Why no war against Stalin?

[Togo]

You can't give credit of this to a single, late coming leader.

<shrug> Then you can't blame previous military mess-ups on a single cabinet minister. Or claim that it was done by Stalin.

His faults were racism, romanticism, military amateurishness, sexism, brutality, ego, and belligerance. His strengths included work ethic, courage, charm and open mindedness, (towards certain things, anyway).

He was also a warmonger. He consistently campaigned for more military campaigns both before and after WWII, and while he had warned about the dangers of Nazi Germany, he warned about a lot of things. According to his writings he was as surprised as anyone when he turned out to be right. I think his main strength was simply pig-headed stubborness. In an era when politicians vyed with eachother to appear accomodating and flexible, he took a line and stuck to it. This made him a good war-time leader, but not a good peace-time one.

 

[Sarpedon]

<shrug> Then you can't blame previous military mess-ups on a single cabinet minister. Or claim that it was done by Stalin

Which specific thing are you referring to?

There are certain military mess ups that are totally and provably Churchill's fault as a cabinet minister, such as the battle of Coronel.

 

[Bronzeage]

<shrug> Then you can't blame previous military mess-ups on a single cabinet minister. Or claim that it was done by Stalin.

His faults were racism, romanticism, military amateurishness, sexism, brutality, ego, and belligerance. His strengths included work ethic, courage, charm and open mindedness, (towards certain things, anyway).

He was also a warmonger. He consistently campaigned for more military campaigns both before and after WWII, and while he had warned about the dangers of Nazi Germany, he warned about a lot of things. According to his writings he was as surprised as anyone when he turned out to be right. I think his main strength was simply pig-headed stubborness. In an era when politicians vyed with eachother to appear accomodating and flexible, he took a line and stuck to it. This made him a good war-time leader, but not a good peace-time one.

It was interesting to read Churchills autobiography and see things which he glossed over or just alluded to, because the matter was still a classified state secret.

 

[MarkW]

One of the oldest rules of warfare is never engage an enemy that can defeat you by walking backwards.

Or, as someone with a tiny bit of knowledge of war put it:

Rule 1, on page 1 of the book of war, is: "Do not march on Moscow"

~Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery.

 

[Togo]

<shrug> Then you can't blame previous military mess-ups on a single cabinet minister. Or claim that it was done by Stalin

Which specific thing are you referring to?

There are certain military mess ups that are totally and provably Churchill's fault as a cabinet minister, such as the battle of Coronel.

Churchill was solely responsbile for the outcome of a battle because he didn't tell the admiral in charge that his plan wasn't exactly what the admirality had intended? In a navy where the role and relative worth of ageing ships was a constant issue that plagued the admirality? Again, if we're arguing that Churchill was merely head of the government that did many innovative things, then we should, to be consistent, argue that he was merely a cabinet minister overseeing the navy. If we want to blame him for particular decisions that he was involved in, then we have to give him praise for particular decisions he was involved in. I'm not a particular fan of Churchill, but either he's responsible or he isn't.

 

[Sarpedon]

When you give an admiral a ramshackle collection of ships and a mission they are absolutely incapable of performing, and then you call the admiral a coward when he points this out, you are absolutely responsible when he goes on to obey your orders without deviation and getting killed in the process. This is something of a tradition in the British armed forces. You know, there's even one of the world's most famous poems written about it: "Their's was not to reason why, their's was to do and die."
It is absolutely the responsibility of a commander to know how to motivate his subordinates. Churchill's mishandling of this affair is a testament to his egoism and negligence.

 

[Togo]

When you give an admiral a ramshackle collection of ships and a mission they are absolutely incapable of performing, and then you call the admiral a coward when he points this out, you are absolutely responsible when he goes on to obey your orders without deviation and getting killed in the process. This is something of a tradition in the British armed forces. You know, there's even one of the world's most famous poems written about it: "Their's was not to reason why, their's was to do and die."
It is absolutely the responsibility of a commander to know how to motivate his subordinates. Churchill's mishandling of this affair is a testament to his egoism and negligence.

Then he was a negligent and egotistical commander then, and a superb prime minster in WWII with many successes to be attributed to him personally. Again, if you want to put the blame on him personally for what he did through the admiralty then, then you need to give the praise for he did through the government later.

 

[Sarpedon]

You are seriously blaming the military officer for obeying orders? That's a huge fail. The officer HAD to obey his orders. That's how the military works. The responsibility lies with the one giving the orders. The procedure is simple: Superior gives the orders. Subordinate usually has an opportunity to protest and/or suggest alternatives, as this one did. If the orders are repeated, they are to be considered final. It amazes me that you think there's some kind of latitude here.

You have yet to prove what 'he did' through the government later. I've already pointed out that the Battle of Britain unfolded more or less independently from him, based on infrastructure and aircraft built long before he was in charge. Which achievements are his, specifically? I have never questioned that his courage and firmness was a great help to civilian and military morale. I have always emphasized his faults were in judgement. And I have never been one to automatically give praise or blame to the person who is at the head of whatever organization. I always look for signs of personal responsibility before making such judgements. Going by your system, I'd have to praise Stalin for being a great warlord, because he won, after all. But Stalin, like Churchill, were at their best when they left things to the professionals. When they meddled personally, disaster followed more often than not.

 

[Horatio Parker]

I'm reading George Marshall's biography. Both Churchill and Brooke thought a cross-channel invasion wasn't feasible until at least 1945. Marshall wanted one right away to relieve the Russians. 1944 was a compromise. Churchill was obsessed with the "soft underbelly" approach through Southern Europe. A prescient attitude, in view of how things turned out.

 

[Sarpedon]

Except that the soft underbelly wasn't so soft. Sure, Italy folded like origami, but the topography and german soldiers stopped the allies dead in their tracks.

Churchill, for all his talk about the soft underbelly, failed to notice that southern europe is where all the mountains are.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Except that the soft underbelly wasn't so soft. Sure, Italy folded like origami, but the topography and german soldiers stopped the allies dead in their tracks.

Churchill, for all his talk about the soft underbelly, failed to notice that southern europe is where all the mountains are.

I think Churchill had his eye on Stalin, one and two the smaller efforts called for a more equitable distribution of force, more of a partnership than an American commanded operation. The Americans initially didn't even want to do North Africa, they wanted to go right to France.

Italy folded was still a very tough nut. Churchill also wanted to invade Norway. Anyplace but near Germany...

I wonder what if they bypassed the Italian mainland and island hopped from Sicily to Sadinia and Corsica, then the south of France. A cross channel landing would then be in the rear of the Germans.

 

[Sarpedon]

They did that in reverse, in support of D-Day. The problem with making that the main effort was the distance between the N African Bases and the target, and the limited number of airfields on Corsica to support the invasion. Corsica is about as far from Marseille as Normandy is from Portsmouth, but southern England had about a bazillion airfields, while Corsica didn't have so many. So, in a word, logistics.

 

[Horatio Parker]

They did that in reverse, in support of D-Day. The problem with making that the main effort was the distance between the N African Bases and the target, and the limited number of airfields on Corsica to support the invasion. Corsica is about as far from Marseille as Normandy is from Portsmouth, but southern England had about a bazillion airfields, while Corsica didn't have so many. So, in a word, logistics.

I was thinking of an alternative to mainland Italy, not so much an alternative to Overlord.

 

[Sarpedon]

Doing the island hopping invasion of southern France while leaving mainland Italy in Axis hands would have been disasterous, as the shipping supporting the invasion would have been vulnerable to axis aircraft operating from mainland Italy. Plus it wouldn't have solved the essential problem: Allied forces getting bogged down in mountanous terrain, as Southern France has plenty of that. It also wouldn't have likely led to the collapse of Italy.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Doing the island hopping invasion of southern France while leaving mainland Italy in Axis hands would have been disasterous, as the shipping supporting the invasion would have been vulnerable to axis aircraft operating from mainland Italy. Plus it wouldn't have solved the essential problem: Allied forces getting bogged down in mountanous terrain, as Southern France has plenty of that. It also wouldn't have likely led to the collapse of Italy.

The islands need not have been totally subdued. Let the enemy starve in the mountains; supplying them would've been a nightmare. Establishing air superiority wasn't an issue on the mainland, why would it suddenly be so on the islands? And the collapse of Italy I think was of more political than military significance. And the landing in southern France needn't be the main effort. Once the Germans were drawn down south, they could be flanked from the channel.

It's the same number of landings, just done in a way to move north more quickly. I'm just playing maybe-if.

 

[Sarpedon]

First off: Air superiority was not established easily or early over the continent. Also, Air superiority is not the same as air supremacy.
Second: Air superiority over the continent was established in part by gaining airstrips on the continent. Even after we established airstrips on mainland italy, we continued to suffer heavy losses of bombers, right up to 1945.
Third: The Italian air force, while unequal to the larger powers, was the least disgraceful arm of their armed forces. Bypassing mainland Italy would have kept Mussolini in charge, and the italian air forces in play, along with the german. Both had many rightly feared anti-shipping aircraft.
Fourth: there's the right angle problem. If a convoy is spotted heading towards its goal, it is relatively easy to intercept it, if the intercepting forces are coming from more or less a right angle to the convoy's path. If you leave the forces in the mountains unsubdued, they can act as spotters.
Fifth: While the Italian army was rather disgraceful, it still numbered around 3-4 million men. The surrender of Italy in 1943, in response to our landing on mainland Italy, led to the greater part of this army being demobilized, and a significant part to change to our side. Landing in southern France instead of Italy would have put this force on our flank, with the Germans dead ahead.
Sixth: The allies didn't have enough shipping to undertake two major landings at the same time. The landing that actually occurred in southern france was small scale relative to normandy, and used many of the same ships, sailed around to get there. If you put the first effort in the south, you would have to use MORE ships to get there, because of the greater distance. This would have meant FEWER ships would have been available for a normandy invasion, which would have to be delayed. So while it COULD work, you would be running the risk of having your southern France operation wiped out before you could even launch your Normandy operation.

As critical as I am of Churchill, I don't regard the Italian campaign, which he pushed for, as a failure. It did not amount to as much as he thought it would, do to his stubborn ignorance of geography, but it accomplished several important goals, including knocking Italy out of the war, securing the supply routes through the mediterranean, gaining airfields for the better bombing of southern Germany, Austria, and Romania, and tying down some german forces. It failed to be the 'second front' that Stalin demanded, but was a success as a diversion, and kept the enemy guessing as to where the next offensive would come.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Except for the Italian AF remaining in the picture, none of this explains why establishing air superiority would be any different.

The Italian AF possessed 3,000 planes, only 60% of which were operational. Against this you have to compare 322k Allied casualties slogging up the mainland. Sicily was overrun in five weeks, at a cost of 22k casualties, and there the Axis had safe and convenient communications. The islands, much more isolated than Sicily, would've fallen like plums, and the allies would've been in striking distance of northern Italy, potentially cutting off the Axis forces, or southern France six months or earlier before d-day. Fewer German forces would've been available to respond to an invasion of France, since Italy would have to remain occupied.

I doubt that any Axis forces worthy of the name would've remained operational without supplies, and spies can spot as well as soldiers.

Except for the political dimension, which admittedly is a huge factor, I don't think the Italian campaign was a good choice.

First off: Air superiority was not established easily or early over the continent. Also, Air superiority is not the same as air supremacy.
Second: Air superiority over the continent was established in part by gaining airstrips on the continent. Even after we established airstrips on mainland italy, we continued to suffer heavy losses of bombers, right up to 1945.
Third: The Italian air force, while unequal to the larger powers, was the least disgraceful arm of their armed forces. Bypassing mainland Italy would have kept Mussolini in charge, and the italian air forces in play, along with the german. Both had many rightly feared anti-shipping aircraft.
Fourth: there's the right angle problem. If a convoy is spotted heading towards its goal, it is relatively easy to intercept it, if the intercepting forces are coming from more or less a right angle to the convoy's path. If you leave the forces in the mountains unsubdued, they can act as spotters.
Fifth: While the Italian army was rather disgraceful, it still numbered around 3-4 million men. The surrender of Italy in 1943, in response to our landing on mainland Italy, led to the greater part of this army being demobilized, and a significant part to change to our side. Landing in southern France instead of Italy would have put this force on our flank, with the Germans dead ahead.
Sixth: The allies didn't have enough shipping to undertake two major landings at the same time. The landing that actually occurred in southern france was small scale relative to normandy, and used many of the same ships, sailed around to get there. If you put the first effort in the south, you would have to use MORE ships to get there, because of the greater distance. This would have meant FEWER ships would have been available for a normandy invasion, which would have to be delayed. So while it COULD work, you would be running the risk of having your southern France operation wiped out before you could even launch your Normandy operation.

As critical as I am of Churchill, I don't regard the Italian campaign, which he pushed for, as a failure. It did not amount to as much as he thought it would, do to his stubborn ignorance of geography, but it accomplished several important goals, including knocking Italy out of the war, securing the supply routes through the mediterranean, gaining airfields for the better bombing of southern Germany, Austria, and Romania, and tying down some german forces. It failed to be the 'second front' that Stalin demanded, but was a success as a diversion, and kept the enemy guessing as to where the next offensive would come.

 

[Togo]

You are seriously blaming the military officer for obeying orders?

No. I'm insisting on consistency.

I made what I thought was a relatively uncontrovertial observation, and you won't leave it alone, despite apparently not remembering what that point was.

IF you want to blame Churchill for earlier failures on the grounds that he was in charge, then you also have to credit him with later successes, on the grounds that he was in charge.
Conversely, if you wish to argue that being in charge is not enough to credit him with later successes, then it follows that it isn't enough to be blamed for earlier failures.

That's it.

Now I suspect, and you've made reference to, the idea that you actually have specific grounds for blaming/crediting Churchill in some areas, and not others. Which is great, but the arguements you're posting here don't reflect that, and are non-responsive to my point. Instead you seem to be making up positions for me to hold.

Maybe if I make it more specific?

You keep on posting that he must be to blame because he was in charge. Since we both appear to agree that that being in charge is not sufficient grounds for blame/credit, then it must be the case that the arguement that he must be to blame because he was in charge is not valid. So why are you still making it?

 

[Sarpedon]

I have never blamed him for anything 'just because he was in charge.' That is simply untrue. I assign responsibility to him for the orders that he issued. I blame him for ill advised operations that he, specifically promoted or was involved in the specific dispositions for. I do expect the man in charge of the navy to have a basic understanding of how it works. If he doesn't he's incompetent.

For example, he was Prime Minister when Singapore fell to the Japanese. A disgraceful defeat for the british empire, which saw an outnumbered Japanese force attacking and capturing a fortified place, a major strategic base. However, I don't blame churchill for this, because he made certain the place was reinforced, and he was told that it was 'impregnable.' The fault does not lie on him.

I don't even blame him for Operation Market Garden, which he DID have a hand in promoting. However, it was an operation that appeared to have a reasonable chance of success, and what failures there were happened well below his level. It was a risky operation to put forwards, but risk is acceptable in war, and occasional defeats aren't to be matters of blame. Plenty of people would disagree, considering the whole operation to have been a reckless 'lets get the war done by christmas' sort of pipe dream. But I won't ascribe blame for a merely very risky operation as I would one that has manifest incompetence, ignorance and bungling.

I DO blame him for the loss of the Prince of Wales, which he sent with no air protection, to reinforce Singapore. (against the advice of his admirals) After Pearl Harbor, no one had any excuse to think the Japanese couldn't sink a battleship with a bomber.

I DO blame the battle of Coronel on him, because he was responsible for selecting the ships, and he gave the orders, overruling the officer on scene. He failed to understand that the ships were incapable of fulfilling the orders, and instead blamed the men.


I DO blame him for Galipoli, because he was the one most aggressively promoted it, overlooking the problems involved, many of which were naval in nature, and he was in charge of the navy.

How dare you accuse me of inconsistency and bias? I have evidence and facts for every one of the things I blame him for, and I don't blame him for a myriad of defeats that occurred during his PMship, only those where his bungling, arrogance, and ignorance are obviously manifest. Yet you would have me praise him for things that he clearly was not responsible for, like the Battle of Britain, as if his Heroic Aura inspired the pilots of the RAF and caused Radar installations and Spitfires to spontaneously assemble themselves. It is no great leadership to be handed a tool and to say 'this is a good tool, let us use it.' That is ordinary leadership. On your side you only have the fantasy movie idea that officers have total ability to ignore bad orders, and those giving the bad orders have no responsibility for them. It is absolutely a fact that Winston Churchill ordered Cradock to fight a battle he couldn't possibly win. Don't you dare deny that. The fact that you refuse to assign responsibilty to the man who gave the orders shows not just an intellectual, but a moral failing on your part.

 

[Togo]

Except for the Italian AF remaining in the picture, none of this explains why establishing air superiority would be any different.

Because of the naval position. The most powerful factor in naval warfare was the land-based planes, and the Italians, despite their faults in other areas, had some excellent naval planes based mainly in southern Italy. From there they could exact a heavy toll on Allied merchant shipping through the Med.

The Italian AF possessed 3,000 planes, only 60% of which were operational. Against this you have to compare 322k Allied casualties slogging up the mainland. Sicily was overrun in five weeks, at a cost of 22k casualties, and there the Axis had safe and convenient communications. The islands, much more isolated than Sicily, would've fallen like plums, and the allies would've been in striking distance of northern Italy, potentially cutting off the Axis forces, or southern France six months or earlier before d-day. Fewer German forces would've been available to respond to an invasion of France, since Italy would have to remain occupied.

Except that, with all of Italy in Axis hands, those islands wouldn't be any use. You couldn't stockpile them with supplies or people without getting bombed.

As critical as I am of Churchill, I don't regard the Italian campaign, which he pushed for, as a failure. It did not amount to as much as he thought it would, do to his stubborn ignorance of geography, but it accomplished several important goals, including knocking Italy out of the war, securing the supply routes through the mediterranean, gaining airfields for the better bombing of southern Germany, Austria, and Romania, and tying down some german forces. It failed to be the 'second front' that Stalin demanded, but was a success as a diversion, and kept the enemy guessing as to where the next offensive would come.

I think the supply lines alone were probably worth it.