According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[Janice Rael]

How does that apply to those who never use English, though?

 

[Jarhyn]

How does that apply to those who never use English, though?

.

1 1
. 1 .

...->111

I could just make a video of all the properties of a triangle from different views. It's already playing in my head, including how to demonstrate the whole process in unary to give basic foundation to binary and then using binary to calculate pi.

A triangle by any other name still scribes PI radians by the sum of its angles, and all that.

 

[Janice Rael]

Math is a symbol language, though.

 

[Jarhyn]

Math is a symbol language, though.

Not exactly. Math is a system of axioms about structures, really just observations of how those structures always operate (see also ZFC).

You could write it with any symbols, or just showing people the basic mechanics of "sets". It's not even really a language so much... Just the inevitable facts that will be observed when trying to understand the effects of re-grouping things.

 

[DBT]

“Inner necessity” is simply a synonym for “hard determinism.” As such it’s a label and question-begging. It assumes the very point in dispute.

''Inner necessity'' is nothing more than the neural architecture and electrochemical activity of the means and mechanisms of decision making and the actions that follow: the brain.

Yet there is nothing “necessary” about any of this “inner” stuff.

Of course there is. If determinism is true - and compatibilists assume it is - events can only go one way and each and every decision that is made is inevitably what it must be according to prior states of the system, and not a matter of 'could have done otherwise.'

That there are alternate actions within a deterministic system - as defined by compatibilists and incompatibilists - is the ultimate in necessitation, greater than being forced or coerced or unduly influenced, which are seen by compatibilists as constraints on free will, even while the greater constraint, inner necessity, is casually ignored.

Tarskian or correspondence theory of truth holds that “truth” lies in descriptive propositions about the world that correspond to facts about the world. Thus if Fred had eggs for breakfast this morning, the proposition “Fred had eggs” is true.

So we have as an example: “Fred had eggs” is true.

Here’s another proposition: “All triangles have three sides.” This is also true.

They’re both true propositions about the world. Notice anything different about them?

I see that, as a rationale, it doesn't address the fundamental reason for the failure of compatibilism. That by failing to account for inner necessity as a constraint, compatibilism just doesn't work.

 

[Jarhyn]

Of course there is.

No there isn't. There is stuff "casual" on the inside of the boundary of our skin, but casual participation does not make for "necessitation".

The fact is, you believe in something so ridiculous as "predestination", and seem incapable of differentiating normal causes with manipulation.

You truly are the black knight. Everyone here recognizes that you've got no arms or legs.

 

[DBT]

Again;

Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy

Huh? No link, but a reference to some guy with a bachelor's degree in philosophy. Google suggests he is the one who got his degree from Beaver college in 1983 and has done some posting in Quora. This is the expert you scrounged up to defend your take on the free will debate? I really don't want to try to pick apart that entire wall of text from your Beaver College undergraduate, but the only time he even attempts to explain what free will is comes up in his third paragraph. The rest is just going on about the nature of causal determinism, which compatibilists do not deny. So I'll skip the parts where he just tosses the term "free will" around as if everybody agreed on how to define it.

You don't need a link. The author of the article is cited. The relevant points are outlined in the article.

The issue is not Silverstein, or a particular poster or writer, but the failure of compatibilism to make a case for the compatibility of the notion of free will in relation to determinism

The reasons for the failure of compatibilism are described in the article.

The need for a link wasn't to learn who the author was. I managed to Google that much. It was to check your source for accuracy and context. In any case, I made my point based on what you quoted. I still find it hard to believe that you scrounged up a poorly written essay by someone with such weak credentials.

You focus on the author, yet fail to address what is being said. If something is true, it is true regardless of who points it out, or how it is written.

Perhaps the article could have been better written, but neither that or who wrote it has much bearing on the validity of what was explained.

BA in philosophy is a qualification, but even if it isn't, what was said made valid points against compatibalism.

...
As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.
...

That's all he has to say about free will. He gives us his opinion that it "posits" a choice between alternative actions. OK. Then he tells us in convoluted prose that free will posits (?) that the choice is somehow not all causally predetermined, which would be essentially libertarian free will. That leaves out any mention of the agent's state of mind--knowledge of the past, present circumstances, and imaginary outcomes. It does not take into account the process of deliberation or calculation that needs to take place before a decision is reached. There is no discussion of control, types of influence, or the assessment of responsibility. IOW, it shows an incredible amount of ignorance about what compatibilists say about free will.

It was a brief outline of free will as a concept, not just compatibilism, and what it may look like. It's not only compatibalism that fails, but the whole notion of free will ( ''which is not a sensible concept'' - Martha Farah).

Again;

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will


There goes any notion of free will regardless of determinism or indeterminism, compatibilist or Libertarian.

Opinion? It's a matter of the given terms and condition and how sound the argument for compatibalism may or may not be.

The author of your text was quite clear that he was giving his opinions on the subject. It was clear that he didn't really have a good grasp of the subject matter, but he wasn't a recognized expert in it. I'm not sure what impressed you with that source other than the fact that you think he supported your own opinions.

It's the essentials that count. That inner necessity falsifies compatibilism, that the notion of free will does not work in relation to either determinism or indeterminism, be it compatibalism or Libertarian.

To repeat.

Quite simply.

Compatibilists quite rightly acknowledge that external elements constrain 'free will' - that if we are forced to act against our will, or we are coerced or unduly influenced, we are not acting according to our own will.

Well, that is oversimplified. If it were such a simple matter, then it would be easy to assign responsibility, blame, and merit every time someone performed an action. The complications come from trying to prioritize conflicting goals and desires.

It's the basic. The fundamental reason for the failure of compatibalism as an argument. If you want to present a valid argument, you can't focus on one element, external necessity (force, coercion, etc), but ignore inner necessity (the non-chosen state and condition of the system as it evolves without deviation).

Yet the compatibilist fails to acknowledge that will itself is being formed, molded, generated by deterministic processes over which will has no control, that will is just as subject to internal actions over which there is no control, just as with external elements such force, coercion, etc.

Now that is utterly false, but you will do your repeat thing over and over apparently. Compatibilists do acknowledge that agents lack control over components of will. The freedom in free will lies with being about to satisfy wants and goals in an unimpeded manner. People can therefore be held responsible and accountable for their choices. This has been pointed out to you repeatedly, but you ignore it and go for the ad nauseam mischaracterization and denial.

It's there, undeniable. Compatibilism defines free will by crafting a definition based on external elements - not being forced, coerced or unduly influenced by other people or circumstances, but nothing that accounts for inner necessity, the state of the system fixing each and every thought and actions as the system and its events unfold without deviation.

You can't have it both ways. You can't acknowledge that external necessity is a constraint on free will without applying the same rules for inner necessity.


''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

So, by focussing on external necessity, yet ignoring inner necessity, the state of the system determining decisions and actions, compatibalism fails as an argument.

To the extent that your term "inner necessity" makes any sense, compatibilists do not ignore it, but you do ignore what they do say about free will. You have to in order to make your straw man argument work.

It's not my term; ''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.

Brain states, in this instance;

ne·ces·si·tate
[nɪˈsɛsɪteɪt]
verb

1. make (something) necessary as a result or consequence: - Oxford
   
   
   

 

[pood]

“Inner necessity” is simply a synonym for “hard determinism.” As such it’s a label and question-begging. It assumes the very point in dispute.

''Inner necessity'' is nothing more than the neural architecture and electrochemical activity of the means and mechanisms of decision making and the actions that follow: the brain.

Yet there is nothing “necessary” about any of this “inner” stuff.

Of course there is. If determinism is true - and compatibilists assume it is - events can only go one way and each and every decision that is made is inevitably what it must be according to prior states of the system, and not a matter of 'could have done otherwise.'

That there are alternate actions within a deterministic system - as defined by compatibilists and incompatibilists - is the ultimate in necessitation, greater than being forced or coerced or unduly influenced, which are seen by compatibilists as constraints on free will, even while the greater constraint, inner necessity, is casually ignored.

Tarskian or correspondence theory of truth holds that “truth” lies in descriptive propositions about the world that correspond to facts about the world. Thus if Fred had eggs for breakfast this morning, the proposition “Fred had eggs” is true.

So we have as an example: “Fred had eggs” is true.

Here’s another proposition: “All triangles have three sides.” This is also true.

They’re both true propositions about the world. Notice anything different about them?

I see that, as a rationale, it doesn't address the fundamental reason for the failure of compatibilism. That by failing to account for inner necessity as a constraint, compatibilism just doesn't work.

Both statements are true, but the first COULD be false, and the second CANNOT be false.

There is a possible non-actual world at which Fred had something else besides eggs for breakfast. There is NO possible world at which triangles have other than three sides. The first statement is therefore contingently true, whereas the second statement is necessarily true.

You have invented a category called “inner necessity” that simply does not exist as a matter of simple logic.

And therefore hard determinism vanishes in a puff of logic.

 

[southernhybrid]

I don't want to get involved in the argument at this point, but I do want to mention two things that some of you might enjoy. NOVA had two episodes about the brain that you can stream. One is about free will. The other one is very interesting as it explains how vision works and a few other things, that I didn't know.

Then, if you are a subscriber to Scientific American, it has an interesting article which I think was in the June edition. If you still have a Facebook account, you might be able to read it there without a subscription, plus SA allows non subscribers to read one free article. I read the article this morning and it discussed both hard determinism and .compatibilism. I thought it was interesting, and perhaps some of you might find it has some info to add to this endless discussion.

Have fun!

 

[DBT]

Of course there is.

No there isn't. There is stuff "casual" on the inside of the boundary of our skin, but casual participation does not make for "necessitation".

The fact is, you believe in something so ridiculous as "predestination", and seem incapable of differentiating normal causes with manipulation.

You truly are the black knight. Everyone here recognizes that you've got no arms or legs.

For heavens sake, you are just making this up......compatibalism is a matter of how compatibilists define free will and how they define determinism.

 

[Jarhyn]

Of course there is.

No there isn't. There is stuff "casual" on the inside of the boundary of our skin, but casual participation does not make for "necessitation".

The fact is, you believe in something so ridiculous as "predestination", and seem incapable of differentiating normal causes with manipulation.

You truly are the black knight. Everyone here recognizes that you've got no arms or legs.

For heavens sake, you are just making this up......compatibalism is a matter of how compatibilists define free will and how they define determinism.

Go on talking O Emperor Who Overpaid for their "magical" and strangely drafty (but very light) new outfit.

You seem to conflate "destination" with "predestination" quite readily. Your inability to cleave these two concepts is unfortunate to say the least.

Determinism says that postconditions are determined by preconditions and there is a single path between these. It says nothing about the "necessity" of some original condition, and therefore nothing about the "necessity" of the post condition.

It is the "necessity" that is an illusion here, because it is only "necessary" with respect to some given initial configuration, which itself ends up being revealed as arbitrary.

 

[pood]

I don't want to get involved in the argument at this point, but I do want to mention two things that some of you might enjoy. NOVA had two episodes about the brain that you can stream. One is about free will. The other one is very interesting as it explains how vision works and a few other things, that I didn't know.

Then, if you are a subscriber to Scientific American, it has an interesting article which I think was in the June edition. If you still have a Facebook account, you might be able to read it there without a subscription, plus SA allows non subscribers to read one free article. I read the article this morning and it discussed both hard determinism and .compatibilism. I thought it was interesting, and perhaps some of you might find it has some info to add to this endless discussion.

Have fun!

Do you have a link to that article?

 

[bilby]

Every single particle that makes up a human acts in a completely deterministic way, in accordance with the laws of physics; Therefore a human must also act in a completely deterministic way, in accordance with the laws of physics; Therefore humans do not and cannot have free will.

Also, Every single particle that makes up a human is physically incapable of breathing, in accordance with the laws of physics; Therefore a human must also be physically incapable of breathing, in accordance with the laws of physics; Therefore humans do not and cannot breathe.

Oh my God! I have killed us all!! Noooooooo!!!

 

[Politesse]

Therefore a human must also act in a completely deterministic way, in accordance with the laws of physics;

I think it would be more accurate to say that we will act in a deterministic way. There is no "must", if you wanted to do something else, you would. And the deterministic nature of the universe means that the outcome of that "choice" is absolutely certain, whether or not you imagine that you might have done something else.

Would you say that you "must" orbit the sun, or that simply that you "do" orbit the sun? There isn't really much practical difference between the two, but I'd argue that the latter phrasing is indicative of clearer thinking.

 

[southernhybrid]

I don't want to get involved in the argument at this point, but I do want to mention two things that some of you might enjoy. NOVA had two episodes about the brain that you can stream. One is about free will. The other one is very interesting as it explains how vision works and a few other things, that I didn't know.

Then, if you are a subscriber to Scientific American, it has an interesting article which I think was in the June edition. If you still have a Facebook account, you might be able to read it there without a subscription, plus SA allows non subscribers to read one free article. I read the article this morning and it discussed both hard determinism and .compatibilism. I thought it was interesting, and perhaps some of you might find it has some info to add to this endless discussion.

Have fun!

Do you have a link to that article?

Ihttps://www.scientificamerican.com/...86pMt9Q7XXrazwxqM8IQBgF_mZLInVXOWi_8vTgTUeigI

I think the above link is it. I did a very fast search as I'm on my way out.

 

[Jarhyn]

Therefore a human must also act in a completely deterministic way, in accordance with the laws of physics;

I think it would be more accurate to say that we will act in a deterministic way. There is no "must", if you wanted to do something else, you would. And the deterministic nature of the universe means that the outcome of that "choice" is absolutely certain, whether or not you imagine that you might have done something else.

Would you say that you "must" orbit the sun, or that simply that you "do" orbit the sun? There isn't really much practical difference between the two, but I'd argue that the latter phrasing is indicative of clearer thinking.

I would say I will orbit the sun until I have other options XD

Which options I take will depend on which options I have, going forward.

 

[Copernicus]

...
The need for a link wasn't to learn who the author was. I managed to Google that much. It was to check your source for accuracy and context. In any case, I made my point based on what you quoted. I still find it hard to believe that you scrounged up a poorly written essay by someone with such weak credentials.

You focus on the author, yet fail to address what is being said. If something is true, it is true regardless of who points it out, or how it is written.
Perhaps the article could have been better written, but neither that or who wrote it has much bearing on the validity of what was explained.
BA in philosophy is a qualification, but even if it isn't, what was said made valid points against compatibalism.

If you are quoting someone as an authority on free will and compatibilism, then their qualifications do matter. Nevertheless, I also focused on what he said, contrary to what you claim here. Nothing he wrote changed or helped to explain anything you've already said over and over, but it would have made more sense to quote someone with more background in the subject matter. There is nothing wrong with a BA in philosophy from Beaver College (now called Arcadia University), but there are a lot of published philosophers out there with better defenses of hard determinism.

...It was a brief outline of free will as a concept, not just compatibilism, and what it may look like. It's not only compatibalism that fails, but the whole notion of free will ( ''which is not a sensible concept'' - Martha Farah).

It was hardly an outline of anything, just some of his opinions on how to describe the problem he saw with compatibilism. Not much different from your opinions. As for Martha Farah, I've already explained my problem with her. She focused on the usefulness of the expression "free will" to neuroscientists, although she seemed to think that it had no usefulness in other contexts.

Again;

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

There goes any notion of free will regardless of determinism or indeterminism, compatibilist or Libertarian.

(1) fails, because it describes free will in the past tense, and you can't change the past. There may also be some ambiguity in the use of the modal, as well. Free will is about the imagined future from the perspective of an agent, not a past action. So "could have" only refers to what was in the mind of the agent at the time, not what transpired subsequently. From that perspective, agents choose to act according to how they imagine the future.

(2) refers to "indeterminate actions", and I have no idea what those are. Random actions? There is nothing random about free will. The agent faces an indeterminate imaginary future and an array of actions to choose from. I suspect this is where you mix up compatibilist free will with libertarian free will, which has to do with indeterminism.

(3) is probably misstated, because you were fixated on the words "indeterminate actions" from (2). You seem to have forgotten that compatibilism is about determinism and free will, not "indeterminism" (whatever that is) and free will.

(4) is a tautology and not under dispute. Free will is defined in a way that is compatible with determinate actions. Agents will explain their actions in terms of the factors that caused them to do what they did.

(5) does not follow logically because of the flaws in your premises. You apparently confuse the "free" in "free will" to refer to freedom from determinacy rather than freedom to choose an action that leads to the most desirable outcome.

I think that you just do not understand the compatibilist concept of free will. Responsibility is something of a litmus test for free will--a deliberate, unimpeded action by an agent. If an agent thinks his or her action was not unduly impeded--that it was the result of free will--then the agent takes responsibility for that action. If it was felt to be impeded by circumstance, forces beyond the agent's control, or psychological compulsion, then that throws the agent's responsibility for the outcome of the action into question. That is what makes the concept of free will psychologically and socially useful. That is why the expression exists. It in no way conflicts with the fact that we live in a deterministic reality and that every aspect of our character is the result of physical causality. Agents are, after all, physical beings. Mental events supervene on physical events. Nobody but perhaps those who support libertarian free will disputes that.

 

[pood]

I don't want to get involved in the argument at this point, but I do want to mention two things that some of you might enjoy. NOVA had two episodes about the brain that you can stream. One is about free will. The other one is very interesting as it explains how vision works and a few other things, that I didn't know.

Then, if you are a subscriber to Scientific American, it has an interesting article which I think was in the June edition. If you still have a Facebook account, you might be able to read it there without a subscription, plus SA allows non subscribers to read one free article. I read the article this morning and it discussed both hard determinism and .compatibilism. I thought it was interesting, and perhaps some of you might find it has some info to add to this endless discussion.

Have fun!

Do you have a link to that article?

Ihttps://www.scientificamerican.com/...86pMt9Q7XXrazwxqM8IQBgF_mZLInVXOWi_8vTgTUeigI

I think the above link is it. I did a very fast search as I'm on my way out.

Gah, need a subscription. Can you gift that link?

Just from glimpsing the title before the paywall went up, it looks to me like the article is about superdeterminism.

 

[Jarhyn]

I don't want to get involved in the argument at this point, but I do want to mention two things that some of you might enjoy. NOVA had two episodes about the brain that you can stream. One is about free will. The other one is very interesting as it explains how vision works and a few other things, that I didn't know.

Then, if you are a subscriber to Scientific American, it has an interesting article which I think was in the June edition. If you still have a Facebook account, you might be able to read it there without a subscription, plus SA allows non subscribers to read one free article. I read the article this morning and it discussed both hard determinism and .compatibilism. I thought it was interesting, and perhaps some of you might find it has some info to add to this endless discussion.

Have fun!

Do you have a link to that article?

Ihttps://www.scientificamerican.com/...86pMt9Q7XXrazwxqM8IQBgF_mZLInVXOWi_8vTgTUeigI

I think the above link is it. I did a very fast search as I'm on my way out.

Gah, need a subscription. Can you gift that link?

Just from glimpsing the title before the paywall went up, it looks to me like the article is about superdeterminism.

Even if the universe is "superdeterministic", from my reading of the concept "pseudorandom", it doesn't obviate the fact that I have a pseudorandom evolving system with fixed physical laws grinding away on my PC right now, and I can still point at a ball of bits and say "that's a will; these are freedoms; this is the mechanism of this agent making a choice of free will in this moment; this is a mechanism of an agent making a coerced action in this moment; this is me coercing it to be a way in this moment." And so on.

It's not language about humans or even neurology, but about the general structure of causal responsibility. If causal responsibility didn't chain deterministically, then we could never render response to momentary causal direction.

I'm pretty sure this goes so deep that it is implied by "an object in motion; an object at rest", and that this is the level of sufficient determinism which evolves and reflects among human discussion of free will and responsibility.

 

[Copernicus]

I don't want to get involved in the argument at this point, but I do want to mention two things that some of you might enjoy. NOVA had two episodes about the brain that you can stream. One is about free will. The other one is very interesting as it explains how vision works and a few other things, that I didn't know.

Then, if you are a subscriber to Scientific American, it has an interesting article which I think was in the June edition. If you still have a Facebook account, you might be able to read it there without a subscription, plus SA allows non subscribers to read one free article. I read the article this morning and it discussed both hard determinism and .compatibilism. I thought it was interesting, and perhaps some of you might find it has some info to add to this endless discussion.

Have fun!

Do you have a link to that article?

Ihttps://www.scientificamerican.com/...86pMt9Q7XXrazwxqM8IQBgF_mZLInVXOWi_8vTgTUeigI

I think the above link is it. I did a very fast search as I'm on my way out.

Gah, need a subscription. Can you gift that link?

Just from glimpsing the title before the paywall went up, it looks to me like the article is about superdeterminism.

Same problem, but people can Google  superdeterminism to figure out what it is about, but not how it relates to free will. As usual, scientists tend to toss around the term as if everyone agreed that it was about freedom from causality rather than freedom from forced choices. Note that the verb "force" means the same thing as "cause", but with the added presupposition that there is some kind of resistance that needs to be overcome in order for the result to come about. As I said in my last post, the concept of "responsiblity" is kind of a litmus test for free will in that agents and observers will reject the notion of a free will if there is undue resistance to the agent's intended or preferred choice.