Are words immaterial?

[ryan]

First of all, you are assuming that properties exist.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'exist'. I'm assuming that properties can be identified. If they can't, claiming two things are identical becomes problematical anyway.

This will lead to circular reasoning since consciousness is usually considered an emergent property.

no circularity. Properties can have properties without any obvious contradiction.

My point was that I struggle to believe that properties exist or are real. But I will suspend that concern in our conversation.

[But let's assume properties exist anyway, 1) is still not valid. Assume I have three identical water molecules in a row. The one in the middle has the property of being in the middle, and the other two do not have that property.

Depends what you mean by 'property', but if you feel that 'being in the middleness' is vital property of the molecule, then you don't have three identical molecules to start with.

Strictly speaking, you're entirely right. Two objects are only identical if they are the same object (share an identity). However, what people usually mean by identical is that they share properties such that they are indistinguishable. If you can tell them apart, they're not identical. What other criteria would you want to use? What does 'X is Y' mean to you? If you can tell the difference between a function and an experience, then they're not identical. If they're not identical, they can't be the same thing.

But what if it is only a matter of a point of reference. If I am examining a brain function, can't I say that the function gives me a visual experience. So couldn't I say that the function that I am examining is purely an experience? And to take it one step further, if I were at a point of reference inside the brain just like I am inside my brain, I would be susceptible to more experiences. Then this raises question about what we are.

Maybe this is what kharakov was telling me yesterday.

[In general, if we assume that properties exist, then I suppose that is how experience/qualia could exist without being detected.

What do you mean? They are detected. We experience them, they are detected by us.

From your side of the argument, I have also said that to people; it doesn't seem to be enough though. They say that I can't provide evidence, which I think is a legitimate concern. So I am still looking for that "knockout punch".

I am also interested to know what a property of experience would be.

Duration? I have an experience that lasts from 12.01am to 12.03am. A neurophysiologist measures a neural pulse that lasts from 12.01am to 12.02am. Is it the case that the neural pulse is the experience? Clearly not. We know this because we have compares the properties of one to the properties of another and see that they are different.

That's the kind of comparison done by neurophysiologists, neuropsychologists, and philosophers of mind, when looking at neural correlates of conscious experience.

Interesting

 

[ryan]

I am not joking, and I don't necessarily think you're wrong; it's just mind-numbing.

Have you gone into one of your "add", "have" psykoses again?

No, although I still think I had a legitimate point there.

Can you agree that the line "This sort of wine has a great savoury flavor" uses "has a" in a correct way despite the fact that wine has no taste at all: a creature, such as a human, is necessesary for the taste to emerge.

Well of course I agree with that. I was trying to make sense of properties by making an account for what exists. I still say that a book does not also have pages.

But anyway, the point I was trying to make about the mind/brain is that a most unsettling possibility that I see by claiming real entities like properties is that it may become infinitely complicated; and I really do mean infinitely. However, this was not an argument; it was a concern.

 

[fast]

Have you gone into one of your "add", "have" psykoses again?

No, although I still think I had a legitimate point there.

Can you agree that the line "This sort of wine has a great savoury flavor" uses "has a" in a correct way despite the fact that wine has no taste at all: a creature, such as a human, is necessesary for the taste to emerge.

Well of course I agree with that. I was trying to make sense of properties by making an account for what exists. I still say that a book does not also have pages.

But anyway, the point I was trying to make about the mind/brain is that a most unsettling possibility that I see by claiming real entities like properties is that it may become infinitely complicated; and I really do mean infinitely. However, this was not an argument; it was a concern.

To say of something that it exists is to say of something that it has properties, but we must be careful not to confuse a description of something that doesn't exist as if it's a property, as it's only a property if there is something (including that which might be non-physical) to instantiate the term.

Take a unicorn for instance. We can describe what would be some properties of a unicorn if one did exist, but (again) unless there is something to instantiate the term, "unicorn", there are no unicorns, and thus they do not exist.

A brain has the property of being an organ, and there is something (indeed, some thing, in fact) to instantiate the term, "brain". It's a tad bit more complicated than that, but that should suffice for the moment.

A mind exists, but it exists not like a brain does, (and so we shouldn't expect a property of a mind to have the same materialistic characteristics. Supposing for a moment that the mind isn't brain function but rather an abstractive consequence of brain function, we shouldn't expect to find a physical property of the mind as we do the brain. Sure, we'd find a physical basis for brain function, but I'm talking about the mind, which is (I maintain) something entirely different. One property of the mind is that it houses ideas, and ideas too are not physical (even if it's so there is a physical basis for it); therefore, the property should be like kind. The number three is neither physical nor mental (despite arguments to the contrary)--they're abstract.

Back to the unicorn. It's not mental, just because they don't exist. What would it be if they did exist? It'd be an equine with a horn, so there needs to be not something mental (and surely not something abstract) to instantiate the term, "unicorn"--we would need to have a physical equine with a horn.

 

[none]

haven't kept up in the past 24 hours... so I don't know what has been said from the various factions...but..
I was thinking about the brain in a vat scenario.. all experience that a brain in a vat would experience would be electro-chemical stimulation, meaning everything would be material.
If everything that a brain in a vat could experience is material what makes you think that if we aren't in a vat there is something immaterial when everything that could be experienced by a brain in a vat is material?

 

[Juma]

One property of the mind is that it houses ideas, and ideas too are not physical (even if it's so there is a physical basis for it); therefore, the property should be like kind. The number three is neither physical nor mental (despite arguments to the contrary)--they're abstract.

You are mixing different categories.
When we say that "the number three is an idea" we måean that we have an idea that represents the notion of number three. The brain has the property of having ideas. These ideas can represent anything real or abstract. The idea itself is a physical interaction of neurons, (like a instance of a class in a computer: something that can be traced by following the changes of bits and bytes). The neurons changes will follow the rules we imposes on number three and thus encoded in the idea. That the number three is abstract doesnt make ideas abstract. Ideas are very real.

 

[ryan]

haven't kept up in the past 24 hours... so I don't know what has been said from the various factions...but..
I was thinking about the brain in a vat scenario.. all experience that a brain in a vat would experience would be electro-chemical stimulation, meaning everything would be material.
If everything that a brain in a vat could experience is material what makes you think that if we aren't in a vat there is something immaterial when everything that could be experienced by a brain in a vat is material?

Togo has a good point by saying that experience is not a function. So if you can accept that experience is real/exists, then it is simply something else.

 

[ryan]

No, although I still think I had a legitimate point there.

Can you agree that the line "This sort of wine has a great savoury flavor" uses "has a" in a correct way despite the fact that wine has no taste at all: a creature, such as a human, is necessesary for the taste to emerge.

Well of course I agree with that. I was trying to make sense of properties by making an account for what exists. I still say that a book does not also have pages.

But anyway, the point I was trying to make about the mind/brain is that a most unsettling possibility that I see by claiming real entities like properties is that it may become infinitely complicated; and I really do mean infinitely. However, this was not an argument; it was a concern.

To say of something that it exists is to say of something that it has properties, but we must be careful not to confuse a description of something that doesn't exist as if it's a property, as it's only a property if there is something (including that which might be non-physical) to instantiate the term.

Take a unicorn for instance. We can describe what would be some properties of a unicorn if one did exist, but (again) unless there is something to instantiate the term, "unicorn", there are no unicorns, and thus they do not exist.

A brain has the property of being an organ, and there is something (indeed, some thing, in fact) to instantiate the term, "brain". It's a tad bit more complicated than that, but that should suffice for the moment.

A mind exists, but it exists not like a brain does, (and so we shouldn't expect a property of a mind to have the same materialistic characteristics. Supposing for a moment that the mind isn't brain function but rather an abstractive consequence of brain function, we shouldn't expect to find a physical property of the mind as we do the brain. Sure, we'd find a physical basis for brain function, but I'm talking about the mind, which is (I maintain) something entirely different. One property of the mind is that it houses ideas, and ideas too are not physical (even if it's so there is a physical basis for it); therefore, the property should be like kind. The number three is neither physical nor mental (despite arguments to the contrary)--they're abstract.

Back to the unicorn. It's not mental, just because they don't exist. What would it be if they did exist? It'd be an equine with a horn, so there needs to be not something mental (and surely not something abstract) to instantiate the term, "unicorn"--we would need to have a physical equine with a horn.

I am having trouble putting this all together and relating it to my post.

 

[ryan]

One property of the mind is that it houses ideas, and ideas too are not physical (even if it's so there is a physical basis for it); therefore, the property should be like kind. The number three is neither physical nor mental (despite arguments to the contrary)--they're abstract.

You are mixing different categories.
When we say that "the number three is an idea" we måean that we have an idea that represents the notion of number three. The brain has the property of having ideas. These ideas can represent anything real or abstract. The idea itself is a physical interaction of neurons, (like a instance of a class in a computer: something that can be traced by following the changes of bits and bytes). The neurons changes will follow the rules we imposes on number three and thus encoded in the idea. That the number three is abstract doesnt make ideas abstract. Ideas are very real.

I think that fast might be talking about the number 3 as we perceive and understand it. Remembering something related to what Togo said, what we know as the number 3 is much different than a brain function even though the latter requires the former.

 

[DBT]

Concepts and ideas must necessarily be related to their respective brain states because that is where the interaction of information pertaining to the idea or the concept occurs. Ideas and concepts are not known to exist anywhere in any other form or place. Nor does does mind/consciousness. These are physical structures with material processes.

 

[ryan]

Concepts and ideas must necessarily be related to their respective brain states because that is where the interaction of information pertaining to the idea or the concept occurs. Ideas and concepts are not known to exist anywhere in any other form or place. Nor does does mind/consciousness. These are physical structures with material processes.

I don't think anyone is arguing that concepts and ideas aren't related to brain states. In fact it seems unanimous, at least on this thread, that brain states are necessary for ideas and concepts to exist.

The problem I have is why the observation of one's own idea is so much different than the observation of the brain function from an external observer? Is it just that the conception of an idea is really just an observation from inside the brain which, of course, would look much different than an observer of the idea but from outside of the brain while the person has the idea?

 

[Juma]

Togo has a good point by saying that experience is not a function.

No he (?) hasnt. Both of you underestimate the concept of "function".

 

[Juma]

You are mixing different categories.
When we say that "the number three is an idea" we måean that we have an idea that represents the notion of number three. The brain has the property of having ideas. These ideas can represent anything real or abstract. The idea itself is a physical interaction of neurons, (like a instance of a class in a computer: something that can be traced by following the changes of bits and bytes). The neurons changes will follow the rules we imposes on number three and thus encoded in the idea. That the number three is abstract doesnt make ideas abstract. Ideas are very real.

I think that fast might be talking about the number 3 as we perceive and understand it. Remembering something related to what Togo said, what we know as the number 3 is much different than a brain function even though the latter requires the former.

No, he explicitly states it is the idea he is writing about.

And again: you underestimate what a function is.

 

[DBT]

Concepts and ideas must necessarily be related to their respective brain states because that is where the interaction of information pertaining to the idea or the concept occurs. Ideas and concepts are not known to exist anywhere in any other form or place. Nor does does mind/consciousness. These are physical structures with material processes.

I don't think anyone is arguing that concepts and ideas aren't related to brain states. In fact it seems unanimous, at least on this thread, that brain states are necessary for ideas and concepts to exist.

I was responding in relation to remarks made on the nature of mind and consciousness that suggested that mind/consciousness is non material. So, presumably, ideas and concepts being activities of mind/consciousness, believed to be non material, ideas and concepts are also believed to be non material.

The problem I have is why the observation of one's own idea is so much different than the observation of the brain function from an external observer? Is it just that the conception of an idea is really just an observation from inside the brain which, of course, would look much different than an observer of the idea but from outside of the brain while the person has the idea?

Obviously an outside observer, which is the activity of a brain, cannot directly access the internal activity of another brain. But conscious perception entails observation. Perception of your environment, perception of external activity of others, your thoughts, ideas and your position in whatever environment you happen to be in. Thoughts and ideas are formed into conscious perception in response to your environmental inputs,and are limited by both the inputs from external sources and neural functionality within the brain itself..

 

[ryan]

Togo has a good point by saying that experience is not a function.

No he (?) hasnt. Both of you underestimate the concept of "function".

Wouldn't you agree that the visual of 3 is quite different from the brain function that lets us experience the vision of 3?

 

[Speakpigeon]

The physical world, according to what you actuallly said, is not material because although partly made of matter, and we have to guess here that it's matter considered in itself so to speak, à la Kant if that's possible, it is also partly made of immaterial things, which were supposed, you said, to be structures and the like. Now, all of a sudden, you bin what you actually said and claim that structures themselves are partly immaterial, partly material.
Please reach equilibrium and come back tell the world.
EB

Okay then let's finally agree that matter is material and material is matter; I was not sure where everyone was at with that.

Never mind where other people are, the point is where you want to be.

Moving on, the amount and position of immaterial in a structure of matter makes a significant difference, but the immaterial is not significant on its own. This is what troubles me.

I'm not sure what "significant on its own" could possibly mean. Perhaps you want to say you are not in the business of sacralising the idea of substance. But maybe you think that structures are not substances but that matter is. But as I see it, the whole of science is moving from a position of matter as substance towards finding out a coherent description of the material world solely in terms of properties. If there are still scientists stuck on a metaphysical dogma of matter as substance I believe these would be the dinosaurs.

Another way to look at it is to ask yourself what is so special about matter that would be different from properties of matter? In other words, is there actually any matter per se (substance) outside whatever properties we can measure, which seem to be nothing but the structure of the material world? Which would make you use of "immaterial" lead to the notion that the material world is... immaterial.

So, instead, you could take matter to be itself a property of the material world rather than, as you do, matter being the only thing properly said to be material in the material world.

So, what is so special about matter that it shouldn't be confused with a mere property of the material world?
EB

 

[DBT]

No he (?) hasnt. Both of you underestimate the concept of "function".

Wouldn't you agree that the visual of 3 is quite different from the brain function that lets us experience the vision of 3?

The visual of 3 is inseparable from the experience of the vision of 3. The experience of the vision of 3 being an activity of the brain in the form of a mental representation of this sensory experience.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I agree with the distinction but I don't see what's not "weird" with qualia too since no scientist only knowing scientific theories could infer the existence of the qualia we do experience.
EB

Why on earth do you beleive such a thing?

I'm certainly not claiming I know my belief to be true!

The redness, dispair etc is somehow there in the dynamics of our neurons.

Possibly so but you just make yourself look foolish asserting something you don't know.

It's one thing to claim or accept that there is a correlation between our neural processes and whatever qualia we experience subjectively, I accept that, but there is an obvious qualitative gap between our qualia as we experience them subjectively and our neural processes as described by science, which is, broadly, an objective description.
EB

 

[Juma]

No he (?) hasnt. Both of you underestimate the concept of "function".

Wouldn't you agree that the visual of 3 is quite different from the brain function that lets us experience the vision of 3?

No.

 

[ryan]

Wouldn't you agree that the visual of 3 is quite different from the brain function that lets us experience the vision of 3?

The visual of 3 is inseparable from the experience of the vision of 3. The experience of the vision of 3 being an activity of the brain in the form of a mental representation of this sensory experience.

I know that the visual of 3 is identical to the experience of the vision of 3. My post was about the argument that the brain function is not the same as the experience that emerges from the brain function; therefore, the brain function isn't identical to the experience.

 

[Juma]

Why on earth do you beleive such a thing?

I'm certainly not claiming I know my belief to be true!

The redness, dispair etc is somehow there in the dynamics of our neurons.

Possibly so but you just make yourself look foolish asserting something you don't know.

It's one thing to claim or accept that there is a correlation between our neural processes and whatever qualia we experience subjectively, I accept that, but there is an obvious qualitative gap between our qualia as we experience them subjectively and our neural processes as described by science, which is, broadly, an objective description.
EB

You get it wrong; the gap is not between the qualia and the brain. The "gap" is us experience the qualia.