What kind of entity is a fictional character?

[ficino]

I'm interested to know anyone's thoughts on the question, what kind of entity is a fictional character - like Hamlet or Anna Karenina.

Whether fictional characters exist is a prior question, I think. I'm assuming here that they do.

I'd like to say, it is a pseudo-object, wholly an effect of the text that purports to describe him/her. But this may be too formal to serve as a definition.

 

[DBT]

A fictional character may be a body of information, various concepts, imagined characters, creators, invisible beings, etc, cobbled together by a mind into a coherant but fictional entity.

 

[Juma]

A fictional character is a figment of imagination. If you share this imagination with others it becomes a group effort. Like santa clause, spiderman etc.


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk HD

 

[ficino]

Thanks for the responses. My interest is both in fictional characters for their own sake and in the more general question about cases where we talk about things that don't exist. My understanding of Alexius Meinong is that he disagreed with Kant and Frege on the question, whether existence is a predicate. On the conviction that "speaking about" must go on about something, Meinong talked about "objects" like the round square. It has predicates such as roundness and four-sidedness but does not have the predicate of existence.

I think Russell attacked this as violating the law of non-contradiction. His analysis would render statements about the round square simply false. Some people aren't satisfied that this analysis explains what's really going on. Certainly, back to the case of fictional characters, it seems counter-intuitive to say that it's false that a sigh wracked Hamlet's bulk or that Anna Karenina threw herself under a train.

 

[steve_bnk]

I'd say Hamlet is a tragic entity.

Fictional and a presumption of existence is mutually exclusive.

We talk about fiction as if it exists because it is the way our language is constructed.

 

[ficino]

I'd say Hamlet is a tragic entity.

Fictional and a presumption of existence is mutually exclusive.

We talk about fiction as if it exists because it is the way our language is constructed.

Cool. What sort of entity (the bolding in the quotation from you is my addition) is a character in fiction, if it doesn't exist? The etymology of "entity," at least, suggests something that exists.

When you speak of the way language is constructed, you're alluding to rules or codes? In this case, perhaps, that author and audience agree to pretend that there was/is a Hamlet (cf. John Searle, fictional discourse is pretend assertions etc.)? If it's enough to analyze the kind of utterance involved in creating fiction, perhaps it is otiose to go on and try to determine what sort of entities the utterances pretend to be about.

In other words, steve_bnk, I'm not sure whether or not your response is consistent with positing Meinongian objects. One thing at stake in the decision about that is the question, whether existence is a predicate.

 

[steve_bnk]

Cool. What sort of entity (the bolding in the quotation from you is my addition) is a character in fiction, if it doesn't exist? The etymology of "entity," at least, suggests something that exists.

When you speak of the way language is constructed, you're alluding to rules or codes? In this case, perhaps, that author and audience agree to pretend that there was/is a Hamlet (cf. John Searle, fictional discourse is pretend assertions etc.)? If it's enough to analyze the kind of utterance involved in creating fiction, perhaps it is otiose to go on and try to determine what sort of entities the utterances pretend to be about.

In other words, steve_bnk, I'm not sure whether or not your response is consistent with positing Meinongian objects. One thing at stake in the decision about that is the question, whether existence is a predicate.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/

IMO sounds like convoluted philosophical nonsense. You may be heading towards the 'are thoughts real discussion?

it is all biochemical states in your brain.. I believe the inability to distinguish between reality and fiction is considered a disorder.


Same with questions of existence. You can not physically hurt your self running into a fictional wall.

'...In this case, perhaps, that author and audience agree to pretend that there was/is a Hamlet..'..of course.

The term I have heard used is 'the willing suspension of disbelief..' meaning when you go to a movie or play you temporarily put aside reality. An escape from reality.

Back in the 80s I watched a Shakespearean company do a Midsummer's Night Dream. It was hilarious. Stage assistants who move sleeping actors around as if by magic. In Shakespeare's day he did not have computer special effects...so the audience pretends not to see.

 

[ficino]

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/

IMO sounds like convoluted philosophical nonsense. You may be heading towards the 'are thoughts real discussion?

it is all biochemical states in your brain.. I believe the inability to distinguish between reality and fiction is considered a disorder.

OK, I thought this was a philosophy forum. But I'm down with it's all biochemical states in my brain. Reductionism rocks.

 

[steve_bnk]

OK, I thought this was a philosophy forum. But I'm down with it's all biochemical states in my brain. Reductionism rocks.

I'm just saying it all comes down tothe brain, an inescapable fact of modern science.


Why did you say you assume fictional characters are real?

 

[Underseer]

Cool. What sort of entity (the bolding in the quotation from you is my addition) is a character in fiction, if it doesn't exist? The etymology of "entity," at least, suggests something that exists.

When you speak of the way language is constructed, you're alluding to rules or codes? In this case, perhaps, that author and audience agree to pretend that there was/is a Hamlet (cf. John Searle, fictional discourse is pretend assertions etc.)? If it's enough to analyze the kind of utterance involved in creating fiction, perhaps it is otiose to go on and try to determine what sort of entities the utterances pretend to be about.

In other words, steve_bnk, I'm not sure whether or not your response is consistent with positing Meinongian objects. One thing at stake in the decision about that is the question, whether existence is a predicate.

Well, since it is possible that the author was accidentally correct, you can't prove with absolute certainty that a fictional character doesn't exist, therefore all fictional characters exist*.

* Lampoon of a common argument used by Christian and Muslim apologists.

 

[ficino]

I'm just saying it all comes down tothe brain, an inescapable fact of modern science.


Why did you say you assume fictional characters are real?

Actually I said I was assuming "here" - by which I meant for the purposes of this thread - that fictional characters exist, not that they are real. You had read the article in the Stanford Enc on objects, and I had read the one on fiction:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fiction/

The authors say that the fundamental question is, are there fictional entities? If there are, the metaphysical question is, what kind of thing is a fictional entity. "Fictional object" may be a less ambiguous phrase than "fictional entity."

The distinction between being real and being an entity may be bogus, but it seems that certain thinkers make that distinction - Meinongians, possible worlds theorists, maybe others.

Really what motivated me to post the thread was what I understand is Meinong's willingness to treat existence as a predicate - i.e. Hamlet, or a golden mountain or a round square, have certain properties but not the property of existence. If this account holds up, it overturns a lot of what I thought I had understood.

 

[Unbeatable]

Well, since it is possible that the author was accidentally correct, you can't prove with absolute certainty that a fictional character doesn't exist, therefore all fictional characters exist*.

* Lampoon of a common argument used by Christian and Muslim apologists.

Your lampoon reminds me of the beliefs of soulbonders.

 

[steve_bnk]

Actually I said I was assuming "here" - by which I meant for the purposes of this thread - that fictional characters exist, not that they are real. You had read the article in the Stanford Enc on objects, and I had read the one on fiction:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fiction/

The authors say that the fundamental question is, are there fictional entities? If there are, the metaphysical question is, what kind of thing is a fictional entity. "Fictional object" may be a less ambiguous phrase than "fictional entity."

The distinction between being real and being an entity may be bogus, but it seems that certain thinkers make that distinction - Meinongians, possible worlds theorists, maybe others.

Really what motivated me to post the thread was what I understand is Meinong's willingness to treat existence as a predicate - i.e. Hamlet, or a golden mountain or a round square, have certain properties but not the property of existence. If this account holds up, it overturns a lot of what I thought I had understood.

Ok.

But you are getting into what to me is contrived metaphysics. Nothing wrong with the pursuits, but I really have no interest in topics like this. I had my fill on the old site.

 

[ficino]

I'm working on fictional discourse now, so I'm into this. But my second reason for the thread was the question, can existence be a predicate? The classic refutation of the Ontological Argument that I heard in college was based on the claim that existence is not a predicate. If it is, though, what are the consequences for the Ontological Argument?

We can have a thread on that if anyone wants, but perhaps that question was done to death on the old board.

 

[DBT]

The distinction between being real and being an entity may be bogus, but it seems that certain thinkers make that distinction - Meinongians, possible worlds theorists, maybe others.

Fictional entities, by definition, do not exist. Possible worlds are a matter of conjecture. The things that are real are the imagined and/or written descriptions of the physical and mental attributes of the character and any events related to the described actions of this fictional character. The mental process of imagining the character, firstly by the author and followed by the readers, is a real and actual process.

 

[ficino]

Here are some issues where our position on fictional objects may make a difference. I quote Amie L. Thomasson, "Fictional Entities," in A Companion to Metaphysics, Second edition. Ed. Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and
Gary Rosenkrantz, Blackwell, 2009: 10-18, p. 18.

I know not everyone will be interested in this. That's OK! Summary: she says it matters for
1. theory of language
2. whether one accepts other objects that don't have spatio-temporal existence (symphonies, laws, etc.)
3. whether existence can be distinguished from quantification


"First, as we have seen in section 1, it has relevance for our theory of language. If we deny that there are fictional entities (and so deny that we ever refer to them), we must explain how we can have true statements involving nonreferring terms. If we accept that there are fictional entities, we must explain how we can refer to non-existent objects (if we take a Meinongian view), merely possible objects, or abstracta (whether Platonist or artifactual)—a task that is especially difficult for causal theories of reference, since none of these entities are obviously a part of the actual causal order.
Issues regarding fictional entities also have broader relevance for work in
metaphysics. If artifactualists like Thomasson are correct, then whether or not one
accepts that there are fictional characters is closely connected to the issue of whether
one accepts other mind-dependent social and cultural objects such as laws and
nations, stories and symphonies. Moreover, our stance regarding fictional entities has
central relevance for issues of ontological commitment and quantification: If the
Meinongian is right, we can quantify over entities that don’t exist, and existence must
be distinguished from quantification. If the minimalist is right, then the measure of ontological commitment is not whether or not we quantify over the relevant entities—
for if we accept that there are authors who use fictional names pretensefully in writing
works of fiction, we are already tacitly committed to fictional characters regardless of
whether they explicitly quantify over them."

here's a link to her whole paper:

http://www.class.uh.edu/phil/garson/Thomasson - Fictional Entities.pdf

 

[Bronzeage]

Yes Virginia, there is a Santa Claus.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Parmenides sez

Come now, I will tell thee - and do thou hearken to my
saying and carry it away - the only two ways of search that
can be thought of. The first, namely, that It is, and that it is
impossible for anything not to be, is the way of conviction,

for truth is its companion.. The other, namely, that It is not,
and that something must needs not be, - that, I tell thee, is a
wholly untrustworthy path. For you cannot know what is
not - that is impossible - nor utter it;

For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be.

 

[Togo]

This is remarkably similar to the paper I wrote in university.

The conclusion I came to reject Russel's arguement, and conclude that existance must indeed be a predicate, because the discussion not just of fictional, but even hypothetical or abstract concepts, relies heavily on granting entities that do not exist, even hypothetically, properties and characteristics. Russel's arguement really only works for physical objects.

My three arguements were:

1) Entities which we agree can not exist by their very definition, still have properties. For example a married bachelor has the property of being married, and of being a bachelor. These properties define the case we are talking about, so it is not true to claim, as Russel does, that we are talking about what properties such a person would if and only if they existed, because the case we are talking about consists entirely of those properties.

2) Lingusitically, all entities can have properties. Ask a kid in almost any modernised country to dress up as superman and they'll know exactly what to wear without further discussion. Superman has properties, these properties are demonstrably and repeatably associated with the concept, and Russel's assertion to the contrary becomes a counterfactual.

3) Existance itself can be a property.
One of my favourite examples is The Never-Ending Story, a particularly impenetrable children's book that got turned into a Disney film. (it featured a 'luck dragon', a cross between a dragon and dog). The film consists of a boy hiding out from bullies, and while doing so he finds and reads a book. The book is a fantasy adventure about the hero searching the kingdom for 'the human child' whom he must find and bring before the princess, or else the world ends. He fails, the world ends, and he finds the princess in her tower floating through space. Whereupon it is discovered that actually he has suceeded, because the human child is the one reading the book in which they appear. The reason why he can save their world is because he exists, and they don't, they're just characters in a story. By reading the story, he drives events forward, and the kingdom is recreated.

But according to Russel's argument, such a story should be incomprehensible, because existance isn't an attribute, and someone can not have the property of existing. In practice the story is quite easy to follow.

 

[ficino]

Great post, Togo! I appreciate your thoughts. You are ahead of me, having written a paper on this. I'm just trying to catch up.

Do you agree with those who posit Meinongian objects?

As to your three points, I need to think further, but can't resist trying a quickie response now. Here's my attempt. Against:

1): we can talk about the class of bachelors and the class of married people. These classes do not intersect; there is no member of both. hence, we cannot quantify over both classes. In the case you mention, it is false that the thing you are talking about is a married bachelor. You are just making an illicit conjunction of the predicates married and bachelor - illicit by the rules of language. Russell is still correct that it is not the case that there is some x that is married and is a bachelor. So you're really just talking about married x's and bachelors and making a mistake in conjoining them.

2): When an author writes a fiction, s/he makes pretend assertions about objects. The author of the Superman stories makes pretend assertions. They are pretend and not real assertions because they have no reference; Superman does not exist. When we talk about a fiction, though, our assertions do have a reference, because the fiction itself is a created artifact that is a real-world referent. So we and children can make genuine assertions about Superman, the created artifact. So no problem with our or critics' discourse about the properties of the text. The problem is with explaining the nature of the referent of the utterances put by the author into the fiction, but that's not the problem you bring up in 2).

3) the story isn't a counterexample against Russell because all the characters are part of the fiction, the boy as much as the princess. It doesn't matter how many back-levels, shall we say, exist in a narrative, i.e. a character who interacts with characters fictional to him, who may in turn interact with characters fictional to them. These are all just pretend referents, and statements about them technically are false. The story is not incomprehensible; it's just that, like all fictions, the utterances that compose it are literally false. But if they were true, it wouldn't be fiction.

OK, show me where I went wrong! And if you have any views about Meinong, I'd like to hear them. So far I'm not prepared to grant his "objects."