Are words immaterial?

[Juma]

This doesn't make sense to me. If it is known to be a function, then what could be so weird?

We know it is a function of the brain since no brain = no conciousness. This is a oversimplifacation but I hope it is enough for you.

The weirdness lies in that in its singularity and its subjectivity: there is no proper habdle on it to even discuss it: you know you have it because you experience it, but there is no way show somebody else that you really do.

Dare I say that you are missing the point of the "hard problem"?

No, but I think a lot of people do. The hard problem is really not a AI problem.

 

[Kharakov]

When you start dividing consciousness's actions into subdivisions of "material" and "immaterial", instead of various levels of supervenience and metavenience with other consciousnesses, you end up with a false perspective on reality.

This isn't helping me. Supervenience goes back to structure from the lower levels of what exists, so then we still have the question of what this structure is made of;

Consciousness.

also, there still must be the structure and not the structure.

Not the structure?

And while one can play around within the ideas of the false realm (materialism/immaterialism false dichotomy) of reality they miss-perceive they exist within, the real thing is better. Really better. Sooo.......

Okay, but now you will be faced with categorizing the "real thing" into intrinsic differences. You will get something that looks a lot like the Standard Model, and then you will discover sciences similar to chemistry, biology, etc. And you will be back to square one.

Not at all. Consciousness interacting with consciousness, but with more information and knowledge of how consciousness interacts with other consciousnesses is not at square one. Especially if it learns to interact beneficially with other consciousnesses.

George Castanza probably would agree with the square one point though. Kudos.

 

[ryan]

We know it is a function of the brain since no brain = no conciousness. This is a oversimplifacation but I hope it is enough for you.

The weirdness lies in that in its singularity and its subjectivity: there is no proper habdle on it to even discuss it: you know you have it because you experience it, but there is no way show somebody else that you really do.

Okay, so then would you agree that it is not just a function?

 

[ryan]

This isn't helping me. Supervenience goes back to structure from the lower levels of what exists, so then we still have the question of what this structure is made of;

Consciousness.

Is it only made of consciousness, or is it also made of material?

also, there still must be the structure and not the structure.

Not the structure?

Can there be no consciousness/structure? For example, is it true that a person is conscious but no longer conscious when dead?

Okay, but now you will be faced with categorizing the "real thing" into intrinsic differences. You will get something that looks a lot like the Standard Model, and then you will discover sciences similar to chemistry, biology, etc. And you will be back to square one.

Not at all. Consciousness interacting with consciousness, but with more information and knowledge of how consciousness interacts with other consciousnesses is not at square one. Especially if it learns to interact beneficially with other consciousnesses.

Can a consciousness interact with something that has no consciousness? If so, what would you call something that is not conscious? Why can't we just call it "material"?

 

[Juma]

We know it is a function of the brain since no brain = no conciousness. This is a oversimplifacation but I hope it is enough for you.

The weirdness lies in that in its singularity and its subjectivity: there is no proper habdle on it to even discuss it: you know you have it because you experience it, but there is no way show somebody else that you really do.

Okay, so then would you agree that it is not just a function?

What is that supposed to mean? "just" a function???

It is a function of the brain. I have no idea why that is not enough for you.

 

[ryan]

Okay, so then would you agree that it is not just a function?

What is that supposed to mean? "just" a function???

It is a function of the brain. I have no idea why that is not enough for you.

You said that there is also "singularity and its subjectivity" associated with it.

 

[Juma]

What is that supposed to mean? "just" a function???

It is a function of the brain. I have no idea why that is not enough for you.

You said that there is also "singularity and its subjectivity" associated with it.

Yes?

 

[ryan]

You said that there is also "singularity and its subjectivity" associated with it.

Yes?

So then why can't you just say that there is more than just a function?

 

[Juma]

Yes?

So then why can't you just say that there is more than just a function?

Now you doing it again. What do you mean by "just" a function?

That, that is a function, has properties. That is obvious. I have no clue whatsoever what "just" a function would be. A pure function with no contents/properties???

 

[DBT]

Through the elimination of a single attribute of consciousness, memory function (cell function, transmitters, connections,etc), we see that consciousness disintegrates. Recognition fails, perception disintegrates, the ability to understand and speak fails, the ability to act meaningfully comes to an end. Without cellular memory function, mind itself has disintegrated.

 

[ryan]

So then why can't you just say that there is more than just a function?

Now you doing it again. What do you mean by "just" a function?

That, that is a function, has properties. That is obvious. I have no clue whatsoever what "just" a function would be. A pure function with no contents/properties???

Not that I think you're wrong, but you are going down a very troubling road. It almost seems as if the brain would have an infinite number of things: properties, contents, singularities, subjectivity, properties of subjectivity, subjectivity of properties, properties of contents, properties of properties of the function, function of subjectivity, function of contents, etc.

I am not joking, and I don't necessarily think you're wrong; it's just mind-numbing.

 

[Togo]

The physicalists always stump me by arguing that the function is the experience for all intents and purposes. And that has been a hard argument for me to counter.

??? Maybe I'm missing something but...

1) If two things are identical then their properties must be identical.
2) If function is the experience then the function and the experience are identical
C1 If function and experience are identical, their properties must be identical
3) Function and experience do not have identical properties
C2 The idea that function is the experience is false.

Now that leaves out the wallpaper phrase - to all intents and purposes - so all you need to do then is work what kind of crack that phrase is papering over, and work out whether the difference between experience and function are important. If you're a scientist, who mainly study function exclusively and experience not at all, then probably not, but if you're interested in metaphysics or other philosophical concerns then it probably does matter, and you end up rejecting the claim that they're equivalent.

I don't know about the majority of neuroscientists, but as far as I know, most philosophers accept or lean towards physicalism, and the percentage goes up when in the field of philosophy of mind (http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl ).

Interesting source. The incidence of physicalism is higher than I would have thought.

We could carry on to discuss the views of neuroscientists, to what extent they have a common view, what qualifies as neuroscience as opposed to behavioural science, and whether the view that represents a strict physical eliminativism that still might be somewhat rare amongst philosophers or a more general physicalism, and whether opinions that 'lean towards' physicalism are in fact congruent with that view.

For example, Chomsky 'leans towards physicalism' in his claim that one supervenes on the other, but specifically argues against the idea that mental phenomenon can be reduced to physical, either in theory or in practice. Mele is a physicalist, but also a consistent opponent of the idea that neuroscience encompasses consciousness. And so on.

I'd be interested in discussing all this, but it's not a small topic. Maybe a different thread?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I don't know about the majority of neuroscientists, but as far as I know, most philosophers accept or lean towards physicalism, and the percentage goes up when in the field of philosophy of mind (http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl ).

Interesting source. The incidence of physicalism is higher than I would have thought.

We could carry on to discuss the views of neuroscientists, to what extent they have a common view, what qualifies as neuroscience as opposed to behavioural science, and whether the view that represents a strict physical eliminativism that still might be somewhat rare amongst philosophers or a more general physicalism, and whether opinions that 'lean towards' physicalism are in fact congruent with that view.

For example, Chomsky 'leans towards physicalism' in his claim that one supervenes on the other, but specifically argues against the idea that mental phenomenon can be reduced to physical, either in theory or in practice. Mele is a physicalist, but also a consistent opponent of the idea that neuroscience encompasses consciousness. And so on.

I'd be interested in discussing all this, but it's not a small topic. Maybe a different thread?

That would be interesting, but I'm afraid I'll have to leave it for another ocassion. These days I can't dedicate the time that would be required for that discussion.
Briefly, one point: "lean towards" (as opposed to "accept") seems to be cases in which the philosopher is probably undecided on the matter, but considers it probable. If a philosopher had a view that is not compatible with physicalism, one would expect that she would respond "accept non-physicalism", or "lean towards" non-physicalism if she's undecided, or an alternative like "reject both" if she (say) rejects the distinction, or something like that.

That said, physicalism doesn't need to be reductive, I think - property dualism may count, even if mental properties would supervene on the physical and there would be no souls. But as I mentioned, in this context the point was apparently about the non-existence of souls.

 

[Togo]

That would be interesting, but I'm afraid I'll have to leave it for another ocassion. These days I can't dedicate the time that would be required for that discussion.

Fair enough - that's why I gave the warning. We can settle for selected points then.

Briefly, one point: "lean towards" (as opposed to "accept") seems to be cases in which the philosopher is probably undecided on the matter, but considers it probable.

Possibly, but it could also refer to the great many established positions on the matter that focus on how to combine mental and physical that give a greater role to the physical. A position of supervenience is often referred to as supervenience physicalism, but it's still treating mental effects are being separate in type in a way that conflicts with, say, neurophysiology.

That said, physicalism doesn't need to be reductive,

No, but some neurophysiological theories are. This is why I now try and avoid the term 'neuroscience', because it is ambiguous as to whether it refers to the study of neurology in some form, or whether it's study of behaviour (aka psychology).

But as I mentioned, in this context the point was apparently about the non-existence of souls.

<shrug> Then the point was fairly uncontroversial, but the mention of neuroscience was a red herring, since neuroscience doesn't pretend to study souls, or the lack of them.

Even as defined by their supporters, souls are supposedly immutable, intangible, invisible ineffable, and can not interact directly with the physical world. Which means philosophical discussion and scientific analysis isn't going to tell whether they exist or not, and for almost every topic in philosophy or science their existence or otherwise makes no difference.

I'm going through a phase of getting quite impatient with substance dualism versus substance monism. If it makes a difference we can discuss the difference. If it doesn't make a difference that's not an argument for monism over dualism, it's an argument for dropping the discussion entirely.

 

[ryan]

??? Maybe I'm missing something but...

1) If two things are identical then their properties must be identical.
2) If function is the experience then the function and the experience are identical
C1 If function and experience are identical, their properties must be identical
3) Function and experience do not have identical properties
C2 The idea that function is the experience is false.

First of all, you are assuming that properties exist. This will lead to circular reasoning since consciousness is usually considered an emergent property.

But let's assume properties exist anyway, 1) is still not valid. Assume I have three identical water molecules in a row. The one in the middle has the property of being in the middle, and the other two do not have that property.

In general, if we assume that properties exist, then I suppose that is how experience/qualia could exist without being detected.

I am also interested to know what a property of experience would be.

 

[Togo]

??? Maybe I'm missing something but...

1) If two things are identical then their properties must be identical.
2) If function is the experience then the function and the experience are identical
C1 If function and experience are identical, their properties must be identical
3) Function and experience do not have identical properties
C2 The idea that function is the experience is false.

First of all, you are assuming that properties exist.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'exist'. I'm assuming that properties can be identified. If they can't, claiming two things are identical becomes problematical anyway.

This will lead to circular reasoning since consciousness is usually considered an emergent property.

no circularity. Properties can have properties without any obvious contradiction.

[But let's assume properties exist anyway, 1) is still not valid. Assume I have three identical water molecules in a row. The one in the middle has the property of being in the middle, and the other two do not have that property.

Depends what you mean by 'property', but if you feel that 'being in the middleness' is vital property of the molecule, then you don't have three identical molecules to start with.

Strictly speaking, you're entirely right. Two objects are only identical if they are the same object (share an identity). However, what people usually mean by identical is that they share properties such that they are indistinguishable. If you can tell them apart, they're not identical. What other criteria would you want to use? What does 'X is Y' mean to you? If you can tell the difference between a function and an experience, then they're not identical. If they're not identical, they can't be the same thing.

[In general, if we assume that properties exist, then I suppose that is how experience/qualia could exist without being detected.

What do you mean? They are detected. We experience them, they are detected by us.

I am also interested to know what a property of experience would be.

Duration? I have an experience that lasts from 12.01am to 12.03am. A neurophysiologist measures a neural pulse that lasts from 12.01am to 12.02am. Is it the case that the neural pulse is the experience? Clearly not. We know this because we have compares the properties of one to the properties of another and see that they are different.

That's the kind of comparison done by neurophysiologists, neuropsychologists, and philosophers of mind, when looking at neural correlates of conscious experience.

 

[Juma]

I am not joking, and I don't necessarily think you're wrong; it's just mind-numbing.

Have you gone into one of your "add", "have" psykoses again?

Can you agree that the line "This sort of wine has a great savoury flavor" uses "has a" in a correct way despite the fact that wine has no taste at all: a creature, such as a human, is necessesary for the taste to emerge.

 

[Juma]

??? Maybe I'm missing something but...

1) If two things are identical then their properties must be identical.
2) If function is the experience then the function and the experience are identical
C1 If function and experience are identical, their properties must be identical
3) Function and experience do not have identical properties
C2 The idea that function is the experience is false.

This is easy: 3) is not true.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Possibly, but it could also refer to the great many established positions on the matter that focus on how to combine mental and physical that give a greater role to the physical.

You mean "lean towards" physicalism?
I guess it's possible, but that seems improbable to me, because if the philosopher holds a position that is incompatible with physicalism, and accepts that position (i.e., she's at least almost certain), it seems to me that something like "accept non-physicalism" would be a more likely answer.
Also, there are alternatives like "accept an intermediate view", and "accept other", which would seem to cover such cases.

Also, the "lean towards" question is asked of many issues (i.e., not just physicalism/non-physicalism), and it seems to be about lack of a definite stance in other cases too, and the authors of the study put them together with "accept" when the results are only coarsely classified - and to my knowledge, there's been no objection to that interpretation of the question on their part.

By the way, here's the paper analyzing the survey, for more info:
http://philpapers.org/rec/BOUWDP
http://consc.net/papers/survey.pdf

In any case, in the case of philosophy of mind specifically, physicalism gets a boost, and "accept physicalism" gets a greater percentage than "accept non-physicalism" plus "lean toward non-physicalism" plus "lean toward physicalism"

On the other hand, it's true that the expression "physicalism" encompassess a number of different views, including some non-reductive ones (plus, different people understand the word differently, so there is that issue as well).

A position of supervenience is often referred to as supervenience physicalism, but it's still treating mental effects are being separate in type in a way that conflicts with, say, neurophysiology.

Are you talking about reductive theories?
As I mentioned, I don't know whether there are more who are reductionists with respect to properties.

No, but some neurophysiological theories are. This is why I now try and avoid the term 'neuroscience', because it is ambiguous as to whether it refers to the study of neurology in some form, or whether it's study of behaviour (aka psychology).

Okay.

Even as defined by their supporters, souls are supposedly immutable, intangible, invisible ineffable, and can not interact directly with the physical world. Which means philosophical discussion and scientific analysis isn't going to tell whether they exist or not, and for almost every topic in philosophy or science their existence or otherwise makes no difference.

I'm going through a phase of getting quite impatient with substance dualism versus substance monism. If it makes a difference we can discuss the difference. If it doesn't make a difference that's not an argument for monism over dualism, it's an argument for dropping the discussion entirely.

Are you suggesting it's untestable?
Still, if something is not empirically distinguishable, then the view with a greater prior remains more probable after any experiments, and it can still be debated which one should be assigned a greater prior; e.g., dualists are adding an extra entity.
In any case, I'm not sure it makes no empirical difference. Let's say observed that, like in some TV shows or movies, people can apparently, say, swap bodies, look at their bodies from the outside, etc. Wouldn't that support some sort of substance dualism? (regardless of whether it's souls or something else). But we don't observe any of that.
The same goes for other things; e.g., we might observe that no amount of damage to any part of the body (including the brain) affects people's personality, desires, intentions, etc., other than the adjustments they have to make due to their diminished physical capabilities, perhaps, but what they value might remain the same. Such results would seem to support substance dualism. But we don't observe that.

 

[fast]

Minds in labs? I suppose you think the mind is actually somewhere--like literally.

I don't smoke that, that's the problem.

Argumentum ad crack smoke-em, lol