to rebut my consideration of what the author said! So why did you write a preamble charging me with something I didn’t do?

I also explicitly said that I did not think that the author was wrong BECAUSE he lacked credentials -- that would be ad hom. I said he was wrong BECAUSE of his argument, not his credentials. And then I went on to show why, the very thing you falsely claimed I did not do. Why do you behave this way? Is it because the big bang made you do it?

I only raised his credentials because I find it odd that Psychology Today would publish a screed by a specialist in marketing. I would have assumed that they would publish stuff by psychologists. Still, I reiterate that I never said that he was wrong BECAUSE he is a specialist in marketing. It’s right there in my own words! How could you have overlooked them?

And yes, as a matter of fact, many of the people you quote are indeed addressing libertarianism and not compatiblism. I showed you that with Farah IN HER OWN WORDS. How did you overlook that? You know, the part about us being morally responsible for our actions provided that we are not coerced, which is almost WORD FOR WORD what we and espeically Marvin has been telling you hundreds of times? How can you possibly deny that Farah is a compatibilist? Her whole and entire target, as she said herself is a dualist conception of free will, and for the millionth time, compatibilists agree with her that dualism is false.

Finally, why do you keep posting that stupid, trollish little image? It’s very childish and no one else here drops in a dumb, taunting image in place of an argument. In fact, except for you, no one else here carpet bombs the thread with quotes from others, many of whom ironically do not even agree with you. We prefer to argue in our own words.

Oh, I know, the big bang makes you do that too, right?

So, there is an interesting observation that might be made, insofar that I expect some people to actually be incapable of what we could consider "compatibilist wills that are held due to a recurrent process".

I discuss this in a few other posts with the term "Chinese room operation" or more commonly "Chinese room". I note it's a term I would like to replace, but until I know another meme that communicates it in a searchable way online, that's what I'm stuck with.

My will "to call it otherwise in that way immediately", is currently unfree.

Essentially, it is the operation of self as an "ignorant lookup table".

This IS in fact how a lot of people operate: some thing happens, some will slides down the chute, they do that thing. No requirement involved. Then something happens a will slides down the chute...

Some people well and truly operate this way.

Look at DBT's behavior: an argument for compatibilism happens. A will slides down the chute to "find a smart-ish seeming hard determinist and post their arguments". The result is assumed to be "success"; there really is no requirement.

Then they see something didn't change and then the next time a will tumbles out of the chute there is a mysteriously different parameter: different expert, recombination of tropes.

There is indeed a system that is constructing the will, the will has a real freedom value, but they aren't concerned with calculating or understanding that. It's literally, actually coming from "someone else in their skull who won't directly talk about it".

The narrator kind of throws a wrench in that belief and it's why he is attempting to attack the narrator with claims of unreliability.

They wish to believe (and perhaps PERHAPS their brain really does not have "the wiring for it", but I doubt it) that they lack the ability to kick back the will or improvise on it once they have it "from the chute".

They don't realize there is a possible negotiation available between "sourcing" and "fulfillment", and that it is the logic and game theory of this negotiation that ethics and morality discusses.

Of course there doesn't need to be such a negotiation for compatibilist free will:

The dwarf has no such negotiation and still has a will and that will still has a fixed freedom value.

Then the system spews "but I have no control over which wills tumble down the chute, I can only merely follow them" when asked not to fulfill those wills, as if the point was not specifically to say "yes you can, quit acting like a petulant child and learn some fucking abnegation or we will yeet you."

 

[DBT]

''Think of someone that you dislike. Let’s call this person X. Now, imagine that you were born with X’s “genetic material.” That is, imagine that you had X’s looks, body odor, inherent tastes, intelligence, aptitudes, etc. Imagine, further, that you had X’s upbringing and life experiences as well; so, imagine that you had X’s parents growing up, and that you grew up in the same country, city, and neighborhood in which X grew up, etc.

Would behave any differently from how X behaves?

Most people realize, perhaps after a moment of startled pause, that the answer to the question is “No.”

The question helps people realize that their thoughts and actions are determined entirely by their genetic and social conditioning. In other words, it helps people intuitively grasp the idea that free will is an illusion.''

Understanding that free will is an illusion means recognizing that people behave in the only way they know how. As such, it is important to realize that, when people act in harmful ways, it is because they are ignorant of the forces that actually shape their thoughts and behaviors.''

Hmm, written by an associate professor of … marketing? At a business school?

Why is this in Psychology Today?

But no matter. Just because he has no credentialed expertise in the subject under discussion, doesn’t mean he’s wrong. No. Rather, he’s wrong because he’s wrong, regardless of his credentials.

So rather than consider what is being said, you question the credentials of the writer.....then whenever I posted quotes and articles by experts in their field....you reject that because they neither 'understand compatibilism,' they are compatibilists but don't know it, or - apparently - what they are talking about.

I guess that only compatibilists can be trusted, no matter their qualifications or lack of them.

You know, this is really weird. You write this little preamble in which you begin, “rather than consider what is being said …” But I DID consider what was said, as you yourself acknowledged by going on to attempt to rebut my consideration of what the author said! So why did you write a preamble charging me with something I didn’t do?

Well, it doesn't appear like you consider what was said. Your response has every appearance of an unconsidered rejection of anything related to incompatibilism, be it from neuroscience or philosophy, be it people qualified or unqualified, if qualified, they don't understand compatibilism, if unqualified....well they shouldn't say anything because anything they say isn't worthy of consideration, because, well they aren't qualified to comment.

It seems that nothing is acceptable when it comes to incompatibilism.

On the other hand, compatibilism, well, even the local grocer can tell us that free will is compatible with determinism and get nods of approval.

I also explicitly said that I did not think that the author was wrong BECAUSE he lacked credentials -- that would be ad hom. I said he was wrong BECAUSE of his argument, not his credentials. And then I went on to show why, the very thing you falsely claimed I did not do. Why do you behave this way? Is it because the big bang made you do it?

I only raised his credentials because I find it odd that Psychology Today would publish a screed by a specialist in marketing. I would have assumed that they would publish stuff by psychologists. Still, I reiterate that I never said that he was wrong BECAUSE he is a specialist in marketing. It’s right there in my own words! How could you have overlooked them?

You made a big show of lampooning his lack of credentials;

''Hmm, written by an associate professor of … marketing? At a business school?'' Why is this in Psychology Today?''

Then added the caveat that he is wrong regardless of his lack of credentials without explaining why he was wrong.

''But no matter. Just because he has no credentialed expertise in the subject under discussion, doesn’t mean he’s wrong. No. Rather, he’s wrong because he’s wrong, regardless of his credentials.''

He said nothing that is contrary to incompatibilism. That you don't accept the argument doesn't mean that incompatibilism is wrong.

Incompatibilism is not wrong. The reasons why it is not wrong have been described numerous times and in numerous ways.

The end result, rejected without consideration.

If there was consideration, you'd understand that will plays no role in the early stages of cognition and cannot alter outcomes when it does emerge.

Consequently, will having no agency, no regulative control, no possible alternate action, there is no claim to be made for free will. It is simply will. We have will, but it is not free.

Compatibilism's action carried out without external coercion or force is not an example of free will, just determined action freely performed as determined but not freely willed, hence not an argument for free will.

 

[fromderinside]

Actually

To be fair in guilty of the "akshully" too. But still.

No, I'm not discussing different ways of "measuring" it giving different results.

When the person inside the system is "measuring" they are not looking at the thing without corrupting the state They are corrupting the thing. You even discuss this, insofar as the neurons are not the thing either.
.

What the person measures is a neural weight that measures a... ...That measures a particle that interacted with the particle you wanted to 'measure'.

You are fundamentally not 'measuring' under even the same definition of 'measurement' as is necessary to discuss instantaneous field states.

One is an operation of a physical interaction and taking the causal implications of that information carrying through. It is not the measurement you would want to take of the double slit experiment.

You're taking your next best swing, when you "measure" through an interaction event.

One operation is "peek" and the other is "pop". Pop changes the system so is less than ideal, and Peek is not available to us.

We in our metaphysics and philosophy on the matter -- which you yourself posted a video to yourself which should have told you in your own words not to do that (and I don't give a shit what you tell me to do or not do so I ignore it) -- have looked at the hypothetical ideal from the view of a "god of simulation" who can hit stop, and do a peek.

In short you have yet again conflated.

This seems a theme among hard determinists.

And you don't seem to realize that I brought up "super determinism" myself already as "just-so determinism", and have several times explained why all stochastic systems can be treated as "just-so determinism" and even discussed all the particular reasons this poses no threat to letting "free" be "when requirements of the noun shall be met" and letting "will" be "a series of instructions unto a requirement" and operating on these to understand the continuity and incidental responsibility of localities of the determined system for given events.

It's almost like I understand her argument better than you do, perhaps...

Maybe you should read a bit.

Screams for explanation: finetuning and naturalness in the foundations of physics https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.02176.pdf​

Abstract​

We critically analyze the rationale of arguments from finetuning and naturalness in particle physics and cosmology, notably the small values of the mass of the Higgs-boson and the cosmological constant. We identify several new reasons why these arguments are not scientifically relevant. Besides laying out why the necessity to define a probability distribution renders arguments from naturalness internally contradictory, it is also explained why it is conceptually questionable to single out assumptions about dimensionless parameters from among a host of other assumptions. Some other numerological coincidences and their problems are also discussed.

 

[Jarhyn]

Well, it doesn't appear like you consider what was said

Then you are not really reading his posts for comprehension but rather merely to attack.

Your response has every appearance of an unconsidered rejection of anything related to incompatibilism

No, it has the appearance of a very considered rejection of incompatibilist, as does Marvin's as does Antichris's. I'm not going to claim mine do because generally, your posts DON'T require a lot of consideration.

I wonder, could you even describe your own pattern of actions in your post?

Your arguments from authority are unconvincing mostly because they do in fact all argue against the straw-man of libertarian free will.

It would be like, well, a Christian coming here and then arguing "a bunch of experts all agree" and then every time the "expert", someone very respected perhaps even in their field, retreats back to Kalam or a variation, and then perhaps make a Watchmaker argument.

The Christian might say exactly the same sorts of garbage as you have here "you didn't consider it!"

Of course we considered it. And we rejected it AFTER the consideration, and most of us have even had the kindness to supply the logical deconstructions along with the text "and so I reject this".

All your posts argue of your capabilities is: look up what someone else who facially agreed with DBT said, post their words, then repeat otherwise unargued premises.

It seems that nothing is acceptable when it comes to incompatibilism

I've told you want is acceptable: taking an otherwise "valid" construction of the concepts of compatibilism and ending up with "true = false".

That IS in fact how you disprove something in a system of modal operation.

On the other hand, compatibilism, well, even the local grocer can tell us that free will is compatible with determinism and get nods of approval

Show us the "local grocer" you are trying to reference, please.

All I see here are people who have studied religion, belief, physics, and modal logic very honestly and intently most of their lives, philosophers who do not merely buy a philosophy off the shelf like some Religionist and head off into the wilds of untamed self-directed thought and pull out something real and substantive on a regular basis from that Chaos.

I'm a software engineer and mathematician who taught themselves enough to construct a prime locating function in infinite product terms that doesn't converge to 0, and who is working on formalizing ethics as a math.

Pood is an author who... Well, he's got his own blog and has published several books.

Marvin... Well, as you can see I correct him here and there and I call his reasoning "sloppy".

You're going to find no "local grocers" here. You came to the wrong place if that's who you wish to "convince".

Have you considered looking in a mirror by chance while reminding yourself it is not a window?

And yes, as a matter of fact, many of the people you quote are indeed addressing libertarianism and not compatiblism. I showed you that with Farah IN HER OWN WORDS. How did you overlook that? You know, the part about us being morally responsible for our actions provided that we are not coerced, which is almost WORD FOR WORD what we and espeically Marvin has been telling you hundreds of times? How can you possibly deny that Farah is a compatibilist? Her whole and entire target, as she said herself is a dualist conception of free will, and for the millionth time, compatibilists agree with her that dualism is false

This is the argument and much more of this argument lives in Pood's blog links.

This is the argument you keep snipping out and ignoring.

You seem to be unable to get from "none of these people have argued at all against anything but Libertarian" to realizing that if you can't actually align an argument properly against compatibism, maybe it is the case that there is no argument that you can align, and that you are sitting in your own Atheist Kalam.

Incompatibilism is not wrong

And there's the statement of absolutely faith we always knew you were gearing up for.

We keep saying "we think compatibilism is right because we see no contradiction in the modalities" and then you throw... Invalid constructions back.

I have yet to see you say "oh, you mean compatibilism means I can't follow the word "willed" with "freely?" I guess I'll stop doing that then."

One more time (and for @Marvin Edwards too): "freely willed" as a construction of utterances is a mistake. "A free will".

How is a free will free? It is free because it met it's requirements. The agent, again has no control over that beyond selecting a will that always was never going to be constrained.

It's like someone winning the lottery. Did they make themselves win? Could they have done anything differently in their picking of the specific numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, because they are an idiot and have insecure luggage? Could they have exercised any operation at all adjacent to picking 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 that would have made them lose beyond "fixing the roller"?

Of course not. It isn't up to them whether their will to win the lottery is free. The only way for an agent to have a "will which is free" is either to select requirements that cannot fail, or a will that will succeed at it's requirements.

There is no way for the lottery winner, or anyone else, to "freely will". They may "will", and causal necessity determines whether their "internal illusion of freedom" was also "real freedom".

rejected without consideration

If the above is not consideration, I wonder what your strategy of finding "experts" and putting "argument from authority" and gems like "Incompatibilism is not wrong" on tap is

will plays no role in the early stages of cognition and cannot alter outcomes when it does emerge.

Hmm... It's almost like we do understand this. I know I just said it but maybe I have to say it again:
There is no way for the lottery winner, or anyone else, to "freely will". They may "will", and causal necessity determines whether their "internal illusion of freedom" was also "real freedom".

This is in fact a criticism insofar as you think compatibilists did not somehow already answer it.

We have you admitting here to "will".

Consequently, will having no agency, no regulative control, no possible alternate action, there is no claim to be made for free will

And again you do it, the bait and switch, where you insert libertarian free will instead of compatibilist free will.

Nobody expects the will to be the interpreter, the agent of process.

The will is not a processor, the will is a list! Lists don't need to be processors, and even the construction of "wills having no agency" means you understand neither the concept of will nor agency well.

Let me repeat:
There is no way for the lottery winner, or anyone else, to "freely will". They may "will", and causal necessity determines whether their "internal illusion of freedom" was also "real freedom".

Sometimes, the will adjusts the agent, because the will is "adjust agency in this way".

Sometimes that will is "study until you answer these questions in this timeframe".

It is a process which modifies the agent, but it is not the will doing it, it is the agent doing it to themselves, as an execution of the will.

Of course a memory on a computer that holds a list of instructions is not (generally, usefully) going to be tripping write lines on itself other than in it's refresh cycle. It may tell the processor "trip this line until the bit reads high", but it is the agent, the processor, which operates it. If the processor throws back "hit max tries, but didn't flip" the will to do so was not free...

Compatibilism's action carried out without external coercion or force is not an example of free will

And then you step in it again with the failure of a number of words starting with the "A"

"Action carried out without coercion or force is an example of A free will, IFF that action fulfills the requirement."

"Action carried out without coercion or force is an example of A will held by A free will."

These are valid constructions. Yours are not.

Yours indicate you still do not understand compatibilism.

 

[Jarhyn]

Maybe you should read a bit.

<Religious garbage that does not in any way answer my post>​

Maybe you should read a bit of my actual post and try to answer it in your own words.

I have made a whole simulated universe using... Well, so much fine tuning it would choke a piano, to put it bluntly.

Maybe a solid half gig of just-so definitions had to go into those raw files and modifying some of them would just break the whole "engine of creation". I'm glad I didn't have to write all that junk up, either. That was done by The Toady One.

It is observably a "justso" system or "superdeterminism"

Yet as I keep pointing out, those dwarves in that determinism still have wills and those wills are still free (sometimes)

Again, look up the difference between "peek" and "pop" and understand that we in this universe are using "pop" when we would rather "peek".

Of course we can only "peek" on a simulated universe.

One is not a measurement in the same definition as the other, nor cannot ever be thanks again to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

One asks "what is the system NOW entirely" and the other says "let's change the system and see what the system was, probably, even if we broke it looking".

Even the fact that you posted that garbage means you didn't read my post for comprehension.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Show us the "local grocer" you are trying to reference, please.

The local grocer is getting it right without the help of philosophy. She knows that most of the day she is making choices for herself. And she refers to that as "free will". She also knows that when the robber points a gun at her and tells her to hand over the money in the cash register that she is being forced to do something she doesn't want to do. And she does not call that "free will". So, her understanding of free will coincides with compatibilist free will, even though she's never in her life heard of "compatibilism" or "determinism".

And she takes cause and effect for granted. She knows that she is the cause of her decisions. She knows that the robber was the cause of her empty cash register. She does not speak of "causation" or "cause and effect" in abstract terms. But she knows how to answer anyone who would ask her, "What happened to the money?". She says, "I was robbed!", and lays out the series of events that took place during the robbery, one thing reliably leading to the next. And she can even recount the thoughts that went through her head during the event.

Marvin... Well, as you can see I correct him here and there and I call his reasoning "sloppy".

Oops!

You're going to find no "local grocers" here. You came to the wrong place if that's who you wish to "convince".

Actually, I like to imagine that I could explain things in a way that even the grocer could understand. Yet even Einstein would have to agree with me. Hey, I can dream can't I?

How is a free will free? It is free because it met it's requirements.

Exactly. The requirement is simply for the choice to be free from coercion and undue influence.

The agent, again has no control over that beyond selecting a will that always was never going to be constrained.

The key is that it was always going to be "constrained" to be exactly what the agent decided it would be. And that is clearly not a meaningful "constraint". The agent was always going to be the meaningful and relevant cause of the choice.

It's like someone winning the lottery. Did they make themselves win? Could they have done anything differently in their picking of the specific numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, because they are an idiot and have insecure luggage? Could they have exercised any operation at all adjacent to picking 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 that would have made them lose beyond "fixing the roller"?

Two things.
(1) It was not a matter of luck that they would choose the numbers 1,2,3,4,5. It was always causally necessary that they would. But it was always causally necessary that it would be they, themselves, who would choose those numbers, and for their own reasons.

(2) They "could" have chosen any five numbers, but they "would" only choose 1,2,3,4,5 today. The word "could" refers to an ability, whether it is exercised or not. For example, they could have chosen 5,4,3,2,1. We know this for a fact because that's the number they chose last week. The word "would" refers to what actually happened.

Of course not. It isn't up to them whether their will to win the lottery is free. The only way for an agent to have a "will which is free" is either to select requirements that cannot fail, or a will that will succeed at it's requirements.
There is no way for the lottery winner, or anyone else, to "freely will". They may "will", and causal necessity determines whether their "internal illusion of freedom" was also "real freedom".

The freedom is in the choosing of the will. The specific freedom is freedom from coercion and undue influence while choosing.

 

[Jarhyn]

Show us the "local grocer" you are trying to reference, please.

The local grocer is getting it right without the help of philosophy. She knows that most of the day she is making choices for herself. And she refers to that as "free will". She also knows that when the robber points a gun at her and tells her to hand over the money in the cash register that she is being forced to do something she doesn't want to do. And she does not call that "free will". So, her understanding of free will coincides with compatibilist free will, even though she's never in her life heard of "compatibilism" or "determinism".

And she takes cause and effect for granted. She knows that she is the cause of her decisions. She knows that the robber was the cause of her empty cash register. She does not speak of "causation" or "cause and effect" in abstract terms. But she knows how to answer anyone who would ask her, "What happened to the money?". She says, "I was robbed!", and lays out the series of events that took place during the robbery, one thing reliably leading to the next. And she can even recount the thoughts that went through her head during the event.

Marvin... Well, as you can see I correct him here and there and I call his reasoning "sloppy".

Oops!

You're going to find no "local grocers" here. You came to the wrong place if that's who you wish to "convince".

Actually, I like to imagine that I could explain things in a way that even the grocer could understand. Yet even Einstein would have to agree with me. Hey, I can dream can't I?

How is a free will free? It is free because it met it's requirements.

Exactly. The requirement is simply for the choice to be free from coercion and undue influence.

The agent, again has no control over that beyond selecting a will that always was never going to be constrained.

The key is that it was always going to be "constrained" to be exactly what the agent decided it would be. And that is clearly not a meaningful "constraint". The agent was always going to be the meaningful and relevant cause of the choice.

It's like someone winning the lottery. Did they make themselves win? Could they have done anything differently in their picking of the specific numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, because they are an idiot and have insecure luggage? Could they have exercised any operation at all adjacent to picking 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 that would have made them lose beyond "fixing the roller"?

Two things.
(1) It was not a matter of luck that they would choose the numbers 1,2,3,4,5. It was always causally necessary that they would. But it was always causally necessary that it would be they, themselves, who would choose those numbers, and for their own reasons.

(2) They "could" have chosen any five numbers, but they "would" only choose 1,2,3,4,5 today. The word "could" refers to an ability, whether it is exercised or not. For example, they could have chosen 5,4,3,2,1. We know this for a fact because that's the number they chose last week. The word "would" refers to what actually happened.

Of course not. It isn't up to them whether their will to win the lottery is free. The only way for an agent to have a "will which is free" is either to select requirements that cannot fail, or a will that will succeed at it's requirements.
There is no way for the lottery winner, or anyone else, to "freely will". They may "will", and causal necessity determines whether their "internal illusion of freedom" was also "real freedom".

The freedom is in the choosing of the will. The specific freedom is freedom from coercion and undue influence while choosing.

I tend towards explanations that people with a masters' (bachelors?) degree can understand, and that einstein couldn't argue with. I'm not sure if I could get mine down to grocer level. Maybe I hire Pood to write a book with me that the grocer groks.

As to the numbers, I'm saying "they choose 1.2.3.4.5" and the roller has to actually choose "1.2.3.4.5" if their will to win is to be called free, and nothing they do short of kicking the roller machine would make them lose. They fundamentally did not choose to "win" the lottery, they chose to "play" the lottery, and the rest of nature chose them to win it.

I'm using the lottery roller machine as a metaphor for all the things outside of you that actually determine whether your "try" is a "success".

 

[fromderinside]

Actually

To be fair in guilty of the "akshully" too. But still.

No, I'm not discussing different ways of "measuring" it giving different results.

When the person inside the system is "measuring" they are not looking at the thing without corrupting the state They are corrupting the thing. You even discuss this, insofar as the neurons are not the thing either.
.

What the person measures is a neural weight that measures a... ...That measures a particle that interacted with the particle you wanted to 'measure'.

You are fundamentally not 'measuring' under even the same definition of 'measurement' as is necessary to discuss instantaneous field states.

One is an operation of a physical interaction and taking the causal implications of that information carrying through. It is not the measurement you would want to take of the double slit experiment.

You're taking your next best swing, when you "measure" through an interaction event.

One operation is "peek" and the other is "pop". Pop changes the system so is less than ideal, and Peek is not available to us.

We in our metaphysics and philosophy on the matter -- which you yourself posted a video to yourself which should have told you in your own words not to do that (and I don't give a shit what you tell me to do or not do so I ignore it) -- have looked at the hypothetical ideal from the view of a "god of simulation" who can hit stop, and do a peek.

In short you have yet again conflated.

This seems a theme among hard determinists.

And you don't seem to realize that I brought up "super determinism" myself already as "just-so determinism", and have several times explained why all stochastic systems can be treated as "just-so determinism" and even discussed all the particular reasons this poses no threat to letting "free" be "when requirements of the noun shall be met" and letting "will" be "a series of instructions unto a requirement" and operating on these to understand the continuity and incidental responsibility of localities of the determined system for given events.

It's almost like I understand her argument better than you do, perhaps...

First you won't watch videos, then you aren't talking about measurement as she and I put it. Now you're complaining that we aren't responding to your setup which isn't answer to anything she or I wrote.

Result" -nm

 

[Jarhyn]

Actually

To be fair in guilty of the "akshully" too. But still.

No, I'm not discussing different ways of "measuring" it giving different results.

When the person inside the system is "measuring" they are not looking at the thing without corrupting the state They are corrupting the thing. You even discuss this, insofar as the neurons are not the thing either.
.

What the person measures is a neural weight that measures a... ...That measures a particle that interacted with the particle you wanted to 'measure'.

You are fundamentally not 'measuring' under even the same definition of 'measurement' as is necessary to discuss instantaneous field states.

One is an operation of a physical interaction and taking the causal implications of that information carrying through. It is not the measurement you would want to take of the double slit experiment.

You're taking your next best swing, when you "measure" through an interaction event.

One operation is "peek" and the other is "pop". Pop changes the system so is less than ideal, and Peek is not available to us.

We in our metaphysics and philosophy on the matter -- which you yourself posted a video to yourself which should have told you in your own words not to do that (and I don't give a shit what you tell me to do or not do so I ignore it) -- have looked at the hypothetical ideal from the view of a "god of simulation" who can hit stop, and do a peek.

In short you have yet again conflated.

This seems a theme among hard determinists.

And you don't seem to realize that I brought up "super determinism" myself already as "just-so determinism", and have several times explained why all stochastic systems can be treated as "just-so determinism" and even discussed all the particular reasons this poses no threat to letting "free" be "when requirements of the noun shall be met" and letting "will" be "a series of instructions unto a requirement" and operating on these to understand the continuity and incidental responsibility of localities of the determined system for given events.

It's almost like I understand her argument better than you do, perhaps...

First you won't watch videos, then you aren't talking about measurement as she and I put it. Now you're complaining that we aren't responding to your setup which isn't answer to anything she or I wrote.

Result" -nm

Hey man, I'm very clear that if you can't provide text, I'm not going to bother.

Measurement in these two situations are not even doing the same kind of ascertainment.

In one situation, we're looking at REAL INSTANTANEOUS FIELD VALUES.

In the other we are modifying field values and making inference.

The reason you get different results is because you are not measuring the same thing.

It is not the method that changes things per se, but the thing you are trying to measure between these two techniques, and that's why you get different results when you're, say, the god of the universe looking at the bitfield as opposed to a bald primate POKING the bitfield.

You are measuring the poke, not the bitfield.

I am talking measuring the bitfield itself

 

[fromderinside]

First you won't watch videos, then you aren't talking about measurement as she and I put it. Now you're complaining that we aren't responding to your setup which isn't answer to anything she or I wrote.

Result" -nm

Hey man, I'm very clear that if you can't provide text, I'm not going to bother.

Measurement in these two situations are not even doing the same kind of ascertainment.

In one situation, we're looking at REAL INSTANTANEOUS FIELD VALUES.

In the other we are modifying field values and making inference.

The reason you get different results is because you are not measuring the same thing.

It is not the method that changes things per se, but the thing you are trying to measure between these two techniques, and that's why you get different results when you're, say, the god of the universe looking at the bitfield as opposed to a bald primate POKING the bitfield.

You are measuring the poke, not the bitfield.

I am talking measuring the bitfield itself

Again. Not responsive. I provided text. What we measure determines what is measured. Whether physics depends on small things isn't what we measure. It's what small things we measure. Do we measure situational observations of interference or do we measure what interference causes. To wit from the article: "A 'measure' is what’s necessary to assign weights to the elements of a set. For all practical purposes it’s the same as a probability distribution." In your words the observation of a partial interference pattern is a clown act which, explained as coherent, is fictional chatter.

 

[DBT]

Well, it doesn't appear like you consider what was said

Then you are not really reading his posts for comprehension but rather merely to attack.

That's an observation, not an attack. The same applies to you.

Why you may ask? Well, just consider your remark - ''It is a process which modifies the agent, but it is not the will doing it, it is the agent doing it to themselves, as an execution of the will'' - Jarhyn - and actually thought about it, you would grasp the fallacy of claiming free will where no will is involved, active or has agency.

''Will plays a part, therefore free will,'' is infantile. It's fall on the floor, kicking the legs in the air, laughing my arse off ridiculous.

The process is not free will, neural architecture is not free will, electrochemical information processing is not free will, determinism allows no alternative actions....but, but, but 'the agent doing it for themselves'' (vague and meaningless, given the nature of the process), is, by gosh, free will.

Why, well, because someone who believes in free will, a compatibilist, declares it so.


The irrelevant padding that is the rest of your post has been addressed too many times, so I'm not wasting any more of my time on it. But type away if it brings you comfort.

 

[Jarhyn]

First you won't watch videos, then you aren't talking about measurement as she and I put it. Now you're complaining that we aren't responding to your setup which isn't answer to anything she or I wrote.

Result" -nm

Hey man, I'm very clear that if you can't provide text, I'm not going to bother.

Measurement in these two situations are not even doing the same kind of ascertainment.

In one situation, we're looking at REAL INSTANTANEOUS FIELD VALUES.

In the other we are modifying field values and making inference.

The reason you get different results is because you are not measuring the same thing.

It is not the method that changes things per se, but the thing you are trying to measure between these two techniques, and that's why you get different results when you're, say, the god of the universe looking at the bitfield as opposed to a bald primate POKING the bitfield.

You are measuring the poke, not the bitfield.

I am talking measuring the bitfield itself

Again. Not responsive. I provided text. What we measure determines what is measured. Whether physics depends on small things isn't what we measure. It's what small things we measure. Do we measure situational observations of interference or do we measure what interference causes. To wit from the article: "A 'measure' is what’s necessary to assign weights to the elements of a set. For all practical purposes it’s the same as a probability distribution." In your words the observation of a partial interference pattern is a clown act which, explained as coherent, is fictional chatter.

I don't think you really understand the difference that I'm talking about.

As I said, the thing you wish to measure has an immediate value. You cannot measure the speed and position of a particle simultaneously. But "a god" can. In fact I do it all the time in my stupid little games.

Essentially one is operating on after-the-fact causal inference and the other is operating on immediate state in such a way that nothing in the system is changed. Of course this requires the ability to stop time and look at field values without causing any effect on them.

This is the stage we imagine ourselves on in a mode of superdeterminism: able to see the dice rolls without causing one to tumble out of the roller.

Two actors cannot believe different things from the same evidence and both be right. So one of us must be wrong about whether measuring in different ways measures different things.

My money is that measuring in ways that yield different numbers measure different things.