A simple explanation of free will.

[fromderinside]

They're not the same things guys. Non-deterministic measurements and mathematics are related to anything that is subject to variability by factors which aren't determined, in-deterministic measurements are related to a specific system of measurements governed by a well defined model predicting behavior, and determinism is the basis for current scientific theory which includes the time t=0 stuff and confidence there is order that results in ultimate explanation of physical things.

I don't agree on the last. Determinists may well feel that their position is linked to current scientific theory and the confidence that there is order, but I don't believe that either of them is part of the definition of determinism, and I don't agree that either confidence in order or scientific theory is linked to determinism, as it's supporters claim.

All scientific experiment measurement are non-deterministic estimates of things presumed to work in a determined way. They are non-deterministic because we can't control everything even in one variable physical study. Some error is going to be present. That thing behind free will is related to in-determinism which is based on outcomes of research of that which is beyond our ability to directly or even indirectly see or manipulate without a frame in which it seems to be explainable.

The later is man's only barrier to our confidence about the behavior of the very small. We are arrogant enough to think that because we can see electromagnetic stuff we can draw upon and model it confidently, beyond not being everywhere all the time, (probably wrongly, but, that is another discussion). What we have left to answer Togo is whether we can design an experiments that distinguishes in-determinism, not non-determinism, from our deterministic model of the world. The EEG example does that quite adequately Togo.

No, I don't agree that in-determinism is relevent at all. Yes, we may encounter measurement problems with human behaviour, but free will is not about human behaviour, it is about human mental states. The problem with free will is not that we don't have the practical ability to measure it, because it isn't measureable, even in theory. The problem is that it contradicts determinism. That's why the problem is one of determinism versus non-determinism, with in-determinism being interesting in it's own right, but ultimately irrelvent.

First I said, if I didn't I'm saying it now,  Scientific Method presumed the deterministic model.

Second, in-determinate, not in-determinism, is relevant since what is being depended upon is something being used that is indeterminable. The EEG example puts that one to the sideline IMHO.

Hiding behind categories doesn't change the fact that what something is categorized as acts as behavior of that which it is (eg: human (brain state) behavior is human behavior). We know very little about brain states IMHO as I think you noted earlier. Brain State theory, state definitions, identified parameters, keep changing.

Finally, we are getting to a point where we can define a closed system. Within the human social sphere, effects are found where what one does has influence on one's survival. These effects derive from one one taking, developing, exercising, a an apparent sense of agency with respect to ones awareness on what one is doing with respect to his social context. Here maybe we have a region for discussion that while it has no bearing on determinism, using it does change one's local possibilities.

 

[Kharakov]

And again a section on non-deterministic models, which you claim don't exist.

They exist like the unicorn outside my window exists.

Either way, I note that the link you posted has a section on non-determined models, so why claim they don't exist?.

Their non-existence is on the level of the NCC 1701 D's non-existence.

Companies pay good money for non-determined models, and use them to run businesses. Do they do that with starships from star trek?

I assume Paramount paid decent money for the models of the Enterprise used in the recent movies.

Companies buying a stochastic model generally care about whether or not the model works, not that the model isliterally labeled "non-deterministic" which is an incorrect descriptor of any model that can be created. Unpredictable != ND, although the equivocation literally relies upon sloppy usage of the terminology.

Observe stuff over time. You don't even have to use a standard candle to observe order around you.

Still looking for that measurement that distinguishes determined from non-determined. Your science seems a little vague here.

It's as vague as the assumption that you aren't a Boltzmann brain that just spontaneously incorporated out of vacuum energy with this thought. Any science that presupposes that you aren't a BB is on shaky foundations, after all, because according to various bullshitters, BBs with your conscious state are far more likely to exist than an actual physical brain that causes your conscious state.

So why, pray tell, do you believe you are not a BB? It's because it is a foolish thought, through and through, just like the thought of nondeterminism. Inductive reasoning can get you past incorrect assumptions, such as ND or being a BB, when you can't prove something.

No, which is why I've several times pointed out that they may indeed be reasonable assumptions. But not observations.

So, you understand that the universe is deterministic. Psychologically, the only ones who could possibly need the mental crutch of the possibility of non-determinism are children or the mentally ill, and I very much doubt that one that could understand our conversation would still need the crutch of the possibility of non-determinism.

Is there some pragmatic reason to act as if it is a possibility, given that current conversation is not being viewed by children or the mentally ill (well, accept for maybe that Tom Sawyer guy who loves murderers and zombie (wouldn't it technically be Lich?) Steve Jobs).

Modelling something non-deterministically is easy. You just add in additional factors that don't significantly effect the phenomenon you have chosen to measure.

That's D, not ND. The hypothetical true ND model has no inputs other than the set inputs (even internal variations caused by race conditions, heat variation, spacetime fluctuations, etc. are considered inputs into the D and hypothetical ND model).

Basically, an ND model, given the exact same starting conditions, will produce different outputs. A D model, with variables that we can and cannot control and/or measure, will produce different outputs given the same variables that we can control and/or measure, because of the variables we cannot control and/or measure.

That's why we make stochastic models- because these models take into account the variables we cannot control and/or measure. Like whether or not you are actually crazy enough to believe in ND.

What? Adding a different argument for the same conclusion doesn't magically make the first argument valid. Whatever additional arguments you may have, the fact remains that the ability to model something deterministically is not itself evidence for it being deterministic. Not even a little bit.

Yeah. When I said no, I meant "no it doesn't", which is why I followed up with the next statement. It was a bit sloppy, like equating D in which one doesn't know or is unable to measure all the variables with ND.

The idea that you can measure or observe the universe being deterministic is untrue, whether the universe is deterministic or not.

Use induction. While we can argue for the extreme version of the  Omphalos hypothesis, as in last Tuesdayism or BB scenarios, neither of us gives it much credit.

So, going onward, seeing as how determinism is an assumption,

No, it's true. It can't be proven, like you can't prove you aren't a remarkable Turing machine, but that has nothing to do with whether it is true. I can't prove that apples won't float tomorrow, but they won't (in any non-trivial manner).

So, going onward, seeing as how determinism is an assumption, the fact that libertarian free will violates determinism is a problem for that assumption, but not a logical problem as you were previously claiming. Previously you claimed that determinism was somehow logically incoherent, but it turns out that the real problem is exactly what I said it was - that you are assuming determinism, and don't want to allow for anything that might violate that assumption.

I said that the position that will is free is illogical to the core. Our will is always caused by our experiences. We don't will in a vacuum. Doesn't mean that we can know all the inputs, which is why will is somewhat hard to predict.

Or to put it another way, the only problem with Libertarian Free Will is that it violates your own beliefs about how the universe works.

It doesn't accurately describe will or the universe, and it's illogical. It accurately describes an ill formed fantasy that is on equal footing with the idea that apples will float tomorrow.

 

[Togo]

Whatever additional arguments you may have, the fact remains that the ability to model something deterministically is not itself evidence for it being deterministic. Not even a little bit.

Doesn't it?

I'm thinking of Bayesian probability here. Suppose a phenomenon under observation behaves in an inherently non-deterministic way. If we tried to model it using deterministic assumptions and failed, that would be more in line with the hypothesis "this phenomenon is non-deterministic" than the hypothesis "this phenomenon is deterministic."

Yes, it would. Although in doing so you'd be directly contradicting Kharakov, because that position would force you to regard quantum mechanics fitting non-determined models as evidence that the universe is not determined, something that he ruled out.

The thing is, measuring how well an event fits a model that is determined, and one that is not determined, doesn't tell you whether it is determined or non-determined in practice. There isn't anything you can measure to tell you one way or the other. It's possible to create a model that fits any result set, so mathematically a result set can't show you that only one model is possible rather than the other.

You could regard it as pursusive, but not conclusive, but then you can't ignore all the various mathematical and physical phenomenon that better fits non-determined models. And a universe that is 99% determined and 1% non-determined, is still a non-determined universe for the purposes of LFW, because it's only contradicted by the idea that it's impossible, not that it's rare.

Given this, it is inescapably true that the success of deterministic models is more in line with the hypothesis that the underlying phenomena are determined.

No, it isn't. Quite the reverse. The evidence is entirely escapable. That's why it doesn't tell you one way or the other.

Look at it this way: it could very well have been the case that deterministic models of observable phenomena are never accurate.

No, I don't beleive that's mathematically possible. What possible results set could a determined model not match? I think the closest we could reach is a situation where the evidence doesn't fit neatly in a determined model, but does into a non-determined model.

And that's where we are with QM. You can propose that there must be hidden determinants that explain everything, but based on what we have, we have particles breaking the speed of light, travelling backwards in time, and displaying other unfortunate effects, as a result of trying to the force them into existing determined paradigms. That's why most physcists don't support a determined model of QM.

If this were the case, you would have no hesitation in pointing that out, since it would be damning evidence against a determined universe.

Nope. Here we are in a discussion of QM and I'm not suggesting that QM proves determinsim to be false. I'm not rushing to draw precisely the conclusion you describe.

In order to be consistent,...

In order to be consistent I must reject the corollary as well.

... the most successful models that describe events bigger than the quantum scale are in fact deterministic, their success is certainly evidence that what is being measured behaves deterministically. That's just how models work.

No, it isn't. It is not a property of models that they share the details of what they measure. On the contrary, given the use of reductionism as a defining principle in almost all scientific models, the reverse is true, and it is 'just how models work' that they simplify and eliminate details that aren't pertinent to what is being modeled. I'd expect most models to end up as determined models irrespective of the nature of the universe. It's a bit like arguing that because it's easiest to model three dimensional things in two dimensions, the universe is somehow fundementally flat. It just doesn't follow.

If we didn't assign a higher probability to our hypotheses based on the models that attempt to describe them,

??? Um.. we don't. We assign higher probabilties based on emperical data. We may tend to select experiementation based on what would be satisfying from a model perspective, but we don't adjust the probabilities based on what would make a good model - unless you can give me an example otherwise?

Ergo, the fact that almost every successful explanation of macroscopic phenomena includes the assumption that effects follow inexorably from causes (when, as I said, it could easily have been otherwise) is pretty good evidence that determinism holds for such phenomena.

Can you demonstrate that cause and effect only occurs in a determined universe? You seem to be assuming that cause and effect, and natural laws generally, somehow require a determined universe. Why would you think that?

Also, is the RI in your location the RI in London?

 

[Kharakov]

It means proving models then verifying and validating them which are at the core of what is meant by non-deterministic.

Ok, from what I can tell, for the purposes of the philosophical discussion, a deterministic model is one that evolves from all conditions that influence it, and a nondeterministic model is one that evolves from conditions that both do and do not exist.

In other words, to make the criteria of non-deterministic, something has to respond to conditions that do not exist (imaginary conditions exist- we're talking about completely non-existent conditions, not boogeymen).

A non-deterministic model, if you're being strict with the term non-deterministic, means a model that in the exact same situation will produce the exact same results. This means that all measurable and immeasurable influences are exactly the same. If a model samples information intentionally or unintentionally that affects the output of the model on different runs, it is deterministic.

If the model is influenced by hidden variables that cannot be detected, it is deterministic.

The other major possibility is that we just don't have the legs necessary for specifying a robust deterministic system.

Yeah. This doesn't mean that any of our models are non-deterministic. It could mean they aren't accurate, or complete. And something we all know is that an incomplete or inaccurate model can still lead to measurable outcomes (look at this discussion). So...

 

[fromderinside]

Ok, from what I can tell, for the purposes of the philosophical discussion, a deterministic model is one that evolves from all conditions that influence it, and a nondeterministic model is one that evolves from conditions that both do and do not exist.

In other words, to make the criteria of non-deterministic, something has to respond to conditions that do not exist (imaginary conditions exist- we're talking about completely non-existent conditions, not boogeymen).

A non-deterministic model, if you're being strict with the term non-deterministic, means a model that in the exact same situation will produce the exact same results. This means that all measurable and immeasurable influences are exactly the same. If a model samples information intentionally or unintentionally that affects the output of the model on different runs, it is deterministic.

If the model is influenced by hidden variables that cannot be detected, it is deterministic.

The other major possibility is that we just don't have the legs necessary for specifying a robust deterministic system.

Yeah. This doesn't mean that any of our models are non-deterministic. It could mean they aren't accurate, or complete. And something we all know is that an incomplete or inaccurate model can still lead to measurable outcomes (look at this discussion). So...

Obviously my view of nondeterministic processes is very different from yours since I accept stochastically varying processes as nondeterministic.



A nondeterministic process is any process that generates different outputs to the same input.

These can arise from flaws in in what are expected to be deterministic processes, changing conditions such as those caused by metabolism, or any other nonlinear condition continuously impacting initial state of the process. Lets take neural transmission or a sensory transducer as instances of nondeterministic processes. Here the transducers (neuron hillock, basilar membrane, etc) are dynamic processes continuously changing, so we can model them by random number generators which leads to different outputs to the same input.

At core these are just dynamic or flawed deterministic processes. There are methods to make outcomes show the deterministic nature of the sensory system other wise it wouldn't be used since such would be meaningless to the individual with the process. The ERP (event related potential) EEG example again which can be found using averaging since doing so tends to reduce effects of noise (uncertain transducer state) with the square root of number of trials sampled.

As you can see by the models I chose these are not responding to stimuli that do not exist nor are the underlying processes driving the metabolic state of the transducer unknown. It is just that the current state of the transducer is uncertain, unknown at the time the stimulus arrives so one cannot reproduce the same output from the system to the same input. No need for woo woo.

An indeterminate process is like the decay of an electron. We can't know how the process works because we cannot model it based on the workings of its sub-components. The difference may only be because we can measure one and not measure the other or it may be that there are things going on with an indeterminate process that we cannot measure if we knew the process existed. That is why I mentioned dark matter and energy in a earlier post. What you did was conflate non and in as non.

 

[Kharakov]

A non-deterministic model, if you're being strict with the term non-deterministic, means a model that in the exact same situation will produce the exact same results different results. This means that all measurable and immeasurable influences are exactly the same. If a model samples information intentionally or unintentionally that affects the output of the model on different runs, it is deterministic.

Obviously my view of nondeterministic processes is very different from yours since I accept stochastically varying processes as nondeterministic.

My view of nondeterministic processes is very different from what was written in my post as well.

A nondeterministic process is any process that generates different outputs to the same input.

Instead of same inputs, "same conditions".

So if varying internal states cause variation in output given the same inputs, you have a chaotic deterministic system, not a non deterministic system.

At core these are just dynamic or flawed deterministic processes. ..
As you can see by the models I chose these are not responding to stimuli that do not exist nor are the underlying processes driving the metabolic state of the transducer unknown. It is just that the current state of the transducer is uncertain, unknown at the time the stimulus arrives so one cannot reproduce the same output from the system to the same input. No need for woo woo.

Yeah. I suppose it's one of those things, like the old equivocation of free will. In the equivocation of deterministic, deterministic doesn't mean determined by every variable involved, it means determined only by the inputs to the system that are controlled.

Deterministic, if we are talking about the philosophical subject, generally would include every variable involved (including internal states of the system). It's not to say that an engineer wouldn't use it the way you do, or that that is wrong in any way. It just isn't the same thing.

The difference may only be because we can measure one and not measure the other or it may be that there are things going on with an indeterminate process that we cannot measure if we knew the process existed. That is why I mentioned dark matter and energy in a earlier post. What you did was conflate non and in as non.

Yeah, indeterminate variables would not make a process non-deterministic, the process would still be deterministic, with some unknowns. Language?

 

[ryan]

Yeah, indeterminate variables would not make a process non-deterministic, the process would still be deterministic, with some unknowns. Language?

Please explain how this is true. Suppose we have a truly random number generator. It generates two random numbers; then we add them. The sum could be random, no?

 

[DBT]

Yeah, indeterminate variables would not make a process non-deterministic, the process would still be deterministic, with some unknowns. Language?

Please explain how this is true. Suppose we have a truly random number generator. It generates two random numbers; then we add them. The sum could be random, no?

The answer is determined by mathematical principles. If your two random numbers are 6 and 11, for instance, adding them together can only produce one outcome, but the final sum is random.

But this doesn't relate to or help the decision making process of a brain. The brain not being a random number generator but an information processor which rewires itself and learns.

 

[ryan]

Please explain how this is true. Suppose we have a truly random number generator. It generates two random numbers; then we add them. The sum could be random, no?

The answer is determined by mathematical principles. If your two random numbers are 6 and 11, for instance, adding them together can only produce one outcome, but the final sum is random.

Okay, but the process might depend on the input. The process could be indeterminate like the input.

But this doesn't relate to or help the decision making process of a brain. The brain not being a random number generator but an information processor which rewires itself and learns.

But we already talked about my argument requiring true randomness like QM randomness. I am not a compatibilist, so I would agree with you if the brain were determinate.

 

[DBT]

The answer is determined by mathematical principles. If your two random numbers are 6 and 11, for instance, adding them together can only produce one outcome, but the final sum is random.

Okay, but the process might depend on the input. The process could be indeterminate like the input.

How does adding random numbers help your case?

But we already talked about my argument requiring true randomness like QM randomness. I am not a compatibilist, so I would agree with you if the brain were determinate.

The brain is a deterministic system, inputs, neurons, connections, memory function, processing of information. Information is not random. Selecting an option is based on a set of criteria. A direct relationship between the requirement and the set criteria in relation to available options being a necessity.

 

[ryan]

Okay, but the process might depend on the input. The process could be indeterminate like the input.

How does adding random numbers help your case?

But we already talked about my argument requiring true randomness like QM randomness. I am not a compatibilist, so I would agree with you if the brain were determinate.

The brain is a deterministic system, inputs, neurons, connections, memory function, processing of information. Information is not random. Selecting an option is based on a set of criteria. A direct relationship between the requirement and the set criteria in relation to available options being a necessity.

I have already told you that my argument depends on random variables such as QM. We are in total agreement if everything were CM.

 

[DBT]

How does adding random numbers help your case?

But we already talked about my argument requiring true randomness like QM randomness. I am not a compatibilist, so I would agree with you if the brain were determinate.

The brain is a deterministic system, inputs, neurons, connections, memory function, processing of information. Information is not random. Selecting an option is based on a set of criteria. A direct relationship between the requirement and the set criteria in relation to available options being a necessity.

I have already told you that my argument depends on random variables such as QM. We are in total agreement if everything were CM.

It's not enough to tell me that your argument depends on random variables such as QM, you have said that many times. You need to explain the why and how of it by giving descriptions and reasoned arguments for the role of randomness in relation to decision making. Which I have asked you to provide, but this is something you have not done.

 

[Togo]

I don't agree on the last. Determinists may well feel that their position is linked to current scientific theory and the confidence that there is order, but I don't believe that either of them is part of the definition of determinism, and I don't agree that either confidence in order or scientific theory is linked to determinism, as it's supporters claim.

All scientific experiment measurement are non-deterministic estimates of things presumed to work in a determined way. They are non-deterministic because we can't control everything even in one variable physical study. Some error is going to be present. That thing behind free will is related to in-determinism which is based on outcomes of research of that which is beyond our ability to directly or even indirectly see or manipulate without a frame in which it seems to be explainable.

The later is man's only barrier to our confidence about the behavior of the very small. We are arrogant enough to think that because we can see electromagnetic stuff we can draw upon and model it confidently, beyond not being everywhere all the time, (probably wrongly, but, that is another discussion). What we have left to answer Togo is whether we can design an experiments that distinguishes in-determinism, not non-determinism, from our deterministic model of the world. The EEG example does that quite adequately Togo.

No, I don't agree that in-determinism is relevent at all. Yes, we may encounter measurement problems with human behaviour, but free will is not about human behaviour, it is about human mental states. The problem with free will is not that we don't have the practical ability to measure it, because it isn't measureable, even in theory. The problem is that it contradicts determinism. That's why the problem is one of determinism versus non-determinism, with in-determinism being interesting in it's own right, but ultimately irrelevant.

First I said, if I didn't I'm saying it now,  Scientific Method presumed the deterministic model.

Sorry, what's 'the deterministic model'? Do you mean a determined universe, in which case I don't agree? Or do you mean just that models tend to be determined because they're, well, models.

Second, in-determinate, not in-determinism, is relevant since what is being depended upon is something being used that is indeterminable. The EEG example puts that one to the sideline IMHO.

Not following the EEG thing at all? Does it related to something I've said, or is it a different point?

Hiding behind categories doesn't change the fact that what something is categorized as acts as behavior of that which it is (eg: human (brain state) behavior is human behavior).

No, it doesn't. You can reduce it to behaviour, of course, but that doesn't make them identical. For example, it's trivially true that several different proposed brain states can lead to the same action, or that several different actions can arise from the same class of brain states. Given this many-to-many relationship, you can't simply sub one for the other.

Finally, we are getting to a point where we can define a closed system. Within the human social sphere, effects are found where what one does has influence on one's survival. These effects derive from one one taking, developing, exercising, a an apparent sense of agency with respect to ones awareness on what one is doing with respect to his social context. Here maybe we have a region for discussion that while it has no bearing on determinism, using it does change one's local possibilities.

Certainly there's a great deal to talk about there, and it's more pertinent to an appreciation of human behaviour than what we're discussing. But this isn't a discussion of human behaviour.

Ok, from what I can tell, for the purposes of the philosophical discussion, a deterministic model is one that evolves from all conditions that influence it, and a nondeterministic model is one that evolves from conditions that both do and do not exist.

In other words, to make the criteria of non-deterministic, something has to respond to conditions that do not exist (imaginary conditions exist- we're talking about completely non-existent conditions, not boogeymen).

Obviously my view of nondeterministic processes is very different from yours since I accept stochastically varying processes as nondeterministic.

I'd note that's also the view taken by mathematicians, physicists, and the on-line links that Kharakov himself posted.

As I said previously, the main problem here is that Kharakov is using an extremely non-standard definition, and thus arguing ferociously against a position that no one here actually holds.

Still looking for that measurement that distinguishes determined from non-determined. Your science seems a little vague here.

It's as vague as the assumption that you aren't a Boltzmann brain that just spontaneously incorporated out of vacuum energy with this thought. Any science that presupposes that you aren't a BB is on shaky foundations, after all, because according to various bullshitters, BBs with your conscious state are far more likely to exist than an actual physical brain that causes your conscious state.

You've missed the point. That you feel your assumption to reasonable, accurate, or sensible doesn't magically make it into a measurement. Your claim that determinism is something measured is still false, irrespective of whether the universe is determined or not.

No, which is why I've several times pointed out that they may indeed be reasonable assumptions. But not observations.

So, you understand that the universe is deterministic.

No, quite the contrary. I don't see a strictly determined universe as being coherent, and I see a mix of strict randomnesss and strict determinism as being a cop-out that explains nothing.

But this isn't about me trying to push a rival worldview to you, this is about me pointing out that he claims you are making around your worldview are assumptions, not observations, and thus that what leads to a rejection of LFW is neither science nor logic, but rather a desire to preserve the purity of a particular theoretical model.

The idea that you can measure or observe the universe being deterministic is untrue, whether the universe is deterministic or not.

Use induction.

Fine, using induction, a process of arguing for a particular conclusion based on incomplete evidence, the universe being deterministic is still not a measurement. How does that help?

So, going onward, seeing as how determinism is an assumption,

No, it's true. It can't be proven, like you can't prove you aren't a remarkable Turing machine, but that has nothing to do with whether it is true.

And whether it's true has nothing to do with whether it is an assumption. The two are entirely unrelated. True, false, the status as an assumption remains unchanged.

So, going onward, seeing as how determinism is an assumption, the fact that libertarian free will violates determinism is a problem for that assumption, but not a logical problem as you were previously claiming. Previously you claimed that determinism was somehow logically incoherent, but it turns out that the real problem is exactly what I said it was - that you are assuming determinism, and don't want to allow for anything that might violate that assumption.

I said that the position that will is free is illogical to the core. Our will is always caused by our experiences. We don't will in a vacuum.

Great, so now all you have to do is demonstrate that LFW implies willing in a vacuum as a logical necessity, and you'll have the beginnings of a point. I don't see the connection myself.

Or to put it another way, the only problem with Libertarian Free Will is that it violates your own beliefs about how the universe works.

It doesn't accurately describe will or the universe,

Precisely. Your view of will and the universe is simply different from that required for LFW. It violates your beliefs.

and it's illogical. It accurately describes an ill formed fantasy that is on equal footing with the idea that apples will float tomorrow.

Ah, now that you have yet to demonstrate.

How does adding random numbers help your case?

But we already talked about my argument requiring true randomness like QM randomness. I am not a compatibilist, so I would agree with you if the brain were determinate.

The brain is a deterministic system, inputs, neurons, connections, memory function, processing of information. Information is not random. Selecting an option is based on a set of criteria. A direct relationship between the requirement and the set criteria in relation to available options being a necessity.

I have already told you that my argument depends on random variables such as QM. We are in total agreement if everything were CM.

It's not enough to tell me that your argument depends on random variables such as QM, you have said that many times. You need to explain the why and how of it by giving descriptions and reasoned arguments for the role of randomness in relation to decision making. Which I have asked you to provide, but this is something you have not done.

As long as the numbers are not determined, why would they need to be random?

 

[Juma]

Another q about "free will": how do a free willing agent know what to decide?

 

[Togo]

Another q about "free will": how do a free willing agent know what to decide?

Is this a problem unique to free will?

There has been some suggestion that the act of consideration or deliberation (- i.e. thinking about a problem), it the act of trying various formulations of a problem to come up with different decision points. For example, if you forget your keys, and think about several different ways to break into your own place without any looking like they will succeed, you instead go and try a locksmith.

Again, not sure why free will would be a special case here?

 

[Juma]

Another q about "free will": how do a free willing agent know what to decide?

Is this a problem unique to free will?

There has been some suggestion that the act of consideration or deliberation (- i.e. thinking about a problem), it the act of trying various formulations of a problem to come up with different decision points. For example, if you forget your keys, and think about several different ways to break into your own place without any looking like they will succeed, you instead go and try a locksmith.

Again, not sure why free will would be a special case here?

Of course. If you dont believe in free will you just weigh the different options and pick the one that seems best.

 

[Togo]

Is this a problem unique to free will?

There has been some suggestion that the act of consideration or deliberation (- i.e. thinking about a problem), it the act of trying various formulations of a problem to come up with different decision points. For example, if you forget your keys, and think about several different ways to break into your own place without any looking like they will succeed, you instead go and try a locksmith.

Again, not sure why free will would be a special case here?

Of course. If you dont believe in free will you just weigh the different options and pick the one that seems best.

And you can't do that with free will because....?

 

[Juma]

Of course. If you dont believe in free will you just weigh the different options and pick the one that seems best.

And you can't do that with free will because....?

Because that is a calculated decision. Thus caused by the inputs and their weights. Nothing free there.

 

[Togo]

And you can't do that with free will because....?

Because that is a calculated decision. Thus caused by the inputs and their weights. Nothing free there.

And you can't have decisions involving weights under free will because...?

 

[Juma]

Because that is a calculated decision. Thus caused by the inputs and their weights. Nothing free there.

And you can't have decisions involving weights under free will because...?

How is a calculated decision free?