What is free will?

[fast]

I think that you first need to establish what you think it means to "make a choice".

It's original usage was specific to biological beings capable of making decisions. An expanded deviated usage that extends the meaning to include non-biological entities doesn't alter its meaning but rather creates ambiguity. Metaphorical usage of a word that becomes apart of common usage merely adds additional uses. Take for instance a computers brain. Before the word "brain" was bastardized, no one would honestly think that a computer has a brain--how silly is that? Even "thinking" has been bastardized. There are numerous words that have been taken to such extremes that we are amidst an array of words that are adrift in a sea of ambiguity. And that, accounts for a lot of conflict.

Machines can be programmed with a list of goals and a set of priorities.

See what I mean? It's so intrusive. A machine with goals? Are machines now capable of aspirations? People have goals. I might even go so far as to say animals have goals. If we keep going and talk like those in biology class, we might even (since we're crossing lines) say why certain plants chose to evolve as they did. Chose. See, once you start crossing the line and consider metaphorical usage as okay to flip flop with original usage, distinctions are lost.

This brings me to the issue in the dangers of denial. If it's indeed acceptable to say computers have goals, then it's certainly of a variety in stark contrast to a biological being having goals. Thus, I could say they do and say they don't while only giving the appearance of contradiction--kind of like how one can talk past another while using a different sense or meaning of a word that has multiple meanings.

When goals conflict, they can calculate the likely outcomes of choices and which outcomes best satisfy priorities. They can also be programmed to adjust future priorities on the basis of trial and error. That is because AI programmers deliberately design choice-making programs to mimic human thought processes.

I admit, it's difficult to talk without the helping hand of metaphorical usage, but we have to be careful not to forget what's mimicking and what's mimicked. It's not the same!--unless redefinitions are broadened to the extreme. If we replaced every human cell with an artificial cell, a human we would not have. At some point, a human brain would not be a brain, yet with ambiguity everpresent to rear its ugly head, it would be a 'brain'--but certainly not biological.

Pressed at the moment; I will return to follow up on other things you were kind enough to respond to me with.

 

[fast]

I've been trying to make sense of your argument here, but I can't quite seem to grasp the logic. How does language have anything at all with making a choice? You seem to be saying that machines cannot deal with uncertainty, but that is exactly what robots have to deal with. I've seen robots navigate their way through obstacle courses that they've never encountered before. Sometimes they have to go over obstacles, sometimes around them, and sometimes under them. They make choices under unpredictable circumstances.

Machines can DEAL with uncertainty, but if there was an objection on my part to be made, it would hinge on the word "deal." I'm just cautious to not use biased words that are biased towards beings with intellect. In other words, if you were to use neutral terms that were just as palatable towards referring to computers as humans, there would be no objection on my part. "Machines can adequately perform with uncertainty" would be welcome and objection free, but as soon as words are used that originally pertained to intellectual beings, then a closer examination is in order--and problems are magnified by ambiguous words that are ever increasingly used so broadly where once they were not.

There is no logic to your paragraph. You start out with a bald faced assertion of the conclusion you want to reach. Then you declare that you refuse to associate choice-making programs with free will because trees can't be happy or unhappy. How does that make sense?

Recall, an underlying premise is that a category error is amongst us. "Happy" and "unhappy" are mutually exclusive, but they are not collectively exhaustive." "Happy" and "not happy" are both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Thus, "unhappy" and "not happy" are not identical. "unhappy" implies "not happy," but the inverse is not true."

A tree, for example, is not happy. It's not the kind of thing that can be happy or unhappy. A computer is not the kind of thing that can think and make choices. A delay that reduces processing time is not equivalent to "it's thinking." A computer is not the kind of thing that can think. Sure, we say (verbally say) all kinds of wild and darling things, but in the literalist of senses, a computer is not doing that which we have observed humans doing, like thinking, deciding, or choosing --they perform actions (as offered as a neutral worded substitute).

They make coffee pots that can be programmed to come on at a certain time, but that is not the same as making a robot that can navigate an obstacle course or play a game of chess. There is a very rudimentary sense in which the coffeemaker "decides" to come on--a simple conditional branch in a computer program that is associated with the value of an internal clock. However, programs that operate under uncertainty are much more complex.

I feel like words of our language are being co-opted and adapted to mean what fluent speakers wouldn't ordinarily mean. To me, a metaphorical usage of a word is akin to a stipulative use of a word where no one in the know would actually think that a words lexical meaning is being influenced by stipulative usage. Of course, adopted stipulative usage evolves into standard usage --but not without creating ambiguity that contrasts with pre-adapted usage.

More to come; eager to get to the remainder of what you had to say.

 

[fast]

As you know, I am a linguist, and I have a great deal of experience with word meanings. I still don't understand how language is relevant to your argument that machines cannot have free will.

Part of the reason may have to do with us not being on the same page as to what free will is. I still haven't given an explanation of free will except (so far) to say that wants is a mighty important factor. Even if a computer could be programmed to mimic that of a person having wants, it would still not be wants that a computer has, even if the scope of what a want is was broadened (as an extremist might) to be something that a computer has--since even still, the new meaning with much breadth would not truly be that which was under discussion.

My position is that we don't normally hold machines responsible for their actions, because we haven't programmed them to respond to human dominance/submission hierarchies. So we don't think of them as having "free will". However, there is no good reason to believe that we could not some day build machines whose behavior could be influenced and modified through social interactions.

When appropriate, I will go into greater detail about what free will is.

The point is that the free will debate started with trying to justify the righteousness of an omniscient deity assigning blame to human actions. If God knows everything his creations will do in an absolute sense, then how can he hold them accountable for actions that he enabled by the act of creation? Accountability is an essential underlying component of the meaning of "free will".

If I know that something will happen, then even if it's impossible that I could be mistaken, that doesn't elevate the thing that will happen as being something that must happen. Events that are contingent events do not magically become necessary events because of infallible knowledge.

 

[DBT]

The neural basis of decision making;

Abstract

''Decision-making is usually accompanied by metacognition, through which a decision maker monitors uncertainty regarding a decision and may then consequently revise the decision. These metacognitive processes can occur prior to or in the absence of feedback. However, the neural mechanisms of metacognition remain controversial. One theory proposes an independent neural system for metacognition in the prefrontal cortex (PFC); the other, that metacognitive processes coincide and overlap with the systems used for the decision-making process per se. In this study, we devised a novel “decision–redecision” paradigm to investigate the neural metacognitive processes involved in redecision as compared to the initial decision-making process. The participants underwent a perceptual decision-making task and a rule-based decision-making task during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We found that the anterior PFC, including the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), were more extensively activated after the initial decision. The dACC activity in redecision positively scaled with decision uncertainty and correlated with individual metacognitive uncertainty monitoring abilities—commonly occurring in both tasks—indicating that the dACC was specifically involved in decision uncertainty monitoring. In contrast, the lFPC activity seen in redecision processing was scaled with decision uncertainty reduction and correlated with individual accuracy changes—positively in the rule-based decision-making task and negatively in the perceptual decision-making task. Our results show that the lFPC was specifically involved in metacognitive control of decision adjustment and was subject to different control demands of the tasks. Therefore, our findings support that a separate neural system in the PFC is essentially involved in metacognition and further, that functions of the PFC in metacognition are dissociable.

Author summary

Decision-making is often accompanied by a sense of uncertainty regarding the outcome. In many situations, there is no explicit feedback or cue to indicate whether the decision is correct or not. Fortunately, our brain can evaluate decision uncertainty using the internal signals and subsequently make appropriate adjustments to initial decisions. The process of considering the outcome of a decision and whether a decision should be adjusted is called metacognition, and it tends to be automatically induced. Thus, decision-making is usually accompanied by metacognition, and the two processes are inevitably coupled. However, the neural systems supporting metacognitive processing remain unclear and have often been misattributed to the neural system of the decision-making process per se. Here, we have analyzed this process in several volunteers by imaging the brain activity in specific regions while they performed Sudoku and random-dot motion (RDM) tasks. Our results suggest the existence of a neural system located in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) mainly involved in metacognition and independent from the neural system of decision-making.''

 

[Juma]

Hopefully, we all acknowledge that software can make choices.

I cannot accept as true that (and thereby cannot acknowledge that) software can make choices. I believe it's a category error to say of a non-thinking entity that it can decide between choices--and by "thinking" and "decide", I don't mean the extremist stance of it. A child can discern the difference between man and machine, but left alone to think without guidance and training, an adult will become sloppy and extremist in thought such that they can no longer tell one from the other. It's often associated with an inability to accept boundaries.

In language, a word's meaning isn't always exact; from an observation of a cross section of imprecise words, their varying usage can be said to pulsate. One person narrows its meaning and has the consequential effect of excluding something while another broadens its scope that includes things that would otherwise not belong, but when there is a sense of associated boundaries linked to the word's usage, we have some that drop that word in place of something else while others talk of probabilities and exceed any semblance of its uncorrupted meaning -- and soon find themselves seeing no distinction between bald and not bald, man and machine, biological entity and a computer.

How would you tell the difference between the software that makes choices and has free will from the software that makes choices and does not have free will?

Software neither make choices nor has free will. See, some of us refuse to link software to those things, just like although some of us would gladly accept that trees are not happy, we would not take that next step and regard them as unhappy.

Free will has to do with wants. If we're dealing with something devoid of wants, we're not dealing with a free will issue. Consider a coffee pot (with software) that has instructions to perform a particular task (like cut on at 6:45 A.M.). If it's an older coffee pot with a strained motor, we may use our beautiful language and make all sorts of darling child like remarks, just like we might say of a tree with wilting leaves that it's feeling unhappy today, but some of us (most of us) in our own beliefs adhere to the links and boundaries of words--despite what we might say in jest.

Does the coffee pot want to cut on? Does it have wants? Recall, without wants, there is no free will issue. Others can argue otherwise; if they want to.

There is more to free will than wants, but not much more. There is one more thing. That's right--just two things in all. Wants is one of them.

1) you have stated witch definition of free will you are using. Thus we can only guess what you are arguing.
2) your image of what an robot is severlly underestimates its complexity.
3) you conflate decision making with you experience of making decisions. It may probably be that a non human cannot experience as we do. But experience of a decision is not a necessary part of a decision. I often make unconsioud decisions.

 

[fast]

Freewill is the absence of compulsion to do as one pleases.

 

[Juma]

Freewill is the absence of compulsion to do as one pleases.

Is moral considerations a compulsion?
Is knowledge a compulsion?
Is habit a compulsion?

What does ”pleases” really mean?

Is free will really to act without considering consequences?

 

[DBT]

Freewill is the absence of compulsion to do as one pleases.

There is a distinction to be made between acting upon ones decisions and how these decisions were made in the first place. Conscious will is a form of compulsion, the prompt or urge to act upon decisions made or desires to fulfill.

 

[fast]

One aspect of compulsion worthy of being mentioned can be when it's thought of as a force that can be overcome. If I don't want to do something but decide to do it anyway because of an outside compelling force, that I could possibly overcome that force is not good reason to not consider the force a compelling force. In such a circumstance, an action is not an action of ones own free will despite it being ones decided choice.

 

[Kharakov]

Hopefully, we all acknowledge that software can make choices.

Anyone who has ever read a bank statement understands that the choices made by software can have an impact on the real world.

Let us imagine two pieces of software:

• One makes choices but does not have free will
• The other makes choices and has free will

How would you go about distinguishing between the two? How would you tell the difference between the software that makes choices and has free will from the software that makes choices and does not have free will?

One makes choices but does not have God.
One makes choices but has God.

How is that for our resident rabid antitheist? Defining FW into existence is... begging the question- assuming that something exists.

 

[DBT]

One aspect of compulsion worthy of being mentioned can be when it's thought of as a force that can be overcome. If I don't want to do something but decide to do it anyway because of an outside compelling force, that I could possibly overcome that force is not good reason to not consider the force a compelling force. In such a circumstance, an action is not an action of ones own free will despite it being ones decided choice.

You may have several conflicting interests, each with its own expression of will. One urge battling another urge, creating an inner conflict, to do this instead of that, or that instead of this....with perhaps another expression of will, the desire to overcome the dilemma of taking one option over another.

 

[fast]

One aspect of compulsion worthy of being mentioned can be when it's thought of as a force that can be overcome. If I don't want to do something but decide to do it anyway because of an outside compelling force, that I could possibly overcome that force is not good reason to not consider the force a compelling force. In such a circumstance, an action is not an action of ones own free will despite it being ones decided choice.

You may have several conflicting interests, each with its own expression of will. One urge battling another urge, creating an inner conflict, to do this instead of that, or that instead of this....with perhaps another expression of will, the desire to overcome the dilemma of taking one option over another.

What are the reasons behind the internal conflicts and urges? Either you're doing something of your own accord, or you're being compelled against your will. How what one wants aligns with a compelling force is important. Let's consider an example.

Wants are important. Let's say you want to obey the posted speed limit. Perhaps you have reasons for why you want to: the safety of yourself and others; respect for the law; desire to be a good citizen, which you attribute to being law abiding.

The law (and its associated consequences for not following it and its openly public enforcement) can potentially serve as a compelling force for others that don't share your wants.

So, when you drive and keep your speed below the posted speed limit, and because it's something you want to do, the law is not a compelling force against you since it's something you do of your own accord.

I, on the other hand, am not driving under the posted speed limit of my own free will. It's not something I want to do. The law is a compelling force that constrains us to do things we don't want and restrains us from doing what we want, but although it's a compelling force to me, it's not a compelling force to you--since you actually want to do what it demands.

That I can resist the force and speed anyway (something I have the capacity to do) does not in any way alter the fact that I am obeying the speed limit against my will when I'm obeying the speed limit--unless I happen to want to.

Another example:

A carjacker demands at gun point that a woman get out of her car. It's not something (absent that threat) that she wants to do. She has the ability to comply or not comply, but no reasonable person is going to say she got out of the car of her own free will. Technically speaking, she had a choice and made her choice, but it wouldn't be unreasonable to expect such a person to say she didn't have a choice, and she'd be correct if you consider that short for it not being a choice she made of her own free will. That she wanted to maximize her opportunity to live through compliance of the carjacker's demands does not alter the pre-compulsory wants she had prior to contemplating conflicting interests and urges.

Third example:

A dog is tied up with a chain and cannot reach the food bowl. The dog is tired, not hungry, and is not in the mood to eat. The dog does not (at the moment) WANT to eat. That the dog cannot eat doesn't change the fact that the dog does not want to eat. No free will issue. Recall: No wants, no free will issue.

4th example:

A prisoner that cannot leave his jail cell is only being held against his will when he wants to leave. Lock the cell or don't lock the cell; it doesn't matter. If he doesn't want to leave, he is staying of his own accord. It s not until he wants to leave and cannot that he is held against his will.

5:
Back to the dog. He's hungry. Untie him. He wants to eat. But, demand that he stay. If he wants to eat but is compelled to stay, he is untied and has the ability to overcome the compelling demands to stay, but despite that, if he stays, he's doing so against his will. It's all about the alignment of wants and compulsion.

Complex example:
Let's say he has conflicting wants. He want to obey, yet he also wants to eat. Think about the alignments. If he wants to obey, the force (as to how it aligns with obedience) is not a compelling force, so if he obeys, he's doing so of his own free will; however, he wants to eat, so tell me, what say you? Think about the first example.

 

[Juma]

One aspect of compulsion worthy of being mentioned can be when it's thought of as a force that can be overcome. If I don't want to do something but decide to do it anyway because of an outside compelling force, that I could possibly overcome that force is not good reason to not consider the force a compelling force. In such a circumstance, an action is not an action of ones own free will despite it being ones decided choice.

You may have several conflicting interests, each with its own expression of will. One urge battling another urge, creating an inner conflict, to do this instead of that, or that instead of this....with perhaps another expression of will, the desire to overcome the dilemma of taking one option over another.

What are the reasons behind the internal conflicts and urges? Either you're doing something of your own accord, or you're being compelled against your will. How what one wants aligns with a compelling force is important. Let's consider an example.

Wants are important. Let's say you want to obey the posted speed limit. Perhaps you have reasons for why you want to: the safety of yourself and others; respect for the law; desire to be a good citizen, which you attribute to being law abiding.

The law (and its associated consequences for not following it and its openly public enforcement) can potentially serve as a compelling force for others that don't share your wants.

So, when you drive and keep your speed below the posted speed limit, and because it's something you want to do, the law is not a compelling force against you since it's something you do of your own accord.

I, on the other hand, am not driving under the posted speed limit of my own free will. It's not something I want to do. The law is a compelling force that constrains us to do things we don't want and restrains us from doing what we want, but although it's a compelling force to me, it's not a compelling force to you--since you actually want to do what it demands.

That I can resist the force and speed anyway (something I have the capacity to do) does not in any way alter the fact that I am obeying the speed limit against my will when I'm obeying the speed limit--unless I happen to want to.

Another example:

A carjacker demands at gun point that a woman get out of her car. It's not something (absent that threat) that she wants to do. She has the ability to comply or not comply, but no reasonable person is going to say she got out of the car of her own free will. Technically speaking, she had a choice and made her choice, but it wouldn't be unreasonable to expect such a person to say she didn't have a choice, and she'd be correct if you consider that short for it not being a choice she made of her own free will. That she wanted to maximize her opportunity to live through compliance of the carjacker's demands does not alter the pre-compulsory wants she had prior to contemplating conflicting interests and urges.

Third example:

A dog is tied up with a chain and cannot reach the food bowl. The dog is tired, not hungry, and is not in the mood to eat. The dog does not (at the moment) WANT to eat. That the dog cannot eat doesn't change the fact that the dog does not want to eat. No free will issue. Recall: No wants, no free will issue.

4th example:

A prisoner that cannot leave his jail cell is only being held against his will when he wants to leave. Lock the cell or don't lock the cell; it doesn't matter. If he doesn't want to leave, he is staying of his own accord. It s not until he wants to leave and cannot that he is held against his will.

5:
Back to the dog. He's hungry. Untie him. He wants to eat. But, demand that he stay. If he wants to eat but is compelled to stay, he is untied and has the ability to overcome the compelling demands to stay, but despite that, if he stays, he's doing so against his will. It's all about the alignment of wants and compulsion.

Complex example:
Let's say he has conflicting wants. He want to obey, yet he also wants to eat. Think about the alignments. If he wants to obey, the force (as to how it aligns with obedience) is not a compelling force, so if he obeys, he's doing so of his own free will; however, he wants to eat, so tell me, what say you? Think about the first example.

You do things according to YOUR free wiil or according to some others will. No need to talk sbout a ”free” will. And it is definitely not a property of humans.

 

[fast]

What are the reasons behind the internal conflicts and urges? Either you're doing something of your own accord, or you're being compelled against your will. How what one wants aligns with a compelling force is important. Let's consider an example.

Wants are important. Let's say you want to obey the posted speed limit. Perhaps you have reasons for why you want to: the safety of yourself and others; respect for the law; desire to be a good citizen, which you attribute to being law abiding.

The law (and its associated consequences for not following it and its openly public enforcement) can potentially serve as a compelling force for others that don't share your wants.

So, when you drive and keep your speed below the posted speed limit, and because it's something you want to do, the law is not a compelling force against you since it's something you do of your own accord.

I, on the other hand, am not driving under the posted speed limit of my own free will. It's not something I want to do. The law is a compelling force that constrains us to do things we don't want and restrains us from doing what we want, but although it's a compelling force to me, it's not a compelling force to you--since you actually want to do what it demands.

That I can resist the force and speed anyway (something I have the capacity to do) does not in any way alter the fact that I am obeying the speed limit against my will when I'm obeying the speed limit--unless I happen to want to.

Another example:

A carjacker demands at gun point that a woman get out of her car. It's not something (absent that threat) that she wants to do. She has the ability to comply or not comply, but no reasonable person is going to say she got out of the car of her own free will. Technically speaking, she had a choice and made her choice, but it wouldn't be unreasonable to expect such a person to say she didn't have a choice, and she'd be correct if you consider that short for it not being a choice she made of her own free will. That she wanted to maximize her opportunity to live through compliance of the carjacker's demands does not alter the pre-compulsory wants she had prior to contemplating conflicting interests and urges.

Third example:

A dog is tied up with a chain and cannot reach the food bowl. The dog is tired, not hungry, and is not in the mood to eat. The dog does not (at the moment) WANT to eat. That the dog cannot eat doesn't change the fact that the dog does not want to eat. No free will issue. Recall: No wants, no free will issue.

4th example:

A prisoner that cannot leave his jail cell is only being held against his will when he wants to leave. Lock the cell or don't lock the cell; it doesn't matter. If he doesn't want to leave, he is staying of his own accord. It s not until he wants to leave and cannot that he is held against his will.

5:
Back to the dog. He's hungry. Untie him. He wants to eat. But, demand that he stay. If he wants to eat but is compelled to stay, he is untied and has the ability to overcome the compelling demands to stay, but despite that, if he stays, he's doing so against his will. It's all about the alignment of wants and compulsion.

Complex example:
Let's say he has conflicting wants. He want to obey, yet he also wants to eat. Think about the alignments. If he wants to obey, the force (as to how it aligns with obedience) is not a compelling force, so if he obeys, he's doing so of his own free will; however, he wants to eat, so tell me, what say you? Think about the first example.

You do things according to YOUR free wiil or according to some others will. No need to talk sbout a ”free” will. And it is definitely not a property of humans.

That comes across as reasonable. What brought that on?

 

[Juma]

What are the reasons behind the internal conflicts and urges? Either you're doing something of your own accord, or you're being compelled against your will. How what one wants aligns with a compelling force is important. Let's consider an example.

Wants are important. Let's say you want to obey the posted speed limit. Perhaps you have reasons for why you want to: the safety of yourself and others; respect for the law; desire to be a good citizen, which you attribute to being law abiding.

The law (and its associated consequences for not following it and its openly public enforcement) can potentially serve as a compelling force for others that don't share your wants.

So, when you drive and keep your speed below the posted speed limit, and because it's something you want to do, the law is not a compelling force against you since it's something you do of your own accord.

I, on the other hand, am not driving under the posted speed limit of my own free will. It's not something I want to do. The law is a compelling force that constrains us to do things we don't want and restrains us from doing what we want, but although it's a compelling force to me, it's not a compelling force to you--since you actually want to do what it demands.

That I can resist the force and speed anyway (something I have the capacity to do) does not in any way alter the fact that I am obeying the speed limit against my will when I'm obeying the speed limit--unless I happen to want to.

Another example:

A carjacker demands at gun point that a woman get out of her car. It's not something (absent that threat) that she wants to do. She has the ability to comply or not comply, but no reasonable person is going to say she got out of the car of her own free will. Technically speaking, she had a choice and made her choice, but it wouldn't be unreasonable to expect such a person to say she didn't have a choice, and she'd be correct if you consider that short for it not being a choice she made of her own free will. That she wanted to maximize her opportunity to live through compliance of the carjacker's demands does not alter the pre-compulsory wants she had prior to contemplating conflicting interests and urges.

Third example:

A dog is tied up with a chain and cannot reach the food bowl. The dog is tired, not hungry, and is not in the mood to eat. The dog does not (at the moment) WANT to eat. That the dog cannot eat doesn't change the fact that the dog does not want to eat. No free will issue. Recall: No wants, no free will issue.

4th example:

A prisoner that cannot leave his jail cell is only being held against his will when he wants to leave. Lock the cell or don't lock the cell; it doesn't matter. If he doesn't want to leave, he is staying of his own accord. It s not until he wants to leave and cannot that he is held against his will.

5:
Back to the dog. He's hungry. Untie him. He wants to eat. But, demand that he stay. If he wants to eat but is compelled to stay, he is untied and has the ability to overcome the compelling demands to stay, but despite that, if he stays, he's doing so against his will. It's all about the alignment of wants and compulsion.

Complex example:
Let's say he has conflicting wants. He want to obey, yet he also wants to eat. Think about the alignments. If he wants to obey, the force (as to how it aligns with obedience) is not a compelling force, so if he obeys, he's doing so of his own free will; however, he wants to eat, so tell me, what say you? Think about the first example.

You do things according to YOUR free wiil or according to some others will. No need to talk sbout a ”free” will. And it is definitely not a property of humans.

That comes across as reasonable. What brought that on?

Your belief that ”wants” enable ”free will”. There is no free will, just will.
And the will is what it is. You are not running your body. You are what the body does.

 

[DBT]

One aspect of compulsion worthy of being mentioned can be when it's thought of as a force that can be overcome. If I don't want to do something but decide to do it anyway because of an outside compelling force, that I could possibly overcome that force is not good reason to not consider the force a compelling force. In such a circumstance, an action is not an action of ones own free will despite it being ones decided choice.

You may have several conflicting interests, each with its own expression of will. One urge battling another urge, creating an inner conflict, to do this instead of that, or that instead of this....with perhaps another expression of will, the desire to overcome the dilemma of taking one option over another.

What are the reasons behind the internal conflicts and urges? Either you're doing something of your own accord, or you're being compelled against your will. How what one wants aligns with a compelling force is important. Let's consider an example.

The reason for the conflict is that decision making is not done by you as a conscious entity with a single undivided will. It is the brain that makes decisions based on available information, and it is the information that forms desires, hopes, fears, etc...all drivers of behaviour and each driver with its own will....hence the will to lose weight competes against the will to eat your favourite foods, often to excess, then guilt emerges, the source for yet another inner conflict

That I can resist the force and speed anyway (something I have the capacity to do) does not in any way alter the fact that I am obeying the speed limit against my will when I'm obeying the speed limit--unless I happen to want to.

Another example:

A carjacker demands at gun point that a woman get out of her car. It's not something (absent that threat) that she wants to do. She has the ability to comply or not comply, but no reasonable person is going to say she got out of the car of her own free will. Technically speaking, she had a choice and made her choice, but it wouldn't be unreasonable to expect such a person to say she didn't have a choice, and she'd be correct if you consider that short for it not being a choice she made of her own free will. That she wanted to maximize her opportunity to live through compliance of the carjacker's demands does not alter the pre-compulsory wants she had prior to contemplating conflicting interests and urges.

Third example:

A dog is tied up with a chain and cannot reach the food bowl. The dog is tired, not hungry, and is not in the mood to eat. The dog does not (at the moment) WANT to eat. That the dog cannot eat doesn't change the fact that the dog does not want to eat. No free will issue. Recall: No wants, no free will issue.

4th example:

A prisoner that cannot leave his jail cell is only being held against his will when he wants to leave. Lock the cell or don't lock the cell; it doesn't matter. If he doesn't want to leave, he is staying of his own accord. It s not until he wants to leave and cannot that he is held against his will.

5:
Back to the dog. He's hungry. Untie him. He wants to eat. But, demand that he stay. If he wants to eat but is compelled to stay, he is untied and has the ability to overcome the compelling demands to stay, but despite that, if he stays, he's doing so against his will. It's all about the alignment of wants and compulsion.

Complex example:
Let's say he has conflicting wants. He want to obey, yet he also wants to eat. Think about the alignments. If he wants to obey, the force (as to how it aligns with obedience) is not a compelling force, so if he obeys, he's doing so of his own free will; however, he wants to eat, so tell me, what say you? Think about the first example.

It doesn't matter whether there is inner conflict or not, your conscious will is an expression of the information state of your brain in any given instance in time. There is no 'free will' that overrides the information state of your brain and its underlying activity, an activity which is being expressed as you and your thoughts and decisions as you go about your daily activities, deciding to this instead of that may not entail conflict but nevertheless the decision you do make in that instance is determined by your brain and represented in conscious form as you making a decision

We have decision making and we have will.

We have the will, desire or urge to carry out our decisions, but this is not free will. It is conditional will. Will that is related to a decision made by a brain, but it is not the agency of decision making.

 

[fast]

That comes across as reasonable. What brought that on?

Your belief that ”wants” enable ”free will”. There is no free will, just will.
And the will is what it is. You are not running your body. You are what the body does.

When you are acting of your own free will, you are freely doing what you want.

Trees don't have wants--and thus can never act of their own free will.

And this brings me full circle back to what I was saying to Copernicus.

A computer that mimics having wants is not something that has wants.

 

[fast]

I don't like the ring of "the brain makes decisions." It sounds silly. It's reminiscent of something we might forgive someone of saying when not knowing how to say something. Brains don't make decisions. People do. I made the decision to go to the store. My brain didn't do that. I make decisions, and brains function.

I screwed the screw. The screwdriver didn't do that. I used the screwdriver to screw the screw. It's kinda screwy to think that the functioning tool and not person operating the tool did the screwing.

People act of their own free will--not their fleshy bony gooey organs.

 

[DBT]

I don't like the ring of "the brain makes decisions." It sounds silly. It's reminiscent of something we might forgive someone of saying when not knowing how to say something. Brains don't make decisions. People do. I made the decision to go to the store. My brain didn't do that. I make decisions, and brains function.

That implies that you - whatever you conceive your self to be - have autonomy from the brain and its activities. The evidence that we now have goes against that proposition.

People act of their own free will--not their fleshy bony gooey organs.

People do think, feel, decide and act....but it is specifically the role of the brain to produce this experience.

 

[fast]

I don't like the ring of "the brain makes decisions." It sounds silly. It's reminiscent of something we might forgive someone of saying when not knowing how to say something. Brains don't make decisions. People do. I made the decision to go to the store. My brain didn't do that. I make decisions, and brains function.

That implies that you - whatever you conceive your self to be - have autonomy from the brain and its activities. The evidence that we now have goes against that proposition.

People act of their own free will--not their fleshy bony gooey organs.

People do think, feel, decide and act....but it is specifically the role of the brain to produce this experience.

There's very little that I disagree with here. I agree with the second part, and I agree with most of the first part.

I don't see that it implies autonomy (from the brain and its activities). I accept that I cannot make decisions without a brain. A brain's function enables me to make decisions. What you suggest is that we are our brains. We are more than that.