According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[pood]

Actually, what do you mean by "compatible"? What is compatible with what? Because unless you are lying or deluded about your views on the deterministic universe, your views are no more compatible with the original theological doctrine of Free Will than Sapolsky's are. Orthodox Christians emphatically do not believe that we simply call the deterministic process of decision-making "free will" despite being neither when put under the microscope. They believe that we truly were imbued with a supernatural, more-than-material psyche, our birthright as children of God, that determines our path in life and makes us subject to the righteous judgement of a holy and eternal God. Their theology cannot survive your revision of it, so how is your revision "compatibilist"?

Why would you think I am interested in vindicating theology?

Actually, what do you mean by "compatible"? What is compatible with what? Because unless you are lying or deluded about your views on the deterministic universe, your views are no more compatible with the original theological doctrine of Free Will than Sapolsky's are. Orthodox Christians emphatically do not believe that we simply call the deterministic process of decision-making "free will" despite being neither when put under the microscope. They believe that we truly were imbued with a supernatural, more-than-material psyche, our birthright as children of God, that determines our path in life and makes us subject to the righteous judgement of a holy and eternal God. Their theology cannot survive your revision of it, so how is your revision "compatibilist"?

Why would you think I am interested in vindicating theology?

Because you are defending free will, or claiming to. Have you really never read any of the literature on free will at all?

Golly, yes. Yes, I have.

I get that you think you can discuss Sapolsky without reading Sapolsky, but you haven't even read the fundamental literature on your own side of the debate?

Golly, yes. Yes, I have.

Yes, free will began as, and still is, a theological doctrine.

No shit!

It was invented to solve a theological problem (If the gods know all that we will do before we do it, why should we be held accountable for that which we could not haven chosen otherwise than to do?) and people's angry reaction to its being challenged refelcts their enculturation into a theistic society.

And of course, if God knows in advance what we will do (if God existed, which he doesn’t) then we CAN be held accountable for what we do. Your formulation commits the modal scope fallacy.

Fallacy: If God knows in advance what I will do, then I (necessarily) MUST do that thing.

Correction: Necessarily, if God knows in advance what I will do, then I WILL [not MUST!] do that thing.

I can do x or y, freely, in the presence of an omniscient predictor. What I can’t do is escape prior DETECTION of what I will do. But I am free to do as I please. This is also the solution to Newcomb’s Paradox.

If centuries of theologians had had access to elementary modal logic and its possible worlds heuristic, they would have saved themselves a lot of bother over nothing at all.

 

[Gospel]

But I am free to do as I please.

The perception of acting freely ("doing as one pleases") is already accounted for in the predictor's foreknowledge. It's already known you'd be free to do as you please.

Edit: correction meant to say free not pleased.

 

[pood]

But I am free to do as I please.

The perception of acting freely ("doing as one pleases") is already accounted for in the predictor's foreknowledge. It's already known you'd be free to do as you please.

Edit: correction meant to say free not pleased.

Right. You’re free to do as you please, and the omniscient predictor knows this, too. And of course I am perfectly well aware that the free will debate started as a theological worry, sometimes called theological determinism or theological fatalism. Modal logic provides the answer, as it does to the earlier worry over logical determinism or logical fatalism (Aristotle’s sea battle). The current, post-religious worry is over causal determinism allegedly vitiating free will, which is the topic of this thread.

 

[pood]

Having read the literature on free will, modern, medieval, and from antiquity, is precisely why I know without even reading his book that Sapolsky is full of it. It is evident that HE has not studied the literature, just from excerpts and descriptions of his book.

 

[pood]

Foreknowledge and Free Will

 

[pood]

Yes. But it remains a part of me. Which was the point in question.

It isn't, though. It absolutely requires inputs from beyond your body in order to function at all. A brain without external stimuli and nutrients is just a lump of carbon slowly decaying into the soil, not even salvageable let alone functional.

We look back on our day and think "I was mad at Steve because he was an asshole", not "I was mad at Steve because there was an unpleasant odor in the workroom and it set off my insular function, which then tripped my amygdala, which set off damn near my entire network towards looking for potential threats, which it found in Steve's facial expression precisely because by that point my brain was searching for any explanation as to why it was freaking out, but I'd already habituated myself to the smell itelf roughly three seconds before and therefore no longer perceived it consciously, so Steve's smirking-ass face, which I had just started perceiving, presented itself as the most likely source of my feeling of unease, and because I'm a primate with a typically overactive temporal parietal junction, I assumed agency and intention on his part rather than pondering how my own perception might have been the true source that sense of agency of intention".

One of those scnearios is deeply emotionally attractive, and most people will choose it to explain their day with (or why, six weeks later, Steve asked to borrow their hammer and they passed it to him by dropping it on his hand). But any neuroscientist knows which of those scenarios is far, far more plausible. Common sense is a comforting concept, but an inaccurate methodology.

I don’t know why you would think any of this is a problem for compatibilism.

 

[Politesse]

Yes. But it remains a part of me. Which was the point in question.

It isn't, though. It absolutely requires inputs from beyond your body in order to function at all. A brain without external stimuli and nutrients is just a lump of carbon slowly decaying into the soil, not even salvageable let alone functional.

We look back on our day and think "I was mad at Steve because he was an asshole", not "I was mad at Steve because there was an unpleasant odor in the workroom and it set off my insular function, which then tripped my amygdala, which set off damn near my entire network towards looking for potential threats, which it found in Steve's facial expression precisely because by that point my brain was searching for any explanation as to why it was freaking out, but I'd already habituated myself to the smell itelf roughly three seconds before and therefore no longer perceived it consciously, so Steve's smirking-ass face, which I had just started perceiving, presented itself as the most likely source of my feeling of unease, and because I'm a primate with a typically overactive temporal parietal junction, I assumed agency and intention on his part rather than pondering how my own perception might have been the true source that sense of agency of intention".

One of those scnearios is deeply emotionally attractive, and most people will choose it to explain their day with (or why, six weeks later, Steve asked to borrow their hammer and they passed it to him by dropping it on his hand). But any neuroscientist knows which of those scenarios is far, far more plausible. Common sense is a comforting concept, but an inaccurate methodology.

I don’t know why you would think any of this is a problem for compatibilism.

Do I? Compatiblism will need to make a clear and cohererent claim before it "has problems" with anything.

 

[Politesse]

But I am free to do as I please.

This is a feeling, not an observation.

What does it mean to be "free to do as you please"? How would a universe in which the God's favorite primates are "free to do as they please" look demonstrably, measurably different from a universe in which no primates were "free to do as they please"?

 

[Jarhyn]

Yes. But it remains a part of me. Which was the point in question.

It isn't, though. It absolutely requires inputs from beyond your body in order to function at all. A brain without external stimuli and nutrients is just a lump of carbon slowly decaying into the soil, not even salvageable let alone functional.

We look back on our day and think "I was mad at Steve because he was an asshole", not "I was mad at Steve because there was an unpleasant odor in the workroom and it set off my insular function, which then tripped my amygdala, which set off damn near my entire network towards looking for potential threats, which it found in Steve's facial expression precisely because by that point my brain was searching for any explanation as to why it was freaking out, but I'd already habituated myself to the smell itelf roughly three seconds before and therefore no longer perceived it consciously, so Steve's smirking-ass face, which I had just started perceiving, presented itself as the most likely source of my feeling of unease, and because I'm a primate with a typically overactive temporal parietal junction, I assumed agency and intention on his part rather than pondering how my own perception might have been the true source that sense of agency of intention".

One of those scnearios is deeply emotionally attractive, and most people will choose it to explain their day with (or why, six weeks later, Steve asked to borrow their hammer and they passed it to him by dropping it on his hand). But any neuroscientist knows which of those scenarios is far, far more plausible. Common sense is a comforting concept, but an inaccurate methodology.

I don’t know why you would think any of this is a problem for compatibilism.

Do I? Compatiblism will need to make a clear and cohererent claim before it "has problems" with anything.

-_-

I think I've made a coherent claim as to what is going on here: that algorithms are "wills" and "wills" are algorithms. This is clear and coherent, coherent because it is consistent with the way that "it is my will to do (algorithm pursuant to a goal state of the algorithm)" is stated. See also "last will and testament" aka "an algorithm for dispensing junk after you die".

It is further my position that there is a specific "will to maintain personal autonomy". This is pretty clear, I think, and it's trivially true at least for me. I very much have a will to maintain personal autonomy.

This will unto personal autonomy will be free or it won't towards the specific and clear satisfaction of that will in any moment.

When I am acting under personal autonomy, responding to my person to abridge or alter the cellular automaton that is "me" is necessary to abridge the actions I take (responding to me impacts my actions; I am "responsible").

All of these are true even if I am deterministic and you are deterministic.

Therefore when I have "free will", autonomy to act as I do will, autonomy to act on my internal algorithms, I am responsible for my actions (and the wills I hold).

 

[pood]

But I am free to do as I please.

This is a feeling, not an observation.

What does it mean to be "free to do as you please"? How would a universe in which the God's favorite primates are "free to do as they please" look demonstrably, measurably different from a universe in which no primates were "free to do as they please"?

No, it is not a “feeling.” It is a clear and concise statement of logic. You raised the issue of theological fatalism, the bogus idea that an omniscient god with perfect foreknowledge of what you will do compels you do to do those things, which, if true, would mean we lack moral responsibility. You correctly noted that this is an old debate in theology, the tension between god’s omniscience and the idea that humans are subject to god’s judgement for their actions. However, as I noted, the original problem of free will goes back at least to Aristotle’s sea battle problem.

I just gave you the solution to this problem, which people have blathered about for hundreds of years. There is a modal fallacy — a clear fallacy of logic — in ascribing an inconsistency between God’s foreknowledge and human free will. Please see the link I provided just up thread to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article “Foreknowledge and Free Will” if you wish to learn more.

 

[bilby]

If an understanding of a system required a complete understanding of all of its components, humanity would be totally fucked - we found out most of chemistry before we even had an inkling about quantum mechanics.

We did indeed! Clever, clever monkeys. But if you do encounter a person or book with knowledge of quantum mechanics, you should embrace it as the next step in better understanding the universe, not reject it because late medieval chemistry was good enough for your grandpappy. If you reify a pre-physics understanding of alchemy, your technology will be able to reach exactly, but never exceed, the limitations of premodern alchemy. Good enough to make gunpowder? Yes. Sufficient to produce a nuclear ICBM? Not a snowball's chance in hell.

Again, you just don't seem to grasp that I agree completely with you.

 

[Politesse]

If an understanding of a system required a complete understanding of all of its components, humanity would be totally fucked - we found out most of chemistry before we even had an inkling about quantum mechanics.

We did indeed! Clever, clever monkeys. But if you do encounter a person or book with knowledge of quantum mechanics, you should embrace it as the next step in better understanding the universe, not reject it because late medieval chemistry was good enough for your grandpappy. If you reify a pre-physics understanding of alchemy, your technology will be able to reach exactly, but never exceed, the limitations of premodern alchemy. Good enough to make gunpowder? Yes. Sufficient to produce a nuclear ICBM? Not a snowball's chance in hell.

Again, you just don't seem to grasp that I agree completely with you.

Must I? Perhaps you can find contentment in the simple joy of providing me so many opportunities to say true things. I know I do.

 

[Copernicus]

This conversation isn't really happening. It is just a bunch of atoms interacting in complex ways. A total illusion for which no one is responsible.

 

[The AntiChris]

Compatiblism will need to make a clear and cohererent claim before it "has problems" with anything.

This might help: Compatibilism: What's that About?

 

[Politesse]

This conversation isn't really happening. It is just a binch of atoms interacting in complex ways. A total illusion for which no one is responsible.

Indeed. Accuracy is not always emotionally satisfying.

 

[Copernicus]

This conversation isn't really happening. It is just a binch of atoms interacting in complex ways. A total illusion for which no one is responsible.

Indeed. Accuracy is not always emotionally satisfying.

This explains a great many of your posts.

 

[Politesse]

In regular life, the practical art of politesse demands nothing from me but such half-truths and generous abstractions as my students and colleagues are prepared to entertain. In forumland, I indulge in the temporary luxury of being uncouth, but blessedly correct.

 

[pood]

In regular life, the practical art of politesse demands nothing from me but such half-truths and generous abstractions as my students and colleagues are prepared to entertain. In forumland, I indulge in the temporary luxury of being uncouth, but blessedly correct.

On this topic, you haven’t said a correct thing yet.

ETA: Well, that’s not true. You’ve said a couple of correct things.

 

[Politesse]

In regular life, the practical art of politesse demands nothing from me but such half-truths and generous abstractions as my students and colleagues are prepared to entertain. In forumland, I indulge in the temporary luxury of being uncouth, but blessedly correct.

On this topic, you haven’t said a correct thing yet.

ETA: Well, that’s not true. You’ve said a couple of correct things.

At least I read books.

 

[Jarhyn]

This conversation isn't really happening. It is just a binch of atoms interacting in complex ways. A total illusion for which no one is responsible.

Indeed. Accuracy is not always emotionally satisfying.

That's like saying computation doesn't happen... There is a conversation, an exchange of phenomena that can reasonably only come from some manner of complex particle types existing on the distant system, a grand and subtle exchanging of information causing change of states.

You are not in the first part accurate.

I do agree that accuracy is not often emotionally satisfying because I have been striving ever towards accuracy here and generally this is spurned for "common language" rather than precise language. Even so, I will continue to point out that in usage, "algorithm" stands synonymous with "will" and "freedom" addresses the probability of access of some statements of said algorithms (that probability being both predictive in the case of our imaginings of the future and real in our direct experience of it in the present).