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According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

"Hard determinism seems like a hard way to go. It can rationalize anything." Yes it can. So what? That is the point of an effective paradigm.
No, quote the opposite, this is the Hallmark of a "trivializing" system of axioms.

Math is specifically "effective" because people reject that quality as part of an effective paradigm.

Being able to "rationalize* anything" means you have rationalized nothing. You have instead just asserted it.
 
"Hard determinism seems like a hard way to go. It can rationalize anything." Yes it can. So what? That is the point of an effective paradigm.
No, quote the opposite, this is the Hallmark of a "trivializing" system of axioms.

Math is specifically "effective" because people reject that quality as part of an effective paradigm.

Being able to "rationalize* anything" means you have rationalized nothing. You have instead just asserted it.
You mosquitoes, that was me.

As free will and determinism are definitions not subject to experimental proof any actions based on eirher is a rationalization or justification.

Don't focus so much on logic and word play and think about how a philosophy plays out in the real w0rld.

Math is not subjective philosophy. Math is subjective to experimental proof pf and demonstration.

Math can be directly applied to physical reality.
 
"Hard determinism seems like a hard way to go. It can rationalize anything." Yes it can. So what? That is the point of an effective paradigm.
No, quote the opposite, this is the Hallmark of a "trivializing" system of axioms.

Math is specifically "effective" because people reject that quality as part of an effective paradigm.

Being able to "rationalize* anything" means you have rationalized nothing. You have instead just asserted it.
You mosquitoes, that was me.

As free will and determinism are definitions not subject to experimental proof any actions based on eirher is a rationalization or justification.

Don't focus so much on logic and word play and think about how a philosophy plays out in the real w0rld.

Math is not subjective philosophy. Math is subjective to experimental proof pf and demonstration.

Math can be directly applied to physical reality.
The problem here is that when freedom is defined as momentary autonomous action, it gets "sucked into" math, and is, in fact subject to suck the idea of "rationalization" or "justification" into it.

In fact, bringing this philosophy into terms that math can "hook into" as it were is the entire point of my approach to compatibilism.

If this is the case, that "rationalization" or "justification" can be mapped to mathematical concepts, then as I said, being able to rationalize "anything" is proof that you have fucked up somehow in the foundational declarations.

Ergo, being able to "rationalize anything" is a bug, not a feature.
 
In religion


Predestination is a doctrine in Calvinism dealing with the question of the control that God exercises over the world. In the words of the Westminster Confession of Faith, God "freely and unchangeably ordained whatsoever comes to pass."[2][3] The second use of the word "predestination" applies this to salvation, and refers to the belief that God appointed the eternal destiny of some to salvation by grace, while leaving the remainder to receive eternal damnation for all their sins, even their original sin. The former is called "unconditional election", and the latter "reprobation". In Calvinism, some people are predestined and effectually called in due time (regenerated/born again) to faith by God while all others are reprobated.[4]
 
"Hard determinism seems like a hard way to go. It can rationalize anything." Yes it can. So what? That is the point of an effective paradigm.
No, quote the opposite, this is the Hallmark of a "trivializing" system of axioms.

Math is specifically "effective" because people reject that quality as part of an effective paradigm.

Being able to "rationalize* anything" means you have rationalized nothing. You have instead just asserted it.
You mosquitoes, that was me.

As free will and determinism are definitions not subject to experimental proof any actions based on eirher is a rationalization or justification.

Don't focus so much on logic and word play and think about how a philosophy plays out in the real w0rld.

Math is not subjective philosophy. Math is subjective to experimental proof pf and demonstration.

Math can be directly applied to physical reality.

Steve, I know from your posts that you are a very practical person. As a practical matter, I agree with most of what you post, including the point of your latest post (quoted above). As a practical matter, we live as if there is a "physical reality" that we understand at some level through math, empirical observation and experimentation, and demonstration -- just as you have written. As a practical matter, that is what we understand to be the "real world" in which we perceive that we live our lives.

I also agree that both Free Will and Determinism (in their pure forms) are theoretical constructs that are impervious to experimental proof (or falsification). I suspect that is why you wrote that "It seems like free will vs determinism is the greatest philosophical mind fuck of all time ;et loose upon us." I submit that Theism may be the greatest mindfuck -- which also has led to more bloodshed than any other philosophical mind fuck.

While I also am a practical person, I enjoy diving into the philosophical abyss and pondering theoretical questions to which the answers are impervious to proof. I have the liberty of being able to do so because I devoted much of my life to practical endeavors that provide me with a comfortable life in which I can pursue such inquiries. In the course of my philosophical musings, I recognize that the very notions of a "real world" or "physical reality" are, themselves, theoretical constructs that are impervious to proof. Or, as Albert Einstein famously said, "Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one."

Again, my musing about a different reality (or no reality at all) does not mean that I reject what we perceive to be the real world or physical reality in order to get out of bed in the morning, go about my daily activities, and then go back to sleep at night. It does mean, however, that I reserve a modicum of doubt resecting our perception, and I enjoy pondering the alternatives to what we perceive.

I also believe there is practical value in the long run to devoting time to esoteric philosophical inquiry about alternate realities (or even the absence of such a thing as reality). As Albert Einstein also said, "Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited, whereas imagination embraces the entire world, stimulating progress, giving birth to evolution.”

At the end of the day, however, we must act as if our perception is reliable to be able to get out of bed, go about our daily activities and get to the end of the day. To quote Einstein again, this time with reference to the relationship between his intellectual belief Determinism and the way he lives his life: "I am compelled to act as if free will existed, because if I wish to live in a civilized society I must act responsibly. . . I know that philosophically a murderer is not responsible for his crime, but I prefer not to take tea with him.”

Thanks for continuing to inject a practical approach to this discussion. It helps to keep us grounded.
 
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Where we come apart is in the belief that the form of free will you have described (assuming it does, in fact, exist) can truly arise in an entirely deterministic way, as opposed to simply having the appearance of arising in a lock-step manner from what appears to be a chaotically and/or indeterminately complex system.
What is the difference between something existing, and something having the appearance of existing?

All our knowledge of anything outside our own thoughts is appearances.

If someting has the appearance of arising, it arises.

Also, the Fallacy of Composition is a fallacy. A whole can have properties that are not properties of its parts.
 
What is the difference between something existing, and something having the appearance of existing?
I used to ask that question. Then it hit me.
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But seriously, all of life is like a lightbulb.
It doesn’t matter if it works, as long as it looks like it works.
 
Fo0r any and all. Some simple applied philosophy.

What does luck have to do with anything? Can someone be lucky?

Do any of you have the free will to post or not pot here?

Or is it inevitable when and what you post?

After 1917 posts what do you believe?

It seems like free will vs determinism is the greatest philosophical mind fuck of all time ;et loose upon us.

Hard determinism seems like a hard way to go. It can rationalize anything.

I was destined to be a slave owner and you to be one one of my slaves.

The original Law And Order TV series touched on it. If we are genetically predisposed to our behavior then the criminal justice system as we have it goes out the widow.
You left out "environmentally exposed." The environment plays a huge part in our behavior.
 
I am using Determinism in the sense it has been posited in classical philosophy, and as articulated by Karl Popper when he wrote:

“The metaphysical doctrine of determinism simply asserts that all events in this world are fixed, or unalterable, or predetermined. It does not assert that they are known to anybody, or predictable by scientific means. But it asserts that the future is as little changeable as is the past. Everybody knows what we mean when we say that the past cannot be changed. It is in precisely the same sense that the future cannot be changed, according to metaphysical determinism."
Notably, Popper did not believe Determinism was true. He was, however, a rigorous philosopher with a keen interest in the philosophy of science.
I don't disagree with him, other than in his assertion that "Everybody knows what we mean when we say that the past cannot be changed". I don't think everybody does know. I think most people have notions. And many of those notions are counterfactual.

The past cannot be changed after the event. Nor can the future; I cannot go back in time to last week and buy the winning lottery ticket, and next week, I won't be able to go back in time to today and buy next week's winner.

The past (exactly like the future) can only be changed by events in its past.

As those events are themselves deterministic, we can imagine a "God's eye view" of a static block universe, in which every event is predetermined; But as no such Gods exist, that thought experiment is of little import. The "immutable future" of such a block exists because of the individuals that inhabit it.

We could instead take a Milliways view; From the end of time, all events in the past have occurred, and when we look back from that point, we can see that nothing can be changed. It would be easy to conclude that therefore nothing could ever have been changed; But that's a non-sequitur. It's both obvious that the past cannot change, and that therefore to an observer at the end of time, our future is as fixed as our past. But that does not imply that at our point in the present, we cannot and do not change the future by our decisions.

Nor does it imply that decisions made in the past were unwilled or unfree at that time. A composer composes a symphony. That remains someting he did, even though now that it is done, it cannot be changed. It wasn't done by his past, even though his past was the only driver of everything he did. It was done by him. He brought together everything in his past, and entirely deterministically created something entirely new, in a way that no other could have done, and that nothing prior to him could have predicted.

The past and the future are unchangeable. But we live in the present, and in the present the unchangeable past is converted to the unchangeable present by our deterministic will - not the will of the past, but a will of our own.
 
What is the difference between something existing, and something having the appearance of existing

If we live in a universe that has an objective reality, then "the difference between something existing, and something having the appearance of existing" is the difference between (i) reality, and (ii) the possibility of delusion. If we live in a universe where anything that has the appearance of existing to the majority of people is reality, then there is no difference "between something existing, and something having the appearance of existing" to a majority of people. If we live in a universe where anything that has the appearance of existing to anyone is reality (at least for them), then there is no difference "between something existing, and something having the appearance of existing" to anyone. If we live in a universe where there is no reality at all, then the difference "between something existing, and something having the appearance of existing" to anyone is that the former does not exist and the latter is a delusion.

There are many people in this world who perceive all sorts of things that the majority of people consider to be fantastical and not reality. If there is no difference between something existing and something having the appearance of existing, then the universe has multiple realities -- which, I suppose, could be the case. If, however, there is one and only one reality, which does not turn on the individual or number of individuals to whom something appears to be real, then there is a substantively significant "difference between something existing, and something having the appearance of existing" -- other than where what is real happens to be the same as that which appears to be real all people. In a universe in which there is one and only one reality (if there is such a universe), any disagreement between any two individuals as to what appears to be real means that at least one person's perception of reality is incorrect.
 
In religion


Predestination is a doctrine in Calvinism dealing with the question of the control that God exercises over the world. In the words of the Westminster Confession of Faith, God "freely and unchangeably ordained whatsoever comes to pass."[2][3] The second use of the word "predestination" applies this to salvation, and refers to the belief that God appointed the eternal destiny of some to salvation by grace, while leaving the remainder to receive eternal damnation for all their sins, even their original sin. The former is called "unconditional election", and the latter "reprobation". In Calvinism, some people are predestined and effectually called in due time (regenerated/born again) to faith by God while all others are reprobated.[4]
You're talking about a religion that involves Omniscience, though, and as we're hopefully all already aware at this point, Omniscience is contradictory. Anything you get from that vine after the original sin of invoking unbounded comprehension just as tainted.

As those events are themselves deterministic, we can imagine a "God's eye view" of a static block universe, in which every event is predetermined
This is where you fell off.

Even in a static block, it's not pre-determined, at least not using the general idea of time: the determination is physically offset from its "priors", still, by exactly the separation you previously saw in time.

It's still determined by course, all that you changed is that you can see the whole course at roughly the same time.

Our decisions are part of what determines our "future" even if someone perceives our "future" as "to the left of" rather than "to the 'future' of" some present.
 
I am using Determinism in the sense it has been posited in classical philosophy, and as articulated by Karl Popper when he wrote:

“The metaphysical doctrine of determinism simply asserts that all events in this world are fixed, or unalterable, or predetermined. It does not assert that they are known to anybody, or predictable by scientific means. But it asserts that the future is as little changeable as is the past. Everybody knows what we mean when we say that the past cannot be changed. It is in precisely the same sense that the future cannot be changed, according to metaphysical determinism."
Notably, Popper did not believe Determinism was true. He was, however, a rigorous philosopher with a keen interest in the philosophy of science.
I don't disagree with him, other than in his assertion that "Everybody knows what we mean when we say that the past cannot be changed". I don't think everybody does know. I think most people have notions. And many of those notions are counterfactual.

The past cannot be changed after the event. Nor can the future; I cannot go back in time to last week and buy the winning lottery ticket, and next week, I won't be able to go back in time to today and buy next week's winner.

The past (exactly like the future) can only be changed by events in its past.

As those events are themselves deterministic, we can imagine a "God's eye view" of a static block universe, in which every event is predetermined; But as no such Gods exist, that thought experiment is of little import. The "immutable future" of such a block exists because of the individuals that inhabit it.

We could instead take a Milliways view; From the end of time, all events in the past have occurred, and when we look back from that point, we can see that nothing can be changed. It would be easy to conclude that therefore nothing could ever have been changed; But that's a non-sequitur. It's both obvious that the past cannot change, and that therefore to an observer at the end of time, our future is as fixed as our past. But that does not imply that at our point in the present, we cannot and do not change the future by our decisions.

Nor does it imply that decisions made in the past were unwilled or unfree at that time. A composer composes a symphony. That remains someting he did, even though now that it is done, it cannot be changed. It wasn't done by his past, even though his past was the only driver of everything he did. It was done by him. He brought together everything in his past, and entirely deterministically created something entirely new, in a way that no other could have done, and that nothing prior to him could have predicted.

The past and the future are unchangeable. But we live in the present, and in the present the unchangeable past is converted to the unchangeable present by our deterministic will - not the will of the past, but a will of our own.

Thanks for the elaboration. Again, I understand and accept your explanation. I also accept that you disagree with Popper about how Determinism operates, which is your prerogative. Because Popper's explanation of Determinism is a foundation of Incompatibilism, however, the fact that you reject Popper's explanation of Determinism in connection with explaining how Free Will exists means that you do not reject the logic of Incompatibilism, so much as you reject that Incompatibilism properly defines Determinism. Thus, when you reconcile the existence of Free Will with Determinism for purposes of defending Compatibilism, you do so with a different definition of Determinism than is employed within the argument of Incompatibilism -- once again proving William James correct.

I want to be very clear. I understand the reluctance of many people to accept that Determinism (as defined for purposes of Incompatibilism) can even possibly be true. That is a respectable position, which may or may not be correct as a factual matter. There also are many people who are reluctant to accept that Free Will exists -- for all sorts of reasons. That also is a respectable position. What I cannot understand, however, it the logic of the argument that the truth if Determinism (as defined for purposes of Incompatibilism) is compatible with the existence of Free Will. I also am at a loss to understand why it is so difficult to simply say: Determinism (as defined for purposes of Incompatibilism) is a false construct that has no reality in the universe in which we live, but I agree that Free Will would not exist in a hypothetical universe in which Determinism (as defined for purposes of Incompatibilism) were a true description of the operation of that universe. Why is the denial of that proposition so critical that people will fight tooth and nail to insist that Free Will and Determinism are compatible when they so obviously are not?
 
In religion


Predestination is a doctrine in Calvinism dealing with the question of the control that God exercises over the world. In the words of the Westminster Confession of Faith, God "freely and unchangeably ordained whatsoever comes to pass."[2][3] The second use of the word "predestination" applies this to salvation, and refers to the belief that God appointed the eternal destiny of some to salvation by grace, while leaving the remainder to receive eternal damnation for all their sins, even their original sin. The former is called "unconditional election", and the latter "reprobation". In Calvinism, some people are predestined and effectually called in due time (regenerated/born again) to faith by God while all others are reprobated.[4]
You're talking about a religion that involves Omniscience, though, and as we're hopefully all already aware at this point, Omniscience is contradictory. Anything you get from that vine after the original sin of invoking unbounded comprehension just as tainted.

As those events are themselves deterministic, we can imagine a "God's eye view" of a static block universe, in which every event is predetermined
This is where you fell off.

Even in a static block, it's not pre-determined, at least not using the general idea of time: the determination is physically offset from its "priors", still, by exactly the separation you previously saw in time.

It's still determined by course, all that you changed is that you can see the whole course at roughly the same time.

Our decisions are part of what determines our "future" even if someone perceives our "future" as "to the left of" rather than "to the 'future' of" some present.
Well, yes, my point is that no such God exists, so the "predetermined" claim fails. We can imagine it; But to do so is erroneous.
 
Why is the denial of that proposition so critical that people will fight tooth and nail to insist that Free Will and Determinism are compatible when they so obviously are not?
Denial of that proposition is not critical. It's not even important. The critically important thing is denial of 'propositions that are factually wrong', as a class.

It just happens that that proposition, which I understand you believe in, and that you feel is somehow critical to defend, is also factually wrong.

Giving you the entirely false impression that people care deeply about it, when in fact they care deeply only about the truth.
 
In religion


Predestination is a doctrine in Calvinism dealing with the question of the control that God exercises over the world. In the words of the Westminster Confession of Faith, God "freely and unchangeably ordained whatsoever comes to pass."[2][3] The second use of the word "predestination" applies this to salvation, and refers to the belief that God appointed the eternal destiny of some to salvation by grace, while leaving the remainder to receive eternal damnation for all their sins, even their original sin. The former is called "unconditional election", and the latter "reprobation". In Calvinism, some people are predestined and effectually called in due time (regenerated/born again) to faith by God while all others are reprobated.[4]
You're talking about a religion that involves Omniscience, though, and as we're hopefully all already aware at this point, Omniscience is contradictory. Anything you get from that vine after the original sin of invoking unbounded comprehension just as tainted.

As those events are themselves deterministic, we can imagine a "God's eye view" of a static block universe, in which every event is predetermined
This is where you fell off.

Even in a static block, it's not pre-determined, at least not using the general idea of time: the determination is physically offset from its "priors", still, by exactly the separation you previously saw in time.

It's still determined by course, all that you changed is that you can see the whole course at roughly the same time.

Our decisions are part of what determines our "future" even if someone perceives our "future" as "to the left of" rather than "to the 'future' of" some present.
Well, yes, my point is that no such God exists, so the "predetermined" claim fails. We can imagine it; But to do so is erroneous.
I'll also note that "at roughly the same time" has a big caveat in that it's not the same time dimension of the simulation, and I would argue that the act of actually rendering the block will cost you whatever time you experience to calculate, render, and arrange the frames... In which case it's literally determined by course not at the "block viewing" but at that earlier time before you were standing in front of the block, assembling the frames, and putting it in front of you to view.

I could do literally all those actions with an execution of, say, Dwarf Fortress. The frame state log buffer would need to be built into DFHack or some similar memory hack, and it would slow down execution to like, one "frame" per "realtime minute", but you could be recording in maybe a week? It might take you a year or more to get any "interesting" events.

One interesting fact about DF is that it is absolutely deterministic, AND uses a pRNG. I suppose this is a concrete example of macrophysical indeterminism, insofar as there are decisions dwarves have made by actions "completely" uncorrelated to anything else in the system.

You could replace the pRNG with a much more interesting RNG using CMWBR, or sound, and just record it on a cassette and distribute numbers as cassette positions/addresses and make a finite tape that gives you the same result, and then the game is both "indeterministic" and "finitely deterministic", in that you can replay it the same any time.

But as you can imagine, this creates a problem in that we can fairly readily observe the ability to declare a change, an alternative, at any point based on the dance the "RNG" performs.

The problem here is that this pRNG is not employed so as to make the dwarves make sense. The purpose is to simulate something that the programmer doesn't know how to code, and even if he did it would eat too much processor time: the actual cogitation of the dwarf.

One could concievably remove any reliance on the RNG at all, in the system, except the role in whatever process generates the initial state.

It can be pRNG based or "aperiodic" or "some human somewhere tossed a whole gobshite of dice willy nilly, or any such thing.

The RNG access, however, is only really useful to allow something to be decided by something external to it. This is why I mock indeterministic nonsense with "Jesus take the wheel".

It is an act of giving the controls of "you" over to "noise". This can be useful when trying to create a problem that is difficult or impossible to really solve, and it can be used to settle decisions, but we call that "gambling", and doing it might mean you are rather "responsible for making a really bad gamble" rather than making a "directly flawed decision".

But as the player and observer and as a human being, generally you can observe that specific fact of "noise" having sway over decisions makes those decisions LESS useful for the dwarves (for all there is still priority sorting).

In fact, any system could be employed to do so, really; it doesn't even need to be chaotic or unpredictable, although the predictability and knowledge of what someone would say would give some power to manipulate such a "simpleton".

In most games, in fact, prediction is specifically the act used to change how outcomes go based on prior outcomes.

As such, having a perfect prediction would give you perfect power over the future rather than no power.
 
Why is the denial of that proposition so critical that people will fight tooth and nail to insist that Free Will and Determinism are compatible when they so obviously are not?
Denial of that proposition is not critical. It's not even important. The critically important thing is denial of 'propositions that are factually wrong', as a class.

It just happens that that proposition, which I understand you believe in, and that you feel is somehow critical to defend, is also factually wrong.

Giving you the entirely false impression that people care deeply about it, when in fact they care deeply only about the truth.
I have said multiple times on this board that I do not believe in Determinism beyond accepting it as a robust paradigm. I have no idea whether Determinism (as explained by Popper, James and others) is true or a false construct. Nor do I have any idea whether Free Will truly exists. There is a world of difference between an argument based on a hypothetical proposition and the defense of a truth statement. I, too, care deeply about the truth, and I am in constant search for what that is. Unless there is more than one truth, I am relatively confident that the truth is not simply whatever the majority of people say it is, and I lack the facility to know who is right and who is wrong when it comes to beliefs for which there is no proof nor falsification. Apparently, you believe that you have a better facility to divine the truth than I do. You may or may not, and I am content to believe that no human knows, or is even capable, if knowing the truth -- but that is just a belief, and I do not know that to be true, either.
 
Just calling something 'free will' - acting without being forced or coerced - doesn't mean that will itself is free, just that we are acting according to our will, which if determinism is true, is inevitable.

Words and terms are not enough, because if determinism is true, what we will or want is a matter of, not freedom, but antecedents.
 
Maybe a rock has a mind. Doesn’t behave like it, though. How do you assess possessors of mind except through behavior?
If you cannot describe what a mind is, or how we can describe it through empirical observation, then the "mind", along with the "freedom" and "will" it supposedly commands, are beyond the domain of the sciences, and my original point stands. Determinism and free will are an apples-to-angels comparison. I'm talking neuroscience and you are talking Bible stories. We will not be able to close the gap, and that's fine if you enjoy the imaginative exercise, but lets not pretend these worldviews are "compatible". They are not.
The fascinating thing about this debate is that (i) some of the posters on this thread who defend the actual existence of Free Will (ad not simply its putative compatibility with Determinism) and reject Incompatibilism accuse those who seek to articulate a definition of Determinism (without making any truth statement about Determinism) are religious fanatics with a disguised belief in God that supports the definition they offer, (ii) when, in fact, it is a belief in the existence of Free Will that has a religious origin that has morphed into a mistaken assertion about a putative scientific fact.
 
Just calling something 'free will' - acting without being forced or coerced - doesn't mean that will itself is free,
Yes it does.
just that we are acting according to our will, which if determinism is true, is inevitable.
Indeed. Determinism is entirely compatible with our acting according to our will.

So what?
 
It's both obvious that the past cannot change, and that therefore to an observer at the end of time, our future is as fixed as our past
If the past changed, it would be obvious to anyone in the present that it had not.
I have that on the authority of [insert every science fiction writer who published in the early-mid 1960s]
 
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