According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[Jarhyn]

inner necessitation

We are part of the whole. When you draw ANY line around any region of the whole, you indicate an inside and an outside, and this means you can derive relations between the "inside" and the "outside" of the region.

Causal drivers for any particular phenomena can be, in any moment, derived to their "inside-ness" and "outside-ness" of that distinction.

When the casual drivers for some phenomena come from "inside" we call it free WRT the line and when they come from "outside" we call it coerced.

Much like I explained to AdamWho in the other thread, relational phenomena are still objectively demonstrated as real.

Free Will is itself a corollary of locality and relativity, and is just as inherently real.

 

[pood]

It is nice to see someone else stepping in here. I am a bit exhausted!

It's been exhausting for a number of years, yet it goes on.

Which is strange given that compatibilism fails on the principle of inner necessitation, where the compatibilist acknowledges that external force, coercion or undue influence constrains freedom of will (as an idea), yet the compatibilist fails to account for inner necessity, which fixes decisions prior to conscious thought or will....which is just as much a problem for free will as external elements.

Except “inner necessitation” is something you made up. And decisions are not fixed prior to conscious thought or will, as even LIbet noted. Moreover, as I noted, later results of experiments similar to Libet’s did not replicate his findings. I linked to a whole article on that. Finally, as I’ve also explained, just because a lot of our mental activity and even some decision-making goes on subconsciously, it’s still us doing that, and is not a problem for compatibilism. I gave my own example of how writers sometimes feel they are “taking dictation” from stuff their subconscious minds settled, but our subconscious minds are still us.

 

[Copernicus]

It is nice to see someone else stepping in here. I am a bit exhausted!

Yes, I've seen this type of argument before. I think that Monty Python did a skit on it involving King Arthur and his nemesis, the Black Knight.

 

[DBT]

It is nice to see someone else stepping in here. I am a bit exhausted!

It's been exhausting for a number of years, yet it goes on.

Which is strange given that compatibilism fails on the principle of inner necessitation, where the compatibilist acknowledges that external force, coercion or undue influence constrains freedom of will (as an idea), yet the compatibilist fails to account for inner necessity, which fixes decisions prior to conscious thought or will....which is just as much a problem for free will as external elements.

Except “inner necessitation” is something you made up

Nothing of the sort. Not even close.

''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.

And decisions are not fixed prior to conscious thought or will, as even LIbet noted. Moreover, as I noted, later results of experiments similar to Libet’s did not replicate his findings. I linked to a whole article on that. Finally, as I’ve also explained, just because a lot of our mental activity and even some decision-making goes on subconsciously, it’s still us doing that, and is not a problem for compatibilism. I gave my own example of how writers sometimes feel they are “taking dictation” from stuff their subconscious minds settled, but our subconscious minds are still us.

As explained, decisions must necessarily follow information acquisition, transmission, processing, memory integration, etc, prior to action initiation and consciousness. This underlying activity is the means that shapes and forms decision making and conscious experience.

In other words, you cannot see or hear or feel something before or during the milliseconds it takes for the senses to acquire and transmit the information to the brain for processing and conscious experience, hence the milliseconds of lag between acquiring the information and experiencing it, Libet, Haynes, et al. It's not 'free will,' it's information processing.

 

[DBT]

It is nice to see someone else stepping in here. I am a bit exhausted!

Yes, I've seen this type of argument before. I think that Monty Python did a skit on it involving King Arthur and his nemesis, the Black Knight.

Compatibilists fail to make a case for compatibility, yet they argue regardless.

That is indeed tiring. It feels much the same as arguing with theists.

Again;

Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy

''Compatibilism is a position that seeks to harmonize Determinism (or Causal Determinism) and Free Will, and posits that they can coexist— typically (i) by watering down the pure form of Free Will to include the illusion of choice that exists prior to the inexorable occurrence of determined activity that is not and cannot be known until after it occurs, or (ii) by watering down Causal Determinism to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence — or by watering down both concepts. Notably, Compatibilism simply stakes out a position respecting the relationship between Determinism and Free Will, and does not take a position as to whether Determinism is true or Free Will exists — or neither. Rather, Compatibilism simply posits that the two concepts can coexist (to the extent that either or both exist).

As explained below, based on my understanding of Determinism and Free Will, I believe that Compatiblism is not supported by sound logic, and results from an emotional resistance to accepting the absence of Free Will. Then, again, if Determinism is true, people who believe in Compatibilism are compelled to have that belief, and are incapable of having any other belief.

''As I understand it, Determinism posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. If Determinism is true, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

Based on the foregoing, if Determinism is true, human beings lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, and thereby lack Free Will. By the same token, if human beings have Free-Will, they are capable of thinking in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, which rules out Determinism. Based on the foregoing, Determinism and Free Will are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism. As I see it, however, watering down either or both definitions does justice to neither concept, and is a cowardly approach to dealing forthrightly with the full implications of either concept being true.''

 

[Jarhyn]

It is nice to see someone else stepping in here. I am a bit exhausted!

Yes, I've seen this type of argument before. I think that Monty Python did a skit on it involving King Arthur and his nemesis, the Black Knight.

Yeah, to me it's like debating ANY theist apologist.

People find all sorts of ways to be religious, and this is no different. It's "the devil/god made me do it" applied with barely recognizable words and no more.

The fact is, it's exactly the behavior I was taught explicitly in Bible Apologist Camp, which I attended until I was either 19 or 20 just to make my parents happy.

The behavior consists largely of looking up and cherry picking a vast array of sources, gish galloping, and returning to refuted arguments once a certain "crowd attention span" has been passed.

It's completely fruitless because usually those who think this way have some vested interest in it.

For what it's worth, the last person I met who did this picked a D&D character who started out happy-go-lucky but had a "dark side" that wanted to just murder everyone and dance in the entrails, whose arc they had planned on driving through to giving more and more power to their dark side.

The irony of meticulously deciding for themselves on the kind of person they would be, as an incompatibilist determinist, was not lost on me... Nor is it lost on me that they were in many ways saying "look at me, I'm actually a sociopath".

I do wonder sometimes what kind of D&D character DBT would play.

 

[pood]

Nothing of the sort. Not even close.

''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.

Einstein also said God doesn’t place dice. He was wrong about that, too.

I defy anyone, anywhere, to show that there is any valid scientific or philosophical category called “inner necessitation.”

 

[Jarhyn]

Nothing of the sort. Not even close.

''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.

Einstein also said God doesn’t place dice. He was wrong about that, too.

I defy anyone, anywhere, to show that there is any valid scientific or philosophical category called “inner necessitation.”

Well, I think I did as much in showing that at any given time, preconditions to an event are relatively local to the event, and the relative difference in locality between the event and it's cause create relative "inside-ness" and relative "outside-ness" associated with the phenomena's relevance to an event.

The gun is much further "outside" from the diner than the relatively "inside" desire to eat salad, despite the "outside" event being the ongoing driver to the choice to instead eat steak.

Hence why I bring up "locality" here, and "relativity".

 

[pood]

“Inner necessity” is simply a synonym for “hard determinism.” As such it’s a label and question-begging. It assumes the very point in dispute.

 

[Copernicus]

Again;

Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy

Huh? No link, but a reference to some guy with a bachelor's degree in philosophy. Google suggests he is the one who got his degree from Beaver college in 1983 and has done some posting in Quora. This is the expert you scrounged up to defend your take on the free will debate? I really don't want to try to pick apart that entire wall of text from your Beaver College undergraduate, but the only time he even attempts to explain what free will is comes up in his third paragraph. The rest is just going on about the nature of causal determinism, which compatibilists do not deny. So I'll skip the parts where he just tosses the term "free will" around as if everybody agreed on how to define it.

...

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

...

That's all he has to say about free will. He gives us his opinion that it "posits" a choice between alternative actions. OK. Then he tells us in convoluted prose that free will posits (?) that the choice is somehow not all causally predetermined, which would be essentially libertarian free will. That leaves out any mention of the agent's state of mind--knowledge of the past, present circumstances, and imaginary outcomes. It does not take into account the process of deliberation or calculation that needs to take place before a decision is reached. There is no discussion of control, types of influence, or the assessment of responsibility. IOW, it shows an incredible amount of ignorance about what compatibilists say about free will.

 

[pood]

I think “inner necessity” is a byproduct of the idea that there are “laws” of physics, which in turn is a hangover of the idea that there is a “lawgiver” — i.e., God.

This is what Newton thought, that he was discovering God’s “laws.” Yet even he was puzzled by certain things — such as the gravity he so successfully (within his known domain) described. He could describe mathematically what gravity did, but had no clue what it was — confiding in letters his puzzlement over some invisible force working across vast distances to keep things nice and orderly. Somehow, he thought, it was God’s will. It took Einstein to naturalize gravity.

Similarly, Newton was puzzled by the fact that windows are mostly but not entirely transparent. It took quantum mechanics to explain that.

An oft-quoted explanation of hard determinism is that: The “laws” of physics, in conjunction with all antecedent events, necessarily entail all future events, including all human actions.

The tipoff is when we put quotes around the word “laws.” The laws are not laws, and there is no lawgiver — no God. What are called “laws” are in fact descriptions of what happens in the real world.

Among those descriptions: there are certain regularities that never seem to change, like the speed of light in a vacuum and the inverse square of gravity. There are other events that are classically statistical, as described (but not mandated) by the so-called “laws” of thermodynamics. There are others that are quantum indeterministic, as described by the Born rule. There are others that are relevant at different levels — such that water is made of H2O, but that combination is not wet except at a certain emergent level of description. And there are still others like when I freely choose what job to take, not because of “inner necessity” (a hangover of a “law”-based view of reality), nor because of outer compulsion (unless someone is holding a gun to my head and ordering me to take that job) but because that is the job I want to take.

Certainly, what I want to do is “caused” by antecedent events, but so what? As I have mentioned several times, we cash this out in terms of counterfactuals. I wanted to take the job in Boston, but it did not pay enough. So I took the job in New York instead, because it paid more, even though I desired to live in Boston. But I balanced my desires and requirements based on reality; i.e., based on antecedents. It just seems so weird to say that I HAD TO take the job in New York. I didn’t HAVE TO do any such thing. I did that thing, because that is what I wanted to do after toting up all the pluses and minuses.

Certainly, if we could rewind the tape of history and play it forward again, and I came to the exact same point of deciding which job to take, I would make the exact same choice, given the exact same antecedents. The fallacy lies in saying that I HAD TO make the choice — a fallacy also known as the modal fallacy, which I have discussed many times.

 

[Jarhyn]

I think “inner necessity” is a byproduct of the idea that there are “laws” of physics, which in turn is a hangover of the idea that there is a “lawgiver” — i.e., God.

This is what Newton thought, that he was discovering God’s “laws.” Yet even he was puzzled by certain things — such as the gravity he so successfully (within his known domain) described. He could describe mathematically what gravity did, but had no clue what it was — confiding in letters his puzzlement over some invisible force working across vast distances to keep things nice and orderly. Somehow, he thought, it was God’s will. It took Einstein to naturalize gravity.

Similarly, Newton was puzzled by the fact that windows are mostly but not entirely transparent. It took quantum mechanics to explain that.

An oft-quoted explanation of hard determinism is that: The “laws” of physics, in conjunction with all antecedent events, necessarily entail all future events, including all human actions.

The tipoff is when we put quotes around the word “laws.” The laws are not laws, and there is no lawgiver — no God. What are called “laws” are in fact descriptions of what happens in the real world.

Among those descriptions: there are certain regularities that never seem to change, like the speed of light in a vacuum and the inverse square of gravity. There are other events that are classically statistical, as described (but not mandated) by the so-called “laws” of thermodynamics. There are others that are quantum indeterministic, as described by the Born rule. There are others that are relevant at different levels — such that water is made of H2O, but that combination is not wet except at a certain emergent level of description. And there are still others like when I freely choose what job to take, not because of “inner necessity” (a hangover of a “law”-based view of reality), nor because of outer compulsion (unless someone is holding a gun to my head and ordering me to take that job) but because that is the job I want to take.

Certainly, what I want to do is “caused” by antecedent events, but so what? As I have mentioned several times, we cash this out in terms of counterfactuals. I wanted to take the job in Boston, but it did not pay enough. So I took the job in New York instead, because it paid more, even though I desired to live in Boston. But I balanced my desires and requirements based on reality; i.e., based on antecedents. It just seems so weird to say that I HAD TO take the job in New York. I didn’t HAVE TO do any such thing. I did that thing, because that is what I wanted to do after toting up all the pluses and minuses.

Certainly, if we could rewind the tape of history and play it forward again, and I came to the exact same point of deciding which job to take, I would make the exact same choice, given the exact same antecedents. The fallacy lies in saying that I HAD TO make the choice — a fallacy also known as the modal fallacy, which I have discussed many times.

I think a better term might be "inner vector" and "outer vector", of "vector" is a well understood concept by the people here. People have some "moment" of trajectory at any given point in time, just like the rock... The path transcribed by the person is no less a product of those forces, even if the moment imparted on the person is going to take that path along a very strange trajectory indeed.

Occasionally certain moments are imparted from the outside, and this causes a change in trajectory. Other times a moment is imparted from outside that fails to change the trajectory at all.

I suspect these could be modeled as quasi-particles such as a "Laplace demon".

Regardless, it is no less a change in systemic moment, systemic context, when such a vector changes the trajectory of the object.

We fundamentally NEED language to discuss this process of how behavioral systems are either operating on an old moment or a new one, and on the basis of whether this moment aligns with the goals, the steering system if you will, that generates its moment from incoming vectors of force.

We find this language in the discussion of "free will".

To pretend this cannot be modeled is foolish and childish, and to pretend that the things being observed aren't "real". To disregard their reality is in fact to disregard the very concept of determinism itself.

 

[DBT]

Again;

Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy

Huh? No link, but a reference to some guy with a bachelor's degree in philosophy. Google suggests he is the one who got his degree from Beaver college in 1983 and has done some posting in Quora. This is the expert you scrounged up to defend your take on the free will debate? I really don't want to try to pick apart that entire wall of text from your Beaver College undergraduate, but the only time he even attempts to explain what free will is comes up in his third paragraph. The rest is just going on about the nature of causal determinism, which compatibilists do not deny. So I'll skip the parts where he just tosses the term "free will" around as if everybody agreed on how to define it.

You don't need a link. The author of the article is cited. The relevant points are outlined in the article.

The issue is not Silverstein, or a particular poster or writer, but the failure of compatibilism to make a case for the compatibility of the notion of free will in relation to determinism

The reasons for the failure of compatibilism are described in the article.

...

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

...

That's all he has to say about free will. He gives us his opinion that it "posits" a choice between alternative actions. OK. Then he tells us in convoluted prose that free will posits (?) that the choice is somehow not all causally predetermined, which would be essentially libertarian free will. That leaves out any mention of the agent's state of mind--knowledge of the past, present circumstances, and imaginary outcomes. It does not take into account the process of deliberation or calculation that needs to take place before a decision is reached. There is no discussion of control, types of influence, or the assessment of responsibility. IOW, it shows an incredible amount of ignorance about what compatibilists say about free will.

Opinion? It's a matter of the given terms and condition and how sound the argument for compatibalism may or may not be.

Compatibilism stands or falls on its own merit, or lack of it.

Compatibalism fails for the reasons described in the article and what I have been pointing out.

To repeat.

Quite simply.

Compatibilists quite rightly acknowledge that external elements constrain 'free will' - that if we are forced to act against our will, or we are coerced or unduly influenced, we are not acting according to our own will.

Yet the compatibilist fails to acknowledge that will itself is being formed, molded, generated by deterministic processes over which will has no control, that will is just as subject to internal actions over which there is no control, just as with external elements such force, coercion, etc.

So, by focussing on external necessity, yet ignoring inner necessity, the state of the system determining decisions and actions, compatibalism fails as an argument.

 

[DBT]

“Inner necessity” is simply a synonym for “hard determinism.” As such it’s a label and question-begging. It assumes the very point in dispute.

''Inner necessity'' is nothing more than the neural architecture and electrochemical activity of the means and mechanisms of decision making and the actions that follow: the brain.

The brain does not choose its own makeup, attributes or abilities, yet whatever they may be, that is the means by which we perceive ourselves and the world, and how we think and act.

''Human behavior is affected both by genetic inheritance and by experience. The ways in which people develop are shaped by social experience and circumstances within the context of their inherited genetic potential. The scientific question is just how experience and hereditary potential interact in producing human behavior.

Each person is born into a social and cultural setting—family, community, social class, language, religion—and eventually develops many social connections. The characteristics of a child's social setting affect how he or she learns to think and behave, by means of instruction, rewards and punishment, and example. This setting includes home, school, neighborhood, and also, perhaps, local religious and law enforcement agencies. Then there are also the child's mostly informal interactions with friends, other peers, relatives, and the entertainment and news media.

How individuals will respond to all these influences, or even which influence will be the most potent, tends not to be predictable. There is, however, some substantial similarity in how individuals respond to the same pattern of influences—that is, to being raised in the same culture. Furthermore, culturally induced behavior patterns, such as speech patterns, body language, and forms of humor, become so deeply imbedded in the human mind that they often operate without the individuals themselves being fully aware of them. ''

 

[Jarhyn]

Compatibilists quite rightly acknowledge that external elements constrain 'free will'

No, we acknowledge that external forces CAN (not must) constrain free will, in the same way an object CAN (not must) be acted upon by an outside force to change its internally held momentum.

Let's look at the three part pendulum: by dint of what it is, it's structure causes not merely linear motion but chaotic motion, and if it HAS a bit of momentum, it will continue in this "wonky path" determined by its structure perfectly, every single time given some consistent momentary state. It will "keep doing it's thing" based on what it's current state determines such that it will do... Until acted upon by an outside force.

Humans are such that we are much more complicated than a mere three part pendulum, however it is our internal structure that continues to determine future motion from our start condition when left unmolested.

Every time you claim that there is no inner and outer necessitation -- and pay attention pood and copernicus too -- you ignore one of newtons laws of motion, one of the primary aspects of "adequate determinism": namely that objects have their own moment, and it takes an external force to change that moment to produce a different (if already complicated) path.

This exercise to me is the examination not of things that lack freedom and will and the ability to be coerced, but for which these terms becomes trivial or small and easy to observe and then apply back to the whole (much like determining something is a Galois group, that Galois groups have known properties, therefore that something has this property).

Clearly the pendulum didn't decide it's initial moment, but only by the pendulum being what it is will it scribe that wonky line.

It just happens that humans are much more interconnected with much more complicated systems, such that they can identify whether a change in that path is being imposed by an outside force or is the result of the existing forces within it, and also identify how recent that force is, and direct the force such that it satisfies useful goals, such that it can internalize or "lean into" external forces that it can ride towards those goals, vs opposing those forces when they bring us further from them.

 

[Jarhyn]

Note too the difference in character between the arguments of the apologist vs the arguments of the philosophers here.

The arguments of the philosophers are many and varied, displaying some deeper understanding and framework for approaching the issue, whereas the apologist falls back onto dubious arguments from authority and repetition of the same argument while not really addressing any of the point, instead repeatedly playing some ill-informed "trump card" argument such as "were you there?" or "there is no regulatory control", and even when such vacuous arguments are addressed, they simply reject these arguments out of hand not because the response is wrong, but because they do not even understand thr response.

 

[Copernicus]

Again;

Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy

Huh? No link, but a reference to some guy with a bachelor's degree in philosophy. Google suggests he is the one who got his degree from Beaver college in 1983 and has done some posting in Quora. This is the expert you scrounged up to defend your take on the free will debate? I really don't want to try to pick apart that entire wall of text from your Beaver College undergraduate, but the only time he even attempts to explain what free will is comes up in his third paragraph. The rest is just going on about the nature of causal determinism, which compatibilists do not deny. So I'll skip the parts where he just tosses the term "free will" around as if everybody agreed on how to define it.

You don't need a link. The author of the article is cited. The relevant points are outlined in the article.

The issue is not Silverstein, or a particular poster or writer, but the failure of compatibilism to make a case for the compatibility of the notion of free will in relation to determinism

The reasons for the failure of compatibilism are described in the article.

The need for a link wasn't to learn who the author was. I managed to Google that much. It was to check your source for accuracy and context. In any case, I made my point based on what you quoted. I still find it hard to believe that you scrounged up a poorly written essay by someone with such weak credentials.

...
As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.
...

That's all he has to say about free will. He gives us his opinion that it "posits" a choice between alternative actions. OK. Then he tells us in convoluted prose that free will posits (?) that the choice is somehow not all causally predetermined, which would be essentially libertarian free will. That leaves out any mention of the agent's state of mind--knowledge of the past, present circumstances, and imaginary outcomes. It does not take into account the process of deliberation or calculation that needs to take place before a decision is reached. There is no discussion of control, types of influence, or the assessment of responsibility. IOW, it shows an incredible amount of ignorance about what compatibilists say about free will.

Opinion? It's a matter of the given terms and condition and how sound the argument for compatibalism may or may not be.

The author of your text was quite clear that he was giving his opinions on the subject. It was clear that he didn't really have a good grasp of the subject matter, but he wasn't a recognized expert in it. I'm not sure what impressed you with that source other than the fact that you think he supported your own opinions.

To repeat.

Quite simply.

Compatibilists quite rightly acknowledge that external elements constrain 'free will' - that if we are forced to act against our will, or we are coerced or unduly influenced, we are not acting according to our own will.

Well, that is oversimplified. If it were such a simple matter, then it would be easy to assign responsibility, blame, and merit every time someone performed an action. The complications come from trying to prioritize conflicting goals and desires.

Yet the compatibilist fails to acknowledge that will itself is being formed, molded, generated by deterministic processes over which will has no control, that will is just as subject to internal actions over which there is no control, just as with external elements such force, coercion, etc.

Now that is utterly false, but you will do your repeat thing over and over apparently. Compatibilists do acknowledge that agents lack control over components of will. The freedom in free will lies with being about to satisfy wants and goals in an unimpeded manner. People can therefore be held responsible and accountable for their choices. This has been pointed out to you repeatedly, but you ignore it and go for the ad nauseam mischaracterization and denial.

So, by focussing on external necessity, yet ignoring inner necessity, the state of the system determining decisions and actions, compatibalism fails as an argument.

To the extent that your term "inner necessity" makes any sense, compatibilists do not ignore it, but you do ignore what they do say about free will. You have to in order to make your straw man argument work.

 

[pood]

“Inner necessity” is simply a synonym for “hard determinism.” As such it’s a label and question-begging. It assumes the very point in dispute.

''Inner necessity'' is nothing more than the neural architecture and electrochemical activity of the means and mechanisms of decision making and the actions that follow: the brain.

Yet there is nothing “necessary” about any of this “inner” stuff.

Tarskian or correspondence theory of truth holds that “truth” lies in descriptive propositions about the world that correspond to facts about the world. Thus if Fred had eggs for breakfast this morning, the proposition “Fred had eggs” is true.

So we have as an example: “Fred had eggs” is true.

Here’s another proposition: “All triangles have three sides.” This is also true.

They’re both true propositions about the world. Notice anything different about them?

 

[Janice Rael]

They’re both true propositions about the world.

Only in English, though.

 

[Jarhyn]

They’re both true propositions about the world.

Only in English, though.

And in any language that has a homomorphism with English and is attached to the same phenomenological drivers. A better and less tautological statement would be "all collections of three points in Cartesian space, in connecting all points to all other points in their set, will form a three sided shape with specific and generalizable properties".

What we call that shape is immaterial to the fact that for every three vertexes in a Cartesian space, you get a flat three sided structure upon a single plane with particular properties.