Are words immaterial?

[DBT]

I'm not getting you. Honest. Come again?

I didn't mean that the clone's experience would be the same. I just meant that the clone would probably have a experiences similar to the original body even though the parts aren't exactly the same - nothing all that new here.

A different environment provides a different set of experiences. If twins are separated shortly after birth, they may not speak the same language or have the same outlook. Behaviour is effected by an interaction of environment and genes.

 

[ryan]

I didn't mean that the clone's experience would be the same. I just meant that the clone would probably have a experiences similar to the original body even though the parts aren't exactly the same - nothing all that new here.

A different environment provides a different set of experiences. If twins are separated shortly after birth, they may not speak the same language or have the same outlook. Behaviour is effected by an interaction of environment and genes.

I new I shouldn't have put it that way. I meant "conscious experience" in general and not specific experiences. For example, they will both feel the quale of pain assuming qualia exist.

 

[Kharakov]

I get what you're saying, I just don't think that the function of stem cells will precisely match that of older neurons that they replace. But maybe they will- like a new car is presumable just a nicer car than your old one.

This seems to be a major problem that I can't explain. But I suspect that further inquiry into functionalism will explain it.

I'm saying that something functioning as a soccer ball is not going to function as an oxygen atom (that functions in a specific way in the soccer ball).

It's like thinking the word "function" can be replaced by the word "xyzzy" and function in the exact same way. Even if xyzzy means function, it has different functional components which by necessity function differently than the components of the word function. I'd say that even if the word xyzzy replaces the word function's function (becomes defined as function), it will always be associated in my mind with a certain game I played on my maternal grandfather's "laptop" (an Osborne portable computer).

Any change to function, and it is not going to function the same to a consciousness that is aware of it.

 

[ryan]

This seems to be a major problem that I can't explain. But I suspect that further inquiry into functionalism will explain it.

I'm saying that something functioning as a soccer ball is not going to function as an oxygen atom (that functions in a specific way in the soccer ball).

Okay but that is how it functions but not its function in the overall process.

It's like thinking the word "function" can be replaced by the word "xyzzy" and function in the exact same way. Even if xyzzy means function, it has different functional components which by necessity function differently than the components of the word function. I'd say that even if the word xyzzy replaces the word function's function (becomes defined as function), it will always be associated in my mind with a certain game I played on my maternal grandfather's "laptop" (an Osborne portable computer).

Any change to function, and it is not going to function the same to a consciousness that is aware of it.

This is just too vast of an area for me to comprehend. I am confident that functionalism has very good explanations; unfortunately I don't know any of them.

 

[Kharakov]

I'm saying that something functioning as a soccer ball is not going to function as an oxygen atom (that functions in a specific way in the soccer ball).

Okay but that is how it functions but not its function in the overall process.

So, you're saying that the soccer ball will have the exact same function as a serotonin molecule, having all the behaviors of serotonin, even being called a serotonin molecule (since this is part of the functional behavior of the serotonin molecule). It would also have to relate to the other "soccer ball molecules" around it in the exact same ways as the various lipids, proteins, etc. behave within our brains, or ultimately the conscious experience of the soccer ball brain you and the natural brain you would diverge.

In fact, if we saw that our consciousness was made up of a bunch of soccer balls, that would be a totally different experience than what we have today: we could actually detect soccer balls (they are rather large), and if the earth had as many soccer balls in it as atoms in all the brains of all the humans on earth... well.. Stuff would be different.

This is just too vast of an area for me to comprehend. I am confident that functionalism has very good explanations; unfortunately I don't know any of them.

Anyway- you brought up functionalism in response to the following quote, which doesn't really seem to be encapsulated by functionalism at all, as far as I can tell now that the soccer ball argument has gone the way it went:

A person also is not conscious while asleep, or unconscious. Doesn't mean there aren't various consciousnesses within them going about their business independently of the human consciousness.

 

[Juma]

This is just too vast of an area for me to comprehend. I am confident that functionalism has very good explanations; unfortunately I don't know any of them.

Sigh.... Yes. And I am pretty sure you have no coherent understanding of how to use the concepts "function", "functional" and "functionalism"

 

[ryan]

Okay but that is how it functions but not its function in the overall process.

So, you're saying that the soccer ball will have the exact same function as a serotonin molecule, having all the behaviors of serotonin, even being called a serotonin molecule (since this is part of the functional behavior of the serotonin molecule). It would also have to relate to the other "soccer ball molecules" around it in the exact same ways as the various lipids, proteins, etc. behave within our brains, or ultimately the conscious experience of the soccer ball brain you and the natural brain you would diverge.

In fact, if we saw that our consciousness was made up of a bunch of soccer balls, that would be a totally different experience than what we have today: we could actually detect soccer balls (they are rather large), and if the earth had as many soccer balls in it as atoms in all the brains of all the humans on earth... well.. Stuff would be different.

The point was that *if* the soccer balls could serve as a function for something, then there may be a conscious experience.

Anyway- you brought up functionalism in response to the following quote, which doesn't really seem to be encapsulated by functionalism at all, as far as I can tell now that the soccer ball argument has gone the way it went:

A person also is not conscious while asleep, or unconscious. Doesn't mean there aren't various consciousnesses within them going about their business independently of the human consciousness.

What you said here made me think of what a functionalist named Simon DeDeo in the field of complex systems said here, http://preposterousuniverse.com/naturalism2012/video.html . Watch from 30:00 to 36:15 in the first video, and he talks about how he has come to problems such as "what is it like to be a conversation". He mentions how mental states really just reduce down to computations. And as long as there are processes with the same functional roles as in the brain, there will be similar mental states.

 

[ryan]

This is just too vast of an area for me to comprehend. I am confident that functionalism has very good explanations; unfortunately I don't know any of them.

Sigh.... Yes. And I am pretty sure you have no coherent understanding of how to use the concepts "function", "functional" and "functionalism"

My irritation is a function of your post.

 

[DBT]

Sigh.... Yes. And I am pretty sure you have no coherent understanding of how to use the concepts "function", "functional" and "functionalism"

My irritation is a function of your post.

Your sense of irritation is material response to the information content of what you read, increased heart rate, respiration, agitation, etc.

 

[Kharakov]

Anyway- you brought up functionalism in response to the following quote, which doesn't really seem to be encapsulated by functionalism at all, as far as I can tell now that the soccer ball argument has gone the way it went:

A person also is not conscious while asleep, or unconscious. Doesn't mean there aren't various consciousnesses within them going about their business independently of the human consciousness.

What you said here made me think of what a functionalist named Simon DeDeo in the field of complex systems said here, http://preposterousuniverse.com/naturalism2012/video.html . Watch from 30:00 to 36:15 in the first video, and he talks about how he has come to problems such as "what is it like to be a conversation". He mentions how mental states really just reduce down to computations. And as long as there are processes with the same functional roles as in the brain, there will be similar mental states.

I like that guy. Moving on- I still don't see a soccer ball, with its function roll, functioning the same as a serotonin molecule.

I suppose you were aiming for the joke about a soccer ball's function "roll" all along, and I just got it. <- quick on a pun, slow on a roll...

 

[Juma]

So, you're saying that the soccer ball will have the exact same function as a serotonin molecule, having all the behaviors of serotonin, even being called a serotonin molecule (since this is part of the functional behavior of the serotonin molecule). It would also have to relate to the other "soccer ball molecules" around it in the exact same ways as the various lipids, proteins, etc. behave within our brains, or ultimately the conscious experience of the soccer ball brain you and the natural brain you would diverge.

In fact, if we saw that our consciousness was made up of a bunch of soccer balls, that would be a totally different experience than what we have today: we could actually detect soccer balls (they are rather large), and if the earth had as many soccer balls in it as atoms in all the brains of all the humans on earth... well.. Stuff would be different.

The point was that *if* the soccer balls could serve as a function for something, then there may be a conscious experience.

Anyway- you brought up functionalism in response to the following quote, which doesn't really seem to be encapsulated by functionalism at all, as far as I can tell now that the soccer ball argument has gone the way it went:

A person also is not conscious while asleep, or unconscious. Doesn't mean there aren't various consciousnesses within them going about their business independently of the human consciousness.

What you said here made me think of what a functionalist named Simon DeDeo in the field of complex systems said here, http://preposterousuniverse.com/naturalism2012/video.html . Watch from 30:00 to 36:15 in the first video, and he talks about how he has come to problems such as "what is it like to be a conversation". He mentions how mental states really just reduce down to computations. And as long as there are processes with the same functional roles as in the brain, there will be similar mental states.

Exactly. But note that doesnt say anything about the SE. Using a cinema allegory: It is like workkng out the logic of the script but not tge projector.

 

[ryan]

Anyway- you brought up functionalism in response to the following quote, which doesn't really seem to be encapsulated by functionalism at all, as far as I can tell now that the soccer ball argument has gone the way it went:

A person also is not conscious while asleep, or unconscious. Doesn't mean there aren't various consciousnesses within them going about their business independently of the human consciousness.

What you said here made me think of what a functionalist named Simon DeDeo in the field of complex systems said here, http://preposterousuniverse.com/naturalism2012/video.html . Watch from 30:00 to 36:15 in the first video, and he talks about how he has come to problems such as "what is it like to be a conversation". He mentions how mental states really just reduce down to computations. And as long as there are processes with the same functional roles as in the brain, there will be similar mental states.

I like that guy. Moving on- I still don't see a soccer ball, with its function roll, functioning the same as a serotonin molecule.

I suppose you were aiming for the joke about a soccer ball's function "roll" all along, and I just got it. <- quick on a pun, slow on a roll...

You're still caught up on a different issue. The point that I was trying to make assumed that it is possible for a soccer balls to function as some parts of the body; I was not concerned on whether it could or not. Simon DeDeo used silicon chips as an example; I used soccer balls to really stress the strange implications that functionalism might have.

 

[ryan]

The point was that *if* the soccer balls could serve as a function for something, then there may be a conscious experience.

Anyway- you brought up functionalism in response to the following quote, which doesn't really seem to be encapsulated by functionalism at all, as far as I can tell now that the soccer ball argument has gone the way it went:

A person also is not conscious while asleep, or unconscious. Doesn't mean there aren't various consciousnesses within them going about their business independently of the human consciousness.

What you said here made me think of what a functionalist named Simon DeDeo in the field of complex systems said here, http://preposterousuniverse.com/naturalism2012/video.html . Watch from 30:00 to 36:15 in the first video, and he talks about how he has come to problems such as "what is it like to be a conversation". He mentions how mental states really just reduce down to computations. And as long as there are processes with the same functional roles as in the brain, there will be similar mental states.

Exactly. But note that doesnt say anything about the SE. Using a cinema allegory: It is like workkng out the logic of the script but not tge projector.

No, Simon was talking about mental states and what it would be like to be these similar processes.

 

[Juma]

The point was that *if* the soccer balls could serve as a function for something, then there may be a conscious experience.

Anyway- you brought up functionalism in response to the following quote, which doesn't really seem to be encapsulated by functionalism at all, as far as I can tell now that the soccer ball argument has gone the way it went:

A person also is not conscious while asleep, or unconscious. Doesn't mean there aren't various consciousnesses within them going about their business independently of the human consciousness.

What you said here made me think of what a functionalist named Simon DeDeo in the field of complex systems said here, http://preposterousuniverse.com/naturalism2012/video.html . Watch from 30:00 to 36:15 in the first video, and he talks about how he has come to problems such as "what is it like to be a conversation". He mentions how mental states really just reduce down to computations. And as long as there are processes with the same functional roles as in the brain, there will be similar mental states.

Exactly. But note that doesnt say anything about the SE. Using a cinema allegory: It is like workkng out the logic of the script but not tge projector.

No, Simon was talking about mental states and what it would be like to be these similar processes.

Yes? SE is not same as being.

 

[ryan]

Yes? SE is not same as being.

To sense is to be. In other words, if you are sensing, you are being.

 

[ryan]

My irritation is a function of your post.

Your sense of irritation is material response to the information content of what you read, increased heart rate, respiration, agitation, etc.

I agree, but don't forget about the dual aspect of it, namely the conscious experience.

 

[Juma]

Yes? SE is not same as being.

To sense is to be. In other words, if you are sensing, you are being.

Nope. Your self and the experience of it is not the same thing.

 

[ryan]

To sense is to be. In other words, if you are sensing, you are being.

Nope. Your self and the experience of it is not the same thing.

When someone asks "what is it like to be him", sensual experience is part of what it's like to be someone/something. Sure there are also memories, will (possibly), tendencies etc.

I don't even know why we are arguing. Are you against functionalism, or what is your main issue?

 

[Juma]

When someone asks "what is it like to be him", sensual experience is part of what it's like to be someone/something. Sure there are also memories, will (possibly), tendencies etc.

No. All that is the content of SE, not SE.

 

[ryan]

When someone asks "what is it like to be him", sensual experience is part of what it's like to be someone/something. Sure there are also memories, will (possibly), tendencies etc.

No. All that is the content of SE, not SE.

To be sensing is to be. I agree that being is not necessarily sensing, but sensing is necessarily being. People are not usually specific when they say what it's like to be me, but it is understood that sensory experience is part of what they mean.