A simple explanation of free will.

[Togo]

And you can't have decisions involving weights under free will because...?

How is a calculated decision free?

Why wouldn't it be? This is your claim, so you must have some idea.

I can help you out a bit... Let's say you have a person deciding whether to eat a sandwich, or buy a hamburger. A sandwich is cheaper, doesn't taste as good, and takes less time to acquire. You've been claiming that a 'free decision' can't be 'caused by the inputs and their weights'. That could mean two things:

1) It could mean that a decision has to be determined by the relative weights of the inputs, and that it is impossible for a decision to involve weights without the decision being strictly determined by them. Free will can't comprise of strict determination. by definition, so free will decisions can't involve weights. All you'd need to do is prove that the first sentence there is true, that a decision has to be strictly determined by relative weights.

2) It could mean that a decision has to be either entirely strictly determined, or entirely random, and that no other states are possible. That essentially a variation on the 'free will is impossible because everything is either determined or random' argument. Again, you'd need to prove that the initial statement is actually true.

Either way, it's your job to explain why there's a problem with free will here. I can't really explain the solution to a problem that hasn't been identified.

 

[Juma]

How is a calculated decision free?

Why wouldn't it be? This is your claim, so you must have some idea.

I can help you out a bit... Let's say you have a person deciding whether to eat a sandwich, or buy a hamburger. A sandwich is cheaper, doesn't taste as good, and takes less time to acquire. You've been claiming that a 'free decision' can't be 'caused by the inputs and their weights'. That could mean two things:

1) It could mean that a decision has to be determined by the relative weights of the inputs, and that it is impossible for a decision to involve weights without the decision being strictly determined by them. Free will can't comprise of strict determination. by definition, so free will decisions can't involve weights. All you'd need to do is prove that the first sentence there is true, that a decision has to be strictly determined by relative weights.

2) It could mean that a decision has to be either entirely strictly determined, or entirely random, and that no other states are possible. That essentially a variation on the 'free will is impossible because everything is either determined or random' argument. Again, you'd need to prove that the initial statement is actually true.

Either way, it's your job to explain why there's a problem with free will here. I can't really explain the solution to a problem that hasn't been identified.

And you could obviously not explain what is "free"...

 

[fromderinside]

How is a calculated decision free?

Interloper here:

...because after calculations yield preference decider is free to choose otherwise is the claim

Really no different than putting a random number generator after the calculator which can generate an unlimited number of responses to calculator product, non-deterministic process, but, still determined as a set of trails would reveal. In other words what first appears to be free isn't actually.

 

[Togo]

Why wouldn't it be? This is your claim, so you must have some idea.

I can help you out a bit... Let's say you have a person deciding whether to eat a sandwich, or buy a hamburger. A sandwich is cheaper, doesn't taste as good, and takes less time to acquire. You've been claiming that a 'free decision' can't be 'caused by the inputs and their weights'. That could mean two things:

1) It could mean that a decision has to be determined by the relative weights of the inputs, and that it is impossible for a decision to involve weights without the decision being strictly determined by them. Free will can't comprise of strict determination. by definition, so free will decisions can't involve weights. All you'd need to do is prove that the first sentence there is true, that a decision has to be strictly determined by relative weights.

2) It could mean that a decision has to be either entirely strictly determined, or entirely random, and that no other states are possible. That essentially a variation on the 'free will is impossible because everything is either determined or random' argument. Again, you'd need to prove that the initial statement is actually true.

Either way, it's your job to explain why there's a problem with free will here. I can't really explain the solution to a problem that hasn't been identified.

And you could obviously not explain what is "free"...

Well if your claim that free will is illogical/false is to be taken seriously, we have to assume you know what it is.

Not strictly determined by inputs. As fromderinside said, given the calculations you can still decide to do otherwise.

More specifically, conscious selection between realisable alternatives. Strict determinists tend to insist that there is no such thing as realisable alternatives, because all decisions were fixed at the Dawn of Time. People who more loosely allow true random events, tend to get stuck at why they're allowing random events and determined events, but nothing else.

You were going to explain why considering weights was impossible unless we have determinism. I'm having difficulty imagining what that reason could be, and I suspect you're having trouble articulating it.

 

[Juma]

More specifically, conscious selection between realisable alternatives.
.

Please explain what/how "conscious selection" is/works.,

 

[ryan]

How does adding random numbers help your case?

But we already talked about my argument requiring true randomness like QM randomness. I am not a compatibilist, so I would agree with you if the brain were determinate.

The brain is a deterministic system, inputs, neurons, connections, memory function, processing of information. Information is not random. Selecting an option is based on a set of criteria. A direct relationship between the requirement and the set criteria in relation to available options being a necessity.

I have already told you that my argument depends on random variables such as QM. We are in total agreement if everything were CM.

It's not enough to tell me that your argument depends on random variables such as QM, you have said that many times. You need to explain the why and how of it by giving descriptions and reasoned arguments for the role of randomness in relation to decision making. Which I have asked you to provide, but this is something you have not done.

I don't know the details. But I do know that if microtubules really are random variables as part of the decision-making process, it may allow one the ability to have made a different decision.

 

[Kharakov]

You've missed the point. That you feel your assumption to reasonable, accurate, or sensible doesn't magically make it into a measurement. Your claim that determinism is something measured is still false, irrespective of whether the universe is determined or not.

Did I say specifically that "determinism can be measured", or did what I say imply that you can measure something and it will remain the same (unless an interior, exterior, or omnipresent force acts upon it)?

But this isn't about me trying to push a rival worldview to you, this is about me pointing out that the claims you are making around your worldview are assumptions, not observations,

Reasonable assumptions based on observations (determinism, apples won't float, chaos and pseudorandomness are generated by order, what exists causes the evolution of what exists) aren't exactly on the same footing as unreasonable assumptions based on ignorance (nondeterminism, apples might float tomorrow, true randomness exists, what exists acts according to things that don't have any influence on what exists, etc.).

and thus that what leads to a rejection of LFW is neither science nor logic, but rather a desire to preserve the purity of a particular theoretical model.

No, what leads to rejection of LFW is just observations that lead to certain pieces of knowledge, such as apples won't rise tomorrow. I know, I know, we don't know with absolute certainty that apples won't rise tomorrow, it's just a reasonable assumption that they won't.

LFW is on far shakier ground then the idea that apples might rise tomorrow. It's just not reasonable at all. Can you even generate anything with the idea of its existence, other than conversation?

The idea that you can measure or observe the universe being deterministic is untrue, whether the universe is deterministic or not.

Use induction.

Fine, using induction, a process of arguing for a particular conclusion based on incomplete evidence, the universe being deterministic is still not a measurement. How does that help?

It made me feel amused. How about you use LFW to respond to something, without having your response being determined by your total state?

Anyway, you might not be aware of it, but you're supposed to use inductive reasoning to determine things about the universe by observing it. You can't prove that the water you're drinking isn't an illusion, created by a computer hooked up to your brain. So you just accept it as true- it's a pragmatic assumption, after all.

As long as we're on an induction kick: Any physical laws pop out at you? Conservation of energy? Evolution? Regular behaviors of things in certain forms (chemistry, or perhaps the still existing footprints on the moon)?

So, going onward, seeing as how determinism is an assumption,

No, it's true. It can't be proven, like you can't prove you aren't a remarkable Turing machine, but that has nothing to do with whether it is true.

And whether it's true has nothing to do with whether it is an assumption. The two are entirely unrelated. True, false, the status as an assumption remains unchanged.

Of course. However when the amount of evidence that is for an assumption is \(\epsilon=\frac{1}{\infty}\) and the amount of evidence for what opposes it (determinism) is \(\infty-1\), with 1= ignorance of the absolute truth, reasonable people tend to go with the latter.

 

[ryan]

Of course. However when the amount of evidence that is for an assumption is \(\epsilon=\frac{1}{\infty}\) and the amount of evidence for what opposes it (determinism) is \(\infty-1\), with 1= ignorance of the absolute truth, reasonable people tend to go with the latter.

Is it determinable which slit the photon travels through?

 

[Kharakov]

Of course. However when the amount of evidence that is for an assumption is \(\epsilon=\frac{1}{\infty}\) and the amount of evidence for what opposes it (determinism) is \(\infty-1\), with 1= ignorance of the absolute truth, reasonable people tend to go with the latter.

Is it determinable which slit the photon travels through?

If you use a detector. Why?

 

[ryan]

Is it determinable which slit the photon travels through?

If you use a detector. Why?

What definition are you using for determinism? Most of the ones that I am reading are about causes dictating the effects.

The detector is not the cause of the photon emission.

 

[Kharakov]

If you use a detector. Why?

What definition are you using for determinism? Most of the ones that I am reading are about causes dictating the effects.

Yeah. Smooth causality though, not discrete. In other words, one doesn't have to write out every digit of pi to orbit something.

The detector is not the cause of the photon emission.

Yeah. The detector is just one of the many factors involved.

 

[Togo]

More specifically, conscious selection between realisable alternatives.
.

Please explain what/how "conscious selection" is/works.,

I don't want to derail our discussion, which was about free will being inherently illogical and your now eagerly awaited explanation of why free will can't involve using weightings as part of the decision process.

Happy to discuss this once you've given your explanation - or withdrawn the claim.

Did I say specifically that "determinism can be measured",

No, you said that determinism was an observation, not an assumption. You've since clarfified that it is an assumption, so I'm not sure why we're still discussing it.

Reasonable assumptions based on observations (determinism, apples won't float, chaos and pseudorandomness are generated by order, what exists causes the evolution of what exists) aren't exactly on the same footing as unreasonable assumptions based on ignorance (nondeterminism, apples might float tomorrow, true randomness exists, what exists acts according to things that don't have any influence on what exists, etc.).

This is a philosophy forum. All assumptions exist on exactly and entirely the same footing. I understand that you want to give reasonable assumptions a different status from unreasonable assumptions, but you can't do that. The structure of the universe does not depend on what you consider reasonable.

and thus that what leads to a rejection of LFW is neither science nor logic, but rather a desire to preserve the purity of a particular theoretical model.

No, what leads to rejection of LFW is just observations

No, it's an assumption. I know you want to label your own worldview as an observation, but logic doesn't work that way. You can't take your own opinion as a starting point.

The idea that you can measure or observe the universe being deterministic is untrue, whether the universe is deterministic or not.

Use induction.

Fine, using induction, a process of arguing for a particular conclusion based on incomplete evidence, the universe being deterministic is still not a measurement. How does that help?

It made me feel amused.

Glad I could help. You still can't make your opinion an observation on the grounds that you believe it to be true.

Anyway, you might not be aware of it, but you're supposed to use inductive reasoning to determine things about the universe by observing it. You can't prove that the water you're drinking isn't an illusion, created by a computer hooked up to your brain. So you just accept it as true- it's a pragmatic assumption, after all.

But that just goes back to the earlier point about not being able to observe a distinction between determined and non-determined events. If you want to claim that Quantum Mechanics isn't support for a non-determined universe, then you can't claim that classical mechanics is support for a determined universe. If you want to use induction in this way to give support from what things seem to be, then induction tells us that decisions are not predetermined and that QM involves non-determined events. If you want to reject that inductive reasoning based on those conclusions violating determinsim, you can't then use indiuction as support for determinism.

Either you go for what you can prove, in which case there is no reason to consider the universe determined, or you go for what seems to be the case, in which case the universe isn't determined.

 

[ryan]

What definition are you using for determinism? Most of the ones that I am reading are about causes dictating the effects.

Yeah. Smooth causality though, not discrete. In other words, one doesn't have to write out every digit of pi to orbit something.

I don't know what this has to do with what we are talking about.

Imagine we prepare an electron to be in a state of spin at, say, 30 degrees from spin up. Then we rotate it 30 degrees to the spin up position. There is a 30% chance that the electron emits a photon; let's say it beat the odds and a photon is emitted. Then we do the exact same procedure over again, except this time no photon is emitted. Obviously the cause on the electron did not determine the effect or else it would have done the same thing twice. I will add that hidden variables in QM has been ruled out.

The detector is not the cause of the photon emission.

Yeah. The detector is just one of the many factors involved.

What the hell are you talking about? The detector may slightly change what the photon will do, but it won't determine what it will do.

 

[bilby]

Ryan, randomness is not will. So you can add randomness as much as you like to a system, without ever getting closer to a system with will; much less one with 'free' will.

Consider:

EITHER
Action is the result of an algorithm with non-random inputs only. In this case, actions are predictable, and only affected by 'will' if what is 'willed' is already known before the algorithm is invoked;
OR
Action is the result of an algorithm with both non-random and random inputs. In this case, actions are not predictable; but are only affected by 'will' if what is 'willed' is:

EITHER
Already determined before the algorithm is invoked, as a non-random input;
OR
Random.​

'Will' that is already determined before any processing takes place is not 'free'; That 'will' is, necessarily, either the output of an earlier iteration of one of the processes described above, or an external influence (which would thereby not be 'will' at all).

A certain amount of random 'jitter' as an input can be a good thing in terms of achieving a decision; it can allow an arbitrary choice between equal alternatives, where its absence would lead to no decision at all (Buridan's ass). But this random input, while it might be described as 'free', is not 'will'.

Or to put it another way:

The class of algorithms of the form "MakeDecision" With Inputs: InputA, InputB, InputC... etc., gives an Output "Descision".

For each "InputX", the value is either the output "Descision" from an earlier iteration; OR it is an "Observation" - a sensory input; or it is "Random".

No matter how complex Function "MakeDecision" might be, nor how many Inputs there are to it, nor how many iterations you go through, the output can ultimately only be dependent upon observations and/or randomness.

Neither 'observation' nor 'randomness' are will. Will is a Decision. Will is an OUTPUT of decision making; It can serve as an input into a new iteration, but it can only ever originate as an OUTPUT of a decision making process (or processes).

The whole idea of 'will' (free or otherwise) as an independent input to the decision making process is an error. It can only be an input insofar as it arose as the output of an earlier iteration of a decision making algorithm; and as such, it cannot be 'free' no matter how much randomness you invoke.

Existing will can be an input to future decision making; but ultimately the process of decision making is the cause of, and therefore must precede, will.

It is a 'chicken and egg' problem; and like that problem, it has a solution. Eggs come before chickens; Decisions come before will.

Randomness is neither necessary not sufficient for 'will'; and will can never be free, because it necessarily depends upon earlier decisions, which, as they are the cause of will, ultimately cannot also be the consequence of will.

 

[ryan]

Ryan, randomness is not will. So you can add randomness as much as you like to a system, without ever getting closer to a system with will; much less one with 'free' will.

Consider:

EITHER
Action is the result of an algorithm with non-random inputs only. In this case, actions are predictable, and only affected by 'will' if what is 'willed' is already known before the algorithm is invoked;
OR
Action is the result of an algorithm with both non-random and random inputs. In this case, actions are not predictable; but are only affected by 'will' if what is 'willed' is:

EITHER
Already determined before the algorithm is invoked, as a non-random input;
OR
Random.​

'Will' that is already determined before any processing takes place is not 'free'; That 'will' is, necessarily, either the output of an earlier iteration of one of the processes described above, or an external influence (which would thereby not be 'will' at all).

A certain amount of random 'jitter' as an input can be a good thing in terms of achieving a decision; it can allow an arbitrary choice between equal alternatives, where its absence would lead to no decision at all (Buridan's ass). But this random input, while it might be described as 'free', is not 'will'.

Or to put it another way:

The class of algorithms of the form "MakeDecision" With Inputs: InputA, InputB, InputC... etc., gives an Output "Descision".

For each "InputX", the value is either the output "Descision" from an earlier iteration; OR it is an "Observation" - a sensory input; or it is "Random".

No matter how complex Function "MakeDecision" might be, nor how many Inputs there are to it, nor how many iterations you go through, the output can ultimately only be dependent upon observations and/or randomness.

Neither 'observation' nor 'randomness' are will. Will is a Decision. Will is an OUTPUT of decision making; It can serve as an input into a new iteration, but it can only ever originate as an OUTPUT of a decision making process (or processes).

The whole idea of 'will' (free or otherwise) as an independent input to the decision making process is an error. It can only be an input insofar as it arose as the output of an earlier iteration of a decision making algorithm; and as such, it cannot be 'free' no matter how much randomness you invoke.

Existing will can be an input to future decision making; but ultimately the process of decision making is the cause of, and therefore must precede, will.

It is a 'chicken and egg' problem; and like that problem, it has a solution. Eggs come before chickens; Decisions come before will.

Randomness is neither necessary not sufficient for 'will'; and will can never be free, because it necessarily depends upon earlier decisions, which, as they are the cause of will, ultimately cannot also be the consequence of will.

First of all, I am thinking that the decision-making process narrows down the choices, or else we would have much more to choose from. Maybe we freely choose/will a choice. Secondly, the decision-making process may have an element of freedom in the form of QM. Thirdly, we don't know that will does not have intrinsic randomness; the decision-making process having an element of randomness does not mean that will does not have it too. Finally, I am not so sure that will can't or shouldn't overlap into the decision-making process.

 

[Juma]

Please explain what/how "conscious selection" is/works.,

I don't want to derail...

You cannot specify what "concious selection" is. That is why you dodge.

 

[bilby]

Ryan, randomness is not will. So you can add randomness as much as you like to a system, without ever getting closer to a system with will; much less one with 'free' will.

Consider:

EITHER
Action is the result of an algorithm with non-random inputs only. In this case, actions are predictable, and only affected by 'will' if what is 'willed' is already known before the algorithm is invoked;
OR
Action is the result of an algorithm with both non-random and random inputs. In this case, actions are not predictable; but are only affected by 'will' if what is 'willed' is:

EITHER
Already determined before the algorithm is invoked, as a non-random input;
OR
Random.​

'Will' that is already determined before any processing takes place is not 'free'; That 'will' is, necessarily, either the output of an earlier iteration of one of the processes described above, or an external influence (which would thereby not be 'will' at all).

A certain amount of random 'jitter' as an input can be a good thing in terms of achieving a decision; it can allow an arbitrary choice between equal alternatives, where its absence would lead to no decision at all (Buridan's ass). But this random input, while it might be described as 'free', is not 'will'.

Or to put it another way:

The class of algorithms of the form "MakeDecision" With Inputs: InputA, InputB, InputC... etc., gives an Output "Descision".

For each "InputX", the value is either the output "Descision" from an earlier iteration; OR it is an "Observation" - a sensory input; or it is "Random".

No matter how complex Function "MakeDecision" might be, nor how many Inputs there are to it, nor how many iterations you go through, the output can ultimately only be dependent upon observations and/or randomness.

Neither 'observation' nor 'randomness' are will. Will is a Decision. Will is an OUTPUT of decision making; It can serve as an input into a new iteration, but it can only ever originate as an OUTPUT of a decision making process (or processes).

The whole idea of 'will' (free or otherwise) as an independent input to the decision making process is an error. It can only be an input insofar as it arose as the output of an earlier iteration of a decision making algorithm; and as such, it cannot be 'free' no matter how much randomness you invoke.

Existing will can be an input to future decision making; but ultimately the process of decision making is the cause of, and therefore must precede, will.

It is a 'chicken and egg' problem; and like that problem, it has a solution. Eggs come before chickens; Decisions come before will.

Randomness is neither necessary not sufficient for 'will'; and will can never be free, because it necessarily depends upon earlier decisions, which, as they are the cause of will, ultimately cannot also be the consequence of will.

First of all, I am thinking that the decision-making process narrows down the choices,

How?

or else we would have much more to choose from. Maybe we freely choose/will a choice.

How, if not by using inputs to a process, as I have described? This is just hand-waving.

Secondly, the decision-making process may have an element of freedom in the form of QM.

And this differs from any random input how?

Thirdly, we don't know that will does not have intrinsic randomness; the decision-making process having an element of randomness does not mean that will does not have it too.

So fucking what? What difference does that make to any of what I just wrote?

Finally, I am not so sure that will can't or shouldn't overlap into the decision-making process.

HOW?

What POSSIBLE mechanism could achieve this?

I say there is no possible way this could occur; You only have to come up with a logically possible way in order to refute me. It doesn't have to be the actual mechanism; any logically possible one would do.

I am looking for you to come up with a mechanism - a methodology - by which will could be an input to the decision making process. I am happy to grant you randomness as one of the inputs; Quantum or otherwise. But that isn't will. Show your work - how do we get from QM, or any other random event, to will (free or otherwise)?

 

[Kharakov]

Did I say specifically that "determinism can be measured",

No, you said that determinism was an observation, not an assumption.

Really. I said that, in the exact words that you're using, in such a way that it means exactly what you claim I said?

Reasonable assumptions based on observations (determinism, apples won't float, chaos and pseudorandomness are generated by order, what exists causes the evolution of what exists) aren't exactly on the same footing as unreasonable assumptions based on ignorance (nondeterminism, apples might float tomorrow, true randomness exists, what exists acts according to things that don't have any influence on what exists, etc.).

This is a philosophy forum. All assumptions exist on exactly and entirely the same footing.

No they don't. You're thinking of a sophistry forum- that's different. In a sophistry forum, the only thing that matters is rhetoric and the interplay of words. In a philosophy forum, one can elevate the existence of gravity or determinism above silly ideas like floating apples and LFW. Really, if apples did start to float tomorrow and we survived, it will only mean someone with a bit of influence on the natural order is fucking around, so it wouldn't impact the discussion one iota.

No, it's an assumption. I know you want to label your own worldview as an observation, but logic doesn't work that way. You can't take your own opinion as a starting point.

It's an assumption like general relativity is an assumption. So what? Everything in the universe points towards deteterminism, and the only thing you can appeal to to even pretend that LFW is true is ignorance. LFW is not even remotely on the same philosophical footing as determinism, and everyone knows this, except for a few crazies.

But that just goes back to the earlier point about not being able to observe a distinction between determined and non-determined events. If you want to claim that Quantum Mechanics isn't support for a non-determined universe, then you can't claim that classical mechanics is support for a determined universe.

Not at all. QM doesn't provide any evidence for or against determinism. Quantum indeterminism is just something that certain woo peddlers grasp at because we can't accurately measure all of the variables at the quantum level. I'm not even saying that being a woo peddler is wrong. Woo just doesn't lead to very interesting information, as reality itself, with all its determined chaos and consciousnesses is quite wonderful enough if one has the time and ability to appreciate it.

If you want to use induction in this way to give support from what things seem to be, then induction tells us that decisions are not predetermined and that QM involves non-determined events.

Decisions are not predetermined, they are determined by all the factors at the time of the decision. If you had one more piece of information, you might (if it has enough impact) make an entirely different decision, which leads to an entirely different decision tree. It's chaos- not nondeterminism.

Chaos and nondeterminism are entirely different. Chaos is real, ND is an incorrect misinterpretation of chaos.

As no human can directly witness a particle, its path, or everything about it, or nonlocal variables that play into the evolution of quantum systems, you can't say that quantum events are non-determined. For all you know they are chaotic.

 

[ryan]

First of all, I am thinking that the decision-making process narrows down the choices,

How?

What do you think I am, a neurologist?

or else we would have much more to choose from. Maybe we freely choose/will a choice.

How, if not by using inputs to a process, as I have described? This is just hand-waving.

Some part of your consciousness may randomly select a choice out of what the decision-making process generated.

Secondly, the decision-making process may have an element of freedom in the form of QM.

And this differs from any random input how?

Well, it's not really an input if it is a element of the process that stays random. But if it fixes itself into a single state, for some other random process to choose from, then it could be considered an input.

Finally, I am not so sure that will can't or shouldn't overlap into the decision-making process.

What POSSIBLE mechanism could achieve this?

I meant definitionally.

I say there is no possible way this could occur; You only have to come up with a logically possible way in order to refute me. It doesn't have to be the actual mechanism; any logically possible one would do.

I am looking for you to come up with a mechanism - a methodology - by which will could be an input to the decision making process. I am happy to grant you randomness as one of the inputs; Quantum or otherwise. But that isn't will. Show your work - how do we get from QM, or any other random event, to will (free or otherwise)?

Think about properties that stay constant at multiple levels. The log house is flammable; the log roof is flammable; a splinter from the log roof is flammable. The freedom in "I" is preserved that way. From the consciousness of the choice all the way down to the QM of the decision-making process. The QM has freedom; therefore, the decision-making process has freedom. The decision-making process has freedom; therefore, I have freedom. QM is a part of "I".

 

[bilby]

How?

What do you think I am, a neurologist?

You shouldn't need to be; I am asking what hypothesis you have as to a possible logical mechanism; Whether or not that mechanism exists, much less what it might consist of if it does, is out of scope at this time.

or else we would have much more to choose from. Maybe we freely choose/will a choice.

How, if not by using inputs to a process, as I have described? This is just hand-waving.

Some part of your consciousness may randomly select a choice out of what the decision-making process generated.

The phrase "Some part of your consciousness may randomly select a choice out of what the decision-making process generated." carries EXACTLY the same information as "perhaps something happens".

No matter how hard you wave your hands, this still isn't an argument for anything.

Secondly, the decision-making process may have an element of freedom in the form of QM.

And this differs from any random input how?

Well, it's not really an input if it is a element of the process that stays random. But if it fixes itself into a single state, for some other random process to choose from, then it could be considered an input.

Finally, I am not so sure that will can't or shouldn't overlap into the decision-making process.

What POSSIBLE mechanism could achieve this?

I meant definitionally.

I say there is no possible way this could occur; You only have to come up with a logically possible way in order to refute me. It doesn't have to be the actual mechanism; any logically possible one would do.

I am looking for you to come up with a mechanism - a methodology - by which will could be an input to the decision making process. I am happy to grant you randomness as one of the inputs; Quantum or otherwise. But that isn't will. Show your work - how do we get from QM, or any other random event, to will (free or otherwise)?

Think about properties that stay constant at multiple levels. The log house is flammable; the log roof is flammable; a splinter from the log roof is flammable. The freedom in "I" is preserved that way. From the consciousness of the choice all the way down to the QM of the decision-making process. The QM has freedom; therefore, the decision-making process has freedom. The decision-making process has freedom; therefore, I have freedom. QM is a part of "I".

I don't know what the fuck you think you are achieving here; but passing information to me about your ideas of free will isn't one of the things you are actually doing.

Could you please address my argument, rather than making some strange defence of the fallacy of composition, which is completely unrelated to what I am saying?

Will is an output. Forget 'free' for a minute; You can't even demonstrate any possible logical mechanism for will as an input into decision making. It therefore matters not one whit whether will is 'free'; Will cannot be anything other than a response to un-willed events - random or not; free or not.

In short, will must be a product of the brain, and cannot be a primary input into decision making.

We can decide what we want to do; and then decide what to do to get what we want. That first part is the creation of our will; and our will cannot be a primary input into it.

I want an apple; I eat an apple.

But I don't want an apple because I want to want an apple. And if I did decide to want to want an apple, it can't simply be because I decided to want to want to want an apple.

If will is an input, then you have an infinite regress. Only by having a completely unwilled starting point for your thought process (perhaps at some remove) can this regress be broken.

Will is not the creator of conscious decisions; will is PART of consciousness, and can't create itself ex-nihilo.