You now write "So, if the simulation can be a perfect replica of ours, but also simultaneously NOT be a perfect replica of ours?"
Replace "the" with "a" and your grammar still assumes the two simulations are the same simulation.
So, uh, are you going to answer my more cogent objection to your position, namely that you have failed to provide any examples of observation of a system without implementing the system?
So, uh, will you first do the courtesy of taking a stance on the bilby-Swammi sub-debate which you excerpted above? Will you comment on the "LESS cogent objection to my position"?
As for your more cogent objection, note first that Tegmark's "Level IV: Mathematical Multiverse" is NOT an obviously true easy-to-accept position! (If it were the philosophy texts would already have been rewritten and we wouldn't be having this discussion.) I conceived of it several decades ago, and was pleased eventually to see that Max Tegmark also liked the idea but -- though I've not searched for it -- Tegmark and I are AFAIK the only two supporters of this weird hypothesis. If you expect me or Tegmark to write a brief essay that's totally convincing . . . that ain't gonna happen.
Tegmark's Level IV relates to the "reality of mathematics" and THAT is itself controversial: Consider the debates between adherents of Hilbert and of Kronecker 130 years ago.
To defend the weird hypothesis, I posted a series of increasing claims above, beginning with
As a thought experiment, imagine a PERFECT simulation of our universe. And I mean PERFECT -- every neuron is simulated, every microtubule or molecule within that neuron is perfectly simulated, etc. If we experience emotions or consciousness in our real universe, so would the corresponding creatures in the perfectly simulated copy, no?
One step at a time! Do you answer Yes or No to this question, the first link in the chain?