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According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

Crock, determinism has nothing to do with 'arbitrary algorithms'
Literally my entire position as a compatibilist is that a will IS any arbitrarily selected algorithm, and that all discussions of freedom relate to which areas of the algorithm will/may see execution.

You are not a compatibilist because you disregard the given terms and conditions of determinism and assert your own conditions, the way you wants things to be. In other words, your position is not logical.

Please pay attention: determinism is not an arbitrary process. Each and every event must necessarily follow its antecedents, without deviation or the possibility of an arbitrary or alternate decision or choice being made.

That is how a deterministic system works, even according to you.


Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''


You've got no legs, and insist on biting at kneecaps.

Given the basic errors you make, one as pointed out above, that's hilarious. Have you heard of irony? :confused2:
 
That is how a deterministic system works, even according to you.


Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''
In what way is randomness even vaguely connected to will?

I don't will things at random. What I want is determined, and that I want it, and so can and do pursue it, is free will.

Random will would simply be (and indeed is) insanity. People whose desires arise seemingly at random are literally crazy.
 
That is how a deterministic system works, even according to you.


Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''
In what way is randomness even vaguely connected to will?

I don't will things at random. What I want is determined, and that I want it, and so can and do pursue it, is free will.

Random will would simply be (and indeed is) insanity. People whose desires arise seemingly at random are literally crazy.
He doesn't understand the difference between "any arbitrarily selected", as in "pick any of these; all of them are wills" and "random" as in "constructed only from discorrolate/indeterministic process"
 
That is how a deterministic system works, even according to you.


Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''
In what way is randomness even vaguely connected to will?

It's not. The point was that determinism as defined by Jarhyn, does not relate his 'arbitrary algorithm' defence of free will.

Jarhyn claims to be a compatibilist, yet uses - with no real explanation, 'arbitrary algorithms' to support his claim, which appears to be some mish mash of Libertarian free will and compatibilism....but then, it's hard to tell what it's meant to be.

I don't will things at random. What I want is determined, and that I want it, and so can and do pursue it, is free will.

Determinism sets all events according to antecedent events/conditions, which has nothing to do with will. Where will, the desire or impulse to do something is fixed by the state of the system in any instance of decision making.....which is why compatibilists define free will as acting without being forced or coerced, yet conveniently ignore that the internal means of decision making and acting is as just as much a constraint on free will as external factors.

Random will would simply be (and indeed is) insanity. People whose desires arise seemingly at random are literally crazy.

Of course. Perhaps someone should tell Jarhyn that 'arbitrary algorithms' have nothing to do with compatibilism or free will.
 
That is how a deterministic system works, even according to you.


Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''
In what way is randomness even vaguely connected to will?

I don't will things at random. What I want is determined, and that I want it, and so can and do pursue it, is free will.

Random will would simply be (and indeed is) insanity. People whose desires arise seemingly at random are literally crazy.
He doesn't understand the difference between "any arbitrarily selected", as in "pick any of these; all of them are wills" and "random" as in "constructed only from discorrolate/indeterministic process"


What you fail to understand is that compatibilist free will has absolutely nothing to do your 'arbitrary algorithms' defense, nor any of the things you mention above. Zilch. All bogus defensive accusations. That your whole line of defense is false. So either you still don't understand compatibilism or determinism as these are defined.....or you are off with the Pixies, where you set your own terms, where computers have a mind, consciousness and free will of their own.....as you have claimed in the past.

But keep on trying.
 
What you fail to understand is that
Oh I QUITE understand that your reading comprehension is nil on the subject.

Have fun playing Pigeon Chess with yourself.
 
Determinism sets all events according to antecedent events/conditions, which has nothing to do with will.
That's right. It has nothing to do with will at all. So why are you talking about it?

You do know that your statement quoted above is agreed with by compatibilists, right? Indeed, it's a fair summary of the entire compatibilist position.
 
compatibilists define free will as acting without being forced or coerced, yet conveniently ignore that the internal means of decision making and acting is as just as much a constraint on free will as external factors.
They don't ignore it; They just correctly consider internal events to be part of "me". When my internal cascade of entirely deterministic (but unpredictably complex) events results in an action, that is my will. It's mine, because it is internal to me; It exists only because I exist.
 
compatibilists define free will as acting without being forced or coerced, yet conveniently ignore that the internal means of decision making and acting is as just as much a constraint on free will as external factors.
They don't ignore it; They just correctly consider internal events to be part of "me". When my internal cascade of entirely deterministic (but unpredictably complex) events results in an action, that is my will. It's mine, because it is internal to me; It exists only because I exist.


Considering that it is 'a part of me' doesn't resolve the issue of free will, be it compatibilist, Libertarian or the common notion of being able to take nay option in any given instance of decision making, not when that 'part of me' does not act freely according to your will. Where there no will involved in how will is being expressed, how you think or what you do. That is set, fixed, done and dusted before the thought, decision or will to act is even experienced consciously, first inputs then memory integration followed by thought and action.

That is not free will.
 
Determinism sets all events according to antecedent events/conditions, which has nothing to do with will.
That's right. It has nothing to do with will at all. So why are you talking about it?

As I said, Jarhyn claims to be a compatibilist, yet he is using 'arbitrary algorithms' as a means of defending compatibalism when there is nothing arbitrary within a deterministic system as it is defined.



You do know that your statement quoted above is agreed with by compatibilists, right? Indeed, it's a fair summary of the entire compatibilist position.

It's the compatibilist definition of free will that's flawed. It is flawed because it acknowledges external elements, force, coercion, yet the compatibilist brushes aside internal necessity where all actions are produced by a deterministic processes.



''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

If someone wants to insist that actions produced by a deterministic process is an example of free will, they need to explain why.

Just saying 'it's a part of you' doesn't work because it is no more an example of freedom of will than being coerced to act in a certain way by an external agent.
 
What you fail to understand is that
Oh I QUITE understand that your reading comprehension is nil on the subject.

Have fun playing Pigeon Chess with yourself.

All you do is show attitude and whine. You invoked 'arbitrary algorithms in defense of compatibilist position (which you claimed to be, yet offered no explanation on how 'arbitratry algoriths' relate to determinism or the compatibalist definition of free will....which is basically to 'act without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced.

Are you able to do that? Can you explain how your 'arbitrary algorithms' defense helps to support compatibilism?

How does it work in relation to determinism? How does it relate to the compatibalist definition of free will?
 
you... offered no explanation on how 'arbitratry algoriths' relate to determinism or the compatibalist definition of free will....
If you think that it is because you have understood exactly zero of my posts on the subject for the last half a decade.

Algorithms are wills. A "will: document" is an explicit algorithm for dispensing with your stuff. A "will: personal intention of action" is an algorithm to accomplish some goal. In fact it's trivially obvious just from "intention of action".

A "will to eat steak" is the result of "a will to generate a will to eat stake given the goal 'to eat steak", and "eating steak" is the result of successfully execution of "a will to eat steak". The successful execution is itself the measure of the freedom of that will towards successful execution.

Any of these are "arbitrary algorithms held by systems capable of supporting some set of arbitrary algorithms".

If you wanted to make a system that "eats steak" by the definition of sliding meat across some sensor, you cannot do that without implementing some algorithm to do so, and that algorithm IS "the will to do so".

Some such systems have a "will to source wills from (inside arbitrary boundary) and work to maintain or guarantee their freedom, and to reject wills from (outside arbitrary boundary) which align against the internally sourced wills/goal states." We call this specific will "free will", and when it is in the failed state, we call this "lacking free will" with respect to the outside goal's execution.

In all situations where the common language statement "I lacked free will" is rendered, the person is saying, effectively, "the will didn't come from inside me, it came from outside me, and I executed it anyway".

How can I make this any more clear to you that this IS the compatibilist definition of free will?

You seem to be the one here incapable of accounting for the compatibilistic acceptance of "inner necessity" being the entire point. (Inside the boundary) IS me, and in fact the part that defines this arbitrary boundary is the thing that in any moment creates "me-ness".
 

Determinism sets all events according to antecedent events/conditions, which has nothing to do with will. Where will, the desire or impulse to do something is fixed by the state of the system in any instance of decision making.....which is why compatibilists define free will as acting without being forced or coerced, yet conveniently ignore that the internal means of decision making and acting is as just as much a constraint on free will as external factors.


The same old stupid merry-go-round — “the internal blah blah blah … is just as much a constraint on free will as external factor.” So one is a constraint on oneself! And yes, that COULD be — for instance, when someone CHOOSES to exercise self-control. But you don’t mean that. In the end it doesn’t matter, because you refuse EVER to address the points put to you, such as about Libet, and the study that contradicted his initial findings, and the modal fallacy, and about who or what built a great building or wrote a great symphony if not the architect/composer themelves, on and on. What a total waste of time! o_O
 


Considering that it is 'a part of me' doesn't resolve the issue of free will, be it compatibilist, Libertarian or the common notion of being able to take nay option in any given instance of decision making, not when that 'part of me' does not act freely according to your will. Where there no will involved in how will is being expressed, how you think or what you do. That is set, fixed, done and dusted before the thought, decision or will to act is even experienced consciously, first inputs then memory integration followed by thought and action.
So, we’re back the big bang writing a major improv jazz piece, as Jerry Coyne believes.

Yawn.

 


Considering that it is 'a part of me' doesn't resolve the issue of free will, be it compatibilist, Libertarian or the common notion of being able to take nay option in any given instance of decision making, not when that 'part of me' does not act freely according to your will. Where there no will involved in how will is being expressed, how you think or what you do. That is set, fixed, done and dusted before the thought, decision or will to act is even experienced consciously, first inputs then memory integration followed by thought and action.
So, we’re back the big bang writing a major improv jazz piece, as Jerry Coyne believes.

Yawn.
"Tell me you believe in God without telling me you believe in God"
 
That’s exactly it. The big bang replaces god.
 
That’s exactly it. The big bang replaces god.
And like, it's still full on Calvinism, just with all the words changed to hide the theology aspect of it.
 


Considering that it is 'a part of me' doesn't resolve the issue of free will, be it compatibilist, Libertarian or the common notion of being able to take nay option in any given instance of decision making, not when that 'part of me' does not act freely according to your will. Where there no will involved in how will is being expressed, how you think or what you do. That is set, fixed, done and dusted before the thought, decision or will to act is even experienced consciously, first inputs then memory integration followed by thought and action.
So, we’re back the big bang writing a major improv jazz piece, as Jerry Coyne believes.

Yawn.

Yawn away, yawn till your jaw aches, yet you cannot refute how determinism is defined, how it works, or the implications that it has for freedom of choice or freedom of will.

Many if not most compatibilists understand the implications, and that is why they define free will as acting according to ones will without external force, coercion or undue influence.

They do this because they understand that determinism does not permit any choice at any given instance. They understand that the brain as a decision maker is bound by antecedents, which does not permit alternate or 'arbitrary' actions.


This is not me saying it, but a compatibilist on this forum, as I'm sure you recall;

''However, in order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for lunch.

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment'' - Marvin Edwards.


Which includes the definition you gave.
 
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