According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[pood]

I contemplate this post, consider it

But the words “contemplate” and “consider” are not themselves descriptive. They can refer to experiences, but they do not describe experiences.

The experience of contemplating involves thinking things over deeply, which all of us have done (maybe not Trump) and the description is self-evident. When I consider choices I mentally weigh options which also ought to be self-evident. Are the choices real or illusory? Sure they are real. Just because I didn’t reach for the Pepsi but for the Coke instead doesn’t mean I couldn’t have done so. Actually I don’t reach for either in general because they are unhealthy sugar bombs.

 

[pood]

Perhaps the sticking point in these discussion is the word “free,” because it seems to imply libertarianism. I fully acknowledge that I am not free of a vast network of interacting forces and conditions, including genes and memes. These conditions help me form a will to choose something for other, but I deny that they dictate my choices.

 

[The AntiChris]

Function is not necessarily will. Computer have programmed function and purpose, while a brain generates thought and response according to its inherent makeup and condition, life experience and memory....which is not a matter of free will.

Where memory failure alone results in an inability to recognize, understand or respond rationally. Free will? Nah, just a conscious interactive form of response determined by unconscious means, the work of neural network.

There lies the inadequacy of compatibilism and defining free will as 'acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced.'

The failure being;

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

"Basic-desert responsibility" is not a core element of compatibilism.

Some compatibilists may subscribe to 'basic-desert' but many (most?) do not and, like me, find the concept incoherent.

 

[Jarhyn]

I will say I reject believing in idealism for the same reason I reject Fatalism: it seems to me an attempt to declare something that exists on whatever other bound of certainty/uncertainty to instead sit across all of it.

I do think experience is something that exists across all concrete forms which have some connected dimension of change. This would be that It is like something to be anything that happens to experience change, but this only happens at the utterly concrete end where "can" instead becomes "did" at some identified location, such that something cannot exist except somehow "concretely".

To me this just makes more sense than utter idealism.

You also invoke a definition that includes natural law, but I say there are no natural laws

This is the most important part, really, I think, to acknowledge: there are no such thing as natural laws that don't end at the borders of the continuity.

It is yet again this subtly embedded idea of "necessitation" outside of "context", and it doesn't really hold as logically consistent.

So while there may be laws accorded to some natural process there are no utter or necessary laws other than the law of non-contradiction

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

The experience of contemplating involves thinking things over deeply, which all of us have done (maybe not Trump) and the description is self-evident. When I consider choices I mentally weigh options which also ought to be self-evident. Are the choices real or illusory? Sure they are real. Just because I didn’t reach for the Pepsi but for the Coke instead doesn’t mean I couldn’t have done so. Actually I don’t reach for either in general because they are unhealthy sugar bombs.

Perhaps the sticking point in these discussion is the word “free,” because it seems to imply libertarianism. I fully acknowledge that I am not free of a vast network of interacting forces and conditions, including genes and memes. These conditions help me form a will to choose something for other, but I deny that they dictate my choices

I have for a long time thought of descriptions for such matters as "thinking things over deeply" to be "self-evident" inasmuch as I have thought that "thinking things over deeply" was the sort of experience which has at least a kernel of commonality for persons. It is possible that the commonality of experience is not as extensive as I have thought, but it is also possible that descriptions are underappreciated for being a critical factor regarding experiences such that a lacking of or in descriptions can at least on some occasions be detrimental.

It is the "self-evident" which often ultimately calls for analysis - especially when that which seems self-evident tends not to actually get described.

When presented with or offered a Pepsi and a Coke, you can "decide" to take the Pepsi, or you can "decide" to take the Coke, or you can "decide" to refrain. In that situation, you can "decide" without deliberating, or you can "decide" after deliberating.

Particularly when you deliberate, you have the experience of thinking that there are multiple possibilities which are effectible, and your deliberating can lead to you choosing. When you have the experience of thinking that there are multiple possibilities which are effectible, you do not think that the indeterminateness apparent in that situation is "imaginary".

Just because you reach for the Pepsi or reach for the Coke or, instead, refrain, does not mean you could not have done otherwise - certainly in the case of the indeterminateness being actual. Even if the indeterminateness is not actual, in the modal logic domain which is non-physicalist and non-determinist, it is most definitely a logical error to insist that it is modally necessary that you do what you do.

On the other hand, if the indeterminateness is not actual and if the description provided by physicalist determinism is wholly apt, then the physicalist determinism physics logic (which is distinct from modal logic) simply asserts that actions are so very constricted that it is physically but not modally necessary that you do what you do.

Even the most strident physicalist determinist does not have the experience that physics "dictates". By the physics logic of physicalist determinism, even the most strident physicalist determinist logically would have to recognize that the composer is necessary in order for his or her composition to be effected.

It is no less preposterous to insist that physics "dictates" than it is to proclaim that indeterminateness is "imaginary". When the Coyne-story composer objected to being told that he did not compose his piece since what he did was just a matter of inexorable physics, that composer was objecting essentially to the idea of physics dictating along with the notion that all of the possibilities with which he worked were imaginary.

 

[Jarhyn]

physically but not modally necessary that you do what you do.

Nope. It is never "necessary" in this utter sense you are trying to support.

Physics does not necessitate, nor is physics as we experience it "necessary", particularly where and when it doesn't actually hold.

There is no thing "utterly" necessary but noncontradiction.

This has been the whole point of my discussion on a general view of time, which you have apparently either failed to read entirely or failed to understand.

"Necessitation" happens under a context; you remove the context and you remove the "necessitation". Physical reality as we experience it, however, presents us the reality of immediately observable parallel contexts in the form of parallel positions. We can observe that the more contextualized something is, the fewer contexts it is "true" in, the less "necessary" it is.

Physical truths, being true in presumably exactly one place, are the diametric opposite of necessary. The very idea of it is a contradiction.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

It is never "necessary" in this utter sense you are trying to support.

Please consider the context. There was no "utter sense". There was a contextually constricted sense. That is why it is sensible to say "physically but not modally necessary".

Physics does not necessitate

Again, please consider the context. The physics is not doing the doing. The physics was used to constrain logic to a context; that context is called the physical. There is a sense in which even logic does not necessitate, and that is the case even if there is anything which is modally necessary.

This has been the whole point of my discussion on a general view of time, which you have apparently either failed to read entirely or failed to understand.

I have neither failed to read nor failed to understand. When time permits - wait, time does not permit; huh, must be a way of saying something though; what can that something be? - I will attempt to show that your way of speaking in terms of location and context can be perfectly compatible with other ways of expressing in terms of eternal.

Physical truths, being true in presumably exactly one place [or,as I believe you also sometimes say: location or context], are the diametric opposite of necessary. The very idea of it is a contradiction.

Truths are not physical.

I can say that truths are physical inasmuch as they are thought. I can say truths are physical insofar as they are expressed (as thoughts). But to call them physical truths is at least misleading in that what would most correctly be claimed is that there can be truths (true expressions/statements) about or describing what we deem the physical.

In order for those truths to be truths, they are expressions which put forth/describe determinate conditions. If A is possible, then A is possible is not a truth; it is what is referred to as a possible truth. Possible A and Possible not-A together present the determinate condition that is a necessary (in the sense of required) condition for truth (and here we can say: simpliciter) - a condition which neither Possible A by itself nor Possible not-A by itself describe determinately/definitively.

 

[Jarhyn]

There was a contextually constricted sense

No, that's the problem: "necessary" and "under constricted context" are direct antonyms. You. Are. Invoking. Contradictions.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

There was a contextually constricted sense

No, that's the problem: "necessary" and "under constricted context" are direct antonyms. You. Are. Invoking. Contradictions.

And you are yet again effecting the modal fallacy by failing or refusing to understand that there is no modally necessary definition of "necessary".

 

[Jarhyn]

There was a contextually constricted sense

No, that's the problem: "necessary" and "under constricted context" are direct antonyms. You. Are. Invoking. Contradictions.

And you are yet again effecting the modal fallacy by failing or refusing to understand that there is no modally necessary definition of "necessary".

Nope. No modal fallacy there.

There IS something of metaphysics we are accessing here when discussing "necessity".

I am specifically discussing exactly the "modal boundary", which is created by freeing contextual constraints.

If you would like to present some concept of necessitation that doesn't comport to this modal boundary, actually present it rather than merely claiming it can make sense somehow.

If A is possible, then A is possible is not a truth; it is what is referred to as a possible truth

If A is possible (under some set of assumptions), through the observation of that set of assumptions and the execution of A, then "A is possible" is proven true, specifically by "A". It is not a possible truth at that point; it is a definitive truth... But specifically on the context of the observation that proved it.

We can even prove the possibility of A by proving the possibility of the components of A, and of the combinability of components in general without ever actually directly observing A.

That is quite definitive, not merely "possible". However, the truth is still contingent the set of assumptions; it's not necessary, or necessarily true of all contexts, or any other sort of necessary. It just is without respect to necessitation.

It is only true where those physics happen to be true.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

With regards to the matters of determinism and macrophysical indeterminateness, I said that to hold that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness within or at any context or location or position or time is to hold that there is eternal determinateness.

I also noted:

that the word eternal can be used in a way that does not include necessitation.

After all, descriptions of conditions or locations do not effect the conditions or locations described.

In response, you insist that:

Eternal is a statement, fundamentally, about positionlessness.

But that is absolutely false. The supposed determinateness is NOT positionless; rather, the supposed determinateness - the condition of there being supposed determinateness - is supposedly the case at each and every "position". That is the very opposite of being positionless; it is the very opposite of "positionlessness".

Eternal can be used to mean "at all times" which, in your manner of expression, would mean at all positions or all locations and even in all contexts.

So, if you deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, you hold that there is determinateness at all positions which means there is determinateness at all times, and that is to admit that the supposed determinateness is sensibly described as eternal. And that is another way of asserting that determinateness is utter - even if it is not modally necessary.

I am specifically discussing exactly the "modal boundary", which is created by freeing contextual constraints.

If you would like to present some concept of necessitation that doesn't comport to this modal boundary, actually present it rather than merely claiming it can make sense somehow.

"Specifically discussing" is the opposite of "freeing contextual constraints." Be that as it may, necessary conditions necessitate nothing - unless they also happen to be sufficient conditions, in which case it is not so much that they necessitate as it is that they are simply sufficient.

If A is possible (under some set of assumptions), through the observation of that set of assumptions and the execution of A, then "A is possible" is proven true, specifically by "A". It is not a possible truth at that point; it is a definitive truth

And you have made my point about the difference between the indeterminateness presumed with "A is possible" and the determinateness of "A is true".

the truth is still contingent

To say that "A is true", even in the sense that "only A could have followed" or even in the sense that "A necessarily follows" is not to say that "A is not contingently true", and it is not to say that "A is modally necessary". Indeed, even incompatibilist-determinists need not hold that an utterly physical reality is modally necessary; they can hold that the reality is contingently the case, and the rest of their points can still be valid and not modally fallacious products.

I realize that necessary, necessitate, and necessitation are all inherited terms, but, in order to appreciate that there is no modally necessary definition for necessary, the concepts at issue can be discussed without reference to those inherited terms. That is a way of "freeing contextual constraints".

 

[Jarhyn]

With regards to the matters of determinism and macrophysical indeterminateness, I said that to hold that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness within or at any context or location or position or time is to hold that there is eternal determinateness

Except that we have plenty of logical contexts where that isn't the case.

is supposedly the case at each and every "position"

No, you're missing "positions" and "contexts" of specifically indeterminate natures, even if those happen outside the context of physics we experience.

You are assuming hidden contexts, and pretending you are not.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

No, you're missing "positions" and "contexts" of specifically indeterminate natures, even if those happen outside the context of physics we experience.

The issue is not "natures"; the context is macrophysical indeterminateness - such as that which we think we experience when we deliberate. If you have the experience of there being such macrophysical indeterminateness, do you regard it as actual, mind-independent, physical indeterminateness? Or, do you regard it as imaginary, as illusion, as non-actual other than as being entirely produced by your own mind/being?

 

[bilby]

the brain is the decision maker, where the decisions that are made are determined by the state of the brain in any given instance in time.

Yup. Welcome to compatibilism. I knew you'd come around eventually.

 

[bilby]

Keep in mind that the brain itself, though the sole agent of thought and decision making, is inseparable from the system at large; the environment in which it operates.

Who ever sugggested that it wasn't?

"Disconnected from reality" is synonymous with "insane" for a reason.

Sane people make decisions according to reality as they understand it - that fact in no way threatens or challenges any aspect of compatibilism.

 

[DBT]

I did. I also pointed out that it is the non chosen condition of a brain, neural architecture, brain state any instance of decision making, …

Decision making? Who or what makes the decision? The Big Bang?

No, the brain is the decision maker, where the decisions that are made are determined by the state of the brain in any given instance in time.

That is according to the terms and conditions of determinism as compatibilists define it to be.

You can't circumvent the terms without eroding the foundation of compatibilism, the argument that free will is compatible with determinism

Keep in mind that the brain itself, though the sole agent of thought and decision making, is inseparable from the system at large; the environment in which it operates.

I again invite you to offer an account of how the Big Bang writes a novel, paints a picture, designs a building or composes a symphony. To the best of my recollection you have never answered these questions.

No need, we all know how determinism is defined by now.

If not, here's a reminder;

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Determinism: given the state of the world at any moment in time, there is only one way it can be at the next moment.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

Compatibilists are of course 'determinists' who define their own concept of free will in relation to determinism.

None of this explains how determinism — a mindless descriptive process — writes a novel, paints a picture, designs a building or composes a symphony.

That's not how it works. People write, paint, etc. If the world is deterministic, causal determinism is a definition of how the world works.

You know how it works. Conditions on earth enabled life to form, three billion years of microbes and five hundred million years of multicellular evolution before a species that is capable of higher order information processing, with the ability to write, and paint and build spacecraft.

And It didn't happen through free will.

 

[DBT]

Function is not necessarily will. Computer have programmed function and purpose, while a brain generates thought and response according to its inherent makeup and condition, life experience and memory....which is not a matter of free will.

Where memory failure alone results in an inability to recognize, understand or respond rationally. Free will? Nah, just a conscious interactive form of response determined by unconscious means, the work of neural network.

There lies the inadequacy of compatibilism and defining free will as 'acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced.'

The failure being;

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

"Basic-desert responsibility" is not a core element of compatibilism.

Some compatibilists may subscribe to 'basic-desert' but many (most?) do not and, like me, find the concept incoherent.

But it is an element of the idea of free will. That is the point.

 

[DBT]

Keep in mind that the brain itself, though the sole agent of thought and decision making, is inseparable from the system at large; the environment in which it operates.

Who ever sugggested that it wasn't?

"Disconnected from reality" is synonymous with "insane" for a reason.

Sane people make decisions according to reality as they understand it - that fact in no way threatens or challenges any aspect of compatibilism.

That is where compatibilism goes wrong. If you acknowledge that the brain is inseparable from the system, and the system is deterministic, where the conditions do not permit alternate thoughts and actions, where what you think and do is set, fixed, inevitable, that is not a system that is compatible with the notion of freedom of will.

If you must think and do according to how events within the system evolve, not a matter of choice, that is not an example of freedom of will, and in spite of how compatibilists define free will, what we think and do has nothing to do with freedom of will, and free will is not compatible with determinism.

 

[The AntiChris]

Function is not necessarily will. Computer have programmed function and purpose, while a brain generates thought and response according to its inherent makeup and condition, life experience and memory....which is not a matter of free will.

Where memory failure alone results in an inability to recognize, understand or respond rationally. Free will? Nah, just a conscious interactive form of response determined by unconscious means, the work of neural network.

There lies the inadequacy of compatibilism and defining free will as 'acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced.'

The failure being;

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

"Basic-desert responsibility" is not a core element of compatibilism.

Some compatibilists may subscribe to 'basic-desert' but many (most?) do not and, like me, find the concept incoherent.

But it is an element of the idea of free will. That is the point.

It may well be an element of your particular take on free will but as you must have noticed, there's more than one notion of free will at play here.

 

[pood]

I did. I also pointed out that it is the non chosen condition of a brain, neural architecture, brain state any instance of decision making, …

Decision making? Who or what makes the decision? The Big Bang?

No, the brain is the decision maker, where the decisions that are made are determined by the state of the brain in any given instance in time.

That is according to the terms and conditions of determinism as compatibilists define it to be.

You can't circumvent the terms without eroding the foundation of compatibilism, the argument that free will is compatible with determinism

Keep in mind that the brain itself, though the sole agent of thought and decision making, is inseparable from the system at large; the environment in which it operates.

I again invite you to offer an account of how the Big Bang writes a novel, paints a picture, designs a building or composes a symphony. To the best of my recollection you have never answered these questions.

No need, we all know how determinism is defined by now.

If not, here's a reminder;

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Determinism: given the state of the world at any moment in time, there is only one way it can be at the next moment.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

Compatibilists are of course 'determinists' who define their own concept of free will in relation to determinism.

None of this explains how determinism — a mindless descriptive process — writes a novel, paints a picture, designs a building or composes a symphony.

That's not how it works. People write, paint, etc. If the world is deterministic, causal determinism is a definition of how the world works.

You know how it works. Conditions on earth enabled life to form, three billion years of microbes and five hundred million years of multicellular evolution before a species that is capable of higher order information processing, with the ability to write, and paint and build spacecraft.

And It didn't happen through free will.

It’s still not an answer. You are arguing not for determinism, but for predeterminisdm. And I would like to know how the Big Bang predetermined a novel, a painting, a building, a symphony. Certainly Jerry Coyne believed his jazz musician did not write his composition, but was a meat robot — his very term. Do you agree with him?