compatibilists do acknowledge that necessity is a problem for the notion of free will, so they carefully craft a definition that takes external necessity into account, yet ignores or dismisses internal necessity
Internal necessity
IS US.
Of course it is. Nobody denies it, or has said otherwise.
Good. That's the end of this daft thread, and the dozens like it.
...but it's not the full picture or entirely true - external inputs, etc.
Oh.
So you DO deny it, and you DO say otherwise.
Shit.
The issue is that compatibilists acknowledge that necessity is a constraint on the notion of free will, yet not only fail to account for internal necessity, which is not only 'us' but all events, both external and internal that shape and form our makeup and how we think and act.
WTF is "us", if not "all events, both external and internal that shape and form our makeup and how we think and act"?
That's what we are. We are the sum of our experiences.
A deterministic process is not an example of free will just because it is deemed to 'be us.'
Yes, it is. It exactly is. That is what compatibilists mean when they say that free will is compatible with determinism.
That is how "free will" is defined by compatibilists; It is also how "free will" is used in law.
”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.
John Searle appears not to understand. As he isn't here, I don't particularly care if he is deeply wrong about this.
Neurobiology is not a matter of will, therefore 'it is me, therefore free will' is not a valid conclusion.
Will is a matter of neurobiology, therefore "it is me, therefore free will" is the obvious conclusion.
I can no more lack free will because of "internal necessity" than I can lack free will because I held a gun to my own head and threatened to shoot myself if I didn't do what I wanted me to do.
The term 'free will' is being asserted, not established.
It is being defined. If you don't like the way compatibilists define "free will", tough. You cannot prove them wrong by demanding that they define their terms to mean something that they don't mean by them.
A definition both asserts and establishes the meaning of a phrase.
If the action is determined, doing what you want is inevitable. You can't do otherwise.
That's completely true. I am unable to do anything other than what I want.
I am the most obedient dog in the world; As long as my master always commands me to "Do as you please", I invariably obey.
"I cannot have free will, because I am unavoidably compelled to do what I choose" is a truly crazy position; Are you sure that you want to take that position?
You are conflating 'doing what you want' with the process of forming the want or the will to act
No, you are doing that. I don't need to, because as a compatibilist, I understand that "the process of forming the want or the will" is just a longwinded way of saying "my self".
All of my experiences, my imaginings, my thoughts, my life - these are the things that form the want or will to act. They are ME.
I don't have a soul sitting in the driver's seat; I am nothing more (or less) than the sum of my experiences. That's what I am.
This was something that was noted long ago; ‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ - Schopenhauer
True.
Irrelevant to free will, as the term is defined by compatibilists; But true, none the less. I can't
decide to like Brussels Sprouts. But I can decide whether to have them for dinner.
In other words, ''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants'' - not only is there nothing to keep the person from doing what he wants, but that action must necessarily proceed as determined, which includes both the will to act and the act itself.
Sure. But again, so what? This doesn't challenge compatibilist free will one iota.
That is basically the reason why we have incompatibilism. And the reason why some see compatibilism as a quagmire of evasion.
''William James thought this idea a “quagmire of evasion,” a “eulogistic terminology,” and a “mere word-grabbing game played by the soft determinists.” He says “they make a pretense of restoring the caged bird to liberty with one hand, while with the other we anxiously tie a string to its leg to make sure it does not get beyond our sight.” 2''
William James appears not to understand. As he isn't here, I don't particularly care if he is deeply wrong about this.