Demystifying Determinism

[Kylie]

Kylie, I don’t think you ever responded to my post 227. Let’s start with this “set in stone” business. Most of us would agree that the past is set in stone. We can’t alter it, we can’t change it. So what? Does that mean we lack free will? To say that yesterday, because I ordered chicken for dinner, I had to do so, is a non sequitur. Similarly, if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will. To suppose that we have to be able to change or alter the past, present or future in order to have free will, is a mistake. In fact, we never even alter or change the present. To do so would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction — it would mean that I have the power to both order, and not order, chicken at the same time. Free will is not about changing the past, present or future. It is about helping to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and the future be, what it will be. We very easily do this every waking hour of our lives. Your probability calculations are mistaken. Your are confusing posterior probability with prior probability. The probability of my ordering chicken, if I order chicken, is 100 percent after the fact, not before. You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy when you argue that because I WILL do x, it follows I MUST do x. Again, I discussed this in some detail in post 227. As a matter of logic, your are incorrect when you claim that because I WILL do x, it follows that I CANNOT do y. To say that I “will” do x, presupposes that I “can” do it. The converse, however, is not true: to say that I WILL do x, never implies that I CANNOT do y. It is within my power to do either x or y, as entering a restaurant and watching people choose what to have for dinner clearly demonstrates. For the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise” simply means “would have done otherwise, if …” If what? If antecedent circumstances had been different. Again, see post 227

What does the past have to do with it? Tonight I will choose what to have for dinner. At this moment, there is no way to predict that in advance. Once I make the decision and prepare that food and eat it, it becomes set in stone. That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely. There were many options, and each of which had a non-zero probability until I decided on one particular option. That decision changed the probability of that option to 100% and all the others to 0%. I had free will to choose BEFORE I made the decision. The fact that I can't change my mind AFTER the fact is irrelevant. Yet for some reason you seem to think that since I can't change my mind AFTER the fact, I shouldn't be able to change it BEFORE the fact either.

Kylie, I don’t think you ever responded to my post 227. Let’s start with this “set in stone” business. Most of us would agree that the past is set in stone. We can’t alter it, we can’t change it. So what? Does that mean we lack free will? To say that yesterday, because I ordered chicken for dinner, I had to do so, is a non sequitur. Similarly, if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will. To suppose that we have to be able to change or alter the past, present or future in order to have free will, is a mistake. In fact, we never even alter or change the present. To do so would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction — it would mean that I have the power to both order, and not order, chicken at the same time. Free will is not about changing the past, present or future. It is about helping to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and the future be, what it will be. We very easily do this every waking hour of our lives. Your probability calculations are mistaken. Your are confusing posterior probability with prior probability. The probability of my ordering chicken, if I order chicken, is 100 percent after the fact, not before. You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy when you argue that because I WILL do x, it follows I MUST do x. Again, I discussed this in some detail in post 227. As a matter of logic, your are incorrect when you claim that because I WILL do x, it follows that I CANNOT do y. To say that I “will” do x, presupposes that I “can” do it. The converse, however, is not true: to say that I WILL do x, never implies that I CANNOT do y. It is within my power to do either x or y, as entering a restaurant and watching people choose what to have for dinner clearly demonstrates. For the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise” simply means “would have done otherwise, if …” If what? If antecedent circumstances had been different. Again, see post 227

What does the past have to do with it? Tonight I will choose what to have for dinner. At this moment, there is no way to predict that in advance. Once I make the decision and prepare that food and eat it, it becomes set in stone. That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely. There were many options, and each of which had a non-zero probability until I decided on one particular option. That decision changed the probability of that option to 100% and all the others to 0%. I had free will to choose BEFORE I made the decision. The fact that I can't change my mind AFTER the fact is irrelevant. Yet for some reason you seem to think that since I can't change my mind AFTER the fact, I shouldn't be able to change it BEFORE the fact either.

Kylie, I don’t think you ever responded to my post 227. Let’s start with this “set in stone” business. Most of us would agree that the past is set in stone. We can’t alter it, we can’t change it. So what? Does that mean we lack free will? To say that yesterday, because I ordered chicken for dinner, I had to do so, is a non sequitur. Similarly, if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will. To suppose that we have to be able to change or alter the past, present or future in order to have free will, is a mistake. In fact, we never even alter or change the present. To do so would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction — it would mean that I have the power to both order, and not order, chicken at the same time. Free will is not about changing the past, present or future. It is about helping to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and the future be, what it will be. We very easily do this every waking hour of our lives. Your probability calculations are mistaken. Your are confusing posterior probability with prior probability. The probability of my ordering chicken, if I order chicken, is 100 percent after the fact, not before. You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy when you argue that because I WILL do x, it follows I MUST do x. Again, I discussed this in some detail in post 227. As a matter of logic, your are incorrect when you claim that because I WILL do x, it follows that I CANNOT do y. To say that I “will” do x, presupposes that I “can” do it. The converse, however, is not true: to say that I WILL do x, never implies that I CANNOT do y. It is within my power to do either x or y, as entering a restaurant and watching people choose what to have for dinner clearly demonstrates. For the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise” simply means “would have done otherwise, if …” If what? If antecedent circumstances had been different. Again, see post 227

What does the past have to do with it? Tonight I will choose what to have for dinner. At this moment, there is no way to predict that in advance. Once I make the decision and prepare that food and eat it, it becomes set in stone. That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely. There were many options, and each of which had a non-zero probability until I decided on one particular option. That decision changed the probability of that option to 100% and all the others to 0%. I had free will to choose BEFORE I made the decision. The fact that I can't change my mind AFTER the fact is irrelevant. Yet for some reason you seem to think that since I can't change my mind AFTER the fact, I shouldn't be able to change it BEFORE the fact either.

Kylie, I don’t think you ever responded to my post 227. Let’s start with this “set in stone” business. Most of us would agree that the past is set in stone. We can’t alter it, we can’t change it. So what? Does that mean we lack free will? To say that yesterday, because I ordered chicken for dinner, I had to do so, is a non sequitur. Similarly, if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will. To suppose that we have to be able to change or alter the past, present or future in order to have free will, is a mistake. In fact, we never even alter or change the present. To do so would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction — it would mean that I have the power to both order, and not order, chicken at the same time. Free will is not about changing the past, present or future. It is about helping to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and the future be, what it will be. We very easily do this every waking hour of our lives. Your probability calculations are mistaken. Your are confusing posterior probability with prior probability. The probability of my ordering chicken, if I order chicken, is 100 percent after the fact, not before. You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy when you argue that because I WILL do x, it follows I MUST do x. Again, I discussed this in some detail in post 227. As a matter of logic, your are incorrect when you claim that because I WILL do x, it follows that I CANNOT do y. To say that I “will” do x, presupposes that I “can” do it. The converse, however, is not true: to say that I WILL do x, never implies that I CANNOT do y. It is within my power to do either x or y, as entering a restaurant and watching people choose what to have for dinner clearly demonstrates. For the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise” simply means “would have done otherwise, if …” If what? If antecedent circumstances had been different. Again, see post 227

What does the past have to do with it? Tonight I will choose what to have for dinner. At this moment, there is no way to predict that in advance. Once I make the decision and prepare that food and eat it, it becomes set in stone. That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely. There were many options, and each of which had a non-zero probability until I decided on one particular option. That decision changed the probability of that option to 100% and all the others to 0%. I had free will to choose BEFORE I made the decision. The fact that I can't change my mind AFTER the fact is irrelevant. Yet for some reason you seem to think that since I can't change my mind AFTER the fact, I shouldn't be able to change it BEFORE the fact either.

I am mystified by your reply. You seem to be AGREEING with me.

Kylie, I don’t think you ever responded to my post 227.

Let’s start with this “set in stone” business. Most of us would agree that the past is set in stone. We can’t alter it, we can’t change it.

So what? Does that mean we lack free will? To say that yesterday, because I ordered chicken for dinner, I had to do so, is a non sequitur.

Similarly, if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will. To suppose that we have to be able to change or alter the past, present or future in order to have free will, is a mistake. In fact, we never even alter or change the present. To do so would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction — it would mean that I have the power to both order, and not order, chicken at the same time.

Free will is not about changing the past, present or future. It is about helping to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and the future be, what it will be. We very easily do this every waking hour of our lives.

Your probability calculations are mistaken. Your are confusing posterior probability with prior probability. The probability of my ordering chicken, if I order chicken, is 100 percent after the fact, not before.

You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy when you argue that because I WILL do x, it follows I MUST do x. Again, I discussed this in some detail in post 227.

As a matter of logic, your are incorrect when you claim that because I WILL do x, it follows that I CANNOT do y. To say that I “will” do x, presupposes that I “can” do it. The converse, however, is not true: to say that I WILL do x, never implies that I CANNOT do y.

It is within my power to do either x or y, as entering a restaurant and watching people choose what to have for dinner clearly demonstrates. For the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise” simply means “would have done otherwise, if …” If what?

If antecedent circumstances had been different.

Again, see post 227

What does the past have to do with it?

Tonight I will choose what to have for dinner. At this moment, there is no way to predict that in advance. Once I make the decision and prepare that food and eat it, it becomes set in stone. That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely. There were many options, and each of which had a non-zero probability until I decided on one particular option. That decision changed the probability of that option to 100% and all the others to 0%. I had free will to choose BEFORE I made the decision. The fact that I can't change my mind AFTER the fact is irrelevant.

Yet for some reason you seem to think that since I can't change my mind AFTER the fact, I shouldn't be able to change it BEFORE the fact either.

I am mystified by your reply. You seem to be AGREEING with me, while ostensibly REBUTTING me. You also, in this response to me, seem to contradict everything you have argued up until now. I am genuinely puzzled. You write: “That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely.” YES! I AGREE! So … I don’t get it. Are you arguing for free will, or against it?

I disagree with your claim that, "if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will."

My position is and always has been that if the present and future are set in stone just like the past is, then we can not have any free will.

 

[Kylie]

I'm not the one trying to deviate from the given terms of determinism.

Determinism makes choosing inevitable. You claim that determinism makes choosing impossible.

How can you call it a choice when the outcome is set in stone?

 

[pood]

I am mystified by your reply. You seem to be AGREEING with me, while ostensibly REBUTTING me. You also, in this response to me, seem to contradict everything you have argued up until now. I am genuinely puzzled. You write: “That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely.” YES! I AGREE! So … I don’t get it. Are you arguing for free will, or against it?

If I'm not mistaken, both Kylie and DBT are arguing for incompatibility, rather than directly for free will.

That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely” sure sounds like an argument for free will. Because what she wrote there is exactly right.

 

[Kylie]

I am mystified by your reply. You seem to be AGREEING with me, while ostensibly REBUTTING me. You also, in this response to me, seem to contradict everything you have argued up until now. I am genuinely puzzled. You write: “That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely.” YES! I AGREE! So … I don’t get it. Are you arguing for free will, or against it?

If I'm not mistaken, both Kylie and DBT are arguing for incompatibility, rather than directly for free will.

That's correct. My argument is only that in a deterministic universe, free will and free choice can not exist. All we can possibly do is what has been set in stone, and there is no way we can do anything different.

 

[pood]

Kylie, I don’t think you ever responded to my post 227. Let’s start with this “set in stone” business. Most of us would agree that the past is set in stone. We can’t alter it, we can’t change it. So what? Does that mean we lack free will? To say that yesterday, because I ordered chicken for dinner, I had to do so, is a non sequitur. Similarly, if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will. To suppose that we have to be able to change or alter the past, present or future in order to have free will, is a mistake. In fact, we never even alter or change the present. To do so would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction — it would mean that I have the power to both order, and not order, chicken at the same time. Free will is not about changing the past, present or future. It is about helping to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and the future be, what it will be. We very easily do this every waking hour of our lives. Your probability calculations are mistaken. Your are confusing posterior probability with prior probability. The probability of my ordering chicken, if I order chicken, is 100 percent after the fact, not before. You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy when you argue that because I WILL do x, it follows I MUST do x. Again, I discussed this in some detail in post 227. As a matter of logic, your are incorrect when you claim that because I WILL do x, it follows that I CANNOT do y. To say that I “will” do x, presupposes that I “can” do it. The converse, however, is not true: to say that I WILL do x, never implies that I CANNOT do y. It is within my power to do either x or y, as entering a restaurant and watching people choose what to have for dinner clearly demonstrates. For the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise” simply means “would have done otherwise, if …” If what? If antecedent circumstances had been different. Again, see post 227

What does the past have to do with it? Tonight I will choose what to have for dinner. At this moment, there is no way to predict that in advance. Once I make the decision and prepare that food and eat it, it becomes set in stone. That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely. There were many options, and each of which had a non-zero probability until I decided on one particular option. That decision changed the probability of that option to 100% and all the others to 0%. I had free will to choose BEFORE I made the decision. The fact that I can't change my mind AFTER the fact is irrelevant. Yet for some reason you seem to think that since I can't change my mind AFTER the fact, I shouldn't be able to change it BEFORE the fact either.

Kylie, I don’t think you ever responded to my post 227. Let’s start with this “set in stone” business. Most of us would agree that the past is set in stone. We can’t alter it, we can’t change it. So what? Does that mean we lack free will? To say that yesterday, because I ordered chicken for dinner, I had to do so, is a non sequitur. Similarly, if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will. To suppose that we have to be able to change or alter the past, present or future in order to have free will, is a mistake. In fact, we never even alter or change the present. To do so would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction — it would mean that I have the power to both order, and not order, chicken at the same time. Free will is not about changing the past, present or future. It is about helping to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and the future be, what it will be. We very easily do this every waking hour of our lives. Your probability calculations are mistaken. Your are confusing posterior probability with prior probability. The probability of my ordering chicken, if I order chicken, is 100 percent after the fact, not before. You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy when you argue that because I WILL do x, it follows I MUST do x. Again, I discussed this in some detail in post 227. As a matter of logic, your are incorrect when you claim that because I WILL do x, it follows that I CANNOT do y. To say that I “will” do x, presupposes that I “can” do it. The converse, however, is not true: to say that I WILL do x, never implies that I CANNOT do y. It is within my power to do either x or y, as entering a restaurant and watching people choose what to have for dinner clearly demonstrates. For the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise” simply means “would have done otherwise, if …” If what? If antecedent circumstances had been different. Again, see post 227

What does the past have to do with it? Tonight I will choose what to have for dinner. At this moment, there is no way to predict that in advance. Once I make the decision and prepare that food and eat it, it becomes set in stone. That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely. There were many options, and each of which had a non-zero probability until I decided on one particular option. That decision changed the probability of that option to 100% and all the others to 0%. I had free will to choose BEFORE I made the decision. The fact that I can't change my mind AFTER the fact is irrelevant. Yet for some reason you seem to think that since I can't change my mind AFTER the fact, I shouldn't be able to change it BEFORE the fact either.

Kylie, I don’t think you ever responded to my post 227. Let’s start with this “set in stone” business. Most of us would agree that the past is set in stone. We can’t alter it, we can’t change it. So what? Does that mean we lack free will? To say that yesterday, because I ordered chicken for dinner, I had to do so, is a non sequitur. Similarly, if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will. To suppose that we have to be able to change or alter the past, present or future in order to have free will, is a mistake. In fact, we never even alter or change the present. To do so would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction — it would mean that I have the power to both order, and not order, chicken at the same time. Free will is not about changing the past, present or future. It is about helping to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and the future be, what it will be. We very easily do this every waking hour of our lives. Your probability calculations are mistaken. Your are confusing posterior probability with prior probability. The probability of my ordering chicken, if I order chicken, is 100 percent after the fact, not before. You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy when you argue that because I WILL do x, it follows I MUST do x. Again, I discussed this in some detail in post 227. As a matter of logic, your are incorrect when you claim that because I WILL do x, it follows that I CANNOT do y. To say that I “will” do x, presupposes that I “can” do it. The converse, however, is not true: to say that I WILL do x, never implies that I CANNOT do y. It is within my power to do either x or y, as entering a restaurant and watching people choose what to have for dinner clearly demonstrates. For the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise” simply means “would have done otherwise, if …” If what? If antecedent circumstances had been different. Again, see post 227

What does the past have to do with it? Tonight I will choose what to have for dinner. At this moment, there is no way to predict that in advance. Once I make the decision and prepare that food and eat it, it becomes set in stone. That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely. There were many options, and each of which had a non-zero probability until I decided on one particular option. That decision changed the probability of that option to 100% and all the others to 0%. I had free will to choose BEFORE I made the decision. The fact that I can't change my mind AFTER the fact is irrelevant. Yet for some reason you seem to think that since I can't change my mind AFTER the fact, I shouldn't be able to change it BEFORE the fact either.

Kylie, I don’t think you ever responded to my post 227. Let’s start with this “set in stone” business. Most of us would agree that the past is set in stone. We can’t alter it, we can’t change it. So what? Does that mean we lack free will? To say that yesterday, because I ordered chicken for dinner, I had to do so, is a non sequitur. Similarly, if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will. To suppose that we have to be able to change or alter the past, present or future in order to have free will, is a mistake. In fact, we never even alter or change the present. To do so would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction — it would mean that I have the power to both order, and not order, chicken at the same time. Free will is not about changing the past, present or future. It is about helping to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and the future be, what it will be. We very easily do this every waking hour of our lives. Your probability calculations are mistaken. Your are confusing posterior probability with prior probability. The probability of my ordering chicken, if I order chicken, is 100 percent after the fact, not before. You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy when you argue that because I WILL do x, it follows I MUST do x. Again, I discussed this in some detail in post 227. As a matter of logic, your are incorrect when you claim that because I WILL do x, it follows that I CANNOT do y. To say that I “will” do x, presupposes that I “can” do it. The converse, however, is not true: to say that I WILL do x, never implies that I CANNOT do y. It is within my power to do either x or y, as entering a restaurant and watching people choose what to have for dinner clearly demonstrates. For the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise” simply means “would have done otherwise, if …” If what? If antecedent circumstances had been different. Again, see post 227

What does the past have to do with it? Tonight I will choose what to have for dinner. At this moment, there is no way to predict that in advance. Once I make the decision and prepare that food and eat it, it becomes set in stone. That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely. There were many options, and each of which had a non-zero probability until I decided on one particular option. That decision changed the probability of that option to 100% and all the others to 0%. I had free will to choose BEFORE I made the decision. The fact that I can't change my mind AFTER the fact is irrelevant. Yet for some reason you seem to think that since I can't change my mind AFTER the fact, I shouldn't be able to change it BEFORE the fact either.

I am mystified by your reply. You seem to be AGREEING with me.

Kylie, I don’t think you ever responded to my post 227.

Let’s start with this “set in stone” business. Most of us would agree that the past is set in stone. We can’t alter it, we can’t change it.

So what? Does that mean we lack free will? To say that yesterday, because I ordered chicken for dinner, I had to do so, is a non sequitur.

Similarly, if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will. To suppose that we have to be able to change or alter the past, present or future in order to have free will, is a mistake. In fact, we never even alter or change the present. To do so would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction — it would mean that I have the power to both order, and not order, chicken at the same time.

Free will is not about changing the past, present or future. It is about helping to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and the future be, what it will be. We very easily do this every waking hour of our lives.

Your probability calculations are mistaken. Your are confusing posterior probability with prior probability. The probability of my ordering chicken, if I order chicken, is 100 percent after the fact, not before.

You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy when you argue that because I WILL do x, it follows I MUST do x. Again, I discussed this in some detail in post 227.

As a matter of logic, your are incorrect when you claim that because I WILL do x, it follows that I CANNOT do y. To say that I “will” do x, presupposes that I “can” do it. The converse, however, is not true: to say that I WILL do x, never implies that I CANNOT do y.

It is within my power to do either x or y, as entering a restaurant and watching people choose what to have for dinner clearly demonstrates. For the compatibilist, “could have done otherwise” simply means “would have done otherwise, if …” If what?

If antecedent circumstances had been different.

Again, see post 227

What does the past have to do with it?

Tonight I will choose what to have for dinner. At this moment, there is no way to predict that in advance. Once I make the decision and prepare that food and eat it, it becomes set in stone. That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely. There were many options, and each of which had a non-zero probability until I decided on one particular option. That decision changed the probability of that option to 100% and all the others to 0%. I had free will to choose BEFORE I made the decision. The fact that I can't change my mind AFTER the fact is irrelevant.

Yet for some reason you seem to think that since I can't change my mind AFTER the fact, I shouldn't be able to change it BEFORE the fact either.

I am mystified by your reply. You seem to be AGREEING with me, while ostensibly REBUTTING me. You also, in this response to me, seem to contradict everything you have argued up until now. I am genuinely puzzled. You write: “That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely.” YES! I AGREE! So … I don’t get it. Are you arguing for free will, or against it?

I disagree with your claim that, "if the present and future are as set in stone as the past, this fact does not vitiate free will."

My position is and always has been that if the present and future are set in stone just like the past is, then we can not have any free will.

Sorry for that big repetitive quote mess. I was having internet connection problems and things got all fugged up.

Ok, I say if the past, present and future are set in stone that is totally irrelevant to free will, since our free acts are among the factors that are setting past, present and future in stone. So please tell me, according to you, what WOULD give us free will? Are you a libertarian about free will?

 

[pood]

I am mystified by your reply. You seem to be AGREEING with me, while ostensibly REBUTTING me. You also, in this response to me, seem to contradict everything you have argued up until now. I am genuinely puzzled. You write: “That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely.” YES! I AGREE! So … I don’t get it. Are you arguing for free will, or against it?

If I'm not mistaken, both Kylie and DBT are arguing for incompatibility, rather than directly for free will.

That's correct. My argument is only that in a deterministic universe, free will and free choice can not exist. All we can possibly do is what has been set in stone, and there is no way we can do anything different.

Then why did you write: “That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely“?

 

[bilby]

in a deterministic universe, free will and free choice can not exist

Not so.

FOR a deterministic universe, free will and free choice cannot exist. But IN a deterministic universe, entities with incomplete knowledge can still exhibit free will and make free choices. Indeed, they couldn't possibly not do so.

The parts do not have the same constraints as the whole; The universe can be completely static in four dimensions, but people living in it can nevertheless not remember the future.

 

[pood]

Let me ask Kylie a different question. If the future is set in stone, as it is in the completely static 4D model of Minkowski, why does that preclude us from having free will?

 

[DBT]

Zero possibility of alternatives is entailed in the given definition of determinism. No possible alternative negates choice.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Something that is inevitable BY DEFINITION has a probability of 100%.

If you wish. But what does "a probability of 100%" tell us that we don't already know by simply knowing it is inevitable? Probabilities are used to estimate the likelihood of something happening. That's their only function, to help us prepare for something that may or may not happen. If you know for certain that something will happen, then it is pointless to state any probability at all. And the same goes for something that we know for certain will not happen.

It doesn't matter if we knew it. The point is that you were saying the outcome was set in stone. Our understanding or knowledge is not required.

If our understanding or knowledge is not required, then why are we discussing it? Evidently our understanding or knowledge is important.

My understanding is that determinism can be metaphorically described as "all events are set in stone". Therefore, choosing is set in stone, just like every other event. We cannot say that "choosing does not happen due to being set in stone". Quite the opposite. Choosing MUST happen if it is set in stone. We confirm this fact by noting people making choices, such as in the restaurant.

It is set in stone that we will enter the restaurant, sit at a table, read the menu, consider our tastes and dietary goals, and decide what we will order. One brick after the next. One stepping stone and then another.

Our walking, our sitting, our reading, our considering, and our choosing, were all equally "set in stone". And they all actually happened in physical reality.

So, the claim that an inevitable choice is not a choice simply does not hold up.

 

[Jarhyn]

We do precisely what we must do because the past went precisely as it did, what we do now, we must do, which in turn makes the future exactly what it must become. Nothing deviates. That's determinism, to pretend any different, that, gosh, maybe this, maybe that, oh, this or that could have happened is a truckload of Horse Shit.

You must precisely decide what you will do with longer lead times before you do it so you have longer to think about what you are doing, and to be critical of those in a philosophical or ethical sense, because if you don't use the leverage you have to make better decisions, you will end up "not deviating" right into a truckload of horseshit.

Objects can be "deviated" from their inertial direction by an application of force. Sometimes, it is rather very little effort to make that happen. Sometimes the effort is so subtle that it is barely noticable at all.

But the tiny bit of effort to keep an eye open and on the road, and to figure out effective ways to make that happen, and applying those can tend to keep tendency to "not deviate" into a truckload of horseshit at bay.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

My argument is only that in a deterministic universe, free will and free choice can not exist. All we can possibly do is what has been set in stone, and there is no way we can do anything different.

And you are using "free" to mean "freedom from deterministic causal necessity/inevitability".

My position is that "free" can NEVER logically mean "freedom from causal necessity", because every freedom we have, to do anything at all, REQUIRES reliable causation. Thus it creates a paradox, because we cannot be free of that which freedom itself requires.

My position is that "free" is only meaningful when it references some meaningful and relevant constraint. For example, a guy with a gun forces us to do what he chooses instead of what we choose. Thus, the "free" in "free will" refers to freedom from those types of realistic constraints upon our ability to choose for ourselves what we will do. It NEVER means "freedom from causal necessity".

Other realistic constraints would include any significant mental illness that (a) distorts reality by hallucination and delusions, (b) impairs our ability to reason, or (c) subjects us to an "irresistible impulse". Another constraint would be manipulation by hypnosis or deception. Another constraint would be authoritative command in an unequal power relationship, like parent/child, commander/soldier, doctor/patient, etc. Basically, any condition, that effectively removes our ability to choose for ourselves what we will do, prevents us from exercising our free will. And those are the things that "free will" actually implies that we are free of.

These realistic constraints define the free will that is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. In a courtroom, they are matters of precedents, objective evidence, and expert testimony.

So, this realistic notion of free will, as freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence, is the only definition that we need.

It is not necessary for free will to be free from deterministic causal necessity. As I've been pointing out, deterministic causal necessity is not a meaningful or relevant constraint. It is exactly identical to us just being us, and doing what we choose to do. It is what we would have done anyway. And that is not a meaningful constraint. It is not something that we can, or need to be, free of.

 

[Kylie]

Sorry for that big repetitive quote mess. I was having internet connection problems and things got all fugged up.

No worries, happens to us all.

Ok, I say if the past, present and future are set in stone that is totally irrelevant to free will, since our free acts are among the factors that are setting past, present and future in stone. So please tell me, according to you, what WOULD give us free will? Are you a libertarian about free will?

But the present and future being set in stone IS relevant to our free will, since if the outcome is set in stone, we can not CHOOSE to do anything differently. Thus we do not have a choice.

And to answer your question, what would give us true free will (and not the illusion of it that has been argued for with that whole, "We were destined to choose" nonsense) is a future that is fluid, not set in stone.

I would say that I do hold a libertarian position with regards to free will, in that I don't see how it can be compatible in a deterministic universe, and that I believe that we have free will. This opinion is based on my belief that we do have free will, since what I see in the real world (people making choices) is what we would expect to see in a universe where we have free will.

Now, to be fair, what I see is also compatible in a world that is purely deterministic, where everything we choose is set in stone and we have no free will. In such a universe, we would merely have the illusion of free will, not actual free will. I can think of no way by which we could tell the difference.

However, in such a universe, we would have people being held accountable for things that they have no control over. The thief is sentenced to prison for stealing, but his theft was set in stone. He couldn't avoid stealing. Even if he believes that he made the choice to steal, he did not, since in a deterministic universe he has no free will, just the illusion of it. So if he could not do anything but, we can not hold him responsible, for he did not CHOOSE to steal, even if he believes he did. And I can't accept that it is ever morally acceptable to hold people responsible for actions they had no control over.

So, there are three options:

1. A purely deterministic universe.
2. A compatibilist universe.
3. A non-deterministic universe.

I reject the second because I can not see how free will and determinism do not fundamentally contradict each other. I reject the first because my entire experience (as well as that of everyone else that I know of) indicates that we must act according to our free will (which contradicts 1). Thus, the third is the only option left.

 

[Kylie]

I am mystified by your reply. You seem to be AGREEING with me, while ostensibly REBUTTING me. You also, in this response to me, seem to contradict everything you have argued up until now. I am genuinely puzzled. You write: “That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely.” YES! I AGREE! So … I don’t get it. Are you arguing for free will, or against it?

If I'm not mistaken, both Kylie and DBT are arguing for incompatibility, rather than directly for free will.

That's correct. My argument is only that in a deterministic universe, free will and free choice can not exist. All we can possibly do is what has been set in stone, and there is no way we can do anything different.

Then why did you write: “That does not change the fact that I made the choice freely“?

Which post of mine are you referring to? I need to see the context in order to answer that question.

 

[Kylie]

in a deterministic universe, free will and free choice can not exist

Not so.

FOR a deterministic universe, free will and free choice cannot exist. But IN a deterministic universe, entities with incomplete knowledge can still exhibit free will and make free choices. Indeed, they couldn't possibly not do so.

The parts do not have the same constraints as the whole; The universe can be completely static in four dimensions, but people living in it can nevertheless not remember the future.

No, in a deterministic universe, entities with incomplete knowledge INCORRECTLY ASSUME they exhibit free will and make free choices. But they do not.

The illusion of free will is not the same thing as actual free will.

 

[Kylie]

Let me ask Kylie a different question. If the future is set in stone, as it is in the completely static 4D model of Minkowski, why does that preclude us from having free will?

I'm not familiar with the "static 4D model of Minkowski".

But yes, I believe that if the future is set in stone, it does prevent us from having free will. As I have explained countless times now, true free will means that when we make a choice, we have several different options, each of which has a non-zero probability. Like such:

Option A: 12%
Option B 48%
Option C: 60%

If the future is set in stone, then one outcome is inevitable. This requires that it have a probability of 100%. So we'd see something more like this:

Option A: 0%
Option B: 100%
Option C: 0%

And, let me take the opportunity to say that the compatibilist model would result in this:

Option A: 12%
Option B 100%
Option C: 60%

Since a probability of more than 100% is nonsensical, this can't be true. For this reason, I reject the compatibilist idea.

 

[bilby]

in a deterministic universe, free will and free choice can not exist

Not so.

FOR a deterministic universe, free will and free choice cannot exist. But IN a deterministic universe, entities with incomplete knowledge can still exhibit free will and make free choices. Indeed, they couldn't possibly not do so.

The parts do not have the same constraints as the whole; The universe can be completely static in four dimensions, but people living in it can nevertheless not remember the future.

No, in a deterministic universe, entities with incomplete knowledge INCORRECTLY ASSUME they exhibit free will and make free choices. But they do not.

The illusion of free will is not the same thing as actual free will.

Sure it is. It's not really an illusion though. Just a perspective from which the future cannot be seen.

Which is the perspective we all have. I assume.

The fact that a god's eye view sees things differently is only relevant to these of us who are gods, ie nobody.

 

[Kylie]

Something that is inevitable BY DEFINITION has a probability of 100%.

If you wish. But what does "a probability of 100%" tell us that we don't already know by simply knowing it is inevitable? Probabilities are used to estimate the likelihood of something happening. That's their only function, to help us prepare for something that may or may not happen. If you know for certain that something will happen, then it is pointless to state any probability at all. And the same goes for something that we know for certain will not happen.

Yes. They tell us that everything else MUST HAVE a zero probability.

And that means no choice, since there are no other options, and a truly free choice requires multiple options.

It doesn't matter if we knew it. The point is that you were saying the outcome was set in stone. Our understanding or knowledge is not required.

If our understanding or knowledge is not required, then why are we discussing it? Evidently our understanding or knowledge is important.

My understanding is that determinism can be metaphorically described as "all events are set in stone". Therefore, choosing is set in stone, just like every other event. We cannot say that "choosing does not happen due to being set in stone". Quite the opposite. Choosing MUST happen if it is set in stone. We confirm this fact by noting people making choices, such as in the restaurant.

It is set in stone that we will enter the restaurant, sit at a table, read the menu, consider our tastes and dietary goals, and decide what we will order. One brick after the next. One stepping stone and then another.

Our walking, our sitting, our reading, our considering, and our choosing, were all equally "set in stone". And they all actually happened in physical reality.

So, the claim that an inevitable choice is not a choice simply does not hold up.

We are discussing it because you are insisting that it's correct and then saying that our ignorance that most of the options are not choosable somehow renders them choosable, we just won't choose them.

If our choice is set in stone and it only had one possible outcome, then there was never a choice to begin with.

 

[Kylie]

My argument is only that in a deterministic universe, free will and free choice can not exist. All we can possibly do is what has been set in stone, and there is no way we can do anything different.

And you are using "free" to mean "freedom from deterministic causal necessity/inevitability".

My position is that "free" can NEVER logically mean "freedom from causal necessity", because every freedom we have, to do anything at all, REQUIRES reliable causation. Thus it creates a paradox, because we cannot be free of that which freedom itself requires.

That eliminates freedom then.

My position is that "free" is only meaningful when it references some meaningful and relevant constraint. For example, a guy with a gun forces us to do what he chooses instead of what we choose. Thus, the "free" in "free will" refers to freedom from those types of realistic constraints upon our ability to choose for ourselves what we will do. It NEVER means "freedom from causal necessity".

Other realistic constraints would include any significant mental illness that (a) distorts reality by hallucination and delusions, (b) impairs our ability to reason, or (c) subjects us to an "irresistible impulse". Another constraint would be manipulation by hypnosis or deception. Another constraint would be authoritative command in an unequal power relationship, like parent/child, commander/soldier, doctor/patient, etc. Basically, any condition, that effectively removes our ability to choose for ourselves what we will do, prevents us from exercising our free will. And those are the things that "free will" actually implies that we are free of.

These realistic constraints define the free will that is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. In a courtroom, they are matters of precedents, objective evidence, and expert testimony.

So, this realistic notion of free will, as freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence, is the only definition that we need.

It is not necessary for free will to be free from deterministic causal necessity. As I've been pointing out, deterministic causal necessity is not a meaningful or relevant constraint. It is exactly identical to us just being us, and doing what we choose to do. It is what we would have done anyway. And that is not a meaningful constraint. It is not something that we can, or need to be, free of.

This requires that every single event in the universe, no matter how small, must be completely deterministic in nature. My understanding is that certain subatomic level events are not deterministic. Another example of something which can not be determined is the Computer Halting Problem. If we use the halting problem and tie some event into whether the program has halted after some arbitrary period, then the outcome of this literally can not be predicted in advance. Thus it can not be set in stone, and is by definition not deterministic.

 

[Kylie]

in a deterministic universe, free will and free choice can not exist

Not so.

FOR a deterministic universe, free will and free choice cannot exist. But IN a deterministic universe, entities with incomplete knowledge can still exhibit free will and make free choices. Indeed, they couldn't possibly not do so.

The parts do not have the same constraints as the whole; The universe can be completely static in four dimensions, but people living in it can nevertheless not remember the future.

No, in a deterministic universe, entities with incomplete knowledge INCORRECTLY ASSUME they exhibit free will and make free choices. But they do not.

The illusion of free will is not the same thing as actual free will.

Sure it is. It's not really an illusion though. Just a perspective from which the future cannot be seen.

Which is the perspective we all have. I assume.

The fact that a god's eye view sees things differently is only relevant to these of us who are gods, ie nobody.

"That which can be asserted without evidence, can be dismissed without evidence." Christopher Hitchens.