objective morality

[Angra Mainyu]

First, subjective observations aside (whatever that is), there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Tom Sawyer holds that there is objective inanity, right?

Second, I already showed repeatedly the mistakes in his definition-based argumentation - you just haven't realized it, and maybe will not, but that is not the point -, and regardless of whether he holds that there is objective inanity.
But with respect to inanity, he's saying that it's inane to say homosexuality is a mental illness because it impairs the ability under consideration (see the exchange), but heterosexuality isn't even if it impairs some other parallel ability (see the exchange).
But for that matter, if there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether it's inane, someone might insist in making the distinction and holding that homosexuality but not heterosexuality is a mental illness. Is there an objective fact of the matter about that?

By the way, if my assessment that Tom Sawyer holds that there objective inanity is mistaken, then he can always correct me, but the wording of his posts decisively supports the assessment that he does hold so, even if implicitly (i.e., even if he has not thought about it).

At any rate, you can always ask him.



That is false.
The problem seems to be that you do not understand the exchange, else you would have changed your position on the issue of objectivity already, and you would refrain from making such false accusations against me.

By the way, do you hold that there is objective illness?
If so, do you know what the relevant difference between illness and immorality is, which basis your different assessments, objectivity-wise?
Remember, "illness" is not defined (else, please provide a definition; your argument will not work if you do, though, for the same reasons Tom Sawyer's arguments didn't), and definitions are not required for objectivity in the first place, anyway.

If you do not understand the difference between subjective and objective, and believe definitions are not needed for objectivity, there is no point to this discussion. It is simply your rehashing of the same statements, over and over again.

I already showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that definitions (explicit definitions, for that's what we're talking about; some people use the word "definition" in a broader sense that would make any meaningful word defined even if no definition is ever given, but that's not what we're talking about) are not needed for objectivity.

But I can show it again, also beyond a reasonable doubt. There is an objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, bears are cars. They are not. And that is true even if no definition of "car" is given. In fact, people do not define "car" while they use the word. Some legislations do, but then, others don't, also legal definitions aren't always the same, and also, even before anyone gave a definition, the assertion that there was an objective fact of the matter as to whether bears are cars would have been true, using the words in the assertion in the way they were used before anyone ever gave a definition of "car".

Moreover, the claim that definitions are required for objectivity is self-defeating, because as I explained, whenever you give a definition, you define it in terms of other words. But some of those other words would not be defined in turn, so there would be no objective fact of the matter as to whether the conditions in the definition are met. Or, if all of the words in your definition are defined, then some of the words in terms of which the words in your definition are defined, are in turn not defined, or..., the point is that as a matter of fact, there is no infinite definitional regress, so in the end you get undefined words.

By the way, you're the one who has a false theory of what "objective" and "subjective" mean, and certainly in some of your posts you are not using them in a way remotely like the way anyone making a metaethical argument for theism would be using it (they would use those words either in the colloquial sense, or in some philosophical sense, but certainly not according to your usage).

As a sample:

There is nothing more subjective than judging an act to be moral or immoral, based on the motive for the action and not the results of the action.

Why don't you ask anyone pressing a metaethical argument for theism, or any philosopher with expertise in metaethics (or, really, any philosopher) whether that is true?
But if you don't want to believe them, why don't you read such arguments, read philosophy papers (and all of the the basics you need in order to understand those papers in the first place, of course), and reconsider the matter?

 

[Bronzeage]

If you do not understand the difference between subjective and objective, and believe definitions are not needed for objectivity, there is no point to this discussion. It is simply your rehashing of the same statements, over and over again.

I already showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that definitions (explicit definitions, for that's what we're talking about; some people use the word "definition" in a broader sense that would make any meaningful word defined even if no definition is ever given, but that's not what we're talking about) are not needed for objectivity.

But I can show it again, also beyond a reasonable doubt. There is an objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, bears are cars. They are not. And that is true even if no definition of "car" is given. In fact, people do not define "car" while they use the word. Some legislations do, but then, others don't, also legal definitions aren't always the same, and also, even before anyone gave a definition, the assertion that there was an objective fact of the matter as to whether bears are cars would have been true, using the words in the assertion in the way they were used before anyone ever gave a definition of "car".

Moreover, the claim that definitions are required for objectivity is self-defeating, because as I explained, whenever you give a definition, you define it in terms of other words. But some of those other words would not be defined in turn, so there would be no objective fact of the matter as to whether the conditions in the definition are met. Or, if all of the words in your definition are defined, then some of the words in terms of which the words in your definition are defined, are in turn not defined, or..., the point is that as a matter of fact, there is no infinite definitional regress, so in the end you get undefined words.

By the way, you're the one who has a false theory of what "objective" and "subjective" mean, and certainly in some of your posts you are not using them in a way remotely like the way anyone making a metaethical argument for theism would be using it (they would use those words either in the colloquial sense, or in some philosophical sense, but certainly not according to your usage).

As a sample:

There is nothing more subjective than judging an act to be moral or immoral, based on the motive for the action and not the results of the action.

Why don't you ask anyone pressing a metaethical argument for theism, or any philosopher with expertise in metaethics (or, really, any philosopher) whether that is true?
But if you don't want to believe them, why don't you read such arguments, read philosophy papers (and all of the the basics you need in order to understand those papers in the first place, of course), and reconsider the matter?

Sorry, no theories about what objective and subjective mean, just the definitions of the words. As for reasonable doubt, I have many reasons doubt you understand what you are saying.

 

[Kharakov]

Moreover, the claim that definitions are required for objectivity is self-defeating, because as I explained, whenever you give a definition, you define it in terms of other words. But some of those other words would not be defined in turn, so there would be no objective fact of the matter as to whether the conditions in the definition are met. Or, if all of the words in your definition are defined, then some of the words in terms of which the words in your definition are defined, are in turn not defined, or..., the point is that as a matter of fact, there is no infinite definitional regress, so in the end you get undefined words.

By "undefined words" do you mean words that aren't defined by the experiences that they are associated with?

Love, peace, joy, pain, 1 orange, 2 pears, 3 apples, and then we get to metawords, like "word".

Think the definitional regress extends past the experience of life itself? Pretty sure context is part of the "infinite" definitional regress of words too.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I already showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that definitions (explicit definitions, for that's what we're talking about; some people use the word "definition" in a broader sense that would make any meaningful word defined even if no definition is ever given, but that's not what we're talking about) are not needed for objectivity.

But I can show it again, also beyond a reasonable doubt. There is an objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, bears are cars. They are not. And that is true even if no definition of "car" is given. In fact, people do not define "car" while they use the word. Some legislations do, but then, others don't, also legal definitions aren't always the same, and also, even before anyone gave a definition, the assertion that there was an objective fact of the matter as to whether bears are cars would have been true, using the words in the assertion in the way they were used before anyone ever gave a definition of "car".

Moreover, the claim that definitions are required for objectivity is self-defeating, because as I explained, whenever you give a definition, you define it in terms of other words. But some of those other words would not be defined in turn, so there would be no objective fact of the matter as to whether the conditions in the definition are met. Or, if all of the words in your definition are defined, then some of the words in terms of which the words in your definition are defined, are in turn not defined, or..., the point is that as a matter of fact, there is no infinite definitional regress, so in the end you get undefined words.

By the way, you're the one who has a false theory of what "objective" and "subjective" mean, and certainly in some of your posts you are not using them in a way remotely like the way anyone making a metaethical argument for theism would be using it (they would use those words either in the colloquial sense, or in some philosophical sense, but certainly not according to your usage).

As a sample:

There is nothing more subjective than judging an act to be moral or immoral, based on the motive for the action and not the results of the action.

Why don't you ask anyone pressing a metaethical argument for theism, or any philosopher with expertise in metaethics (or, really, any philosopher) whether that is true?
But if you don't want to believe them, why don't you read such arguments, read philosophy papers (and all of the the basics you need in order to understand those papers in the first place, of course), and reconsider the matter?

Sorry, no theories about what objective and subjective mean, just the definitions of the words. As for reasonable doubt, I have many reasons doubt you understand what you are saying.

Actually, "objective" and "subjective" were apparently not being used under a definition, but intuitively, at least by the theists in question. There are some definitions in philosophy, but what you propose matches no such usage. As before, I suggest that you check that as I explained.

As for reasonable doubt, the point remains I have shown beyond a reasonable doubt that definitions are not needed for objectivity, repeatedly. You do not reply to my arguments, but say you haev many reasons to believe I don't understand what I'm saying. However, you don't have any - unless, of course, you count very bad reasons as reasons, in which case you may have some; what do I know?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Moreover, the claim that definitions are required for objectivity is self-defeating, because as I explained, whenever you give a definition, you define it in terms of other words. But some of those other words would not be defined in turn, so there would be no objective fact of the matter as to whether the conditions in the definition are met. Or, if all of the words in your definition are defined, then some of the words in terms of which the words in your definition are defined, are in turn not defined, or..., the point is that as a matter of fact, there is no infinite definitional regress, so in the end you get undefined words.

By "undefined words" do you mean words that aren't defined by the experiences that they are associated with?

Love, peace, joy, pain, 1 orange, 2 pears, 3 apples, and then we get to metawords, like "word".

No, I mean words that aren't defined in terms of other words, which is what we're talking about. Else, "immoral" is also defined by the experiences it's associated with. But that's not the sort of definition we're talking about, as I pointed out earlier.

Words like "love", "pain" or "joy" also make my point. For example, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, I love Yahweh. I do not - I know he doesn't exist, of course, but in any case, I wouldn't love him.
Yet, "love" is not a defined word, in the sense of definition that was claimed or implied was required for objectivity.

 

[dx713]

But your usage does not seem to match colloquial usage; for example, your usage of "subjective morality" seems to imply that whether or not some morals are reasonable is an objective matter (apparently, in a society-independent way), and also that society-relative morality is objective.

Note that I didn't argue for "subjective" morality, but for "subjective evaluation of morality". Also, my view is not that the negotiation of a shared morality is society-independant, as it is part of the social debate.

The best guess I can come up with is that you're proposing culture-relativism with considerable constraints due to some human universal morality that makes up part though not all of the culture-based morality - a moderate relativism.

Not exactly, but close enough for the current debate, yes (and the part not accurate I've still got to formulate it well enough to share it, not in a hurry as it does have no bearing on how I live my life). Glad I could get that through.

But that's still not subjectivism, in the colloquial sense, and I get
the impression it's not in apeman's.

Once again, apeman is on my ignore list, and I've got no interest in arguing a deluded theist definitions. I'd rather enjoy a philosphical debate between reasonnable people than have to parrot all the people who have alredy shown how the idea of a morality dictated by some supernatural fact, or intrinsic to the fabric of the universe is silly.
Also, the OP is about objective morality, so I don't see why you absolutely want me to defend subjectivism. It's not one or the other, as often with philosophical question, this would be a false dilemna, there is plenty of room for discussion between those extreme.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

But your usage does not seem to match colloquial usage; for example, your usage of "subjective morality" seems to imply that whether or not some morals are reasonable is an objective matter (apparently, in a society-independent way), and also that society-relative morality is objective.

Also, my view is not that the negotiation of a shared morality is society-independant, as it is part of the social debate.

Actually, you said

Now it means that with a totally relative morality, different societies can have different standards of mental illness: for instance, in a society where homosexuality can lead to death, homosexuality can be considered a mental illness.
But subjective morality doesn't mean totally relative. It just means it's up to the people to discuss and agree on a set of morals. Different societies can (and should) call out the others on morals that are not reasonnable.

You were talking in that post - the first of your posts I replied to - about subjective morality.

I replied:

I've never seen that usage of "subjective". If that is what you mean by "subjective", then you're not using "subjective" in any way theists who make metaethical arguments do.

And

But that's a side issue here. The main issue is that you're not using "subjective" in any of the ways that might be relevant when it comes to theistic metaethical arguments (i.e., any of the ways in which theists who make those arguments use it).

Then, you replied to that:

I'm not going to bow to the theist misuse of words.
They believe subjective assessment of morality MUST lead to absolutely relative morals. That's one of the problem of their arguments, one of their needs for a god, and I disagree, so I don't feel bound to follow their wrongly making the two words synonimous.
I believe I have sufficiently explained how I can believe they're not synonimous, how a subjective evaluation of morality can be shared through societal debate.

For some reason, you changed from "subjective morality", to "subjective evaluation of morality". If you meant something different, then the shift makes your reply fail to engage my point - which was about your conception of subjective morality -, and theists' metaethical arguments too - which are about subjective morality as well.
If you're not interested in replying to theistic arguments, the point remains that you failed to engage my point if you changed the meaning of the expression when you changed the wording.
I'm still unsure what point or points you're trying to defend and/or challenge.

Also, my view is not that the negotiation of a shared morality is society-independant, as it is part of the social debate.

I don't know what that means, could you clarify, please?
In any case, I was talking about your point about subjective morality.

The best guess I can come up with is that you're proposing culture-relativism with considerable constraints due to some human universal morality that makes up part though not all of the culture-based morality - a moderate relativism.

Not exactly, but close enough for the current debate, yes (and the part not accurate I've still got to formulate it well enough to share it, not in a hurry as it does have no bearing on how I live my life). Glad I could get that through.

Okay. I just hope you understood what I said above, and that this is not a case of miscommunication.

Once again, apeman is on my ignore list, and I've got no interest in arguing a deluded theist definitions. I'd rather enjoy a philosphical debate between reasonnable people than have to parrot all the people who have alredy shown how the idea of a morality dictated by some supernatural fact, or intrinsic to the fabric of the universe is silly.

But the thread is about theistic metaethical arguments - or it was; now it's about that and a number of other things. Which one are you trying to argue for or against?

Also, the OP is about objective morality, so I don't see why you absolutely want me to defend subjectivism. It's not one or the other, as often with philosophical question, this would be a false dilemna, there is plenty of room for discussion between those extreme.

I do not want you to defend subjectivism. I challenged a claimed you made about subjective morality, among others.

As I mentioned, I would like to ask what point or points you intend to defend and/or challenge.

 

[fromderinside]

Demonstrably not true and demonstrably not true.

gay sex presumably conducted by gay people is an objective misuse of some human or any other species procreative features in that the behavior does not result in objective design result of pregnancy and procreation.

How did you determine that it is a 'misuse'? Is there some document or blueprint, perhaps in the 'objective design' you refer to, that says sex can only be for procreation?

Oh shit. I jumped to the conclusion that most of us here presumed evolution theory was among natural laws underlying materialistic structure underlying objectivity.

Oh shit II. I used design to refer to within context of fitness theory not as an overall design. If fitness is the mechanism through which organisms evolve, then sex for other than creation would be a waste of energy unless it were shown to have some benefit as with non social insects. Global design has nothing to do with anything. Such would necessarily refer to some supreme law giver structure.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

How did you determine that it is a 'misuse'? Is there some document or blueprint, perhaps in the 'objective design' you refer to, that says sex can only be for procreation?

Oh shit. I jumped to the conclusion that most of us here presumed evolution theory was among natural laws underlying materialistic structure underlying objectivity.

Oh shit II. I used design to refer to within context of fitness theory not as an overall design. If fitness is the mechanism through which organisms evolve, then sex for other than creation would be a waste of energy unless it were shown to have some benefit as with non social insects. Global design has nothing to do with anything. Such would necessarily refer to some supreme law giver structure.

I met a woman in the woods by my house when I was walking my dog yesterday. I did not rape her in order to increase the odds of having her husband raise my child, therefore being able to have additional offspring without needing to expend additional effort to ensure their survival, despite the clear and well-documented evolutionary advantages of such a strategy.

Do you feel that my lack of action was objectively immoral?

 

[fromderinside]

Oh shit. I jumped to the conclusion that most of us here presumed evolution theory was among natural laws underlying materialistic structure underlying objectivity.

Oh shit II. I used design to refer to within context of fitness theory not as an overall design. If fitness is the mechanism through which organisms evolve, then sex for other than creation would be a waste of energy unless it were shown to have some benefit as with non social insects. Global design has nothing to do with anything. Such would necessarily refer to some supreme law giver structure.

I met a woman in the woods by my house when I was walking my dog yesterday. I did not rape her in order to increase the odds of having her husband raise my child, therefore being able to have additional offspring without needing to expend additional effort to ensure their survival, despite the clear and well-documented evolutionary advantages of such a strategy.

Do you feel that my lack of action was objectively immoral?

No, not at all. Your abstention was a tribute to your understanding that you would probably be caught unless you killed her which is beneficial for several reasons. She can still have more children, you won't be executed for rape and murder if you are a consistent fitness lad, etc.

 

[apeman]

[



You have something in common with God , you have a mind. Having a mind means that you are able (with effort) to think of what a God would want should He exist. It may be the case that your ideas about what He wants are wrong, but long term belief in the truth of certain morals lead to an increase in our knowledge of their objectivity (or not).

To sum up, "I may be wrong, but if I believe something is true for long enough, I will learn more about it, but maybe not."

To my mind, this does not make a bit of sense.

Put simply, belief in objective morals is required in order to seek to refine them.

 

[PyramidHead]

How do you refine something that is objectively true? It would be like saying "ice melts at zero degrees centigrade, can we refine that somehow?" Doesn't that defeat the whole idea of it being objective?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

apeman,

Would you please addressed the objections raised by Bomb#20 and by me?

Also, by the way:

1. Could you please explain why you think God is required for there to be objective morality? What if God does ont exist? Are then moral matters, not objective matters? Does a moral error theory obtain? What do you think happens without God?

2. Do you think God is required for there to be objective illness? If you make a difference, objectivity-wise, between morality and illness, do you know why you make that difference? If so, please explain.

3. For that matter, do you think God is required for there to be, say, objective horseness? (i.e., the property of being a horse) If you make a difference, objectivity-wise, between morality and horseness, do you know why you make that difference? If so, please explain.

 

[Kharakov]

It's objectively moral to seek to do what increases the happiness of those you can increase the happiness of. The pre-position that one cannot seek the happiness of themselves and others is objectively immoral, and should be discarded with the realization that one can seek the happiness of others, although it may require someone to have their ass kicked for being an idiot before they realize they are being objectively immoral by not seeking the happiness of others and themselves.

 

[dx713]

For some reason, you changed from "subjective morality", to "subjective evaluation of morality". If you meant something different, then the shift makes your reply fail to engage my point - which was about your conception of subjective morality -, and theists' metaethical arguments too - which are about subjective morality as well.
If you're not interested in replying to theistic arguments, the point remains that you failed to engage my point if you changed the meaning of the expression when you changed the wording.
I'm still unsure what point or points you're trying to defend and/or challenge.

Yes, I changed my vocabulary because I realized "subjective morality" was unclear, given that it could be taken as me supporting cultural relativism if read in isolation without my discussion about the standards for declaring mental illness and how I evaluate some as reasonnable or not. "Subjective evaluation of morality" seemed clearer, in that it does better reflect my sense of being agnostic on the existence of an objective morality we might one day converge to if it exists, while still making clear that I don't believe it can be revealed to us by some external or supernatural entity.
Sorry for not making that vocabulary shift clearer, but I'm not a philosopher, and neither a native English speaker, so I'm winging it as the discussion progresses.

So, let's try to clarify my points:
On the OP: I was disagreeing with the points I believe the OP presented, i.e.
- that an objective morality must imply god (I believe there could be an objective morality that is discovered through social debate),
- and that there is necessarily such a thing as an objective morality (I'm agnostic on the subject, but at the very least I'm sure there's no revealed objective morality).
But I didn't participate much in that discussion because plenty explained that better than I did)

More generaly, on the morality subject, I have two basic idea that I follow in my life:
1) I don't believe there is an objective morality already written somewhere that I just have to find. I don't believe in Kant's categorical imperative or things like that - a similar act can be moral or not depending on the exact situation. (like, lying to save a life would be moral)
2) I don't believe in cultural relativism either. I believe I can judge other cultures' notions of morality by applying basic rules like the golden rule and see if I consider their notions of morality really moral, just different from mine due to differing circumstances, or immoral and to be challenged (to get back to the beginning of our discussion, for example, religious prejudice against homosexuality).

That's when the discussion about the evaluation of mental illnesses started that I decided to put my grain of salt, because I realized that the modern psychiatry practice of declaring an illness or not based on the effect on the patient quality of life stroke me as relevant to my point of view.

Hoping that's clear enough.

 

[Bronzeage]

To sum up, "I may be wrong, but if I believe something is true for long enough, I will learn more about it, but maybe not."

To my mind, this does not make a bit of sense.

Put simply, belief in objective morals is required in order to seek to refine them.

Which is to say, "Before I search for Santa's workshop, I must believe there is a Santa Claus or I will never find it."

If objective morals exist, such morals would be absolute. There would be no refinement or more precise interpretation.

Is there any moral rule which is not subject to the situation, the society, and the culture in which it is relevant?

 

[Tom Sawyer]

Is there any moral rule which is not subject to the situation, the society, and the culture in which it is relevant?

Bro Code Rule #28:

A bro should never ever under any circumstances sleep with a bro’s ex-girlfriend. A bro may proceed to make moves on another bro’s failed target (he got rejected) but only after asking permission first. If the bro declines your invitation to bust some moves, you must adhere to his wishes and find a new target.

There's no possible society where it would be cool to break that rule.

 

[Bronzeage]

Bro Code Rule #28:

A bro should never ever under any circumstances sleep with a bro’s ex-girlfriend. A bro may proceed to make moves on another bro’s failed target (he got rejected) but only after asking permission first. If the bro declines your invitation to bust some moves, you must adhere to his wishes and find a new target.

There's no possible society where it would be cool to break that rule.

Bro Code Rule #28 is a corollary of the "Bros before hoes" postulate, which only applies to women who have already slept with a bro's entire social circle.

There's plenty of wiggle room in Rule #28. For instance, what if she comes on to you? What if she leaves the club and 5 minutes later you get a text which reads, "I'm waiting by your car." What's a bro to do? No bro court in the world would convict.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

There's plenty of wiggle room in Rule #28. For instance, what if she comes on to you? What if she leaves the club and 5 minutes later you get a text which reads, "I'm waiting by your car." What's a bro to do? No bro court in the world would convict.

No. That's a clear violation. You may get a lighter punishment due to the extenuating circumstances, but you're definitely guilty.

 

[Bronzeage]

There's plenty of wiggle room in Rule #28. For instance, what if she comes on to you? What if she leaves the club and 5 minutes later you get a text which reads, "I'm waiting by your car." What's a bro to do? No bro court in the world would convict.

No. That's a clear violation. You may get a lighter punishment due to the extenuating circumstances, but you're definitely guilty.

I would appeal to the court of If I don't, somebody else will.