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A simple explanation of free will.

Suppose we have an exact mechanical replication of an instance of someone's will. Now let's replace "will" with "decision" to stay consistent with scientific terms (still in philosophy but using scientific definitions). So we have this amazingly complex machine that we isolate in an environment where all variables are controlled except for one. Then we stimulate the input that is not fixed, and we get X. Assume we do the exact same thing again, except this time we get Y.

Upon further inspection, we see where the signals changed course. We narrow it down to a very small area that depends on the state of the synthetic microtubules. They are presumed to be in a quantum state, thus breaking the symmetry of what we would expect if the machine were following classical mechanics.

So, hopefully you can see that the microtubules did not make the decision; but instead, they were part of the decision. We may be adding an indeterminate property to the decision, but we are not adding the mechanism to the decision. Many other elements in the machine help make the decision.

Yes, of course. But the question is: what have this to do with libertarian free will? LFW says that YOU are free. Not that there are trillions of free nano-yous

It also eludes to the idea that I could have chosen differently. I may be limited to choosing A or B, but at least that is a free choice due to random mechanisms that make up the choice.
 
Yes, of course. But the question is: what have this to do with libertarian free will? LFW says that YOU are free. Not that there are trillions of free nano-yous

It also eludes to the idea that I could have chosen differently. I may be limited to choosing A or B, but at least that is a free choice due to random mechanisms that make up the choice.

No, since random will is not free will...
 
It also eludes to the idea that I could have chosen differently. I may be limited to choosing A or B, but at least that is a free choice due to random mechanisms that make up the choice.

No, since random will is not free will...

Is a random outcome fixed or is it free to be any of the possible outcomes?
 
Is a random outcome fixed or is it free to be any of the possible outcomes?

That question doesnt make sense. The range of outcomes has nothing to do wether the outcome is random or not.

Assume a simple system has a random outcome of either A or B. Is it fixed to be A or B, or is it free of any cause to be A or B?
 
That question doesnt make sense. The range of outcomes has nothing to do wether the outcome is random or not.

Assume a simple system has a random outcome of either A or B. Is it fixed to be A or B, or is it free of any cause to be A or B?

How do I know? There could be hidden causes.

But let us assume that it is "true random" which is by definition "uncaused" and thus free in the meaning of uncoupled to any other process.
 
Assume a simple system has a random outcome of either A or B. Is it fixed to be A or B, or is it free of any cause to be A or B?

How do I know? There could be hidden causes.

But let us assume that it is "true random" which is by definition "uncaused" and thus free in the meaning of uncoupled to any other process.
Okay, so do you agree with those conditions?
 
How do I know? There could be hidden causes.

But let us assume that it is "true random" which is by definition "uncaused" and thus free in the meaning of uncoupled to any other process.
Okay, so do you agree with those conditions?

What do you mean? Are you asking if I can assume a hypotetical case?
 
The first part is simply a list of what can be eliminated in terms of the presence of will. The second part describes the circumstances needed in order for will to be formed and generated....specific mechanisms and specific conditions. All of which are not formed by means of will, neural architecture, connectivity, electrochemical activity, information processing, yada, yada.

Nor does your random quantum events changing decisions enable 'free will, because neither the information processing activity of decision making, or any form of random interference, are regulated by or subject to will. It has nothing to do with will. Will is the byproduct of information processing under specific conditions...and the orchestrator or controller of nothing.

What you have is an intelligent interactive self programming system that adapts to a wide range of conditions and in the process generates rational [and sometimes irrational] will as the driver for action.

Be happy with that.

None of this seems like a response to my post.

The first part is simply a list of what can be eliminated in terms of the presence of will.

What are you referring to?

The second part describes the circumstances needed in order for will to be formed and generated....specific mechanisms and specific conditions.

Same question: what are you referring to?

All of which are not formed by means of will, neural architecture, connectivity, electrochemical activity, information processing, yada, yada.
What does this mean?

I am really serious DBT; I have no idea what you are talking about.


I am pointing out the fallacy of your contention, that random quantum alterations to a decision making process is an example of free will.....when neither the mechanism of decision making or the proposed random change to that process is a matter of will.

The process does what it does and will, the drive or impulse to act, may be the end product.

Hence your contention that random changes enable 'free will' is false.

Simple enough to grasp you'd think.
 
Why not (why don't particular particles have will)?
The implication is that some particles, not all, have will. If such is the case we should be able to identify particles that are not like other particles. Confirmed theory is that particles have a set of properties. It is not that a each particle has a set of properties.
They might all act in certain ways for various reasons- has nothing to do with whether they have will or not. Maybe certain regular behaviors are enjoyable.

Just noodling here. The reason for posting such a 'possibility' arises from one individual's wish tank probably located in some nether land, a place that doesn't exist.
One in which everyone wears the same uniform.
 
They might all act in certain ways for various reasons- has nothing to do with whether they have will or not. Maybe certain regular behaviors are enjoyable.

So its not will then. Its pleasure. That hasn't turned up either.


One in which everyone wears the same uniform.

Are they the uniforms of the keepers or the kept?
 
No, I am asking if you agree with my entire proposition about the possibility of having free will.

So you pose two phony questions and then want me to embrace your wildfetched phantasy? Hell no!
What's with these outbursts?

I thought you put a condition on my "phony" question, and then I thought we could move on.
 
So you pose two phony questions and then want me to embrace your wildfetched phantasy? Hell no!
What's with these outbursts?

I thought you put a condition on my "phony" question, and then I thought we could move on.

Maybe it was he noted your question to be phony because of the condition he mentioned. In that case you are imagining a conversation that isn't there.

You seem to be winding up in this place quite a bit. Perhaps there's a lesson for you in that recurring happenstance.
 
None of this seems like a response to my post.

The first part is simply a list of what can be eliminated in terms of the presence of will.

What are you referring to?

The second part describes the circumstances needed in order for will to be formed and generated....specific mechanisms and specific conditions.

Same question: what are you referring to?

All of which are not formed by means of will, neural architecture, connectivity, electrochemical activity, information processing, yada, yada.
What does this mean?

I am really serious DBT; I have no idea what you are talking about.


I am pointing out the fallacy of your contention, that random quantum alterations to a decision making process is an example of free will.....when neither the mechanism of decision making or the proposed random change to that process is a matter of will.

But I have responded to this many times, yet you don't address my response. You keep going back to this same objection. For this discussion to progress, you must address my responses whether they are good responses or not. Look at what I put in bold in your part of this post. I have tried to address this many times, but then you bring something else up.

For the last time, the QM vibrations wouldn't be acting on the decision-making process; they would be a part of the decision-making process. Even Juma agreed with me here in post #734, and I am pretty sure he would argue against his own existence if it meant proving me wrong about something. Read that post that I made to Juma; maybe it is a clearer explanation of what I am trying to tell you.

The process does what it does and will, the drive or impulse to act, may be the end product.

I addressed this exact argument two days ago (#718), but you cut it out of my post. I will not repeat myself anymore. If you won't read what I say, then I have no interest in furthering this discussion.
 
What's with these outbursts?

I thought you put a condition on my "phony" question, and then I thought we could move on.

Maybe it was he noted your question to be phony because of the condition he mentioned. In that case you are imagining a conversation that isn't there.
From what I gathered, it seems that his condition equated "true randomness" to freedom from causal determinism. Now, I don't know what other factors could determine objective/true randomness of physical indeterminism. I guess one would have to assume an nonphysical or supernatural effect.
 
The implication is that some particles, not all, have will. If such is the case we should be able to identify particles that are not like other particles. Confirmed theory is that particles have a set of properties. It is not that a each particle has a set of properties.
They might all act in certain ways for various reasons- has nothing to do with whether they have will or not. Maybe certain regular behaviors are enjoyable.
So its not will then. Its pleasure. That hasn't turned up either.
Ehh, I was going for "willing behaviors that are pleasurable" or "not willing to change pleasurable patterns of behavior".


One in which everyone wears the same uniform.

Are they the uniforms of the keepers or the kept?
Probably.
 
So you pose two phony questions and then want me to embrace your wildfetched phantasy? Hell no!
What's with these outbursts?

I thought you put a condition on my "phony" question, and then I thought we could move on.

Move on? You are leaping around like a flying goat. My outbursts actually mean something. Take it from there.
 
But I have responded to this many times, yet you don't address my response. You keep going back to this same objection. For this discussion to progress, you must address my responses whether they are good responses or not. Look at what I put in bold in your part of this post. I have tried to address this many times, but then you bring something else up.

For the last time, the QM vibrations wouldn't be acting on the decision-making process; they would be a part of the decision-making process. Even Juma agreed with me here in post #734, and I am pretty sure he would argue against his own existence if it meant proving me wrong about something. Read that post that I made to Juma; maybe it is a clearer explanation of what I am trying to tell you.

That is where you go wrong, ryan. That is your error.

Random vibrations/atomic decay, or whatever random quantum element you care to invoke is not identical with the deterministic structures and processes of sifting information in order to benefit from the selection that is made according to the evolved needs of an organism....regardless of its presence within the system as a form of random 'noise'

Consequently, it may well be a part of the system as random noise, but noise that acts upon the deterministic structures of the brain in unpredictable and and non willed ways. More likely than not being expressed as a mental glitch....you forgot where you left your keys or someone's name, etc.

So it's not that I have failed to address your claims, but you fail to support your own claim with a reasoned argument backed by evidence. You cannot show that random elements, if present, are beneficial to decision making.

And you completely ignore the fact that random changes to decision making are not willed. You simply tack the term 'free will' onto something that has no relationship to will.


I addressed this exact argument two days ago (#718), but you cut it out of my post. I will not repeat myself anymore. If you won't read what I say, then I have no interest in furthering this discussion.

Except that you did not address a single thing in that post.

You made some vague generalizations - for example - ''Normally, if I have an urge, say to eat ice cream after supper, my will may allow me to do it. But sometimes my will intervenes on my urge, and then I don't eat ice cream.'' - remarks which are not even accurate in terms of the cognitive process.

As if 'you' or 'your will' are separate entities and not aspects of the same process, as if the urge to eat ice cream is somehow a different agency to the urge to abstain, or that any part of this information processing has anything to do with random quantum fluctuations as a reliable and beneficial input into decision making.
 
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