Noone who disagrees with you is going to see the same implications.
Some, like you, will deliberately ignore the implications.
I honestly don't believe there are any implications that would stand up to examination. Feel free to state what they are, if you disagree.
You know those religious people who crop up every so often, and claim that the natural world so obviously implies a creator that it's dishonest to pretend otherwise? But then refuse to say what these oh-so-convincing implications are? Do you find them convincing? Because you're trying to pull the same crap here. State what the point is.
Neural structures, fed data, react and feed data to other structures. The consciousness generated by the neural structures might have an influence on the neural structures, since the neural structures are a bit more dynamic than atoms in a permanent magnet, but ultimately the will generated by the structures is not free of the structures which have been built by the interplay of environmental (both internal and external) forces.
Why would it need to be?
It isn't, and doesn't. The will is determined by multiple factors that cause it to be what it is. Will is no more free than a rock in the Earth's gravity is free.
Maybe I wasn't clear. Why would will need to be free in the way you describe as a prerequisite for LFW?
So physicists consult with philosophers on anything other than philosophy of science courses?
Telling lies still isn't an argument.
So you weren'tpresenting an argument. It still seems disingenuous, as the subject of that thread revolved around the use of philosophy, and then you made that claim and never backed it up. At the very least, it was reckless to claim that physicists regularly consult with philosophers, especially since they apparently don't (although the physicist I asked said a physicist might consult a philosopher in some circumstance after first scoffing and saying "why would a physicist consult a philosopher?").
Telling lies still isn't going to get you anywhere.
You didn't make the apparently false claim that it was a common practice for physicists to consult with philosophers where you worked, and then go on to claim that mathematicians and statisticians did as well, and never (to my knowledge) back up the claim with any examples?
You didn't claim it was university policy to have philosophers consult with physicists, mathematicians, statisticians, etc., and not name the university or the policy name/number, or provide any corroborating statements whatsoever?
I mean, if I was arguing with someone who deliberately makes stuff up and presents it as the truth...
I don't think I'd ever get over it.
Telling lies still won't get you anywhere.
Seriously,
, why did you make those claims and not back them up?
Telling lies still won't get you anywhere.
On that note, why don't you back up your claim that LFW exists
Because it's missing the point. I'm not claiming that determinism is false because LFW is true, I'm claiming that determinism fails on it's own merits. It's not terribly coherent, it doesn't make particular sense or do any useful work, and because it doesn't really do what people think it does as a position.
Once determinism is out of the way, LFW remains a workable hypothesis. It still might be false, but there's no particular reason to think so.
You're arguing that the entire history of the universe is a single unbroken chain of determined events
A 4+ dimensional web of events is not a single chain by any means.
A single interlocking branching and weaving chain, but still a single-source unbroken chain nonetheless. An event in the present is still linked to the distant past, and events in the distant past are still, by definition, better predictors of future events than events in the present.
In what chaotic system is that true:
Chaotic map List of chaotic maps
??
In any chaotic system that is determined, by definition.
Only if you equivocate the meaning of your statement in various ways- you know exactly what I meant by the question, and deliberately chose to ignore the implied context of my question. Funny...
One can extract statistical data from event
s (plural) and predict the likelihood of future events based on this data. However, individual events in a chaotic tapestry of events are
not good predictors of future events- one can't predict the effect of a butterfly flapping its wings. It's true that the further in the past the individual event is, the greater the impact of the single event on the future of the system. It's not true that a single event in the past is a better predictor of the future than a single event now, in a system which behaves chaotically- the system behaves chaotically.
Ah, ok, my bad, I should have used the word 'predictors', as that causes confusion. There's no need for an actual prediction to be possible. I'll substitute the term:
An event in the present is still linked to the distant past, and events in the distant past are still, by definition, better
causal explanations of future events than events in the present.
Does that make it clearer? The point is that any local cause is necessarily incomplete, and gets less incomplete the further back in the chain you go. Which means that this form of determinism commits you to the very counter-intuitive position that the big bang is a better explanation of why the ball is rolling down the hill than me pushing it. The idea of causation becomes illusory.
LFW requiring independence from a physical brain
It requires independence from what causes it to have the characteristics that it has which cause it to pick certain paths.
Why? The only requirement is that it isn't determined.
Independence from what determines it to be what it is is what is required.
No, it isn't. All that is required is that it is not determined by prior events. There's no need for it to be entirely independent of prior events. The only reason you're thinking that the two are the same is that you're picturing all events as being determined - precisely the situation that is not true when talking about LFW.
The qualia of strawberry sundae (in a consciousness) cannot be broken down into individual momentum, position, charge, etc. portions and maintain an adequate description of the whole. In other words, you can't look at something as simply momentum, position, charge, etc. and capture the essence of the whole. The wavefunction of a strawberry sundae definitely does not capture the qualia, or describe it in a very meaningful way.
This is a discussion of qualia and the question of whether descriptions of qualities can scale. I'm not seeing the connection between this and QM.
So you can't see how the qualia of a strawberry sundae can be reconciled with the measurements of QM, since the measurements of QM do not include all of the properties of the system?
If you can't measure the strawberryness of an electron...
But that's a problem with any reduction. When you break down an explanation of the whole into an explanation of the parts, then information is lost.
An explanation is never the whole, it is only a symbolic representation of the whole.
You're still not making a point specific to QM.
QM doesn't describe all the properties of the system. That's been the
point all along.
But no description does. That's still not a problem with QM.
Yes, of course I've observed something changing without observing anything changing it.
But you know something changed it, because you're not a moron.
I
assume something changed it. Your claim was that I observed it, and that claim is false.
You've perceived that stuff does not change without something changing it, because everything that you've seen indicates this, because you're not a moron
No, I haven't. Nor have you. The reason you need the 'not a moron' condition there is precisely because you have to make assumptions beyond what you directly perceived. In practice, we both see things changing without seeing something changing it all the time. You may well assume something changes it, you may well be right that something is changing it, but an assumption, even an assumption that is correct in practice, is still not an observation.
I should point out that every example you've given that purports to be an observation of determinism turns out to be nothing of the kind.
Are you still claiming to observe determinism in the world?
Of course I perceive (observe) determinism in the world. Anyone who doesn't is remarkably misinformed.
What you directly perceive can not be a function of 'being informed'. Either you see it or you don't. Otherwise scientists could make observations of universe by closing their eyes and imagining how it works!
Turn the question around. Have you ever observed an event, and every single factor that was involved in that outcome. I haven't. I don't think it's possible. Yet this is what you're telling me you're observing. So it doesn't seem unreasonable to ask how.
I never said we observe every single factor.
Then how can you claim to have observed determinism?
I have perceived enough causality to perceive that there is always a cause for every event in the world around me.
That's great for causation, although I don't see how you're perceiving that there is a cause for every event when you've just said you don't observe every event. But determinism is not causation. You don't really get causation under determinism (see above and below) Determinism is the idea that every event is completely determined by prior events, such that the combination of all influences on an event fixes the outcome. That there are no random events. How can you observe that the combination of ALL influences fixes the outcome if you never observe all of them?
Under determinism, the effect is still the ball being set into motion. It was set into motion by the stick, which was set into motion by my hand, which was set into motion by my brain, which was set into motion by my upbringing and genetics, which was set into motion by my existence, which was set into my motion by my parents, who were set into motion by a power cut, and so on back to the dawn of time. It doesn't make sense, under this system to assign the status of 'cause' to any specific step in the chain. Everything, all phenomena, and all events throughout all of history, have at best a single cause, the Big Bang, and even the status is that is dodgy (since it violates determinism). At worse, the concept of cause becomes an illusion.
So what if there is an originating cause that was uncaused? That's obvious. Equally as obvious are the characteristics of the originating cause are what determined the evolution of the causal system.
Missing the point. The problem is that you lose causation as a useful concept.
No you don't. If you understand the potential consequences of pushing the boulder (it might be fun to watch it bound around down the hill- but it might run into a person or a house, which would be detrimental) because you have previous statistical information about causality to access, you can determine whether or not you should push the boulder.
You've missed the point. Under determinism, the statistical information you've gathered is a fake explanation of why I push or do not push the boulder. Sure those stats may have had some kind of influence, but the decision isn't made on that, because there's also the influence of genetics, my current state of mind, the lighting conditions provided by the planet Venus, and countless others. The stats, the reasoning I go through, that's all a folk psychological explanation, and illusory, remember? The real explanation is the pattern of the big bang, because that's the only point where all the variables are accounted for.
It illustrates the exact same thing. A brain is not the consciousness it creates, even though the consciousness is one with the brain (while the brain might have its own agendas).
I think I understand what you're saying, but your choice of language would commit you to dualism. You're insisting that there is something (consciousness) that is totally mental and has no physical component.
A magnet is physical. A magnetic field is physical. A brain is physical. A consciousness is physical. That's not dualism.
I'm afraid ryan is right, it is.
But even if you stick to rejecting substance dualism, you're still stuck with the question of what this 'consciousness' you're describing is made up of, if not the brain. If consciousness is not made up of brain, then what is it made of, and where is it. It's not an energy field, it's not field force, and you're saying it's not non-physical, so we need a substance that is comprised of. If not the brain, then what's left?
As I said, this is in part a language point - we can't treat consciousness as being a different thing from the brain, unless we go for dualism, because there isn't any other physical thing there. However, it does mean that, as a substance monist, you're stuck with the idea that consciousness is a physical object, or process or both. Which means it isn't distinct from the physical brain.
That's why this point about whether determinism is observed or assumed is so important. Because if we're going with substance monism, then it's going to be the physical brain which is either determined, or not determined. The issue can't be hived off into an elusive consciousness that's separate from the brain.
And my brain. Which means that I can share identity with my brain - we can talk about what my brain is doing and it's still me.
No you can't. There are plenty of parts of your brain that are not you, because you are a consciousness (unless I'm talking to a philosophical zombie, which might explain a bit of your inaccuracies in perception of reality).
No I'm not. I have fingers, and a nose. I'm pretty sure my consciousness doesn't. Are you saying my legs aren't part of me?
(And the entire point of the philosophical zombie scenario is that zombie is identical to a non-zombie in every measurable way, so you wouldn't be able to detect the difference.)
There could very well be a consciousness generated by your brain, but your brain is completely unaware of it, and it is not downwardly causal because your brain lacks awareness of it.
There could be, but it raises a host of questions:
1) Why is this consciousness generated? why have we evolved something that consumes energy but serves no useful purpose?
2) Having evolved it, why don't we use it?
3) Having evolved it, and given that it consumes energy, yet doesn't do anything, why isn't it selected against?
4) Why do we stop acting when the areas of the brain associated with consciousness fall silent? (i.e. unconsciousness)
5) why do we start acting again when the areas of the brain associated with consciousness, but not with action, are directly stimulated?
6) How is this consciousness kept in strict parallel with our actual actions, speech, and thoughts?
7) Why can we successfully predict the actions of ourselves based on conscious experience?
8) Why can we successfully predict the actions of ourselves based on assuming we will act according to our conscious experience?
9) Why can we successfully predict the actions of others based on assuming they are acting based on their conscious experience?
10) Why is conscious attention associated with different task performance from unattended tasks?
11) When we ask someone to consciously undertake certain activities, such as repeating numbers in their head or holding a particular image in their mind, without asking for any particular output from them, what is going on, neurologically speaking?
etc. etc.
It's a nice idea, but it's pretty impractical to build into any model of how the brain works, or how people actually behave. That's why it's a theory that's popular with those who don't study human behaviour, and largely ignored as wishful thinking by those who do.