The Teletransporter Problem

[Speakpigeon]

But then, for the one still alive, there would be no longer a choice between being one or the other.

There was never a choice. Each one is itself.

I wouldn't know. I'm not omniscient myself.

As long as they are identical they have the same properties so how could they have a different consciousness?
EB

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I don't know. I didn't say that it should or would.

Yes, we can state such a hypotetical machine but that is a different function.

Sure but all I said was that we can assume the machine could also do it. You can assume otherwise, too, it's fine.
EB

No you cannot since that would violate the specified thought experiment.

Not substantially.
EB

 

[Juma]

There was never a choice. Each one is itself.

I wouldn't know. I'm not omniscient myself.

As long as they are identical they have the same properties so how could they have a different consciousness?
EB

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I don't know. I didn't say that it should or would.

Yes, we can state such a hypotetical machine but that is a different function.

Sure but all I said was that we can assume the machine could also do it. You can assume otherwise, too, it's fine.
EB

No you cannot since that would violate the specified thought experiment.

Not substantially.
EB

Yes. Substantially. Making a copy at a single time is a very different thing from "keeping two instances identical". I'm not sure what that even means....

 

[Juma]

There was never a choice. Each one is itself.

I wouldn't know. I'm not omniscient myself.

As long as they are identical they have the same properties so how could they have a different consciousness?
EB

What? Because they are different instances! A change to one instance will not necessarily result in the same change in the other one. They are not coupled!

 

[PyramidHead]

I think it's pretty clear that the moment a duplicate is created, their consciousness must differ solely by virtue of being on different planets. That's just an aspect of the thought experiment though. Another thought experiment might stipulate that the duplicate is actually a "brain in a vat" that is designed to experience the exact same thing as the original at all times (maybe with a few milliseconds of latency). This does not change the outcome of terminating one of them if consciousness resides at the token (or instance) level, and not at the type (or person) level.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I think it's pretty clear that the moment a duplicate is created, their consciousness must differ solely by virtue of being on different planets.

If their consciousnesses differ then of course the original will not feel the double is the same as himself but the first part of the thought experiment precludes any difference.

That's just an aspect of the thought experiment though. Another thought experiment might stipulate that the duplicate is actually a "brain in a vat" that is designed to experience the exact same thing as the original at all times (maybe with a few milliseconds of latency).

Yeah, I guess it's the same idea as the machine keeps them identical for life.

This does not change the outcome of terminating one of them if consciousness resides at the token (or instance) level, and not at the type (or person) level.

Sure but that's precisely what you don't know.

Broadly, your view comes down to the idea that consciousness is just part the body. Since you think that in the scenario there are two bodies and that they are different in the ordinary physical sense then the consciousnesses of these bodies are also necessarily different, idea which you then exemplified with your second scenario. However, we actually don't know if consciousness comes down to a brain process and you didn't even mention the issue in the OP. So maybe you are correct, maybe not.

However, my point in my initial post was that if you believe that the consciousness of the double on Mars is different from the consciousness of the original who remained on the Earth then you should also accept that the your conciousness at time t1 is just as different from your conciousness at time t2 so that the scenarios make no difference in this respect compared real ordinary life.

The main point is that if you could assume in all certainty that the machine will work properly, you wouldn't have any rational reason for not pressing the button since there would be no difference with actual life except the money.

And "except the money" here was only a joke.
EB

 

[Juma]

we actually don't know if consciousness comes down to a brain process.

Yes we do.

 

[PyramidHead]

I guess if we don't know enough about what consciousness is and where it "resides" then the safest solution is to abstain from entering the machine, which is still consistent with my recommendation. I'm not seeing any argument that we can be confident that the machine wouldn't end the consciousness of the person who walked in.

 

[Speakpigeon]

That's a fair point but is that a rational argument at all? If we behaved in our lives on the basis of possibilities we are unable to exclude in all certainty we would do nothing at all and doing nothing seems a deadly strategy. Again, I wouldn't press the button myself, equally for irrational reasons such as fear or queasiness, and I would also grant you that if consciousness is a local property of brains then to destroy your brain is to destroy your consciousness. However, even given this and given that the first scenario assumes that the brain of the double is initially identical to the brain of the original, I still don't see any rational argument for not pressing the button.

I also think that once this machine has been proved to work as specified then human beings would lose over time any qualms about using it for themselves, like we did for trains, cars and airplanes, even repeatedly in the course of our lives.
EB

 

[Togo]

I'm with Pyramidhead on this one. The guy who walked into the booth is going to get disintegrated. That there is a physically identical person on Mars, doesn't make him any less dead.

Try this variant. Actually, the booth operating lies to you. No copy of you is made on Mars. Does that change anything that happens to you, either in terms of your subjective experience or the physical progression of events? If not, on what basis can you argue that having a copy appear on Mars changes anything for the guy getting disintegrated down on earth?

 

[bilby]

I'm with Pyramidhead on this one. The guy who walked into the booth is going to get disintegrated. That there is a physically identical person on Mars, doesn't make him any less dead.

Try this variant. Actually, the booth operating lies to you. No copy of you is made on Mars. Does that change anything that happens to you, either in terms of your subjective experience or the physical progression of events? If not, on what basis can you argue that having a copy appear on Mars changes anything for the guy getting disintegrated down on earth?

Sure, the guy who enters the booth is no more; but he's yesterday's man either way. The guy who goes to bed, and expects to awaken hours later with no continuity of consciousness, is no more either.

The guy who awakes the next morning has only the memories of who he was the day before to tell him that he is the same person.

The guy who steps out of the booth on Mars is in the same situation. As long as he has the same memories, he is as much the same person as any other person who claims continuity with his past.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Yes, and at least as good as I could have made it.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I'm with Pyramidhead on this one. The guy who walked into the booth is going to get disintegrated. That there is a physically identical person on Mars, doesn't make him any less dead.

The point of my argument is that you have to compare to actual life (hence, in my inital post in this thread, "Me I don't see any significant difference with actual life").

Try this variant. Actually, the booth operating lies to you. No copy of you is made on Mars. Does that change anything that happens to you, either in terms of your subjective experience or the physical progression of events?

The guy who goes to bed, a kind of sleep machine to transfert you to tomorrow morning, may die in his sleep. Most people die in their beds.

If not, on what basis can you argue that having a copy appear on Mars changes anything for the guy getting disintegrated down on earth?

The guy who awakes in the morning can do nothing for the guy who went to sleep yesterday and is no more.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

I'm with Pyramidhead on this one. The guy who walked into the booth is going to get disintegrated. That there is a physically identical person on Mars, doesn't make him any less dead.

Try this variant. Actually, the booth operating lies to you. No copy of you is made on Mars. Does that change anything that happens to you, either in terms of your subjective experience or the physical progression of events? If not, on what basis can you argue that having a copy appear on Mars changes anything for the guy getting disintegrated down on earth?

Sure, the guy who enters the booth is no more; but he's yesterday's man either way. The guy who goes to bed, and expects to awaken hours later with no continuity of consciousness, is no more either.

The guy who awakes the next morning has only the memories of who he was the day before to tell him that he is the same person.

The guy who steps out of the booth on Mars is in the same situation. As long as he has the same memories, he is as much the same person as any other person who claims continuity with his past.

The problem with this line of reasoning is that it does not distinguish between sleep and death. If I stab you at 9PM and you fall unconscious, only to die hours later from blood loss, you seem to be saying I haven't killed you; the person I stabbed is not the same as the person who died hours later after being unconscious for a while. Do I have to explain why this is a remarkably strange way to interpret the night's events?

 

[PyramidHead]

The point of my argument is that you have to compare to actual life (hence, in my inital post in this thread, "Me I don't see any significant difference with actual life").

Try this variant. Actually, the booth operating lies to you. No copy of you is made on Mars. Does that change anything that happens to you, either in terms of your subjective experience or the physical progression of events?

The guy who goes to bed, a kind of sleep machine to transfert you to tomorrow morning, may die in his sleep. Most people die in their beds.

If not, on what basis can you argue that having a copy appear on Mars changes anything for the guy getting disintegrated down on earth?

The guy who awakes in the morning can do nothing for the guy who went to sleep yesterday and is no more.
EB

All any of this tells me is that you see no relevant difference between life and death. That's fine; I'm not going to waste any time persuading you otherwise, as it has nothing to do with the problem we're discussing.

If there is never a case in which the permanent cessation of someone's consciousness is a problem, then the teletransporter thought experiment doesn't apply. But I doubt anyone, including you, actually operates in the world based on that premise.

 

[Juma]

The point of my argument is that you have to compare to actual life (hence, in my inital post in this thread, "Me I don't see any significant difference with actual life").


The guy who goes to bed, a kind of sleep machine to transfert you to tomorrow morning, may die in his sleep. Most people die in their beds.

If not, on what basis can you argue that having a copy appear on Mars changes anything for the guy getting disintegrated down on earth?

The guy who awakes in the morning can do nothing for the guy who went to sleep yesterday and is no more.
EB

All any of this tells me is that you see no relevant difference between life and death. That's fine; I'm not going to waste any time persuading you otherwise, as it has nothing to do with the problem we're discussing.

If there is never a case in which the permanent cessation of someone's consciousness is a problem, then the teletransporter thought experiment doesn't apply. But I doubt anyone, including you, actually operates in the world based on that premise.

First person death is never a problem because the first person doesnt exist to be bothered by the fact.
The reason death is bad i how it affects others.
And in "others" i include the series of persions that will become the guy that is going to die.

 

[PyramidHead]

The point of my argument is that you have to compare to actual life (hence, in my inital post in this thread, "Me I don't see any significant difference with actual life").


The guy who goes to bed, a kind of sleep machine to transfert you to tomorrow morning, may die in his sleep. Most people die in their beds.

If not, on what basis can you argue that having a copy appear on Mars changes anything for the guy getting disintegrated down on earth?

The guy who awakes in the morning can do nothing for the guy who went to sleep yesterday and is no more.
EB

All any of this tells me is that you see no relevant difference between life and death. That's fine; I'm not going to waste any time persuading you otherwise, as it has nothing to do with the problem we're discussing.

If there is never a case in which the permanent cessation of someone's consciousness is a problem, then the teletransporter thought experiment doesn't apply. But I doubt anyone, including you, actually operates in the world based on that premise.

First person death is never a problem because the first person doesnt exist to be bothered by the fact.
The reason death is bad i how it affects others.
And in "others" i include the series of persions that will become the guy that is going to die.

Philosophical discussions truly bring out the most bizarre statements. There seems to be no limit to how much people are willing to torture logic, stretching ordinary concepts beyond all recognition, in order to feel like they've had the last word on the internet. Listen to what you're saying: by the same reasoning, nothing is a problem from the first person perspective, because any negative consequences will inevitably only be suffered by "the series of persons that will become" the first person. Also, there is no such thing as selfish behavior. If I keep all my money in a mattress and let my kids starve, I can just say I was doing it out of consideration for future iterations of myself, who are all different people (and none of them are me!). How saintly of me to give 100% of my income to others!

Meanwhile, in the actual world, I'm a miserly asshole who only looks out for himself. And you're someone who probably wears a seatbelt because you don't want to die in car accident. As we progress by increments from this plain landscape to the murky waters of philosophical jargon, the situation we are discussing becomes an abstraction with no connection to reality. It gives me some hope to observe that the only way to dispute my conclusion is by adhering to a funhouse mirror version of rational discourse.

 

[Kharakov]

The guy who goes to bed, a kind of sleep machine to transfert you to tomorrow morning, may die in his sleep. Most people die in their beds.

Most modern people die in their head first... con template death without space time to hold everything and everyone together and apart as individuals who are also connected by spacetime in the net of all interred.

 

[Juma]

The point of my argument is that you have to compare to actual life (hence, in my inital post in this thread, "Me I don't see any significant difference with actual life").


The guy who goes to bed, a kind of sleep machine to transfert you to tomorrow morning, may die in his sleep. Most people die in their beds.

If not, on what basis can you argue that having a copy appear on Mars changes anything for the guy getting disintegrated down on earth?

The guy who awakes in the morning can do nothing for the guy who went to sleep yesterday and is no more.
EB

All any of this tells me is that you see no relevant difference between life and death. That's fine; I'm not going to waste any time persuading you otherwise, as it has nothing to do with the problem we're discussing.

If there is never a case in which the permanent cessation of someone's consciousness is a problem, then the teletransporter thought experiment doesn't apply. But I doubt anyone, including you, actually operates in the world based on that premise.

First person death is never a problem because the first person doesnt exist to be bothered by the fact.
The reason death is bad i how it affects others.
And in "others" i include the series of persions that will become the guy that is going to die.

Philosophical discussions truly bring out the most bizarre statements. There seems to be no limit to how much people are willing to torture logic, stretching ordinary concepts beyond all recognition, in order to feel like they've had the last word on the internet. Listen to what you're saying: by the same reasoning, nothing is a problem from the first person perspective, because any negative consequences will inevitably only be suffered by "the series of persons that will become" the first person.

No, you misunderstood. It IS the series of "person"s that will become the dead person that suffers (but only if they know what will happen and then they suffer from kniwledge, not death itself). Since that series ends in death there is noone to suffer afterwards.

And you're someone who probably wears a seatbelt because you don't want to die in car accident..

Yes! Isnt that amazing!

 

[bilby]

Sure, the guy who enters the booth is no more; but he's yesterday's man either way. The guy who goes to bed, and expects to awaken hours later with no continuity of consciousness, is no more either.

The guy who awakes the next morning has only the memories of who he was the day before to tell him that he is the same person.

The guy who steps out of the booth on Mars is in the same situation. As long as he has the same memories, he is as much the same person as any other person who claims continuity with his past.

The problem with this line of reasoning is that it does not distinguish between sleep and death. If I stab you at 9PM and you fall unconscious, only to die hours later from blood loss, you seem to be saying I haven't killed you; the person I stabbed is not the same as the person who died hours later after being unconscious for a while. Do I have to explain why this is a remarkably strange way to interpret the night's events?

Death is an irreversible cessation of consciousness. Reversible cessation of consciousness is different from it ONLY in its reversibility.

If you render me unconscious, and I never regain consciousness, then you have killed me. If You stab me, and I die from the wounds later - whether or not I spend all of the intervening time conscious or unconscious - then you have killed me.

Your description of this scenario as you having not killed me is truly strange, and I wouldn't describe it in that way at all. It certainly is not implied by what I wrote.

Of course, if you stab me, and I later die from the wounds, you have killed me. But the me that dies is not the same me that was stabbed; Nobody is the same person they were five minutes earlier.

 

[bigfield]

Of course, if you stab me, and I later die from the wounds, you have killed me. But the me that dies is not the same me that was stabbed; Nobody is the same person they were five minutes earlier.

Or to put it another way, the person who has been killed is the person who has your identity.

A person, or rather, a person's mind, is a series of states of consciousness that share a personal identity.