Sam Harris' argument against free will (video lecture)

[Togo]

He makes the assumption that the universe consists of events that are either determined or random, and then goes through various iterations of demonstrating that this assumption is incompatible with (incompatibalist) free will.

And you keep arguing the possibility of a causation that goes as it pleases...

Not sure what you mean here. Determinism is incompatible with (incompatibalist) free will. We know that. Taking determinism as your start point doesn't add anything useful to the discussion.

 

[Juma]

And you keep arguing the possibility of a causation that goes as it pleases...

Not sure what you mean here. Determinism is incompatible with (incompatibalist) free will. We know that. Taking determinism as your start point doesn't add anything useful to the discussion.

You are delirious. Modern science has proved that, without doubt, the basics of the universe are mechanistic.

 

[Togo]

Not sure what you mean here. Determinism is incompatible with (incompatibalist) free will. We know that. Taking determinism as your start point doesn't add anything useful to the discussion.

You are delirious. Modern science has proved that, without doubt, the basics of the universe are mechanistic.

No, it hasn't. Don't take my word for it. Try raising the topic on the science board and see what you get. Physics is stranger than you think.

 

[Juma]

You are delirious. Modern science has proved that, without doubt, the basics of the universe are mechanistic.

No, it hasn't. Don't take my word for it. Try raising the topic on the science board and see what you get. Physics is stranger than you think.

It is strange but not in that respect. I have a masters degree in physics and believe I kept enough up to date to know that some sort of "free will causuality" is not possible.

If you have reason to believe otherwise then present them or else agree that you dont know. Your argument by proxy ("those over there might show you") is patetic.

 

[fromderinside]

I'm of the view that if alternatives are outside the range of individuals involved they need not be considered when considering free will even though it is post hoc. Thus put, there is free will. Its not actually, but, to those participating or involved it appears to be so.

 

[Togo]

No, it hasn't. Don't take my word for it. Try raising the topic on the science board and see what you get. Physics is stranger than you think.

It is strange but not in that respect. I have a masters degree in physics and believe I kept enough up to date to know that some sort of "free will causuality" is not possible.

Great! Why is it not possible? Reference, study, whatever form you want.

Maybe Sam can include it in his next video!

 

[Juma]

It is strange but not in that respect. I have a masters degree in physics and believe I kept enough up to date to know that some sort of "free will causuality" is not possible.

Great! Why is it not possible? Reference, study, whatever form you want.

1)Because "free will causality" is not causality. Will requires a=>b, "free will" requires a!=>b. If its free then its not able to will.

2) free will rests on a dualistic view of mind. free will rests on the belief on a homonuculus. There no such thing. The mind is massivily parallell. There are a lot of competing "selfs".

3) the mind does not have "decision points", decisions are not at all so discrete as we assume them to be. We do not as much turn a page as flow into another part of the stream where other goals are more important.

 

[Togo]

Great! Why is it not possible? Reference, study, whatever form you want.

1)Because

Ok, first off? None of these points you've raised are thing 'proved by modern science', nor are they physics by any reasonable definition of the term. What you said was that modern science had proved this, and you knew it because you kept your physics degree up to date. So why do all your points seem to be philosophical ones, using philosophical terminology? Where's the science?

"free will causality" is not causality. Will requires a=>b,

Eh? No, it doesn't.

Imagine an army. The commander wants to invade country X, and so gives the order to advance. The invasion technically starts when Private Bert steps across the border at 7.34am.
Has the army invaded according to the commander's will? Yes
Is there some kind of direct connection between that will and the motion of Private Bert's foot, and the time of 7.34am? Does there need to be any control by the commander of who crosses the border when in order for his will to be carried out? I don't see that there does. So there is no logical requirement for a =>b.

2) free will rests on a dualistic view of mind.

No, it doesn't. Replace any mental function with a physical function and no obvious contradictions emerge. Unless you can find one?

free will rests on the belief on a homonuculus.

No, it doesn't. Unless you can demonstrate otherwise?

3) the mind does not have "decision points", decisions are not at all so discrete as we assume them to be. We do not as much turn a page as flow into another part of the stream where other goals are more important.

I'd agree. I don't see why Free will would require 'decision points' though.

Ok, so to sum up, when you say 'modern science has disproved free will', what you actually mean is 'my ideas around free will are logically inconsistent', therefore the subject matter must be at fault?

To be fair, I appreciate that you're largely paraphrasing Sam's videos. But he's typically very careful to avoid claiming that free will has been disproven scientifically, which was the claim you made, so ultimately his arguments won't be enough.

 

[Juma]

Imagine an army. The commander wants to invade country X, and so gives the order to advance. The invasion technically starts when Private Bert steps across the border at 7.34am.
Has the army invaded according to the commander's will? Yes
Is there some kind of direct connection between that will and the motion of Private Bert's foot, and the time of 7.34am? Does there need to be any control by the commander of who crosses the border when in order for his will to be carried out? I don't see that there does. So there is no logical requirement for a =>b.

If private Bert doesnt obey orders he will be shot. That is a very strong connection between what the commander wants and what happens. Thus a=>b.

Whether Bert is steps over the border at 7.34 or 8.05 isnt important.

Who steps over the border at 7.34 is not important.

The important thing is that the commanders will is always executed. If not, the army, as a whole, has no will at all but acts randomly. (Unless the men learns to act as a group, but then it has become an example of something else)

 

[Togo]

Imagine an army. The commander wants to invade country X, and so gives the order to advance. The invasion technically starts when Private Bert steps across the border at 7.34am.
Has the army invaded according to the commander's will? Yes
Is there some kind of direct connection between that will and the motion of Private Bert's foot, and the time of 7.34am? Does there need to be any control by the commander of who crosses the border when in order for his will to be carried out? I don't see that there does. So there is no logical requirement for a =>b.

If private Bert doesnt obey orders he will be shot. That is a very strong connection between what the commander wants and what happens. Thus a=>b.

That's doesn't follow. The only form of a=>b that poses an issue for free will is the idea that if a occurs, b must occur. That a determines b.

But your 'very strong relationship' isn't that. It's 'f a occurs, b is very strongly likely to occur. Or if not b, then something close to b, or some equivalent, whatever.'

Whether Bert is steps over the border at 7.34 or 8.05 isnt important.

That's the point. It's not important, but it is b. The will isn't for event b to occur as an inevitable consequence of a It's for actions to be undertaken that will reliably lead to a broad class of outcomes. You don't give an order intending Private Bert's left foot to cross the line at 7.35am. You give an order to advance, the army does something that vaguely falls under that heading as coordinated by the various subsystems within it, and sooner or later someone will cross.

It may feel like I'm arguing around the edges here, but the central point is that you can't demonstrate decision making to be dependent on a determines b.

And I'll note that while I'm happy to talk philosophy on the philosophy board, this isn't the scientific explanation you were promising - it's an entirely logic-based argument.

 

[Juma]

If private Bert doesnt obey orders he will be shot. That is a very strong connection between what the commander wants and what happens. Thus a=>b.

That's doesn't follow. The only form of a=>b that poses an issue for free will is the idea that if a occurs, b must occur. That a determines b.

But your 'very strong relationship' isn't that. It's 'f a occurs, b is very strongly likely to occur. Or if not b, then something close to b, or some equivalent, whatever.'

No. B is the invasion. Not the tiny unimportant details of a specific possible invasiion.

Whether Bert is steps over the border at 7.34 or 8.05 isnt important.

That's the point. It's not important, but it is b. The will isn't for event b to occur as an inevitable consequence of a It's for actions to be undertaken that will reliably lead to a broad class of outcomes. You don't give an order intending Private Bert's left foot to cross the line at 7.35am. You give an order to advance, the army does something that vaguely falls under that heading as coordinated by the various subsystems within it, and sooner or later someone will cross. .

Exactly. So B, the invasion, or rather, the attempt of an invasion should always happen if the commander wants, in other cases it is not possible of the act of a will.

It may feel like I'm arguing around the edges here, but the central point is that you can't demonstrate decision making to be dependent on a determines b.

And I'll note that while I'm happy to talk philosophy on the philosophy board, this isn't the scientific explanation you were promising - it's an entirely logic-based argument.

And that is because "free will" IS a purely philosophical issue: there is no observation of it. It cannot be observed.

 

[Togo]

That's doesn't follow. The only form of a=>b that poses an issue for free will is the idea that if a occurs, b must occur. That a determines b.

But your 'very strong relationship' isn't that. It's 'f a occurs, b is very strongly likely to occur. Or if not b, then something close to b, or some equivalent, whatever.'

No. B is the invasion. Not the tiny unimportant details of a specific possible invasion.

Then it's a category of outcomes, not a determined event, and thus a=>b doesn't conflict with free will. Either what happens is determined, or it is not.

It may feel like I'm arguing around the edges here, but the central point is that you can't demonstrate decision making to be dependent on a determines b.

And I'll note that while I'm happy to talk philosophy on the philosophy board, this isn't the scientific explanation you were promising - it's an entirely logic-based argument.

And that is because "free will" IS a purely philosophical issue: there is no observation of it. It cannot be observed.

Then why did you claim the issue had been settled by modern science?

 

[Juma]

No. B is the invasion. Not the tiny unimportant details of a specific possible invasion.

Then it's a category of outcomes, not a determined event,

Sigh.
It is an example of that will requires that the mechanism is absolute either we wont talk about will. Not about whether it is deterministic in every detail. No sane person would argue that that each detail in the attack is the will of the commander.

 

[Togo]

Sigh.
It is an example of that will requires that the mechanism is absolute either we wont talk about will.

I'm really having trouble parsing this.

Can you explain how the example relates to your claim that the existence of will somehow contradicts free will, or vice versa. Or to put it another way, how the ability to carry out decisions somehow implies an inability to make them? I don't think the a and b in your two formulae are being used consistently.

And I'm still trying to work out why you claim any of this is 'modern science'? Or is that an overstatement?

 

[Juma]

Sigh.
It is an example of that will requires that the mechanism is absolute either we wont talk about will.

I'm really having trouble parsing this.

Can you explain how the example relates to your claim that the existence of will somehow contradicts free will, or vice versa. Or to put it another way, how the ability to carry out decisions somehow implies an inability to make them? I don't think the a and b in your two formulae are being used consistently.

Will requers consitent causation, free will requires inconsitent causation.

 

[DBT]

Will is the product of information processing. It is not the orchestrator or director of that process.

 

[DrZoidberg]

Fascinating stuff.

I've always felt that free will is an illusion for many of the reasons Harris states. If you rearranged all of my atoms to match those of Charles Manson at a certain point in his life, then replaced him with me at the appropriate point in the past, then I would have made all the same decisions he did.

At around 37:00, he brings up another point I've long agreed with: that determinism isn't the same thing as fatalism.

I don´t like how these types of talks are billed. Free will is a retarded subject.

What is it that is free?
What is it free from?
How is free?

Whenever anybody makes are argument on free will, they start off by defining the above three in a way so that they win. Everybody always wins a free will debate. No matter on what side they´re on.

Sam Harris must know this. As anybody who has read any amount of philosophy. It´s just a boring subject.

 

[GenesisNemesis]

Fascinating stuff.

I've always felt that free will is an illusion for many of the reasons Harris states. If you rearranged all of my atoms to match those of Charles Manson at a certain point in his life, then replaced him with me at the appropriate point in the past, then I would have made all the same decisions he did.

At around 37:00, he brings up another point I've long agreed with: that determinism isn't the same thing as fatalism.

I don´t like how these types of talks are billed. Free will is a retarded subject.

What is it that is free?
What is it free from?
How is free?

Whenever anybody makes are argument on free will, they start off by defining the above three in a way so that they win. Everybody always wins a free will debate. No matter on what side they´re on.

Sam Harris must know this. As anybody who has read any amount of philosophy. It´s just a boring subject.

Plus either viewpoint is ultimately unfalsifiable.

 

[DBT]

I argue that the term 'free will' is irrelevant.

It doesn't tell us anything about human behaviour or the nature and function of the brain.

Given its irrelevancy in terms of conveying useful information, it is probably, for some, a form of ideology.

 

[Deborah]

I agree with Dan Dennett to the extent that the free will debate generally boils down to a debate on the issue of whether the concept of moral responsibility is in some way (not necessarily as the popular concept of moral responsibility - whatever that is) a tenable concept worth salvaging.

In everyday life I could say - and I do - that "I intellectually know he's just a meat machine. But why can't I get angry with him? Anger is my birthright!" - That position is consistent with scepticism on moral responsibility. The position opposing scepticism - i.e. compatibilism (which Harris repudiates as changing the subject) - says that I can say something more on moral responsibility such that the concept of moral responsibility is worth salvaging. Dennett provides consequentialist reasons for salvaging the concept of moral responsibility, and I don't dispute that the concept helps society to function. But philosophically is that sufficient reason to salvage the concept of moral responsibility? - I'm not really convinced. It seems to depend on what is one's take on the concept of moral responsibility. What does the concept entail?