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According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

It's not that I say it, but that the terms entail it.
You either didn't read or didn't understand my post.

The "terms" don't entail anything. Words don't have innate, irrevocable meaning. Meaning is derived from usage.

Meaning is derived from usage.

In relation to free will as compatibilists define it, I refer to word usage and word meaning as expressed by compatibilists.

That is the point.

It was the point from the beginning, and is still the point. The point has not changed.

Why is this so hard to grasp?
:shrug:
Yep. It's very frustrating to deal with DBT's claim that he knows all about compatilists' definitions of free will when he repeatedly confuses them with libertarian free will. What else can you do but shrug? He isn't going to address the many attempts to disabuse him of his confusion.


Clearly not true. I have quoted compatibilist definitions of free will and determinism, adding or subtracting nothing from either definition, sticking precisely to their terms and conditions.

Which proves the lament of William James; that Compatibilism is a quagmire of evasion.

Sour Grapes.

Drown your sorrows, guys, Compatibilism is nothing more than a quagmire of evasion and you have no case to argue from the start.
 
Coyne didn't say what you did, though.
He said the jazz composition was determined “in advance.”

I make no claims of my own. I refer to how compatibilists define determinism. Compatibilists are, by definition, determinists.

In order to understand the implications of how a deterministic system evolves, why not refer to your own definition of determinism?
.
''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: Constant conjunction.'' - Pood

''In philosophy, constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.[1]'' - Wiki

Now, obviously this does not mean that the big bang itself composed Jazz in the first microseconds, or anytime soon after...so how do you think we have Jazz being composed now if the universe began with a Big Bang and is deterministic, that being, where event A is always followed by event B?
Why do YOU think we do? The question is for you, not me — I’ve given my answer.

Your answers do not address the issue. They never have, not even close.

Based on what you said, I suspect that you either avoid the implications of your own definition of determinism, or else you have failed grasp the nature of determinism.

That you keep invoking the crock question, 'did the big bang write jazz' suggests the latter.
 
It's not that I say it, but that the terms entail it.
You either didn't read or didn't understand my post.

The "terms" don't entail anything. Words don't have innate, irrevocable meaning. Meaning is derived from usage.

Meaning is derived from usage.

In relation to free will as compatibilists define it, I refer to word usage and word meaning as expressed by compatibilists.

That is the point.

It was the point from the beginning, and is still the point. The point has not changed.

Why is this so hard to grasp?
:shrug:

Shrugging won't help you make a case for compatibilism.

But if it makes you feel better, shrug away.

Meanwhile, compatibilism fails because it is a quagmire of evasion, an argument that acknowledges that necessity is a problem for the notion of free will, takes external necessity into consideration, yet conveniently ignores inner necessity....where what you will and what you do is fixed by antecedents (as defined by compatibilists), and that acting according to your will is inevitable because it is generated by inner necessity.

A determined action must necessarily proceed as determined, unrestricted and unimpeded. Given that decisions are necessitated/determined and actions necessarily follow (motor action), freedom of action does not equate to freedom of will.

Consequently, the claim that 'it is our brain that is performing decision making and action, therefore free will' is not a reasonable conclusion.

Therefore incompatibilism has it right; the notion of free will is indeed incompatible with determinism.
 
your will is inevitable because it is generated by inner necessity
Your will is inevitabl[y free] because [when] it was generated by inner necessity [(yourself), which is the basic requirement for compatibilist free will].

The obtuseness of your replies is palpable.
 
Coyne didn't say what you did, though.
He said the jazz composition was determined “in advance.”

I make no claims of my own. I refer to how compatibilists define determinism. Compatibilists are, by definition, determinists.

In order to understand the implications of how a deterministic system evolves, why not refer to your own definition of determinism?
.
''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: Constant conjunction.'' - Pood

''In philosophy, constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.[1]'' - Wiki

Now, obviously this does not mean that the big bang itself composed Jazz in the first microseconds, or anytime soon after...so how do you think we have Jazz being composed now if the universe began with a Big Bang and is deterministic, that being, where event A is always followed by event B?
Why do YOU think we do? The question is for you, not me — I’ve given my answer.

Your answers do not address the issue. They never have, not even close.

Based on what you said, I suspect that you either avoid the implications of your own definition of determinism, or else you have failed grasp the nature of determinism.

That you keep invoking the crock question, 'did the big bang write jazz' suggests the latter.

Oh? Who was it who just wrote upthread that “Now, obviously this does not mean that the big bang itself composed Jazz in the first microseconds, or anytime soon after …”? Why, you did. So when DID the jazz score get written, and who or what wrote it, and how? Talk about a quagmire of evasion! Please just answer the question. Jerry Coyne, a hard determinist like you, gave his silly answer — the jazz musician didn’t write the score! It was “written” somehow, some way, in advance! At least he accepts the logic of his absurd beliefs — that everything, including jazz scores, novels, architectural and artistic masterpieces, etc. etc., were laid down at the big bang. He also is fond of saying, “The laws of nature made me …” when, of course, there ARE no such laws!
 
Coyne didn't say what you did, though.
He said the jazz composition was determined “in advance.”

I make no claims of my own. I refer to how compatibilists define determinism. Compatibilists are, by definition, determinists.

In order to understand the implications of how a deterministic system evolves, why not refer to your own definition of determinism?
.
''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: Constant conjunction.'' - Pood

''In philosophy, constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.[1]'' - Wiki

Now, obviously this does not mean that the big bang itself composed Jazz in the first microseconds, or anytime soon after...so how do you think we have Jazz being composed now if the universe began with a Big Bang and is deterministic, that being, where event A is always followed by event B?
Why do YOU think we do? The question is for you, not me — I’ve given my answer.

Your answers do not address the issue. They never have, not even close.

Based on what you said, I suspect that you either avoid the implications of your own definition of determinism, or else you have failed grasp the nature of determinism.

That you keep invoking the crock question, 'did the big bang write jazz' suggests the latter.

Oh? Who was it who just wrote upthread that “Now, obviously this does not mean that the big bang itself composed Jazz in the first microseconds, or anytime soon after …”? Why, you did. So when DID the jazz score get written, and who or what wrote it, and how? Talk about a quagmire of evasion! Please just answer the question. Jerry Coyne, a hard determinist like you, gave his silly answer — the jazz musician didn’t write the score! It was “written” somehow, some way, in advance! At least he accepts the logic of his absurd beliefs — that everything, including jazz scores, novels, architectural and artistic masterpieces, etc. etc., were laid down at the big bang. He also is fond of saying, “The laws of nature made me …” when, of course, there ARE no such laws!
I don't know about the "Big Bang", but the starting conditions of the universe did make the eventual outcome of that jazz piece inevitable. Only scientific illiteracy would lead one to conclude otherwise. That doesn't mean that your "Big Bang" composed the piece, only that it ensured it would eventually be composed, exactly as it eventually was. We are material beings, subject to the exact same forces that shape all other phenomena. Time as we conceive of it is an illusion; exchanges of matter, energy and time are in a complex but inexorable and ultimately measurable balance with one another, that the nervous system of a single organism (however clever) has no capacity to upend.
 
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As I have argued in this thread, it does not matter if past, present and future are all fixed — all “inevitable.” That still does not vitiate compatibilist free will.

If it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then tomorrow there WILL be a sea battle — inevitably — given that all true propositions are necessarily true.

However, although the statement is necessarily true, the event itself is not — a sea battle happening tomorrow is a CONTINGENT truth about reality.

This means that while the sea battle WILL happen tomorrow, it does not HAVE TO happen. Contrast this with propositions like “all triangles have three sides.” This is a necessary truth about the world.

There is no possible world at which triangles have other than three sides. There are possible worlds at which the sea battle does not happen. These are counterfactual, or possible non-actual, worlds.

Similarly, if it is true today that five years from now I will buy a house, then certainly I will do so. Moreover, under the Minkowski block universe, it is INEVITABLE that I will buy house. From this, it still does not logically follow that I MUST do so — only that I WILL do so.

Even though I WILL buy a house five years from now, it is within my power NOT to do so — and, if I did NOT do so, then a DIFFERENT prior proposition about the future would be true — that five years from now, I will NOT buy a house.

Thus is it is philosophically illiterate to conflate physical inevitability with logical necessity.

Sabine Hossenfelder has argued that if the future is as fixed as the past, then we do not have free will because we are unable to CHANGE the future. The mistake here is that compatibilist free will does not require us to CHANGE anything — past, present, or future. It only requires that we do, within our capacity, what makes the past, present, and future be what it was, is, and will be. Seen in this light, we see that we can’t actually CHANGE anything — including the present. If I lift my right arm right now, I have not changed the present — I have simply made it be, what it is.
 
Only scientific illiteracy would lead one to conclude otherwise.

Would that be of a piece with your philosophical illiteracy?
Sure, if literacy in philosophy requires an abandonment of physics. Of course, I do not agree that it does. One can be a philosopher and still embrace science. One may also be literate in non- or pre-scientific philosophies without necessarily agreeing with them all.

Your comparison of the ideologically "true" belief of Christian doctrine to the tautologically true statements like "triangles have three sides" is not convincing me of your depth of study in philosophy. Triangles are three sided because we define objects with three straight sides as triangles, not because of any fundamental natural property of triangles. Indeed, naturally occurring triangles do not exist as we imagine them when we picture an ideal triangular form. Even the most angular of crystals has some rough edges ince you fetch out the hand lens and really look at it.
 
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These are counterfactual, or possible non-actual, worlds.
Of what possible relevance to the real world is a counterfactual reality? I can think of a thousand counterfactual worlds sitting in an armchair for ten minutes, but a rational mind knows that none of them will manifest outside the window simply because they have been dreamed of. There is but one material world our senses have access to, and it does not answer to any person's "will", free or otherwise, except insofar as that will produces actions. Actions that are as measurable and predictable as any other physical phenomena.
 
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Coyne didn't say what you did, though.
He said the jazz composition was determined “in advance.”

I make no claims of my own. I refer to how compatibilists define determinism. Compatibilists are, by definition, determinists.

In order to understand the implications of how a deterministic system evolves, why not refer to your own definition of determinism?
.
''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: Constant conjunction.'' - Pood

''In philosophy, constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.[1]'' - Wiki

Now, obviously this does not mean that the big bang itself composed Jazz in the first microseconds, or anytime soon after...so how do you think we have Jazz being composed now if the universe began with a Big Bang and is deterministic, that being, where event A is always followed by event B?
Why do YOU think we do? The question is for you, not me — I’ve given my answer.

Your answers do not address the issue. They never have, not even close.

Based on what you said, I suspect that you either avoid the implications of your own definition of determinism, or else you have failed grasp the nature of determinism.

That you keep invoking the crock question, 'did the big bang write jazz' suggests the latter.

Oh? Who was it who just wrote upthread that “Now, obviously this does not mean that the big bang itself composed Jazz in the first microseconds, or anytime soon after …”? Why, you did.

Of course I did. The big bang did not compose jazz.

So when DID the jazz score get written, and who or what wrote it, and how?


You know very well who writes jazz. Human being write jazz. 13.7 billion years after the initial event. 13.7 billion years of evolution of the universe, formation of the solar system, life emerging on earth....and here we are, there are some people who write music.

Talk about a quagmire of evasion! Please just answer the question. Jerry Coyne, a hard determinist like you, gave his silly answer — the jazz musician didn’t write the score! It was “written” somehow, some way, in advance! At least he accepts the logic of his absurd beliefs — that everything, including jazz scores, novels, architectural and artistic masterpieces, etc. etc., were laid down at the big bang. He also is fond of saying, “The laws of nature made me …” when, of course, there ARE no such laws!

You seem to keep missing the point. I don't claim the big bang writes jazz, that's your quagmire of evasion. I merely point to how determinism is defined and the implications of that definition, that all events are determined by antecedents. Just like you said. Constant Conjunction, event B must necessarily follow event A, etc, etc, no deviation, no alternate actions. If jazz is being composed, it must necessarily be composed based on all the events that brought us to that point in time and place.

That's how determinism works.

That's how determinism works according to how you define it.
 
your will is inevitable because it is generated by inner necessity
Your will is inevitabl[y free] because [when] it was generated by inner necessity [(yourself), which is the basic requirement for compatibilist free will].

The obtuseness of your replies is palpable.

Not even close. Have a think and try again. As a clue, compatibilists do acknowledge that necessity is a problem for the notion of free will, so they carefully craft a definition that takes external necessity into account, yet ignores or dismisses internal necessity - just like you are doing now, playing word games, as expressed by James, a quagmire of evasion.
 
compatibilists do acknowledge that necessity is a problem for the notion of free will
You seem to be delusional. Compatibilists do not, in fact, think "necessity" in the way you seem to (badly) understand the topic is a problem for the notion of free will.

The initial condition is not "necessary" either given the fact that the initial condition was different literally everywhere.
 
compatibilists do acknowledge that necessity is a problem for the notion of free will, so they carefully craft a definition that takes external necessity into account, yet ignores or dismisses internal necessity
Internal necessity IS US.

I can no more lack free will because of "internal necessity" than I can lack free will because I held a gun to my own head and threatened to shoot myself if I didn't do what I wanted me to do.

"I cannot have free will, because I am unavoidably compelled to do what I choose" is a truly crazy position; Are you sure that you want to take that position?
 
compatibilists do acknowledge that necessity is a problem for the notion of free will, so they carefully craft a definition that takes external necessity into account, yet ignores or dismisses internal necessity
Internal necessity IS US.

Of course it is. Nobody denies it, or has said otherwise....but it's not the full picture or entirely true - external inputs, etc. The issue is that compatibilists acknowledge that necessity is a constraint on the notion of free will, yet not only fail to account for internal necessity, which is not only 'us' but all events, both external and internal that shape and form our makeup and how we think and act.

A deterministic process is not an example of free will just because it is deemed to 'be us.'

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

Neurobiology is not a matter of will, therefore 'it is me, therefore free will' is not a valid conclusion.


I can no more lack free will because of "internal necessity" than I can lack free will because I held a gun to my own head and threatened to shoot myself if I didn't do what I wanted me to do.

The term 'free will' is being asserted, not established. If the action is determined, doing what you want is inevitable. You can't do otherwise.


"I cannot have free will, because I am unavoidably compelled to do what I choose" is a truly crazy position; Are you sure that you want to take that position?

You are conflating 'doing what you want' with the process of forming the want or the will to act

This was something that was noted long ago; ‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ - Schopenhauer

In other words, ''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants'' - not only is there nothing to keep the person from doing what he wants, but that action must necessarily proceed as determined, which includes both the will to act and the act itself.


That is basically the reason why we have incompatibilism. And the reason why some see compatibilism as a quagmire of evasion.

''William James thought this idea a “quagmire of evasion,” a “eulogistic terminology,” and a “mere word-grabbing game played by the soft determinists.” He says “they make a pretense of restoring the caged bird to liberty with one hand, while with the other we anxiously tie a string to its leg to make sure it does not get beyond our sight.” 2''
 
compatibilists do acknowledge that necessity is a problem for the notion of free will
You seem to be delusional. Compatibilists do not, in fact, think "necessity" in the way you seem to (badly) understand the topic is a problem for the notion of free will.

The initial condition is not "necessary" either given the fact that the initial condition was different literally everywhere.

Wakey, wakey. Compatibilists acknowledge that things like external force, coercion or undue influence are constraints on free will as they defined it, and when they are present, you are not acting of your own 'free will'

External force (being forced to act in a way contrary to your will), coercion or undue influence are instances of external necessity.

These are examples of external necessity which compatibilist agree are not compatible with their version of free will.

Now think about internal necessity, a process that not only shapes and forms who you are, but determines how you think, what you think and what you do...without you as a conscious person being aware of the process.
 
internal necessity, a process that not only shapes and forms who you are
I AM "internal necessity". So I shape and form who I am, and so on. What part of this "you are 'internal necessity'" do you not get?

We are asserting our definition of "free will" as "I choose who I shall be and what I do rather than something outside me".

That exists, DBT. You really don't seem to be able to grok that the usage there is definitional. You keep trying to fight our definition by fighting your own definition. You'll only ever end up fighting a straw-man that way.

We have every right to assert what we mean by what we say. You may not like how we use language, but how we use language works way better than how some idiot in antiquity used it, and it applies to reality and functions in common use in all the same ways as the nonsense antiquity term, implying that the attempt to formalize the term in antiquity as something other than the common use definition was the issue in the first place.

Compatibilists resolve this by ejecting the antiquated nonsense formalization and presenting a different formalization of the term: that a will is an algorithm, and that as long as an algorithm comes from inner necessity the "will to have autonomy" is free because responsibility is really about having momentary autonomy in an action.
 
compatibilists do acknowledge that necessity is a problem for the notion of free will, so they carefully craft a definition that takes external necessity into account, yet ignores or dismisses internal necessity
Internal necessity IS US.

Of course it is. Nobody denies it, or has said otherwise.
Good. That's the end of this daft thread, and the dozens like it.
...but it's not the full picture or entirely true - external inputs, etc.
Oh.

So you DO deny it, and you DO say otherwise.

Shit.
The issue is that compatibilists acknowledge that necessity is a constraint on the notion of free will, yet not only fail to account for internal necessity, which is not only 'us' but all events, both external and internal that shape and form our makeup and how we think and act.
WTF is "us", if not "all events, both external and internal that shape and form our makeup and how we think and act"?

That's what we are. We are the sum of our experiences.
A deterministic process is not an example of free will just because it is deemed to 'be us.'
Yes, it is. It exactly is. That is what compatibilists mean when they say that free will is compatible with determinism.

That is how "free will" is defined by compatibilists; It is also how "free will" is used in law.
”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.
John Searle appears not to understand. As he isn't here, I don't particularly care if he is deeply wrong about this.
Neurobiology is not a matter of will, therefore 'it is me, therefore free will' is not a valid conclusion.
Will is a matter of neurobiology, therefore "it is me, therefore free will" is the obvious conclusion.
I can no more lack free will because of "internal necessity" than I can lack free will because I held a gun to my own head and threatened to shoot myself if I didn't do what I wanted me to do.

The term 'free will' is being asserted, not established.
It is being defined. If you don't like the way compatibilists define "free will", tough. You cannot prove them wrong by demanding that they define their terms to mean something that they don't mean by them.

A definition both asserts and establishes the meaning of a phrase.
If the action is determined, doing what you want is inevitable. You can't do otherwise.
That's completely true. I am unable to do anything other than what I want.

I am the most obedient dog in the world; As long as my master always commands me to "Do as you please", I invariably obey. :rolleyesa:
"I cannot have free will, because I am unavoidably compelled to do what I choose" is a truly crazy position; Are you sure that you want to take that position?

You are conflating 'doing what you want' with the process of forming the want or the will to act
No, you are doing that. I don't need to, because as a compatibilist, I understand that "the process of forming the want or the will" is just a longwinded way of saying "my self".

All of my experiences, my imaginings, my thoughts, my life - these are the things that form the want or will to act. They are ME.

I don't have a soul sitting in the driver's seat; I am nothing more (or less) than the sum of my experiences. That's what I am.
This was something that was noted long ago; ‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ - Schopenhauer
True.

Irrelevant to free will, as the term is defined by compatibilists; But true, none the less. I can't decide to like Brussels Sprouts. But I can decide whether to have them for dinner.
In other words, ''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants'' - not only is there nothing to keep the person from doing what he wants, but that action must necessarily proceed as determined, which includes both the will to act and the act itself.
Sure. But again, so what? This doesn't challenge compatibilist free will one iota.
That is basically the reason why we have incompatibilism. And the reason why some see compatibilism as a quagmire of evasion.

''William James thought this idea a “quagmire of evasion,” a “eulogistic terminology,” and a “mere word-grabbing game played by the soft determinists.” He says “they make a pretense of restoring the caged bird to liberty with one hand, while with the other we anxiously tie a string to its leg to make sure it does not get beyond our sight.” 2''
William James appears not to understand. As he isn't here, I don't particularly care if he is deeply wrong about this.
 
But I can decide whether to have them for dinner.
That is simply not true, though. Your brain "decides" what to have for dinner, and your conscious mind generates an explanation for it post facto. That, at least, is the current conclusion of neuroscientists, based on the preponderence of the data we now possess. This, interestingly enough, is often touted as evidence of free will by incompatibilists (since the "decision" doesn't originate in a thought process, they see it as evidence for a supernatural "will" intervening against the observable). But it is a major problem for compatibilism, as I see it. The moment we call a "choice" in common language and perception is not the moment when the outcome of a neurological process is first determined, but occurs in the aftermath of it. So what does it mean to preserve the aesthetic "sense" of free will without contradicting the observations that the science of the mind has produced? We simply do not percieve the world or our mind the way they actually function. Perception is "designed" for (better: coalesced around the evolutionary fitness of) making complex organisms function more efficiently, not for being an accurate gauge of our most intuitive and internal processes of thought. But we now have the tools to crack open that box, and we shouldn't let 4th century theoogical hangups prevent us from exploring the implications of that. Aristotle was not to blame for not knowing about these evidences, which he could not have had access to. But he would be the last person in history to advise ignoring their implications now that we have them.
 
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"I cannot have free will, because I am unavoidably compelled to do what I choose" is a truly crazy position; Are you sure that you want to take that position?

But I can decide whether to have them for dinner.
That is simply not true, though. Your brain "decides" what to have for dinner, and your conscious mind generates an explanation for it post facto.
Good thing your brain is you, then.

This is an example of assuming that “true” free will must be libertarian; i.e. there must be some kind of homunculus, or “ghost in the machine,” or some such, that makes “real” decisions. Compatibilists, of course, reject such magic.
 
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