According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[WAB]

A random event is generally defined mathematically as one event not predictably affecting the next event

I will note that one of the major issues in this discussion is that there are two different concepts of "random" flitting about though this discussion...

It seems to me the reason the discussion attracts perennial interest, and has for centuries, is because it's unresolvable, and it's unresolvable primarily because by and large participants can't agree on definitions, and because they understand various concepts in different ways, not to mention that even if it could be resolved to the satisfaction of everyone, it makes not a lick of difference in how we go about our lives.

It does no good to tell me that I have no actual choices and that everything happens by 'necessity'. If it's reality, that's one aspect of reality I feel content to ignore: because I have to ignore it in order to live and to act.

 

[peacegirl]

A random event is generally defined mathematically as one event not predictably affecting the next event

I will note that one of the major issues in this discussion is that there are two different concepts of "random" flitting about though this discussion...

It seems to me the reason the discussion attracts perennial interest, and has for centuries, is because it's unresolvable,

I don't think that is the reason. It has a lot to do with whether we are to blame based on whether we could have chosen otherwise. Blame and punishment are the cornerstones of our civilization because our justice and penal systems are based on the belief that the "wrongdoer" (judged by the laws within a society) didn't have to do what he did and is therefore deserving of just desert or punishment.

The phrase "just deserts" refers to the punishment or reward that one deserves due to their actions. It is often used in a negative context, indicating that someone will receive the appropriate consequences for their wrongdoing. The term "desert" in this context is derived from the Old French word "deservir," meaning "to deserve".
Merriam Webster

and it's unresolvable primarily because by and large participants can't agree on definitions, and because they understand various concepts in different ways, not to mention that even if it could be resolved to the satisfaction of everyone, it makes not a lick of difference in how we go about our lives.

Not at this time, but once we understand the accurate definition of determinism (which is not arbitrary) as it relates to human thought and action, then the conflict between these two opposing ideologies can be resolved and lead us to a more peaceful world. But I have gotten so much blowback from this group that it's hard to continue.

It does no good to tell me that I have no actual choices and that everything happens by 'necessity'. If it's reality, that's one aspect of reality I feel content to ignore: because I have to ignore it in order to live and to act.

You are misunderstanding what is meant by determinism like so many. The truth of determinism does not take anything away from you. You, as an agent, are not left out of the equation of choice-making. It is true that everything happens out of necessity, once a choice has been made, but this does not mean your future is already determined, where you have no say in the matter.

 

[Jarhyn]

A random event is generally defined mathematically as one event not predictably affecting the next event

I will note that one of the major issues in this discussion is that there are two different concepts of "random" flitting about though this discussion...

It seems to me the reason the discussion attracts perennial interest, and has for centuries, is because it's unresolvable, and it's unresolvable primarily because participants can't agree on definitions and understand various concepts in different ways, not to mention that even if it could be resolved to the satisfaction of everyone, it makes not a lick of difference in how we go about our lives.

It does no good to tell me that I have no actual choices and that everything happens by 'necessity'. If it's reality, that's one aspect of reality I feel content to ignore: because I have to ignore it in order to live and to act.

Well, I think anyone with a background in math can "agree" on the definitions because the mathematical definitions of these things are quite fixed.

In fact when it comes to math, oftentimes we find that definitions converge between disciplines: people find out that their definitions share identity with definitions of other terms in those other fields.

This tells me that if we are going to approach such a subject as might have definitions handled within the discussion of math, we ought use those because they are eminently useful in ways that other sorts of definitions are not.

I can apply terms defined within math to solve problems.

I cannot use "fatalism" to build anything. It offers no useful... Anything.

I can use the discussion of autonomy to make a relatively autonomous thing.

I can use the discussion about wills to make a system that builds alternative "wills".

I can use the discussion of freedom and constraint to isolate where in a system the freedom towards some outcome was constrained, and whether the system is free from external constraints.

I can use the discussion of responsibility to isolate where in a system some outcome is arising from.

But for some reason, perhaps owing to the utterly unnecessary assumption tacked on which Occam's razor directs us to cut away, or perhaps due to the fact that there's an insufficiently bounded comprehension principle kicking around in the mix, or perhaps at times due to a modal fallacy injected at a foolish time, or perhaps all of these, Fatalism fails to actually give us anything but an excuse to ignore the immediately apparent facts of autonomy, wills, alternatives, freedom and responsibility.

In fact...

Just imagine, someone comes up to you and says "give me three different alternatives to choose from, of this deck of playing cards".

We should all be fairly able to understand this as them saying to pick three cards and hand them to them, with the idea that after this act, they will make a choice involving those cards.

They might hand these cards back to you, two of them, and say "show me the four alternative ways to order one or more of these two cards".

(C1; C1, C2; C2, C1; C2)

The word "alternative" has a meaning, In math, that does not have any requirement for it to exist at the same time and place and context!

It's almost like Fatalism is a worse-than-useless belief.

 

[bilby]

It does no good to tell me that I have no actual choices and that everything happens by 'necessity'. If it's reality, that's one aspect of reality I feel content to ignore: because I have to ignore it in order to live and to act.

It's almost like Fatalism is a worse-than-useless belief.

Indeed; Not only wrong, but pointless even if it were right.

 

[Jarhyn]

It does no good to tell me that I have no actual choices and that everything happens by 'necessity'. If it's reality, that's one aspect of reality I feel content to ignore: because I have to ignore it in order to live and to act.

It's almost like Fatalism is a worse-than-useless belief.

Indeed; Not only wrong, but pointless even if it were right.

Well, I mean, it does have ONE use, particularly for the person who doesn't act at all like a fatalist: people who DO act as Fatalists, people who do not seek to steer their own will but let others and their own first intuition do so at all times may be steered very easily to give up their dreams and act according to the will of the false fatalist.

 

[bilby]

It does no good to tell me that I have no actual choices and that everything happens by 'necessity'. If it's reality, that's one aspect of reality I feel content to ignore: because I have to ignore it in order to live and to act.

It's almost like Fatalism is a worse-than-useless belief.

Indeed; Not only wrong, but pointless even if it were right.

Well, I mean, it does have ONE use, particularly for the person who doesn't act at all like a fatalist: people who DO act as Fatalists, people who do not seek to steer their own will but let others and their own first intuition do so at all times may be steered very easily to give up their dreams and act according to the will of the false fatalist.

Well, it's not like they have a choice.

 

[peacegirl]

A random event is generally defined mathematically as one event not predictably affecting the next event

I will note that one of the major issues in this discussion is that there are two different concepts of "random" flitting about though this discussion...

It seems to me the reason the discussion attracts perennial interest, and has for centuries, is because it's unresolvable, and it's unresolvable primarily because participants can't agree on definitions and understand various concepts in different ways, not to mention that even if it could be resolved to the satisfaction of everyone, it makes not a lick of difference in how we go about our lives.

It does no good to tell me that I have no actual choices and that everything happens by 'necessity'. If it's reality, that's one aspect of reality I feel content to ignore: because I have to ignore it in order to live and to act.

Well, I think anyone with a background in math can "agree" on the definitions because the mathematical definitions of these things are quite fixed.

In fact when it comes to math, oftentimes we find that definitions converge between disciplines: people find out that their definitions share identity with definitions of other terms in those other fields.

This tells me that if we are going to approach such a subject as might have definitions handled within the discussion of math, we ought use those because they are eminently useful in ways that other sorts of definitions are not.

I can apply terms defined within math to solve problems.

I cannot use "fatalism" to build anything. It offers no useful... Anything.

I can use the discussion of autonomy to make a relatively autonomous thing.

I can use the discussion about wills to make a system that builds alternative "wills".

I can use the discussion of freedom and constraint to isolate where in a system the freedom towards some outcome was constrained, and whether the system is free from external constraints.

I can use the discussion of responsibility to isolate where in a system some outcome is arising from.

But for some reason, perhaps owing to the utterly unnecessary assumption tacked on which Occam's razor directs us to cut away, or perhaps due to the fact that there's an insufficiently bounded comprehension principle kicking around in the mix, or perhaps at times due to a modal fallacy injected at a foolish time, or perhaps all of these, Fatalism fails to actually give us anything but an excuse to ignore the immediately apparent facts of autonomy, wills, alternatives, freedom and responsibility.

In fact...

Just imagine, someone comes up to you and says "give me three different alternatives to choose from, of this deck of playing cards".

We should all be fairly able to understand this as them saying to pick three cards and hand them to them, with the idea that after this act, they will make a choice involving those cards.

They might hand these cards back to you, two of them, and say "show me the four alternative ways to order one or more of these two cards".

(C1; C1, C2; C2, C1; C2)

The word "alternative" has a meaning, In math, that does not have any requirement for it to exist at the same time and place and context!

It's almost like Fatalism is a worse-than-useless belief.

The word “alternative” has meaning in determinism. We have alternatives Jaryn, which is why we contemplate. I’m sure you’ve contemplated what to discuss even in this thread. It is an important attribute given to humans. You keep bringing fatalism up as if it’s the same thing as determinism. Fatalism doesn’t mean we wash our hands of doing anything because nothing matters in the end. That’s very destructive but that is not the same thing as determinism (i.e. the more accurate definition) and does not take anything away from you (especially the will to make your own decisions), even if that will is not free, and never was.

 

[steve_bank]

A random event is generally defined mathematically as one event not predictably affecting the next event

I will note that one of the major issues in this discussion is that there are two different concepts of "random" flitting about though this discussion: the one you just stated about correlation between events; and "indeterminate" randomness, "true randomness" of the sort math cannot even possibly express.

Deterministic systems can be dripping with "discorrolate randomness"; the one thing a deterministic system cannot abide is "indeterminate randomness".

I was responding to Pg's assertion random events have no effect on daily life. They do IAW the definition of a random variable.

Regardless of how the universe works to us there are observed phenomena we define as random.

I just gad a 'random; thought and can not think of any antecedents tat led to my thought.

Random/randomness can be co opted for different uses than math.

The debate come down to deterministic causality versus random. Can something be random but causal?

 

[Jarhyn]

Can something be random but causal?

This is why I brought up relativity in an aperiodic field structure.

Yes, something can be "random" but causal.

First, take a "placement regime" for Spectre tiles (or any aperiodic tile placement field; if you place chevrons with a suitable regime, they will be aperiodic, for example).

Once you have an infinite field of such shapes, imagine each tile has an initially identical ant on it, facing towards the same point of the einstein tile.

Let's say light travels at 1 tile distance per minute, and a minute is more than enough time for the ant to think about everything it sees.

Assuming the "identical ant" does not know anything about what the placement regime is, you now have something "random", and "differently random" at every tile:

Every finite patch repeats an infinite number of times at different orientations and with different surrounding contexts and similar surrounding contexts but at different orientations and different surrounding contexts, meaning that given the infinite variance in placement regime, and the infinite extent of how far the ant may be "thrown" from the origin of the placement (and this isn't even considering that there are many "equally" simple placement regime and disruptions and so on), no ant could ever actually be certain of what placement they are in. The ant has an infinitely large problem to solve and a finite amount of information that is found in EVERY possible solution to "solve" it with.

This means that with mathematical certainty that the ants have information that does not correlate to anything they know or expect or could possibly predict coming in constantly, yet the whole thing is "deterministic".

 

[DBT]

at least in terms of not permitting alternate choices in any instance of decision making

Only if you commit the no-true-scotsman and state idiotically that "true" alternatives cannot exist offset from one another.

Or maybe you should try to grasp the significance of given terms of determinism, even as you define it to be.

If you did that you'd understand that the given terms do not permit alternate actions in any given instance, and that what you say does not apply.

We've been over this again and again.

An alternative offset in time and/or space is still an alternative.

I call Crock. But please try to explain how you think it works in terms of brain function, decision making or free will.

I look forward to your contribution.

The conditional branch address is still an address, in computer science terms. The conditoonal branch instruction is still an instruction. Something happens that decides on some third party variable whether or not to branch, and that is the execution of a choice.

Meaningless in terms of how determinism is defined.

That is nothing more than trying to circumvent the terms.

One very important aspect of a complete computing machine is that it has to be capable of branching selectively. It's an absolute requirement. A OISC, a "one instruction set computer" is possible, but only if that instruction contains a selective jump (such as the "subtract and jump if less than or equal to" or SUBLEQ computer).

This is important because we can accurately and reliably identify the existence of this "choosing mechanism", and build one and know that's what it does.

Are you unable to grasp that whatever happens within a deterministic system strictly follows antecedent events?

''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''
Jarhyn

This means that nothing that was not determined can happen, no random events, no alternate actions, otherwise you get deviations in the development of future states of the system....and if you consider your own terms.....

We can identify the addresses that are the alternatives.

No, you are playing with words without regard to the given terms, your very own terms.

Quite simply, if there are alternate actions available in any given instance, it is not determinism.

You are a Libertarian.

You argue against compatibilism without even knowing that you are doing it.

We can identify the nature of the thing that makes the choice (although the "decider of freedom" is very abstract and chaotic, given the nature of that particular computer), and see exactly how and why the alternatives are offset, even if the reasons for its ability to choose are very (weird/circuit) shaped.

Whether or not humans are "computers", if humans can do something abstractly like "jumping between enumerator states" or anything of the like, they can similarly have as much ability to "choose" across "alternatives".

Oh, boy.

 

[peacegirl]

A random event is generally defined mathematically as one event not predictably affecting the next event

I will note that one of the major issues in this discussion is that there are two different concepts of "random" flitting about though this discussion: the one you just stated about correlation between events; and "indeterminate" randomness, "true randomness" of the sort math cannot even possibly express.

Deterministic systems can be dripping with "discorrolate randomness"; the one thing a deterministic system cannot abide is "indeterminate randomness".

I was responding to Pg's assertion random events have no effect on daily life. They do IAW the definition of a random variable.

Regardless of how the universe works to us there are observed phenomena we define as random.

I just gad a 'random; thought and can not think of any antecedents tat led to my thought.

Random/randomness can be co opted for different uses than math.

The debate come down to deterministic causality versus random. Can something be random but causal?

If a random thought comes into your mind that has nothing to do with antecedents, this does not conflict with the lack of human free will. It actually supports it because it is a mechanism in the brain over which you have no control. The term "antecedent" can be taken to mean ONLY the thoughts that you are considering before making a decision. It boils down to definition. I believe the term can mean anything that comes up in the brain, whether you are aware of what prompted the "random" thought or not. It could be that your subconscious brought up thoughts you didn't consciously ask for, but the randomness does nothing to "cause" you to act on this thought (where the rubber meets the road), if it is telling you to go punch the neighbor, for example. It has no actual power unless you give that power to it through your behavior, which you can control. It is your agency (your will) that can accept or reject what the thought is saying, especially if it is instructing you to do something that you really don't want to do. You are in the driver's seat, but this does not mean your will is free. Obviously, you didn't read the correct definition of determinism this author uses regarding the word "cause" being misleading. I can't help you if you refuse to read because we aren't even on the same page.

 

[pood]

Reliably predicting things such as planetary orbits, comets, landing spacecraft on distant planets, etc, supports causality. That events happening now are causally related to past events, where if the links are strong enough, we have causal determinism.....or at least adequate determinism.

I believe your statement gives away too much.

To begin, I believe we both agree that the predictability of given activity is immaterial to the question of whether the given activity could be otherwise than it is as a result of antecedent activity. While some folks argue that predictability follows from Determinism, others disagree. All Incompatibilists agree, however, that the truth of Determinism (if true) forecloses alternatives without regard to the ability of anyone to predict the determined activity.

Secondly, I have an issue with the words "if the links are strong enough." Antecedent activity that is closest in time and proximity to subsequent activity are simply the most obvious of the nearly infinite antecedent activity that coalesces to cause the activity in question. To credit the activity that is closest in time and proximity is akin to attributing the weight of a single straw to breaking a camel's back, when the fact is that every straw is a causal antecedent, as is the age of the camel, the activities of the camel that contributed to the strength of the camel's back, the strength of the force of gravity at the location in which the came is standing, and innumerable other antecedents that combine to cause the instant of camel back collapse.

Determinism posits that the collapse of the camel's back was inevitable at the precise time and location it occurred as a result of all antecedent activity from the beginning of time (Big Bang?) to the moment of collapse. To characterize the antecedent causes of activity as "adequate" within the paradigm of Determinism denigrates their inevitability.

I understand that you are trying to make a point to folks who refuse to understand, much less appreciate the paradigm, but that is no reason to cater to their ignorance, as it feeds into their contrary and unsupportable contentions.

I meant causal links, as in causal determinism;

''Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. The idea is ancient, but first became subject to clarification and mathematical analysis in the eighteenth century. Determinism is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions, on the one hand, and with our views about human free action on the other.''

Which is fundamentally how compatibilists define determinism, yet some on this forum try to deny or circumvent the given terms.

That's all.

Since I reject that definition of causal determinism in toto, for reasons I have repeatedly explained, I am not trying to deny or circumvent anything.

That you reject it doesn't alter the terms and conditions of determinism as defined by compatibilists, which is not that different, at least in terms of not permitting alternate choices in any instance of decision making.

It makes no real difference.

A brief recap:

Necessity is solely a matter of logic and not physics.

The laws of nature are not laws at all.

Therefore the definition given above is fatally flawed

The terms and conditions of determinism as compatibilism define it to be describe how the world physically works, if it is deterministic.

If that is indeed flawed, as you say, compatibilism is flawed. Then compatibilism is flawed in terms of both its definition of determinism and free will.

Did you actually read the article the first paragraph from which you quoted?

 

[pood]

If @DBT had bothered to read the article, the first paragraph from which he quoted, he would have observed that most of the rest of the article goes on to contest the definition of determinism given at the outset. This is very typical for articles at SEP and other places — supply a certain definition and then pick it apart.

The problem here is that DBT is not defending determinism, he is defending hard determinism — which rules out free will a priori by definition. But one must prove hard determinism at the conclusion of an argument, not establish it as a first premise. What we have here is one big fat exercise in question begging.

 

[Jarhyn]

Reliably predicting things such as planetary orbits, comets, landing spacecraft on distant planets, etc, supports causality. That events happening now are causally related to past events, where if the links are strong enough, we have causal determinism.....or at least adequate determinism.

I believe your statement gives away too much.

To begin, I believe we both agree that the predictability of given activity is immaterial to the question of whether the given activity could be otherwise than it is as a result of antecedent activity. While some folks argue that predictability follows from Determinism, others disagree. All Incompatibilists agree, however, that the truth of Determinism (if true) forecloses alternatives without regard to the ability of anyone to predict the determined activity.

Secondly, I have an issue with the words "if the links are strong enough." Antecedent activity that is closest in time and proximity to subsequent activity are simply the most obvious of the nearly infinite antecedent activity that coalesces to cause the activity in question. To credit the activity that is closest in time and proximity is akin to attributing the weight of a single straw to breaking a camel's back, when the fact is that every straw is a causal antecedent, as is the age of the camel, the activities of the camel that contributed to the strength of the camel's back, the strength of the force of gravity at the location in which the came is standing, and innumerable other antecedents that combine to cause the instant of camel back collapse.

Determinism posits that the collapse of the camel's back was inevitable at the precise time and location it occurred as a result of all antecedent activity from the beginning of time (Big Bang?) to the moment of collapse. To characterize the antecedent causes of activity as "adequate" within the paradigm of Determinism denigrates their inevitability.

I understand that you are trying to make a point to folks who refuse to understand, much less appreciate the paradigm, but that is no reason to cater to their ignorance, as it feeds into their contrary and unsupportable contentions.

I meant causal links, as in causal determinism;

''Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. The idea is ancient, but first became subject to clarification and mathematical analysis in the eighteenth century. Determinism is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions, on the one hand, and with our views about human free action on the other.''

Which is fundamentally how compatibilists define determinism, yet some on this forum try to deny or circumvent the given terms.

That's all.

Since I reject that definition of causal determinism in toto, for reasons I have repeatedly explained, I am not trying to deny or circumvent anything.

That you reject it doesn't alter the terms and conditions of determinism as defined by compatibilists, which is not that different, at least in terms of not permitting alternate choices in any instance of decision making.

It makes no real difference.

A brief recap:

Necessity is solely a matter of logic and not physics.

The laws of nature are not laws at all.

Therefore the definition given above is fatally flawed

The terms and conditions of determinism as compatibilism define it to be describe how the world physically works, if it is deterministic.

If that is indeed flawed, as you say, compatibilism is flawed. Then compatibilism is flawed in terms of both its definition of determinism and free will.

Did you actually read the article the first paragraph from which you quoted?

I personally clicked it and gave it a bit of a read and it almost immediately discussed the flaws of fatalism and the problem of philosophically "loose" definitions in favor of mathematical ones which do not justify necessity.

It's always nice when I say something and have an article later shown to me that vindicates what I say.

 

[pood]

See, for example, from the SEP article, Laws of Nature, which discusses whether “laws” of nature are “pushy explainers,” or that they do not exist at all.

Which is what I have been arguing. My stance is basically neo-Humean compatibilism.

 

[Jarhyn]

If @DBT had bothered to read the article, the first paragraph from which he quoted, he would have observed that most of the rest of the article goes on to contest the definition of determinism given at the outset. This is very typical for articles at SEP and other places — supply a certain definition and then pick it apart.

The problem here is that DBT is not defending determinism, he is defending hard determinism — which rules out free will a priori by definition. But one must prove hard determinism at the conclusion of an argument, not establish it as a first premise. What we have here is one big fat exercise in question begging.

I mean, yeah, that's why I rejected that definition some ream's worth of pages ago.

We had exactly the discussion in that article, here, repeatedly.

I made all those observations that there is no suitable cause for the initial condition presented to force it to be just so.

Our perception that it is "just so" is much like the perception that a solipsist may have, lacking understanding of how or why they wouldn't and couldn't possibly directly feel the emotions of others: it is not factual or necessarily true that the initial condition itself was a matter of natural laws, and their disconnect is a product of actual disconnection, not a metaphysical absence or impossibility of the other.

Rather, natural law might very well be that different initial conditions happen in different spatial circumstances that we simply cannot access, like deaf, blind, insensate, mutes slaying next to one another on a floor and each thinking this is the only way things may be, the only thoughts that might be had, as a matter of natural law.

 

[pood]

I must point out that @DBT does this all the time. He finds shit on the Internet that seems to support the conclusion (hard determinism) he incorporates into his first premise (question begging) but fails to actually read the whole article from which he cherry picks. Very often he cherry picks what he wants to hear from people, like Hume, who are compatibilists.

 

[pood]

@DBT has also claimed, if I have read him correctly, than any experiment with the same initial conditions will yield the same result, with the same antecedents entailing the same outcomes. Yet this is not so. See the linked article’s discussion of ceteris paribus.

 

[Jarhyn]

@DBT has also claimed, if I have read him correctly, than any experiment with the same initial conditions will yield the same result, with the same antecedents entailing the same outcomes. Yet this is not so. See the linked article’s discussion of ceteris paribus.

So, from my perspective of experiments embedded in a multidimensional aperiodic field with relative interaction, it's to generally impossible to replicate all initial conditions because the initial condition for the experiment includes small (but still meaningful) influences from a slightly different "relative" view.

If you were to do the experiment to the left, you will see a different "horizon" than you would of you were to do it to the "right" and this is part of the initial condition.

The only time you can do the experiment with the same initial conditions is if you bring the threshold for "importance" of some interaction much higher than the ambient energy, such that the ambient energy cannot overcome the activation energy within the system holding the interaction of interest (Signal would need to be drowned out by sufficiently loud noise).

This happens in circuits, such that only the energy of things like quantum rays and directed EM bursts of specific frequencies tends to overcome the minimum necessary energy for influence.

As a result, we can do this sort of experiment in binary computation, but it is exceedingly difficult to do otherwise.

In physics, there is the concept of the "smallest meaningful amount of energy", under which particles containing less energy will not influence events even in a chaotic way, and this is broadly what is accomplished in a computer: energy bursts smaller than the activation energy of a transistor simply do not matter to the outcome of those experiments, and when such an experiment happens... The result is identical every time (not accounting for the remainder that didn't matter to the result).

But most notably, I have engaged repeatedly in discussing freedom and wills in terms compatible with this property of deterministic execution; as I lay it out, even a software process can have a will, and has observable freedoms, can test how "free" those freedoms are, and even identify the momentary origins of constraint on action.

Clearly whether or not an experiment can be repeated exactly in a universal sense is immaterial to whether or not compatibilist free will may exist.

 

[steve_bank]

I would say from reality as we detect and measure it, quantitatively an experiment can not be repeated exactly.

A repeatable experiment is where the results vary within an executed range. Experiential error.

All measurements have an uncertainty.

Chaos theory, initial conditions can not be be repeated such that long term system response will not diverge. There are experiments that demonstrate it.

It depends on what you mean by initial conditions. The Earth is in motion. Atom are always in a state of flux.

Philosophically you could say in a causal deterministic universe IF you know the exact initial conditions and IF you can repeat the exact initial conditions the experiment could be repeated exactly.

However if you include the universe its state changes between experiments.

At the quantum scale there appears to be a universal 'noise', like audio his. You may not see it in dally life but it is an issue in the electronics you use.